Collingham v. Northfield Hospital and Clinics

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota April 25, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

John Collingham, et al., Case No. 21-CV-2466 (JMB/DLM)

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

Northfield Hospital and Clinics,

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc.
No. 105) by which Plaintiffs seek the Court’s leave to file a third amended complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. For the reasons addressed below, the Court
denies Plaintiffs’ motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs1 are former employees of Defendant Northfield Hospital and Clinics
(Northfield). (Doc. No. 46 ¶ 2.) In August 2021, Northfield implemented a vaccination
policy requiring all employees to be fully vaccinated against COVID‐19 on or before
October 1, 2021. (Id. ¶ 19); (Doc. No. 123-3.) The vaccination policy allowed employees
to request medical or religious exemptions. (Doc. No. 46 ¶ 19.) Each Plaintiff to this
action requested a medical or religious exemption (or both), and Northfield denied each

1 The Court has been notified that six of the original plaintiffs have resolved their claims
through settlement. (Doc. No. 134.) The Court will not dismiss those plaintiffs, however,
until the Parties file the requisite stipulation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41.
Plaintiff’s request. (See generally Id. ¶¶ 20–40.) Because Plaintiffs were not exempted
from the vaccination policy and because Plaintiffs thereafter refused to get vaccinated

against COVID-19 as required by the vaccination policy, Plaintiffs either resigned or
Northfield terminated their employment. (Id.)
On June 6, 2022, approximately seven months after initiating this action and with
Northfield’s written consent, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint.2 The Second
Amended Complaint asserts the following claims against Northfield and the City of
Northfield (the City): religious discrimination and failure to accommodate under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count I); disability discrimination and failure to
accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213
(ADA) (Count II); disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the
Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subds. 1, 6 (MHRA) (Count III);
Deprivation of Rights under Color of State Law under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

 (Count IV);3 

breach-of-contract (Count V); and failure to pay wages under

Minn. Stat. §§ 181.13

 and 
181.14 (Count VI).  (See generally Doc. No. 46.)  Northfield filed its Answer to the Second 
Amended Complaint on July 22, 2022.  (Doc. No. 55).                       



2 Plaintiffs’ Complaint and First Amended Complaint included additional claims and 
defendants.  (Doc. Nos. 1, 4.)  On May 17, 2022, the Court granted defendants’ motions to 
dismiss.  (Doc. Nos. 25, 31, 44.)  The Second Amended Complaint followed.  (Doc. No. 
46.)                                                                      

3 The parties subsequently stipulated to the dismissal of Count IV, leaving Northfield as 
the sole remaining defendant.  (Doc. Nos. 52, 54.)                        
    According to the Scheduling Order in this case, the deadline for further amendments 
to the pleadings was November 30, 2022.  (Doc. No. 59 at 3.)  Nevertheless, on January 2, 

2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion seeking leave to amend their pleadings for a third 
time.  (Doc. No. 105.)                                                    
                          DISCUSSION                                     
    Plaintiffs request the Court’s permission under Rule 15(a) to file a third amended 
complaint in order to add a seventh claim against Northfield: religious discrimination and 
failure to accommodate under the MHRA.  (Doc. No. 107 at 4); see generally Minn. Stat. 

§ 363A.08.  Northfield opposes the motion, arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to establish 
the required “good cause” under Rule 16(b) to amend the pleadings after the time for 
amendment has passed.  (Doc. No. 126 at 6.)                               
    Rule 15(a)(2) provides that, absent prejudice to a non-moving party, the court 
should “freely give leave” to amend the pleadings “when justice so requires.”  Roberson v. 

Hayti Police Dep’t.,

241 F.3d 992, 995

 (8th Cir. 2001).  However, when a party moves for 
leave  to  amend  the  pleadings  under  Rule  15(a)  outside  of  the  time  permitted  by  a 
scheduling order “requires a showing of good cause” pursuant to Rule 16.  Williams v. 
TESCO Servs., Inc.,

719 F.3d 968, 977

 (8th Cir. 2013); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).  This 
good-cause requirement “is not optional.”  Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc.,

532 F.3d 709, 716

 (8th Cir. 2008).                                                 
    “The interplay between Rule 15(a) and Rule 16(b) is settled in this circuit.”

Id.

  The 
Court may engage in the Rule 15(a) analysis only after resolving whether good cause exists 
to amend a scheduling order.  Shank v. Carleton Coll.,

329 F.R.D. 610

, 614 (D. Minn. 
2019).  Stated another way, “Rule 16 opens the door to Rule 15.”

Id.

  This is a more 
stringent standard than in Rule 15.  See Bradford v. DANA Corp.,

249 F.3d 807, 809

 (8th 
Cir. 2001) (calling the good-cause standard “less forgiving”).4           

    As noted, the Scheduling Order set November 30, 2022, as the deadline to amend 
the pleadings.  (Doc. No. 59 at 3.)  Plaintiffs brought this motion on January 2, 2024—13 
months after the Scheduling Order’s deadline.  (Doc. No. 105.)  Accordingly, Plaintiffs are 
required to show good cause for their delay.  Plaintiffs, however, do not explicitly address 
the “good cause” standard under Rule 16(b) in their written submission to the Court.  (Doc. 

