Berscheid v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota

Berscheid v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.

Trial Court Opinion

                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                          
                      DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                              
BECKY BERSCHEID,                                                         
                                      Civil No. 22-086 (JRT/LIB)         
                       Plaintiff,                                        

v.                                                                       
                                ORDER DENYING PARTIES’ REQUESTS TO       
EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS,     FILE MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER           
INC.,                                                                    

                      Defendant.                                         

    Anthony P. Chester, CHESTER LAW PLLC, 8400 Normandale Lake Boulevard, 
    Suite  920,  Bloomington,  MN  55437;  Ryan  D.  Peterson,  CONSUMER 
    ATTORNEYS, PLC, 6600 France Avenue, Suite 602, Edina, MN 55435, for  
    Plaintiff.                                                           

    Chelsea  Bollman,  JONES  DAY,  90  South  Seventh  Street,  Suite  4950, 
    Minneapolis, MN 55402; Christopher Adam Hall, JONES DAY, 110 North   
    Wacker, Suite 4800, Chicago, IL 60606, for Defendant.                


    On March 4, 2024, the Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part 
Defendant  Experian  Information  Solutions,  Inc.’s  (“Experian”)  motion  for  summary 
judgment  and  denying  Plaintiff  Becky  Berscheid’s  motion  for  summary  judgment.  
Experian  and  Berscheid  both  filed  letters  requesting  permission  to  file  motions  for 
clarification or reconsideration under Local Rule 7.1(j).  The Court will deny both requests. 
                           DISCUSSION                                    
    Under the Local Rules, after demonstrating compelling circumstances, a party may 
file a motion to reconsider with the permission of the Court.  D. Minn. L.R. 7.1(j).  Motions 
to reconsider “serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to 
present newly discovered evidence.”  Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp., 
839 F.2d 407, 414
 

(8th Cir. 1988) (quotation and citation omitted).  A motion to reconsider should not be 
employed to relitigate old issues, but to “afford an opportunity for relief in extraordinary 
circumstances.”  Dale & Selby Superette & Deli v. United States Dept. of Agric., 
838 F. Supp. 1346, 1348
 (D. Minn. 1993).                                         

    Experian requests permission to clarify two issues: (1) that there has been no 
finding that Berscheid’s debt is legally uncollectible or that Experian’s reporting was 
inaccurate as a matter of law, and (2) that Berscheid cannot sustain a cause of action 

related to her second dispute.  The Court can clarify these issues without the need for 
more briefing.  First, the Court’s March 4, 2024 Order did not hold that Berscheid’s debt 
is legally uncollectible or that Experian’s reporting was inaccurate as a matter of law.  
Instead, the Order held there is a material question of fact on whether, given what the 

state court judgment says, it was materially misleading to continue to report the debt on 
Berscheid’s account.  (Order (“Summary Judgment Order”) at 13, Docket No. 173.)  The 
Court concluded that a jury could find that, given the ambiguous state court judgment 
that could indicate the debt is legally uncollectible, it was materially misleading for 

Experian  to  continue  to  report  the debt  on Berscheid’s account,  especially without 
attaching the state court judgment or explaining that the debt may be uncollectible.  As 
a result, Berscheid raised a genuine issue of material fact on the question of accuracy.  
(Id.)  Second, consistent with the Court’s March 4, 2024 Order, Berscheid cannot sustain 
a cause of action related to her second dispute because Experian deleted the debt from 

her report 30 days after it received her dispute, in accordance with the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act’s (“FCRA”) requirements.  (See Summary Judgment Order at 11 (“When a 
consumer disputes information included in their credit report, the FCRA requires CRAs to 
‘conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is 

inaccurate and record the current status of the disputed information, or delete the item 
from the file’ within 30 days of receiving the dispute.”) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A); 
Reed v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 
321 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1113
 (D. Minn. 2004)).)  Because 

