Crow v. Rasmussen
U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota
Crow v. Rasmussen
Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Johnny James Crow, No. 23-cv-2403 (KMM/TNL)
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER
Eric Lee Rasmussen, Andrew Timothy
Ruden, and The City of Minneapolis,
Defendants.
This case arises out of the mistaken and unfortunate detention of Johnny Crow by officers
of the Minneapolis Police Department. Mr. Crow brought this two-count action against the City
of Minneapolis (“the City”) and Minneapolis Police Officers Eric Lee Rasmussen and Andrew
Timothy Ruden (“the Officers”). The Complaint raises a 42 U.S.C. § 1983claim for excessive force and unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment. Compl. (Doc. 1). It also includes a Minnesota state law claim for false arrest.Id.
The Defendants
answered the Complaint and now move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c).
Ans., (Doc. 7); Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 15). The Defendants argue that Mr. Crow’s detention did not
constitute an arrest and that he was not subjected to excessive force, while also arguing that the
Officers and the City are protected by both qualified and official immunity. The Court heard oral
argument on Defendants’ Motion on December 14, 2023. For the reasons that follow, the Court
grants Defendants’ Motion.
I. Background1
On November 9, 2022, Mr. Crow was sitting in his red Toyota Corolla at a Minneapolis
gas station. Compl. ¶ 7; Ex. 1 at 0:49 (Doc. 8). Minneapolis Police Officers Rasmussen and Ruden
pulled up behind Crow and activated their emergency lights. Compl. ¶¶ 9–10. As the Officers
arrived, Officer Ruden accessed a data system in the patrol car. Ex. 1 at 0:01; Ex. 2 at 0:01 (Doc. 8).
This system provided officers with National Crime Information Center (NCIC) information about
the car, including its connection to both Mr. Crow and Narcisse Redkettle. The NCIC information
indicated that there was an open valid warrant for Mr. Redkettle for “5th degree drugs,” described
him as a “wanted person,” and stated “caution combative.” Ex. 3 (Doc. 9). The system also
identified Mr. Redkettle as five foot eleven inches tall, 160 pounds, and with scars on his face,
forehead, left calf, left hand, and left wrist. Id.It included a long list of aliases for Mr. Redkettle, one of which is Johnny James Crow.Id.
The Officers approached Mr. Crow’s car and ordered him to step out of his vehicle, face
away from the Officers, and place his hands behind his back. Compl. ¶¶ 11–12; Ex. 1 at 0:50.
Mr. Crow complied with all of the Officers’ commands. Id. He asked the Officers what is going
on, but received no response. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 16; Ex. 1 at 0:59. As the officers began to place
Mr. Crow in handcuffs, they asked if he was the registered owner of the car. Compl. ¶ 14; Ex. 1 at
1:00. Mr. Crow responded that he is Johnny Crow. Compl. ¶ 15; Ex. 1 at 1:02. Officer Rasmussen
asked if the name is Redkettle, to which Mr. Crow responded, “No. Crow, Johnny Crow.” Compl.
¶ 17; Ex. 1 at 1:05. Officer Rasmussen hesitantly acknowledged the response before continuing to
handcuff Crow. Ex. 1 at 1:08. Officer Ruden stated that the Officers would check his identification
1 The facts in this section are taken from both the allegations in the Complaint as well as
body-worn video footage of the incident. See infra Part II.B for discussion on the inclusion of the
body-worn video footage.
and asked Crow if he owned the vehicle. Mr. Crow confirmed that he did. Id. at 1:10. Officer Rasmussen stated that the car was registered to someone with multiple felony warrants with the name Redkettle.Id. at 1:14
. Mr. Crow confirmed that he has relatives with that last name.
Compl. ¶ 18; Ex. 1 at 1:22. Mr. Crow told the Officers that his identification was in his wallet in
his car, and where they could find it. Compl. ¶ 19; Ex. 1 at 1:26.
As the Officers escorted a handcuffed Mr. Crow to their patrol vehicle, they told him they
would confirm whether he was the person with the warrant. Ex. 1 at 1:28. Mr. Crow responded
that he understood and reiterated that he has relatives with felonies. Id. at 1:33. He said that “this is messed up.”Id.
The Officers patted Mr. Crow down and confirmed that he did not have any
weapons. Compl. ¶ 21; Ex. 1 at 1:39. Mr. Crow expressed his confusion about why his car would
have warrants linked to it and told the Officers that he has relatives with the last name Redkettle
that he did not associate with. Ex. 1 at 1:47. The Officers placed Mr. Crow in the backseat of their
patrol car, noting how small it is, and closed the door. Compl. ¶ 22; Ex. 2 at 2:17. Mr. Crow
remained handcuffed throughout this encounter.
Next, Officer Rasmussen again accessed the data system in the patrol car’s on-board laptop
computer. Ex. 1 at 2:13. As he did so, Officer Ruden returned to Mr. Crow’s vehicle, retrieved
Crow’s identification from his gym bag, and eventually reviewed it against the data system in the
patrol car. Ex. 2 at 2:39. The NCIC system listed Mr. Crow as six feet tall and 180 pounds. Ex. 3.
After reviewing the NCIC information further, Officer Rasmussen opened the rear passenger door
of the patrol car and asked Mr. Crow if he knows Narcisse Redkettle. Ex. 1 at 2:59. Mr. Crow
explained that Redkettle is his cousin and has used Mr. Crow’s name in the past. Id.at 3:04–07. During this discussion, Mr. Crow is visibly physically uncomfortable sitting with his hands behind his back in the patrol car.Id. at 3:38
. The Officers talked further with Mr. Crow and determined
that he was not the subject of the open warrant. Compl. ¶ 23; Ex. 1 at 3:50. As the Officers assisted
Mr. Crow out of the car, he grimaced and groaned in discomfort. Ex. 1 at 3:56. Mr. Crow was in
the squad car for less than two minutes. Ex. 1 at 3:59; Ex. 2 at 2:08–3:57. Officer Rasmussen
apologized to Mr. Crow twice and unlocked the handcuffs. Compl. ¶ 24; Ex. 1 at 3:56. Mr. Crow
was handcuffed for less than three minutes. The Officers told Mr. Crow that he was free to go and
that he should contact the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension to remove the connection
of Mr. Redkettle’s warrants from his car. Compl. ¶ 25; Ex. 1 at 4:32. The entire encounter lasted
less than five minutes.
Based on these events, Mr. Crow claims that the Officers violated his constitutional right
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and engaged in conduct amounting to the common-
law tort of false arrest. Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
II. Analysis
A. Standard
A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is reviewed under the same
standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Clemons v. Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119, 1124(8th Cir. 2009). The distinction between a Rule 12(c) motion and a 12(b)(6) motion is “purely formal.” Westcott v. City of Omaha,901 F.2d 1486, 1488
(8th Cir. 1990).
To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual allegations to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Smithrud v. City
of St. Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 397(8th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). The facts alleged in the complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Twombly,550 U.S. at 555
). When considering a motion to dismiss, the court takes all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff. Usenko v. MEMC LLC,926 F.3d 468, 472
(8th Cir. 2019). However, the court does not take as true wholly conclusory allegations or the legal arguments offered by the plaintiff. Hager v. Ark. Dep’t of Health,735 F.3d 1009, 1013
(8th Cir. 2013).
B. Record Before the Court
Defendants filed four exhibits along with their Answer. Exhibits 1 and 2 are footage of the
incident recorded on the Officers’ body-worn cameras. Exhibit 3 is an “Incident Detail Report,”
which is a printout of the NCIC information available to the officers at the time of the arrest.
Finally, Exhibit 4 includes the police reports prepared by Officers Rasmussen and Ruden following
the incident. For the following reasons, Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 will be considered for purposes of this
motion, while Exhibit 4 will not be.
“When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings (or a motion to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)), the court generally must ignore materials outside of the pleadings. . . .”
Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079(8th Cir. 1999). However, the court may consider materials that (1) are “part of the public record,” (2) “do not contradict the complaint,” or (3) are “necessarily embraced by the pleadings.”Id.
(quotations omitted) (citing Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe,164 F.3d 1102
, 1107 (8th Cir. 1999); and Piper Jaffray Cos. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.,967 F. Supp. 1148, 1152
(D. Minn. 1997)). Consideration of these narrow categories of materials does not operate to convert the motion to one for summary judgment. Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc.,323 F.3d 695
, 697 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003).