No. 107.)  Although the Court could deny the motion on this basis alone, the Court 
nevertheless addresses whether good cause exists.  See Sherman,

532 F.3d at 719, 724

. 
    To determine good cause, courts analyze “the movant’s diligence in attempting to 
meet the [scheduling] order’s requirements.”  Harris v. FedEx Nat’l LTL, Inc.,

760 F.3d 780, 786

 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Albright ex rel. Doe v. Mountain Home Sch. Dist.,

926 F.3d 942, 951

 (8th Cir. 2019) (“The primary measure of good cause is the movant’s 
diligence in attempting to meet deadlines.” (quotation omitted)).  Evidence of good cause 
could be “a change in the law, newly discovered facts, or another significant changed 
circumstance that requires amendment of a party’s pleading.”  Ellingsworth v. Vermeer 
Mfg. Co.,

949 F.3d 1097, 1100

 (8th Cir. 2020).  A movant must also demonstrate that, 


4 Plaintiffs focus almost entirely on an argument that the requested amendment would not 
prejudice Northfield.  (Doc. No. 107 at 5–7.)  Contrary to this argument, however, and 
pursuant to Rule 16, courts must first consider whether the moving party acted diligently.  
Sherman, 532 F.3d at 716–17; see also Hartis v. Chi. Title Ins. Co.,

694 F.3d 935, 948

 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (“[Courts] generally will not consider prejudice [to the nonmovant] if the 
movant has not been diligent in meeting the scheduling order’s deadlines.”). 
despite diligence, the proposed claims could not have been reasonably sought in a timely 
manner.  Sherman, 532 F.3d at 716–17.                                     

    Here, Plaintiffs generally assert that their motion is based on “a recent clarification 
of the law,” and that they brought this motion “as soon as [they] became aware of” two 
decisions in this District.  (Doc. No. 107 at 3–4, 6.); see Lee v. Seasons Hospice, No. 22-
CV-1593 (PJS/DJF),

2023 WL 6387794

 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2023); Witham v. Hershey 
Co., No. 23-CV-1563 (ECT/JFD),

2023 WL 8702627

 (D. Minn. Dec. 15, 2023).  The Court 
is not convinced that this assertion satisfies the diligence requirement for three reasons. 

    First, the proposed amendment is not based on a change in the law.  As Plaintiffs 
acknowledge, neither of the two cited decisions binds the Court in this case.  Similarly, 
neither  decision  changed  or  developed  the  applicable  law.    Instead,  the  proposed 
amendment is based on a change in Plaintiffs’ assessment of the merits of a claim that 
could have been brought all along.  In other words, the amendment reflects a change in 

litigation strategy, which is insufficient to establish good cause.  See Ellingsworth,

949 F.3d at 1100

; Schnuck Mkts., Inc. v. First Data Merch. Servs. Corp.,

852 F.3d 732, 740

 
(8th  Cir.  2017)  (affirming  denial  of  motion  to  amend because the  “[d]efendants are 
responsible for pleading their case without the Court’s assistance” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Sherman,

532 F.3d at 718

 (explaining that a diligent party “would have 

performed this research at the outset of the litigation, and at least prior to the scheduled 
deadline”); Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc.,

133 F.3d 1417

, 1419 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming 
denial of motion to amend because “the information supporting the proposed amendment 
to the complaint was available to Sosa even before she filed suit”).      
    Second, the amendment is also not based on any change in facts.  Plaintiffs assert 
that the proposed MHRA claim “is virtually, or even exactly, identical” to their failure to 

accommodate claims under Title VII and that “[t]he discovery already conducted by 
Defendant on this issue will exactly address any [MHRA] claim . . . .”  (Doc. No. 107 at 
5.)  In making this argument, Plaintiffs necessarily concede that they had all the necessary 
facts  to  bring  the  proposed  MHRA  claim  when  they  commenced  this  litigation  on 
November 8, 2021, and when they filed the Second Amended Complaint on June 6, 2022. 
    Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Plaintiffs provide no explanation as to why 

they were precluded from bringing the proposed MHRA claim prior to the Scheduling 
Order’s deadline.  Nor do Plaintiffs explain the steps they took to diligently pursue the 
proposed MHRA claim before the deadline.  Absent any legal or factual changes and 
without some description of the steps Plaintiffs took to satisfy the diligence requirement, 
the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to show good cause for filing this motion 

after the deadline in the Scheduling Order.

ORDER

    Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. No. 105) is 
DENIED.                                                                   


Dated:  April 25, 2024                  /s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan              
                                       Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan            
                                       United States District Court