Experian complied with the FCRA’s requirements by timely deleting the account from her 
credit report after Berscheid’s second dispute, Berscheid cannot sustain a cause of action 
for the second dispute.  Since the Court has now clarified the issues raised by Experian, it 
finds no “compelling circumstances” that would justify its request to file a motion to 

reconsider.                                                               
    Berscheid argues that her request should be granted because the Court’s March 4, 
2024 Order erred in concluding that Experian did not commit a willful violation of the 
FCRA as a matter of law.  Rather, Berscheid contends willfulness is a question best left for 

a jury.  However, summary judgment is appropriate when there remain no genuine issues 
of material fact, and the moving party can demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The Court’s Order clearly explained the Court’s 
conclusion that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the question of 
willfulness, as Berscheid failed to present sufficient evidence of a knowing and intentional 
violation  of  the  FCRA.   (Summary  Judgment  Order  at  18-19.)   Berscheid’s  letter  to 
reconsider merely repeats the arguments she made in writing and orally before the Court 

on  her  motion  for summary judgment.  Thus,  in  effect,  Berscheid  attempts to take  a 
“second  bite  at  the  apple,”  which  is  prohibited  under the  Local  Rules.   Accordingly, 
Berscheid  has also failed to demonstrate the “compelling circumstances”  necessary to 
justify her request. 

ORDER

      Based on the foregoing, and  all the files,  records, and  proceedings herein,  IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that: 
      1.  Defendant’s  Request  to  File  a  Motion  to  Reconsider  [Docket  No.  174]  is 
         DENIED; 
      2.  Plaintiff's Request to File  a Motion to Reconsider [Docket No. 175] is DENIED; 
         and 
      3.  Pursuant to the Court’s Summary Judgment Order [Docket No.  173],  Plaintiff 

         cannot seek liability from Defendant for the second dispute. 

DATED:  May 9, 2024                               dob, K. (redeem 
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.                         JOHN R. TUNHEIM 
                                             United States District Judge 

                                     -4- 

Trial Court Opinion

                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                          
                      DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                              
BECKY BERSCHEID,                                                         
                                      Civil No. 22-086 (JRT/LIB)         
                       Plaintiff,                                        

v.                                                                       
                                ORDER DENYING PARTIES’ REQUESTS TO       
EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS,     FILE MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER           
INC.,                                                                    

                      Defendant.                                         

    Anthony P. Chester, CHESTER LAW PLLC, 8400 Normandale Lake Boulevard, 
    Suite  920,  Bloomington,  MN  55437;  Ryan  D.  Peterson,  CONSUMER 
    ATTORNEYS, PLC, 6600 France Avenue, Suite 602, Edina, MN 55435, for  
    Plaintiff.                                                           

    Chelsea  Bollman,  JONES  DAY,  90  South  Seventh  Street,  Suite  4950, 
    Minneapolis, MN 55402; Christopher Adam Hall, JONES DAY, 110 North   
    Wacker, Suite 4800, Chicago, IL 60606, for Defendant.                


    On March 4, 2024, the Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part 
Defendant  Experian  Information  Solutions,  Inc.’s  (“Experian”)  motion  for  summary 
judgment  and  denying  Plaintiff  Becky  Berscheid’s  motion  for  summary  judgment.  
Experian  and  Berscheid  both  filed  letters  requesting  permission  to  file  motions  for 
clarification or reconsideration under Local Rule 7.1(j).  The Court will deny both requests. 
                           DISCUSSION                                    
    Under the Local Rules, after demonstrating compelling circumstances, a party may 
file a motion to reconsider with the permission of the Court.  D. Minn. L.R. 7.1(j).  Motions 
to reconsider “serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to 
present newly discovered evidence.”  Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp., 
839 F.2d 407, 414
 