The Court begins with the Officers’ body-worn video. Where their authenticity and
completeness are not in dispute, the Eighth Circuit and courts from this District have routinely
held that body-worn videos like the ones here are “embraced by the pleadings” and proper to
consider on a motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings. E.g., LeMay v. Mays, 18
F.4th 283, 289(8th Cir. 2021); Ching v. City of Minneapolis,73 F.4th 617, 621
(8th Cir. 2023); Anderson v. St. Luke’s Hospital, No. 19-cv-106 (MJD/LIB),2019 WL 7882118
, at *3 n.5 (D. Minn. Nov. 19, 2019); Verino v. Higgins, No. 19-cv-3024 (DWF/LIB),2020 WL 3542757
, at *1 n.1 (D. Minn. June 30, 2020). The court does not need to “adopt the plaintiff’s version of the facts if they are blatantly contradicted by video evidence.” Waters v. Madson,921 F.3d 725, 734
(8th
Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Here, Mr. Crow not only does not dispute the authenticity or completeness
of the body-worn video, but he also cites the video in his opposition. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3 (Doc. 21).
Therefore, the Court finds Defendants’ Exhibits 1 and 2 are embraced by the pleadings and
considers them for purposes of this motion.
The Court will similarly consider the Incident Detail Report in Exhibit 3 because it is also
embraced by the pleadings. The Incident Detail Report shows what information was available to
the Officers from the NCIC system about Mr. Crow’s car during the time of the incident.2 This
includes information about Mr. Crow and his connection to the vehicle; it links Mr. Redkettle to
the vehicle; it states that Redkettle is a “wanted person”; it identifies that there is an active warrant
for “5th degree drugs” for Mr. Redkettle; and it includes a warning about Redkettle that states
“caution combative.” Ex. 3 at 2. The system also identifies Mr. Redkettle as being five foot eleven
2 An Incident Detail Report is an auto-generated document that shows when and how the
Officers engaged with the NCIC system and what information was shown to them during their
engagement. Unlike the police reports offered by Defendants, it includes no narrative elements.
Instead it contains only a readout of the information from the NCIC system that the Officers
accessed just before they pulled up behind Mr. Crow’s vehicle and after they returned to the patrol
car to verify his identity.
inches tall, weighing 160 pounds, and having scars on his face, forehead, left calf, left hand, and
left wrist. Id.It also states that Johnny James Crow is a known alias used by Mr. Redkettle.Id.
Here, nothing in Exhibit 3 is extraneous to or contradicts the Complaint—indeed the
information in Exhibit 3 is embraced by the pleadings because the only reasonable inference to be
drawn from the video footage of the encounter and the allegations in the Complaint is that the
Officers consulted the NCIC information contained in the Incident Detail Report before they
engaged with Mr. Crow. As seen in the body-worn video, the Officers navigated through a database
on their patrol car computer as they pulled into the gas station parking lot behind Mr. Crow’s
sedan. Ex. 1 at 0:01; Ex. 2 at 0:01. As the Officers began to detain Mr. Crow, they questioned if
he goes by the name Redkettle. Compl. ¶ 17; Ex. 1 at 1:05. The Officers then stated that the car is
connected to someone who has active felony warrants. Ex. 1 at 1:14. This sequence of events
reveals virtually no possibility except that the Officers consulted the NCIC system before engaging
with Mr. Crow. Further, like Exhibits 1 and 2, Mr. Crow relies on these facts in his characterization
of the incident. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2–3. Therefore, the Court finds Exhibit 3 is embraced by the
pleadings and will be considered for purposes of this motion.
The Court reaches the opposite conclusion about the police reports in Exhibit 4. The Court
need not determine whether the reports are “necessarily embraced by the pleadings” because even
if they were, the Court may not consider them for the truth of the matters asserted. LeMay, 18 F.4th
at 289. In LeMay, the Eighth Circuit declined to consider a police report of the incident at issue at the motion-to-dismiss stage because the defendant did “not simply want [the court] to consider the police report’s existence. He also want[ed the court] to accept its narrative as truth.”Id.
This is
what the Defendants seek to do here. The reports primarily provide the Officers’ narrative
recounting of the incident. Ex. 4 (Doc. 12). Defendants refer to these reports multiple times in their
reply brief to support factual assertions about how the NCIC information impacted the Officers’
thinking. Defs.’ Reply at 7, 9–11 (Doc. 24). This effort to have the Court consider the police reports
for the truth of the matters asserted therein is rejected, and the Court will not consider Exhibit 4 in
determining the instant motion.
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim
In Count One of his Complaint, Mr. Crow alleges a § 1983 claim against the Defendants
for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He claims that the conduct of the
Officers amounts to excessive force and unlawful arrest. The Court begins with the excessive force
claim.
1. Excessive Force and the Terry Stop
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. The Supreme Court held in Terry v. Ohio that law enforcement officers can make
“brief, investigatory stop[s]” within certain limits. 392 U.S. 1(1968). Terry created a two-part inquiry into (1) whether, at the outset, the investigatory stop was lawful, and (2) whether the manner of the stop “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”Id.
at 19–20. First, a Terry stop is lawful at the outset if the officer has “reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts” that some criminal activity may exist. United States v. Sokolow,490 U.S. 1, 7
(1989) (citing Terry,392 U.S. at 30
). Second, even if the investigatory stop itself is reasonably supported, the manner of the stop “may nonetheless violate the Fourth Amendment if it is excessively intrusive in its scope or manner of execution.” El- Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume,636 F.3d 452, 457
(8th Cir. 2011).
Excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment are based on a reasonableness
standard. Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497, 502(8th Cir. 2006). “An officer’s use of force violates the Fourth Amendment if it was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Pollreis v. Marzolf,9 F.4th 737, 747
(8th Cir. 2021) (citing Graham v. Connor,490 U.S. 386
, 394–96 (1989)). Objective reasonableness is assessed “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham,490 U.S. at 396
. Reasonableness is based on the factual circumstances of each case, including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers” and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest. . . .” Pollreis,9 F.4th at 747
(quoting Graham,490 U.S. at 396
).
During a Terry stop, law enforcement is allowed to use “some degree of physical coercion”
toward their investigatory ends. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The Eighth Circuit has held that in certain circumstances police officers may reasonably use handcuffs and place a suspect in a police patrol car during Terry stops. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez,462 F.3d 903, 907
(8th Cir. 2006) (finding that placing the handcuffed suspect in the patrol car and transporting him to the scene of a bank robbery for a show-up identification did not transform a Terry stop into an arrest); United States v. Maltais,403 F.3d 550, 553
, 55–56 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding stop remained within bounds of Terry where suspect held in patrol car for at least 90 minutes while officer investigated whether suspect was a member of a drug smuggling operation); United States v. Navarrete-Barron,192 F.3d 786, 791
(8th Cir. 1999) (explaining that law enforcement can place the subject of a Terry stop in their patrol car if “reasonably necessary” to maintain the status quo or for police safety). To use handcuffs, the Fourth Amendment requires “some reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous or that the restraints are necessary for some other legitimate purpose, evaluated on the facts of each case.” El-Ghazzawy,636 F.3d at 457
(quoting Bennett v. City of Eastpointe,410 F.3d 810, 836
(6th Cir. 2005)). However, handcuffing a suspect “absent any
concern for safety” violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 460.
Mr. Crow’s excessive force arguments implicate the second prong of the analysis of
whether a Terry stop is valid.3 He alleges that the Officers used excessive force by handcuffing
him and placing him in the patrol car during his detention. Mr. Crow argues that the Officers
should have known that he was not Mr. Redkettle and that he did not pose any type of threat to the
Officers because he was compliant. Therefore, Mr. Crow argues the Officers’ use of handcuffs and
his placement in the patrol car was unreasonable and excessive. Pl.’s Opp’n at 6–9. As explained
below, the Court concludes the Defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings with respect
to this claim.
Under the circumstances presented here, the Officers’ use of handcuffs and their decision
to place Mr. Crow in their patrol car while they completed a brief investigation was reasonably
necessary. Although Mr. Crow asserts that the Officers had no justification for using handcuffs
because he was compliant, presented no safety threat, identified himself as Mr. Crow and not
Mr. Redkettle, and the Officers’ pat down found no weapons, he overlooks other information
available to Officers Rasmussen and Ruden that provided objective safety concerns from the
perspective of an officer on the scene. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (“Reasonableness is assessed
‘from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.’”). At the time of the detention, the Officers understood Mr. Crow’s car to be connected
3 There is no dispute that the Officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to make the
Terry stop. The Officers ran Mr. Crow’s license plate, which returned NCIC information that a
person associated with the car, Narcisse Redkettle, had an active 5th degree drug warrant for his
arrest. Ex. 3. The report further indicated that that person was a “wanted person.” Id.This rises to the level of reasonable articulable suspicion for a lawful Terry stop of Mr. Crow and nowhere in Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings did does he contest this point. to Narcisse Redkettle, a “wanted person” who had at least one active drug warrant for his arrest. The NCIC information also cautioned that Redkettle was known to be “combative,” which is not a scenario in which the “officers [had] no objective concerns for safety. . . .” El-Ghazzawy,636 F.3d at 460
. Further, when Mr. Crow verbally identified himself, that also confirmed what at the
moment the Officers knew to be one of the many aliases used by Mr. Redkettle. And as the Officers
stated on the scene, they were going to—and did—investigate the discrepancy between the name
Mr. Crow gave them and the name associated with the warrant once they placed Mr. Crow in the
patrol car, where he stayed for less than two minutes. Ex. 1 at 1:10, 1:28, 3:59; Ex. 2 at 2:08, 3:57.
From these circumstances, the Officers could reasonably have believed that the use of handcuffs
and patrol car was necessary for public or officer safety.
Mr. Crow argues that the Eighth Circui’s decision in El-Ghazzawy clearly established that
the Officers’ use of handcuffs under these circumstances was unreasonable. But El-Ghazzawy is
easily distinguishable. In that case, Karim El-Ghazzawy collected and sold wrist watches to a pawn
shop on several occasions. A store manager believed that one of the watches El-Ghazzawy sold
was a fake. The next time El-Ghazzawy returned to sell more watches to the shop, the manager
contacted the police. 636 F.3d at 454–55. When the officer arrived on the scene, she handcuffed
El-Ghazzawy before “even the most basic investigation” was undertaken for an alleged crime that
did not raise a concern about him being armed or dangerous. Id.The Eighth Circuit noted that the officer failed to point to any specific facts that supported her concern for officer safety.Id.
at 458–
59.
This case is unlike El-Ghazzawy in meaningful ways. Here, the body-cam video shows that
the Officers consulted the NCIC system before stopping Mr. Crow. Ex. 1 at 0:01; Ex. 2 at 0:01;
Ex. 3. In the system they found an active warrant for a man linked to Mr. Crow’s vehicle. The
NCIC report warned officers that Redkettle was considered “combative” and listed an active
warrant for the possession of drugs, which the Eight Circuit has held creates a reasonable belief
the suspect may be armed and dangerous. Id.; Haynes v. Minnehan, 14 F.4th 830, 836(8th Cir. 2021); United States v. Johnson,528 F.3d 575, 580
(8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Navarrete- Barron,192 F.3d 786, 791
(8th Cir. 1999). Additionally, identifying himself as Mr. Crow only
confirmed what Rasmussen and Ruden knew to be an alias for Redkettle. Mr. Crow did everything
that was asked of him by the Officers, staying admirably calm and compliant amidst an uncertain
situation. But, the information available to the Officers provided a reasonable basis for their use
of handcuffs and decision to place Mr. Crow in the patrol vehicle to maintain the status quo while
they completed their investigation.
Mr. Crow disputes that the Officers saw the “caution combative” comment on the NCIC
report, suggesting that it is reasonable to infer that the Officers did not read that part of the
information reflected in the Incident Detail Report. Pl.’s Opp’n at 7–8. The Court disagrees—to
draw such an inference would be unreasonable in light of the encounter captured on the body-cam
video. The Incident Detail Report shows that the “caution combative” line on the NCIC report fell
between Mr. Redkettle’s physical description and the details of his open warrant above and his list
of known aliases below. If the Officers knew at the time of the stop the information that straddled
it, it is not reasonable to conclude that the Officers did not see the “caution combative” comment
in the NCIC system.
Similarly, Mr. Crow contends that the inclusion of “combative” in the NCIC system does
not necessarily mean that Redkettle is prone to violence, but rather that he has an “argumentative
demeanor.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. That construction contradicts both the plain language and most
natural police-related use of the word. The average person would use combative to mean physical
adversariness. Combative, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/combative (last visited Mar. 25, 2024) (defining “combative” as “marked
by eagerness to fight or contend”). In the police context, that use seems even more likely. While a
“fight” could also mean a verbal altercation, it does not follow that the police would use
“combative” to describe a suspect they verbally disagree with. In total, the Officers made a
constitutionally valid Terry stop and did not use excessive force during Mr. Crow’s detention.
2. De Facto Arrest
Next, Mr. Crow contends that his detention turned from a Terry stop into a de facto arrest,
which was unconstitutionally made without probable cause. Pl.’s Opp’n at 9–11. However, the
Court concludes that it is unnecessary to determine whether the Officers had probable cause to
arrest Mr. Crow because the Terry stop in this case never became an arrest.
The Eighth Circuit has held that “‘an action tantamount to arrest has taken place if the
officers’ conduct is more intrusive than necessary for an investigative stop.’” United States v.
Raino, 980 F.2d 1148, 1149(8th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Rose,731 F.2d 1337, 1342
(8th Cir. 1984)) (brackets removed). Specifically, a lawful Terry stop “may become an arrest, requiring probable cause, ‘if the stop lasts for an unreasonably long time or if officers use unreasonable force.’” United States v. Newell,596 F.3d 876, 879
(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Navarrete–Barron,192 F.3d at 790
). Courts consider an array of factors when determining if an
investigative stop became an arrest, including:
the number of officers and police cars involved, the nature of the
crime and whether there is reason to believe the suspect might be
armed, the strength of the officers’ articulable, objective suspicions,
the erratic behavior of or suspicious movements by the persons
under observation, and the need for immediate action by the officers
and lack of opportunity for them to have made the stop in less
threatening circumstances.
United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 639–40 (8th Cir. 1985).
Mr. Crow maintains that his Terry stop transformed into an arrest without probable cause
because the Officers detained him unreasonably. He argues that the Officers’ actions were more
intrusive than necessary because the facts show that he was compliant with the Officers, they found
no weapons on him and were given no reason to fear for their safety, he told the Officers he was
not Redkettle, and his description did not match the description of Redkettle in the NCIC
information. Pl.’s Opp’n at 10–11. These facts, he contends, in combination with the Officers’ use
of handcuffs and placing him in the patrol car, transformed his Terry stop into an arrest.
The Court disagrees with this analysis. First, the Officers did not detain Mr. Crow for an
“unreasonably long time.” Newell, 596 F.3d at 879. The Supreme Court has held that, while there is no bright line, when asking whether police have detained a suspect for too long to call the encounter a Terry stop, the issue is whether law enforcement “diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.” United States v. Sharpe,470 U.S. 675, 686
(1985); United States v. Morgan,729 F.3d 1086, 1090
(8th Cir. 2013) (“There is no bright line rule”). That is precisely what Officers Rasmussen and Ruden did in this case. The entire encounter lasted less than five minutes. Mr. Crow was in handcuffs for less than three minutes, and he was in the patrol car for less than two minutes. During that brief period, the Officers quickly took steps to confirm whether or not Mr. Crow was the individual with an active warrant identified as Narcisse Redkettle by the NCIC information in their patrol car computer. The Eighth Circuit has routinely held that comparable durations do not transform a Terry stop into an arrest. See Pollreis,9 F.4th 737 at 746
(handcuffing juvenile suspects for two minutes during an entire encounter that lasted seven minutes did not turn Terry stop into an arrest); Irvin v. Richardson,20 F.4th 1199, 1207
(8th Cir. 2021) (handcuffing two suspects for thirteen minutes did not turn stop into an arrest); Chestnut v. Wallace,947 F.3d 1085
, 1087–88 (8th Cir. 2020)
(handcuffing a compliant suspect during a warrant check for twenty minutes, even following a pat-
down that identified no weapons, did not transform stop into an arrest). The Court finds that
Officers Rasmussen and Ruden did not detain Mr. Crow longer than was necessary to correctly
determine his identity, at which point they took him out of the patrol car, removed the handcuffs,
apologized, and told him he was free to go.
The Court is also not persuaded by Mr. Crow’s argument that the investigative detention
turned into an arrest due to the Officers’ alleged use of excessive force. Mr. Crow again highlights
the Officers’ use of handcuffs and placement in the patrol car to this end. Pls.’ Opp’n at 11.
However, as described above, the use of handcuffs under these circumstances was not excessive
force. Where, as here, there is an objective safety concern, law enforcement may detain a suspect
using handcuffs while verifying the person’s identity. See Pollreis, 9 F.4th at 741–42, 744
(handcuffing and frisking two boys before verifying their identities was not unreasonable).