(8th Cir. 1988) (quotation and citation omitted).  A motion to reconsider should not be 
employed to relitigate old issues, but to “afford an opportunity for relief in extraordinary 
circumstances.”  Dale & Selby Superette & Deli v. United States Dept. of Agric., 
838 F. Supp. 1346, 1348
 (D. Minn. 1993).                                         

    Experian requests permission to clarify two issues: (1) that there has been no 
finding that Berscheid’s debt is legally uncollectible or that Experian’s reporting was 
inaccurate as a matter of law, and (2) that Berscheid cannot sustain a cause of action 

related to her second dispute.  The Court can clarify these issues without the need for 
more briefing.  First, the Court’s March 4, 2024 Order did not hold that Berscheid’s debt 
is legally uncollectible or that Experian’s reporting was inaccurate as a matter of law.  
Instead, the Order held there is a material question of fact on whether, given what the 

state court judgment says, it was materially misleading to continue to report the debt on 
Berscheid’s account.  (Order (“Summary Judgment Order”) at 13, Docket No. 173.)  The 
Court concluded that a jury could find that, given the ambiguous state court judgment 
that could indicate the debt is legally uncollectible, it was materially misleading for 

Experian  to  continue  to  report  the debt  on Berscheid’s account,  especially without 
attaching the state court judgment or explaining that the debt may be uncollectible.  As 
a result, Berscheid raised a genuine issue of material fact on the question of accuracy.  
(Id.)  Second, consistent with the Court’s March 4, 2024 Order, Berscheid cannot sustain 
a cause of action related to her second dispute because Experian deleted the debt from 

her report 30 days after it received her dispute, in accordance with the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act’s (“FCRA”) requirements.  (See Summary Judgment Order at 11 (“When a 
consumer disputes information included in their credit report, the FCRA requires CRAs to 
‘conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is 

inaccurate and record the current status of the disputed information, or delete the item 
from the file’ within 30 days of receiving the dispute.”) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A); 
Reed v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 
321 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1113
 (D. Minn. 2004)).)  Because 

Experian complied with the FCRA’s requirements by timely deleting the account from her 
credit report after Berscheid’s second dispute, Berscheid cannot sustain a cause of action 
for the second dispute.  Since the Court has now clarified the issues raised by Experian, it 
finds no “compelling circumstances” that would justify its request to file a motion to 

reconsider.                                                               
    Berscheid argues that her request should be granted because the Court’s March 4, 
2024 Order erred in concluding that Experian did not commit a willful violation of the 
FCRA as a matter of law.  Rather, Berscheid contends willfulness is a question best left for 

a jury.  However, summary judgment is appropriate when there remain no genuine issues 
of material fact, and the moving party can demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The Court’s Order clearly explained the Court’s 
conclusion that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the question of 
willfulness, as Berscheid failed to present sufficient evidence of a knowing and intentional 
violation  of  the  FCRA.   (Summary  Judgment  Order  at  18-19.)   Berscheid’s  letter  to 
reconsider merely repeats the arguments she made in writing and orally before the Court 

on  her  motion  for summary judgment.  Thus,  in  effect,  Berscheid  attempts to take  a 
“second  bite  at  the  apple,”  which  is  prohibited  under the  Local  Rules.   Accordingly, 
Berscheid  has also failed to demonstrate the “compelling circumstances”  necessary to 
justify her request. 

ORDER

      Based on the foregoing, and  all the files,  records, and  proceedings herein,  IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that: 
      1.  Defendant’s  Request  to  File  a  Motion  to  Reconsider  [Docket  No.  174]  is 
         DENIED; 
      2.  Plaintiff's Request to File  a Motion to Reconsider [Docket No. 175] is DENIED; 
         and 
      3.  Pursuant to the Court’s Summary Judgment Order [Docket No.  173],  Plaintiff 

         cannot seek liability from Defendant for the second dispute. 

DATED:  May 9, 2024                               dob, K. (redeem 
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.                         JOHN R. TUNHEIM 
                                             United States District Judge 

                                     -4- 

Reference

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