Additionally, in United States v. Lego, the Eighth Circuit held that confining a potentially
dangerous suspect to a patrol car while checking his identification was not tantamount to an arrest.
855 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1988). This precedent reiterates that the Officers’ conduct here did not
constitute excessive force and did not transform Mr. Crow’s stop into an arrest.
Weighing the Jones factors also supports the same conclusion. First, the encounter was not
particularly “police dominated,” as it involved only two officers arriving in one patrol car. Jones,
759 F.2d at 640. Second, the Officers were aware an open warrant for a drug-related crime, which the Eighth Circuit has held creates a reasonable belief the suspect may be armed and dangerous. Haynes,14 F.4th at 836
; Johnson,528 F.3d at 580
; Navarrete-Barron,192 F.3d at 791
. Third, the
Officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to make the stop and were cautioned by the NCIC
information that Redkettle was a wanted person and known to be combative. Factor four weighs
in favor of Mr. Crow, as he was undoubtedly compliant with the Officers and showed no suspicious
or erratic behavior. However, fifth and finally, the opportunity for the Officers to make an arrest
on an open warrant, and doing so with reasonable means, cuts against him. Together, the Jones
factors support the conclusion that the Terry stop of Mr. Crow did not transform into an arrest.
For these reasons, the Court finds that the lawful Terry stop in this case never transformed
into an arrest, and as a result, no showing of probable cause was necessary to justify Mr. Crow’s
brief detention.
3. Mistaken Identity
Mr. Crow additionally argues that the Officers’ mistake of identity gives rise to a Fourth
Amendment violation. Specifically, Mr. Crow contends that the Officers were unreasonable in
mistaking Mr. Crow for Redkettle. Since the car was registered to Mr. Crow alone and he had no
outstanding warrants, he suggests that there is only a “tenuous” connection between Mr. Crow and
Redkettle. Pl.’s Opp’n at 13. But a mistake of identity by law enforcement rarely constitutes a
constitutional violation. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment is generally not
violated when a person is mistakenly detained pursuant to a valid warrant for another individual.
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143–45 (1979). In McCollan, the Court observed that the ultimate innocence of the stopped individual does not suffice to allege a constitutional violation.Id. at 145
.
Critically, there is no Fourth Amendment violation in a case of mistaken identity if law
enforcement had a “reasonable, good faith belief” that the individual they stopped is the suspect
they are pursuing. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802–03 (1971). In Hill v. California, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement did not act unreasonably when arresting a man who fit the description of the individual they had probable cause to arrest, but who identified himself by another name.Id.
Those facts are directly analogous to the circumstances here. The Officers
engaged Mr. Crow under a valid arrest warrant for Redkettle, who was listed as five foot eleven
inches tall and 160 pounds. Mr. Crow is listed as six feet tall and 180 pounds, with only a one-inch
difference in height and twenty pounds in weight from Redkettle. A mistake based on this slight
difference in height and size can hardly be seen as unreasonable. While the NCIC system also
states that Redkettle has scars on his face, forehead, left calf, left hand, and left wrist, Mr. Crow’s
similarity in size and stature—as well as the use of his name as an alias of Redkettle—does not
make the Officers’ mistake unreasonable.
Mr. Crow further asserts that a reasonable officer would have done more to inquire into
Mr. Crow’s identity before detaining him. Pl.’s Opp’n at 12–13. Specifically, Mr. Crow suggests
that the Officers should have investigated the link between the open warrant for Redkettle and
Mr. Crow’s car registration before stopping and detaining him. Id. But the Fourth Amendment
does not impose a duty on law enforcement to fully investigate claims of mistaken identity.
McCollan, 443 U.S. at 145–46. Even a failure to do so does not make the Officers’ mistake
unreasonable, and here there was no such failure.
Even had the brief mistaken identity in this case been negligent, the Eighth Circuit has held
it does not constitute a constitutional violation. Lane v. Sarpy County, 165 F.3d 623(8th Cir. 1999) (summary judgment). In Lane, “the defendants mistakenly arrested and detained plaintiff for approximately six hours, believing him to be a different individual with the same name” for whom they had an arrest warrant.Id.
at 623–24. The Lane court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants because the errors in preparation and execution of the arrest warrant were nothing more than negligent conduct that was insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.Id. at 624
(“Because plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation, defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.”). The Eighth Circuit later affirmed that principle under similar facts to the circumstances here. In Young v. City of Little Rock, Ms. Young was arrested and detained for hours under a warrant issued for her sister-in-law who had used Young’s name as an alias.249 F.3d 730, 732
(8th Cir. 2001). The Eighth Circuit found that the district court properly dismissed any claim against the arresting officer and the dispatching officer who mistakenly verified that there was an arrest warrant for Ms. Young. The Young court held that the mistake was “nothing more than negligence,” citing the conditions surrounding police decision-making, and determined that no § 1983 claim was stated against these officers. Id. at 734 (citing Sarpy County,165 F.3d at 624
and noting that “the mistake was not deliberate [but] was
occasioned, rather, by the press of business and by the speed with which officers . . . were required
to act”).4
Following the rationale of both Lane and Young, and viewing the facts alleged in the light
most favorable to Mr. Crow, Officers Rasmussen and Ruden would at most have been negligent
in initially mistaking him for Redkettle. Nothing in the Complaint, the body-cam video, or in the
NCIC report suggests a reasonable inference that the Officers acted maliciously, intentionally, or
even recklessly in believing that they were making an arrest of the individual who was the subject
of the active warrant linked to the vehicle they saw in the gas station parking lot.
4 Even after Ms. Young was taken to the county jail and the arresting officer and his
superior officer learned of the issue of mistaken identity, they did not immediately release her.
Young, 249 F.3d at 734–35. Still, the Young court disagreed that Ms. Young’s claim regarding this
continued detention should have gone to a jury because “the situation was equivocal.” Id. at 735. The officers had some information indicating that Ms. Young was the subject of a valid warrant and other information indicating that they had made a mistaken arrest, so the court concluded that “an objectively reasonable officer could have decided to wait for a judge to make the final determination,” and as a result, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.Id.
(“[A]
reasonable officer could have thought it reasonable to wait for a judge’s decision.”).
In sum, the Officers’ actions were reasonable under the circumstances and do not plausibly
violate the Fourth Amendment for excessive force, unlawful arrest, or mistaken identity.
Therefore, the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is dismissed.
D. False Arrest Claim
Finally, Mr. Crow brings a common law false arrest claim under Minnesota state law. See
Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 481(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lundeen v. Renteria,224 N.W.2d 132, 135
(1974)). District Courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when they are “so related to” the federal law claims in that action.28 U.S.C. § 1331
, 1367(a). However, a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim when the court dismisses the accompanying federal claims.Id.
§ 1367(c)(3). Here, because the
§ 1983 claim has been dismissed, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the state law
claim. Therefore, the Court dismisses the false arrest claim without prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
Although likely little consolation, it is worth reiterating the Court’s appreciation of
Mr. Crow’s compliance with law enforcement during his mistaken and unfortunate detention.
Mr. Crow was ultimately stopped, handcuffed, and detained due to an error in the police’s NCIC
system. Mr. Crow did nothing wrong and did not deserve such an upsetting—and painful—
incident. There is little doubt that without Mr. Crow’s compliance and calm demeanor this incident
could have resulted in something much more serious.
One more piece of this incident is also worth highlighting: As the Officers released
Mr. Crow and apologized to him, they stated that Mr. Crow should contact the Minnesota Bureau
of Criminal Apprehension to remove Redkettle’s affiliation with his car from their system. It is
unclear to the Court why the City of Minneapolis, the Minneapolis Police Department, or the
Officers themselves would not instead take on the responsibility of resolving this error for him. It
is clear from this incident that an inaccurate NCIC system poses a threat to innocent citizens,
especially when faced with the possibility of being detained, searched, handcuffed, and placed in
a patrol car “simply because some bureaucrat has failed to maintain an accurate computer
database.” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This is especially true when law enforcement information is shared, “infect[ing] not only one agency, but the many agencies that share access to the database.” Evans,514 U.S. at 26
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
Ultimately, this is law enforcement’s issue to fix. Failure to do so threatens to make this
unfortunate incident a reality again. The Court encourages the City of Minneapolis to take
affirmative steps to ensure that Mr. Crow does not face a repeat of the kind of encounter that
precipitated this litigation.
IV. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc. 15, is GRANTED;
2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983claim (Count 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice, and Plaintiff’s false arrest claim (Count 2) is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 1367
(c).
Let Judgment be entered accordingly.
Date: May 7, 2024 s/Katherine Menendez
Katherine Menendez
United States District Judge Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Johnny James Crow, No. 23-cv-2403 (KMM/TNL)
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER
Eric Lee Rasmussen, Andrew Timothy
Ruden, and The City of Minneapolis,
Defendants.
This case arises out of the mistaken and unfortunate detention of Johnny Crow by officers
of the Minneapolis Police Department. Mr. Crow brought this two-count action against the City
of Minneapolis (“the City”) and Minneapolis Police Officers Eric Lee Rasmussen and Andrew
Timothy Ruden (“the Officers”). The Complaint raises a 42 U.S.C. § 1983claim for excessive force and unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment. Compl. (Doc. 1). It also includes a Minnesota state law claim for false arrest.Id.
The Defendants
answered the Complaint and now move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c).
Ans., (Doc. 7); Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 15). The Defendants argue that Mr. Crow’s detention did not
constitute an arrest and that he was not subjected to excessive force, while also arguing that the
Officers and the City are protected by both qualified and official immunity. The Court heard oral
argument on Defendants’ Motion on December 14, 2023. For the reasons that follow, the Court
grants Defendants’ Motion.
I. Background1
On November 9, 2022, Mr. Crow was sitting in his red Toyota Corolla at a Minneapolis
gas station. Compl. ¶ 7; Ex. 1 at 0:49 (Doc. 8). Minneapolis Police Officers Rasmussen and Ruden
pulled up behind Crow and activated their emergency lights. Compl. ¶¶ 9–10. As the Officers
arrived, Officer Ruden accessed a data system in the patrol car. Ex. 1 at 0:01; Ex. 2 at 0:01 (Doc. 8).
This system provided officers with National Crime Information Center (NCIC) information about
the car, including its connection to both Mr. Crow and Narcisse Redkettle. The NCIC information
indicated that there was an open valid warrant for Mr. Redkettle for “5th degree drugs,” described
him as a “wanted person,” and stated “caution combative.” Ex. 3 (Doc. 9). The system also
identified Mr. Redkettle as five foot eleven inches tall, 160 pounds, and with scars on his face,
forehead, left calf, left hand, and left wrist. Id.It included a long list of aliases for Mr. Redkettle, one of which is Johnny James Crow.Id.
The Officers approached Mr. Crow’s car and ordered him to step out of his vehicle, face
away from the Officers, and place his hands behind his back. Compl. ¶¶ 11–12; Ex. 1 at 0:50.
Mr. Crow complied with all of the Officers’ commands. Id. He asked the Officers what is going
on, but received no response. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 16; Ex. 1 at 0:59. As the officers began to place
Mr. Crow in handcuffs, they asked if he was the registered owner of the car. Compl. ¶ 14; Ex. 1 at
1:00. Mr. Crow responded that he is Johnny Crow. Compl. ¶ 15; Ex. 1 at 1:02. Officer Rasmussen
asked if the name is Redkettle, to which Mr. Crow responded, “No. Crow, Johnny Crow.” Compl.
¶ 17; Ex. 1 at 1:05. Officer Rasmussen hesitantly acknowledged the response before continuing to
handcuff Crow. Ex. 1 at 1:08. Officer Ruden stated that the Officers would check his identification
1 The facts in this section are taken from both the allegations in the Complaint as well as
body-worn video footage of the incident. See infra Part II.B for discussion on the inclusion of the
body-worn video footage.
and asked Crow if he owned the vehicle. Mr. Crow confirmed that he did. Id. at 1:10. Officer Rasmussen stated that the car was registered to someone with multiple felony warrants with the name Redkettle.Id. at 1:14
. Mr. Crow confirmed that he has relatives with that last name.
Compl. ¶ 18; Ex. 1 at 1:22. Mr. Crow told the Officers that his identification was in his wallet in
his car, and where they could find it. Compl. ¶ 19; Ex. 1 at 1:26.
As the Officers escorted a handcuffed Mr. Crow to their patrol vehicle, they told him they
would confirm whether he was the person with the warrant. Ex. 1 at 1:28. Mr. Crow responded
that he understood and reiterated that he has relatives with felonies. Id. at 1:33. He said that “this is messed up.”Id.
The Officers patted Mr. Crow down and confirmed that he did not have any
weapons. Compl. ¶ 21; Ex. 1 at 1:39. Mr. Crow expressed his confusion about why his car would
have warrants linked to it and told the Officers that he has relatives with the last name Redkettle
that he did not associate with. Ex. 1 at 1:47. The Officers placed Mr. Crow in the backseat of their
patrol car, noting how small it is, and closed the door. Compl. ¶ 22; Ex. 2 at 2:17. Mr. Crow
remained handcuffed throughout this encounter.
Next, Officer Rasmussen again accessed the data system in the patrol car’s on-board laptop
computer. Ex. 1 at 2:13. As he did so, Officer Ruden returned to Mr. Crow’s vehicle, retrieved
Crow’s identification from his gym bag, and eventually reviewed it against the data system in the
patrol car. Ex. 2 at 2:39. The NCIC system listed Mr. Crow as six feet tall and 180 pounds. Ex. 3.
After reviewing the NCIC information further, Officer Rasmussen opened the rear passenger door
of the patrol car and asked Mr. Crow if he knows Narcisse Redkettle. Ex. 1 at 2:59. Mr. Crow
explained that Redkettle is his cousin and has used Mr. Crow’s name in the past. Id.at 3:04–07. During this discussion, Mr. Crow is visibly physically uncomfortable sitting with his hands behind his back in the patrol car.Id. at 3:38
. The Officers talked further with Mr. Crow and determined
that he was not the subject of the open warrant. Compl. ¶ 23; Ex. 1 at 3:50. As the Officers assisted
Mr. Crow out of the car, he grimaced and groaned in discomfort. Ex. 1 at 3:56. Mr. Crow was in
the squad car for less than two minutes. Ex. 1 at 3:59; Ex. 2 at 2:08–3:57. Officer Rasmussen
apologized to Mr. Crow twice and unlocked the handcuffs. Compl. ¶ 24; Ex. 1 at 3:56. Mr. Crow
was handcuffed for less than three minutes. The Officers told Mr. Crow that he was free to go and
that he should contact the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension to remove the connection
of Mr. Redkettle’s warrants from his car. Compl. ¶ 25; Ex. 1 at 4:32. The entire encounter lasted
less than five minutes.
Based on these events, Mr. Crow claims that the Officers violated his constitutional right
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and engaged in conduct amounting to the common-
law tort of false arrest. Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
II. Analysis
A. Standard
A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is reviewed under the same
standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Clemons v. Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119, 1124(8th Cir. 2009). The distinction between a Rule 12(c) motion and a 12(b)(6) motion is “purely formal.” Westcott v. City of Omaha,901 F.2d 1486, 1488
(8th Cir. 1990).
To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual allegations to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Smithrud v. City
of St. Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 397(8th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). The facts alleged in the complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Twombly,550 U.S. at 555
). When considering a motion to dismiss, the court takes all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff. Usenko v. MEMC LLC,926 F.3d 468, 472
(8th Cir. 2019). However, the court does not take as true wholly conclusory allegations or the legal arguments offered by the plaintiff. Hager v. Ark. Dep’t of Health,735 F.3d 1009, 1013
(8th Cir. 2013).
B. Record Before the Court
Defendants filed four exhibits along with their Answer. Exhibits 1 and 2 are footage of the
incident recorded on the Officers’ body-worn cameras. Exhibit 3 is an “Incident Detail Report,”
which is a printout of the NCIC information available to the officers at the time of the arrest.
Finally, Exhibit 4 includes the police reports prepared by Officers Rasmussen and Ruden following
the incident. For the following reasons, Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 will be considered for purposes of this
motion, while Exhibit 4 will not be.
“When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings (or a motion to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)), the court generally must ignore materials outside of the pleadings. . . .”
Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079(8th Cir. 1999). However, the court may consider materials that (1) are “part of the public record,” (2) “do not contradict the complaint,” or (3) are “necessarily embraced by the pleadings.”Id.
(quotations omitted) (citing Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe,164 F.3d 1102
, 1107 (8th Cir. 1999); and Piper Jaffray Cos. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.,967 F. Supp. 1148, 1152
(D. Minn. 1997)). Consideration of these narrow categories of materials does not operate to convert the motion to one for summary judgment. Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc.,323 F.3d 695
, 697 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003).
The Court begins with the Officers’ body-worn video. Where their authenticity and
completeness are not in dispute, the Eighth Circuit and courts from this District have routinely
held that body-worn videos like the ones here are “embraced by the pleadings” and proper to
consider on a motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings. E.g., LeMay v. Mays, 18
F.4th 283, 289(8th Cir. 2021); Ching v. City of Minneapolis,73 F.4th 617, 621
(8th Cir. 2023); Anderson v. St. Luke’s Hospital, No. 19-cv-106 (MJD/LIB),2019 WL 7882118
, at *3 n.5 (D. Minn. Nov. 19, 2019); Verino v. Higgins, No. 19-cv-3024 (DWF/LIB),2020 WL 3542757
, at *1 n.1 (D. Minn. June 30, 2020). The court does not need to “adopt the plaintiff’s version of the facts if they are blatantly contradicted by video evidence.” Waters v. Madson,921 F.3d 725, 734
(8th
Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Here, Mr. Crow not only does not dispute the authenticity or completeness
of the body-worn video, but he also cites the video in his opposition. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3 (Doc. 21).
Therefore, the Court finds Defendants’ Exhibits 1 and 2 are embraced by the pleadings and
considers them for purposes of this motion.
The Court will similarly consider the Incident Detail Report in Exhibit 3 because it is also
embraced by the pleadings. The Incident Detail Report shows what information was available to
the Officers from the NCIC system about Mr. Crow’s car during the time of the incident.2 This
includes information about Mr. Crow and his connection to the vehicle; it links Mr. Redkettle to
the vehicle; it states that Redkettle is a “wanted person”; it identifies that there is an active warrant
for “5th degree drugs” for Mr. Redkettle; and it includes a warning about Redkettle that states
“caution combative.” Ex. 3 at 2. The system also identifies Mr. Redkettle as being five foot eleven
2 An Incident Detail Report is an auto-generated document that shows when and how the
Officers engaged with the NCIC system and what information was shown to them during their
engagement. Unlike the police reports offered by Defendants, it includes no narrative elements.
Instead it contains only a readout of the information from the NCIC system that the Officers
accessed just before they pulled up behind Mr. Crow’s vehicle and after they returned to the patrol
car to verify his identity.
inches tall, weighing 160 pounds, and having scars on his face, forehead, left calf, left hand, and
left wrist. Id.It also states that Johnny James Crow is a known alias used by Mr. Redkettle.Id.
Here, nothing in Exhibit 3 is extraneous to or contradicts the Complaint—indeed the
information in Exhibit 3 is embraced by the pleadings because the only reasonable inference to be
drawn from the video footage of the encounter and the allegations in the Complaint is that the
Officers consulted the NCIC information contained in the Incident Detail Report before they
engaged with Mr. Crow. As seen in the body-worn video, the Officers navigated through a database
on their patrol car computer as they pulled into the gas station parking lot behind Mr. Crow’s
sedan. Ex. 1 at 0:01; Ex. 2 at 0:01. As the Officers began to detain Mr. Crow, they questioned if
he goes by the name Redkettle. Compl. ¶ 17; Ex. 1 at 1:05. The Officers then stated that the car is
connected to someone who has active felony warrants. Ex. 1 at 1:14. This sequence of events
reveals virtually no possibility except that the Officers consulted the NCIC system before engaging
with Mr. Crow. Further, like Exhibits 1 and 2, Mr. Crow relies on these facts in his characterization
of the incident. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2–3. Therefore, the Court finds Exhibit 3 is embraced by the
pleadings and will be considered for purposes of this motion.
The Court reaches the opposite conclusion about the police reports in Exhibit 4. The Court
need not determine whether the reports are “necessarily embraced by the pleadings” because even
if they were, the Court may not consider them for the truth of the matters asserted. LeMay, 18 F.4th
at 289. In LeMay, the Eighth Circuit declined to consider a police report of the incident at issue at the motion-to-dismiss stage because the defendant did “not simply want [the court] to consider the police report’s existence. He also want[ed the court] to accept its narrative as truth.”Id.
This is
what the Defendants seek to do here. The reports primarily provide the Officers’ narrative
recounting of the incident. Ex. 4 (Doc. 12). Defendants refer to these reports multiple times in their
reply brief to support factual assertions about how the NCIC information impacted the Officers’
thinking. Defs.’ Reply at 7, 9–11 (Doc. 24). This effort to have the Court consider the police reports
for the truth of the matters asserted therein is rejected, and the Court will not consider Exhibit 4 in
determining the instant motion.
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim
In Count One of his Complaint, Mr. Crow alleges a § 1983 claim against the Defendants
for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He claims that the conduct of the
Officers amounts to excessive force and unlawful arrest. The Court begins with the excessive force
claim.
1. Excessive Force and the Terry Stop
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. The Supreme Court held in Terry v. Ohio that law enforcement officers can make
“brief, investigatory stop[s]” within certain limits. 392 U.S. 1(1968). Terry created a two-part inquiry into (1) whether, at the outset, the investigatory stop was lawful, and (2) whether the manner of the stop “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”Id.
at 19–20. First, a Terry stop is lawful at the outset if the officer has “reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts” that some criminal activity may exist. United States v. Sokolow,490 U.S. 1, 7
(1989) (citing Terry,392 U.S. at 30
). Second, even if the investigatory stop itself is reasonably supported, the manner of the stop “may nonetheless violate the Fourth Amendment if it is excessively intrusive in its scope or manner of execution.” El- Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume,636 F.3d 452, 457
(8th Cir. 2011).
Excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment are based on a reasonableness
standard. Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497, 502(8th Cir. 2006). “An officer’s use of force violates the Fourth Amendment if it was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Pollreis v. Marzolf,9 F.4th 737, 747
(8th Cir. 2021) (citing Graham v. Connor,490 U.S. 386
, 394–96 (1989)). Objective reasonableness is assessed “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham,490 U.S. at 396
. Reasonableness is based on the factual circumstances of each case, including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers” and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest. . . .” Pollreis,9 F.4th at 747
(quoting Graham,490 U.S. at 396
).
During a Terry stop, law enforcement is allowed to use “some degree of physical coercion”
toward their investigatory ends. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The Eighth Circuit has held that in certain circumstances police officers may reasonably use handcuffs and place a suspect in a police patrol car during Terry stops. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez,462 F.3d 903, 907
(8th Cir. 2006) (finding that placing the handcuffed suspect in the patrol car and transporting him to the scene of a bank robbery for a show-up identification did not transform a Terry stop into an arrest); United States v. Maltais,403 F.3d 550, 553
, 55–56 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding stop remained within bounds of Terry where suspect held in patrol car for at least 90 minutes while officer investigated whether suspect was a member of a drug smuggling operation); United States v. Navarrete-Barron,192 F.3d 786, 791
(8th Cir. 1999) (explaining that law enforcement can place the subject of a Terry stop in their patrol car if “reasonably necessary” to maintain the status quo or for police safety). To use handcuffs, the Fourth Amendment requires “some reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous or that the restraints are necessary for some other legitimate purpose, evaluated on the facts of each case.” El-Ghazzawy,636 F.3d at 457
(quoting Bennett v. City of Eastpointe,410 F.3d 810, 836
(6th Cir. 2005)). However, handcuffing a suspect “absent any
concern for safety” violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 460.
Mr. Crow’s excessive force arguments implicate the second prong of the analysis of
whether a Terry stop is valid.3 He alleges that the Officers used excessive force by handcuffing
him and placing him in the patrol car during his detention. Mr. Crow argues that the Officers
should have known that he was not Mr. Redkettle and that he did not pose any type of threat to the
Officers because he was compliant. Therefore, Mr. Crow argues the Officers’ use of handcuffs and
his placement in the patrol car was unreasonable and excessive. Pl.’s Opp’n at 6–9. As explained
below, the Court concludes the Defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings with respect
to this claim.
Under the circumstances presented here, the Officers’ use of handcuffs and their decision
to place Mr. Crow in their patrol car while they completed a brief investigation was reasonably
necessary. Although Mr. Crow asserts that the Officers had no justification for using handcuffs
because he was compliant, presented no safety threat, identified himself as Mr. Crow and not
Mr. Redkettle, and the Officers’ pat down found no weapons, he overlooks other information
available to Officers Rasmussen and Ruden that provided objective safety concerns from the
perspective of an officer on the scene. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (“Reasonableness is assessed
‘from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.’”). At the time of the detention, the Officers understood Mr. Crow’s car to be connected
3 There is no dispute that the Officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to make the
Terry stop. The Officers ran Mr. Crow’s license plate, which returned NCIC information that a
person associated with the car, Narcisse Redkettle, had an active 5th degree drug warrant for his
arrest. Ex. 3. The report further indicated that that person was a “wanted person.” Id.This rises to the level of reasonable articulable suspicion for a lawful Terry stop of Mr. Crow and nowhere in Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings did does he contest this point. to Narcisse Redkettle, a “wanted person” who had at least one active drug warrant for his arrest. The NCIC information also cautioned that Redkettle was known to be “combative,” which is not a scenario in which the “officers [had] no objective concerns for safety. . . .” El-Ghazzawy,636 F.3d at 460
. Further, when Mr. Crow verbally identified himself, that also confirmed what at the
moment the Officers knew to be one of the many aliases used by Mr. Redkettle. And as the Officers
stated on the scene, they were going to—and did—investigate the discrepancy between the name
Mr. Crow gave them and the name associated with the warrant once they placed Mr. Crow in the
patrol car, where he stayed for less than two minutes. Ex. 1 at 1:10, 1:28, 3:59; Ex. 2 at 2:08, 3:57.
From these circumstances, the Officers could reasonably have believed that the use of handcuffs
and patrol car was necessary for public or officer safety.
Mr. Crow argues that the Eighth Circui’s decision in El-Ghazzawy clearly established that
the Officers’ use of handcuffs under these circumstances was unreasonable. But El-Ghazzawy is
easily distinguishable. In that case, Karim El-Ghazzawy collected and sold wrist watches to a pawn
shop on several occasions. A store manager believed that one of the watches El-Ghazzawy sold
was a fake. The next time El-Ghazzawy returned to sell more watches to the shop, the manager
contacted the police. 636 F.3d at 454–55. When the officer arrived on the scene, she handcuffed
El-Ghazzawy before “even the most basic investigation” was undertaken for an alleged crime that
did not raise a concern about him being armed or dangerous. Id.The Eighth Circuit noted that the officer failed to point to any specific facts that supported her concern for officer safety.Id.
at 458–
59.
This case is unlike El-Ghazzawy in meaningful ways. Here, the body-cam video shows that
the Officers consulted the NCIC system before stopping Mr. Crow. Ex. 1 at 0:01; Ex. 2 at 0:01;
Ex. 3. In the system they found an active warrant for a man linked to Mr. Crow’s vehicle. The
NCIC report warned officers that Redkettle was considered “combative” and listed an active
warrant for the possession of drugs, which the Eight Circuit has held creates a reasonable belief
the suspect may be armed and dangerous. Id.; Haynes v. Minnehan, 14 F.4th 830, 836(8th Cir. 2021); United States v. Johnson,528 F.3d 575, 580
(8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Navarrete- Barron,192 F.3d 786, 791
(8th Cir. 1999). Additionally, identifying himself as Mr. Crow only
confirmed what Rasmussen and Ruden knew to be an alias for Redkettle. Mr. Crow did everything
that was asked of him by the Officers, staying admirably calm and compliant amidst an uncertain
situation. But, the information available to the Officers provided a reasonable basis for their use
of handcuffs and decision to place Mr. Crow in the patrol vehicle to maintain the status quo while
they completed their investigation.
Mr. Crow disputes that the Officers saw the “caution combative” comment on the NCIC
report, suggesting that it is reasonable to infer that the Officers did not read that part of the
information reflected in the Incident Detail Report. Pl.’s Opp’n at 7–8. The Court disagrees—to
draw such an inference would be unreasonable in light of the encounter captured on the body-cam
video. The Incident Detail Report shows that the “caution combative” line on the NCIC report fell
between Mr. Redkettle’s physical description and the details of his open warrant above and his list
of known aliases below. If the Officers knew at the time of the stop the information that straddled
it, it is not reasonable to conclude that the Officers did not see the “caution combative” comment
in the NCIC system.
Similarly, Mr. Crow contends that the inclusion of “combative” in the NCIC system does
not necessarily mean that Redkettle is prone to violence, but rather that he has an “argumentative
demeanor.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. That construction contradicts both the plain language and most
natural police-related use of the word. The average person would use combative to mean physical
adversariness. Combative, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/combative (last visited Mar. 25, 2024) (defining “combative” as “marked
by eagerness to fight or contend”). In the police context, that use seems even more likely. While a
“fight” could also mean a verbal altercation, it does not follow that the police would use
“combative” to describe a suspect they verbally disagree with. In total, the Officers made a
constitutionally valid Terry stop and did not use excessive force during Mr. Crow’s detention.
2. De Facto Arrest
Next, Mr. Crow contends that his detention turned from a Terry stop into a de facto arrest,
which was unconstitutionally made without probable cause. Pl.’s Opp’n at 9–11. However, the
Court concludes that it is unnecessary to determine whether the Officers had probable cause to
arrest Mr. Crow because the Terry stop in this case never became an arrest.
The Eighth Circuit has held that “‘an action tantamount to arrest has taken place if the
officers’ conduct is more intrusive than necessary for an investigative stop.’” United States v.
Raino, 980 F.2d 1148, 1149(8th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Rose,731 F.2d 1337, 1342
(8th Cir. 1984)) (brackets removed). Specifically, a lawful Terry stop “may become an arrest, requiring probable cause, ‘if the stop lasts for an unreasonably long time or if officers use unreasonable force.’” United States v. Newell,596 F.3d 876, 879
(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Navarrete–Barron,192 F.3d at 790
). Courts consider an array of factors when determining if an
investigative stop became an arrest, including:
the number of officers and police cars involved, the nature of the
crime and whether there is reason to believe the suspect might be
armed, the strength of the officers’ articulable, objective suspicions,
the erratic behavior of or suspicious movements by the persons
under observation, and the need for immediate action by the officers
and lack of opportunity for them to have made the stop in less
threatening circumstances.
United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 639–40 (8th Cir. 1985).
Mr. Crow maintains that his Terry stop transformed into an arrest without probable cause
because the Officers detained him unreasonably. He argues that the Officers’ actions were more
intrusive than necessary because the facts show that he was compliant with the Officers, they found
no weapons on him and were given no reason to fear for their safety, he told the Officers he was
not Redkettle, and his description did not match the description of Redkettle in the NCIC
information. Pl.’s Opp’n at 10–11. These facts, he contends, in combination with the Officers’ use
of handcuffs and placing him in the patrol car, transformed his Terry stop into an arrest.
The Court disagrees with this analysis. First, the Officers did not detain Mr. Crow for an
“unreasonably long time.” Newell, 596 F.3d at 879. The Supreme Court has held that, while there is no bright line, when asking whether police have detained a suspect for too long to call the encounter a Terry stop, the issue is whether law enforcement “diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.” United States v. Sharpe,470 U.S. 675, 686
(1985); United States v. Morgan,729 F.3d 1086, 1090
(8th Cir. 2013) (“There is no bright line rule”). That is precisely what Officers Rasmussen and Ruden did in this case. The entire encounter lasted less than five minutes. Mr. Crow was in handcuffs for less than three minutes, and he was in the patrol car for less than two minutes. During that brief period, the Officers quickly took steps to confirm whether or not Mr. Crow was the individual with an active warrant identified as Narcisse Redkettle by the NCIC information in their patrol car computer. The Eighth Circuit has routinely held that comparable durations do not transform a Terry stop into an arrest. See Pollreis,9 F.4th 737 at 746
(handcuffing juvenile suspects for two minutes during an entire encounter that lasted seven minutes did not turn Terry stop into an arrest); Irvin v. Richardson,20 F.4th 1199, 1207
(8th Cir. 2021) (handcuffing two suspects for thirteen minutes did not turn stop into an arrest); Chestnut v. Wallace,947 F.3d 1085
, 1087–88 (8th Cir. 2020)
(handcuffing a compliant suspect during a warrant check for twenty minutes, even following a pat-
down that identified no weapons, did not transform stop into an arrest). The Court finds that
Officers Rasmussen and Ruden did not detain Mr. Crow longer than was necessary to correctly
determine his identity, at which point they took him out of the patrol car, removed the handcuffs,
apologized, and told him he was free to go.
The Court is also not persuaded by Mr. Crow’s argument that the investigative detention
turned into an arrest due to the Officers’ alleged use of excessive force. Mr. Crow again highlights
the Officers’ use of handcuffs and placement in the patrol car to this end. Pls.’ Opp’n at 11.
However, as described above, the use of handcuffs under these circumstances was not excessive
force. Where, as here, there is an objective safety concern, law enforcement may detain a suspect
using handcuffs while verifying the person’s identity. See Pollreis, 9 F.4th at 741–42, 744
(handcuffing and frisking two boys before verifying their identities was not unreasonable).
Additionally, in United States v. Lego, the Eighth Circuit held that confining a potentially
dangerous suspect to a patrol car while checking his identification was not tantamount to an arrest.
855 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1988). This precedent reiterates that the Officers’ conduct here did not
constitute excessive force and did not transform Mr. Crow’s stop into an arrest.
Weighing the Jones factors also supports the same conclusion. First, the encounter was not
particularly “police dominated,” as it involved only two officers arriving in one patrol car. Jones,
759 F.2d at 640. Second, the Officers were aware an open warrant for a drug-related crime, which the Eighth Circuit has held creates a reasonable belief the suspect may be armed and dangerous. Haynes,14 F.4th at 836
; Johnson,528 F.3d at 580
; Navarrete-Barron,192 F.3d at 791
. Third, the
Officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to make the stop and were cautioned by the NCIC
information that Redkettle was a wanted person and known to be combative. Factor four weighs
in favor of Mr. Crow, as he was undoubtedly compliant with the Officers and showed no suspicious
or erratic behavior. However, fifth and finally, the opportunity for the Officers to make an arrest
on an open warrant, and doing so with reasonable means, cuts against him. Together, the Jones
factors support the conclusion that the Terry stop of Mr. Crow did not transform into an arrest.
For these reasons, the Court finds that the lawful Terry stop in this case never transformed
into an arrest, and as a result, no showing of probable cause was necessary to justify Mr. Crow’s
brief detention.
3. Mistaken Identity
Mr. Crow additionally argues that the Officers’ mistake of identity gives rise to a Fourth
Amendment violation. Specifically, Mr. Crow contends that the Officers were unreasonable in
mistaking Mr. Crow for Redkettle. Since the car was registered to Mr. Crow alone and he had no
outstanding warrants, he suggests that there is only a “tenuous” connection between Mr. Crow and
Redkettle. Pl.’s Opp’n at 13. But a mistake of identity by law enforcement rarely constitutes a
constitutional violation. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment is generally not
violated when a person is mistakenly detained pursuant to a valid warrant for another individual.
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143–45 (1979). In McCollan, the Court observed that the ultimate innocence of the stopped individual does not suffice to allege a constitutional violation.Id. at 145
.
Critically, there is no Fourth Amendment violation in a case of mistaken identity if law
enforcement had a “reasonable, good faith belief” that the individual they stopped is the suspect
they are pursuing. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802–03 (1971). In Hill v. California, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement did not act unreasonably when arresting a man who fit the description of the individual they had probable cause to arrest, but who identified himself by another name.Id.
Those facts are directly analogous to the circumstances here. The Officers
engaged Mr. Crow under a valid arrest warrant for Redkettle, who was listed as five foot eleven
inches tall and 160 pounds. Mr. Crow is listed as six feet tall and 180 pounds, with only a one-inch
difference in height and twenty pounds in weight from Redkettle. A mistake based on this slight
difference in height and size can hardly be seen as unreasonable. While the NCIC system also
states that Redkettle has scars on his face, forehead, left calf, left hand, and left wrist, Mr. Crow’s
similarity in size and stature—as well as the use of his name as an alias of Redkettle—does not
make the Officers’ mistake unreasonable.
Mr. Crow further asserts that a reasonable officer would have done more to inquire into
Mr. Crow’s identity before detaining him. Pl.’s Opp’n at 12–13. Specifically, Mr. Crow suggests
that the Officers should have investigated the link between the open warrant for Redkettle and
Mr. Crow’s car registration before stopping and detaining him. Id. But the Fourth Amendment
does not impose a duty on law enforcement to fully investigate claims of mistaken identity.
McCollan, 443 U.S. at 145–46. Even a failure to do so does not make the Officers’ mistake
unreasonable, and here there was no such failure.
Even had the brief mistaken identity in this case been negligent, the Eighth Circuit has held
it does not constitute a constitutional violation. Lane v. Sarpy County, 165 F.3d 623(8th Cir. 1999) (summary judgment). In Lane, “the defendants mistakenly arrested and detained plaintiff for approximately six hours, believing him to be a different individual with the same name” for whom they had an arrest warrant.Id.
at 623–24. The Lane court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants because the errors in preparation and execution of the arrest warrant were nothing more than negligent conduct that was insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.Id. at 624
(“Because plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation, defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.”). The Eighth Circuit later affirmed that principle under similar facts to the circumstances here. In Young v. City of Little Rock, Ms. Young was arrested and detained for hours under a warrant issued for her sister-in-law who had used Young’s name as an alias.249 F.3d 730, 732
(8th Cir. 2001). The Eighth Circuit found that the district court properly dismissed any claim against the arresting officer and the dispatching officer who mistakenly verified that there was an arrest warrant for Ms. Young. The Young court held that the mistake was “nothing more than negligence,” citing the conditions surrounding police decision-making, and determined that no § 1983 claim was stated against these officers. Id. at 734 (citing Sarpy County,165 F.3d at 624
and noting that “the mistake was not deliberate [but] was
occasioned, rather, by the press of business and by the speed with which officers . . . were required
to act”).4
Following the rationale of both Lane and Young, and viewing the facts alleged in the light
most favorable to Mr. Crow, Officers Rasmussen and Ruden would at most have been negligent
in initially mistaking him for Redkettle. Nothing in the Complaint, the body-cam video, or in the
NCIC report suggests a reasonable inference that the Officers acted maliciously, intentionally, or
even recklessly in believing that they were making an arrest of the individual who was the subject
of the active warrant linked to the vehicle they saw in the gas station parking lot.
4 Even after Ms. Young was taken to the county jail and the arresting officer and his
superior officer learned of the issue of mistaken identity, they did not immediately release her.
Young, 249 F.3d at 734–35. Still, the Young court disagreed that Ms. Young’s claim regarding this
continued detention should have gone to a jury because “the situation was equivocal.” Id. at 735. The officers had some information indicating that Ms. Young was the subject of a valid warrant and other information indicating that they had made a mistaken arrest, so the court concluded that “an objectively reasonable officer could have decided to wait for a judge to make the final determination,” and as a result, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.Id.
(“[A]
reasonable officer could have thought it reasonable to wait for a judge’s decision.”).
In sum, the Officers’ actions were reasonable under the circumstances and do not plausibly
violate the Fourth Amendment for excessive force, unlawful arrest, or mistaken identity.
Therefore, the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is dismissed.
D. False Arrest Claim
Finally, Mr. Crow brings a common law false arrest claim under Minnesota state law. See
Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 481(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lundeen v. Renteria,224 N.W.2d 132, 135
(1974)). District Courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when they are “so related to” the federal law claims in that action.28 U.S.C. § 1331
, 1367(a). However, a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim when the court dismisses the accompanying federal claims.Id.
§ 1367(c)(3). Here, because the
§ 1983 claim has been dismissed, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the state law
claim. Therefore, the Court dismisses the false arrest claim without prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
Although likely little consolation, it is worth reiterating the Court’s appreciation of
Mr. Crow’s compliance with law enforcement during his mistaken and unfortunate detention.
Mr. Crow was ultimately stopped, handcuffed, and detained due to an error in the police’s NCIC
system. Mr. Crow did nothing wrong and did not deserve such an upsetting—and painful—
incident. There is little doubt that without Mr. Crow’s compliance and calm demeanor this incident
could have resulted in something much more serious.
One more piece of this incident is also worth highlighting: As the Officers released
Mr. Crow and apologized to him, they stated that Mr. Crow should contact the Minnesota Bureau
of Criminal Apprehension to remove Redkettle’s affiliation with his car from their system. It is
unclear to the Court why the City of Minneapolis, the Minneapolis Police Department, or the
Officers themselves would not instead take on the responsibility of resolving this error for him. It
is clear from this incident that an inaccurate NCIC system poses a threat to innocent citizens,
especially when faced with the possibility of being detained, searched, handcuffed, and placed in
a patrol car “simply because some bureaucrat has failed to maintain an accurate computer
database.” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This is especially true when law enforcement information is shared, “infect[ing] not only one agency, but the many agencies that share access to the database.” Evans,514 U.S. at 26
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
Ultimately, this is law enforcement’s issue to fix. Failure to do so threatens to make this
unfortunate incident a reality again. The Court encourages the City of Minneapolis to take
affirmative steps to ensure that Mr. Crow does not face a repeat of the kind of encounter that
precipitated this litigation.
IV. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc. 15, is GRANTED;
2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983claim (Count 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice, and Plaintiff’s false arrest claim (Count 2) is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 1367
(c).
Let Judgment be entered accordingly.
Date: May 7, 2024 s/Katherine Menendez
Katherine Menendez
United States District Judge Reference
- Status
- Unknown