UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Preston Byron Knapp and Michelle   Case No. 24-cv-00100 (SRN-DTS)        
Nichole Knapp,                                                           

          Plaintiffs,                                                    
                                  MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND                
v.                                          ORDER                        

Compass Minnesota, LLC, and Daniel                                       
Philip Hollerman,                                                        

          Defendants.                                                    


Plaintiffs Preston Byron Knapp and Michelle Nichole Knapp, 2624 North Saunders Lake 
Drive, Minnestrista, MN 55364, pro se.                                   

Michael Kernstock and Tessa A. Mansfield, Foley & Mansfield, PLLP, 250 Marquette 
Ave S, Suite 1200, Minneapolis, MN 55401, for Defendant Compass Minnesota, LLC. 

Carl E. Christensen, Robert J. Kouba, and Ryan Supple, Christensen Sampsel PLLC 
305 North Fifth Avenue, Suite 375, Minneapolis, MN 55401 for Defendant Daniel Philip 
Hollerman.                                                               


SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge                        
    This  matter  is  before  the  Court  on  Defendants  Compass  Minnesota,  LLC 
(“Compass”) and Daniel Philip Hollerman’s (“Hollerman”) (collectively, “Defendants”) 
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint [Doc. No. 10]; Plaintiffs Preston Byron Knapp and 
Michelle  Nichole  Knapp’s  (the  “Knapps”  or  “Plaintiffs”)  Motion  to  Compel 
Communication with Attorney-in-Fact [Doc. No. 22]; the Knapps’ Motion for Default 
Judgment as to Hollerman [Doc. No. 27]; and the Knapps’ Motion for Default Judgment 
as to Compass [Doc. No. 30].                                              
    Based on a review of the files, submissions, and proceedings herein, and for the 
reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, and 

DENIES Plaintiffs’ motions.                                               
I.   BACKGROUND                                                           
    Plaintiffs’ Complaint (“Compl.”) [Doc. No. 1] concerns Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ 
involvement in a real property transaction. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants breached their 
contract with and fiduciary duties towards Plaintiffs and engaged in other malfeasance by 
refusing to follow the instructions of Brandon Joe Williams (“Williams”), Plaintiffs’ 

“attorney-in-fact,” to have “collateral securities exchanged for Federal Reserve Notes and 
to have those notes placed in escrow.” (Compl. ¶¶ 9-17.) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ 
complaint fails to plausibly allege a breach of contract and/or a breach of fiduciary duty, 
and that they have no legal responsibility to communicate with Williams.  
    A.   Factual Background                                              
    The Knapps reside in Hennepin County, Minnesota. (Compl. ¶ 1). Compass is a 

national real estate sales company operating in Minnesota, and Hollerman works as an 
agent for them. (Def’s Mot. to Dismiss Br. [Doc. No. 12] at 2.) The parties do not dispute 
that the Knapps engaged Hollerman to sell their then-current home as well as purchase a 
new home. (Id.)                                                           
    The  parties  executed  several  agreements  as  part  of  this  engagement.  (See 

Declaration of Robert J. Kouba (“First Kouba Decl.”) [Doc. No. 13], Exs. A-D (together, 
the “Contracts”.)1 Hollerman and the Knapps executed a buyer representation contract on 
August 29, 2023, granting Hollerman the exclusive right to “locate and/or to assist in 

negotiations for the purchase, exchange of or option to [purchase] property located in 
Minnesota at a price and with terms acceptable to Buyer[.]” (First Kouba Decl., Ex. B (the 
“Buyer Representation Contract”) at 1.) The parties also executed a listing contract on 
September 15, 2023, granting Hollerman the exclusive right to sell their home at 2624 
North Saunders Lake Drive in Minnetrista, Minnesota. (First Kouba Decl., Ex. A (the 
“Seller Representation Contract”).) Under representation, the Knapps signed a purchase 

agreement on August 29, 2023 for a property at 9350 Forest Road in Cannon Falls, 
Minnesota for $2,450,000. (First Kouba Decl., Ex. D (the “Purchase Agreement”).) The 
Knapps later accepted an offer for their North Saunders Lake Drive property in the amount 
of $1,150,000 on October 10, 2023. (First Kouba Decl., Ex. C (the “Sale Agreement”).)  





    1 Plaintiffs argue that the Court may not consider these documents for purposes of 
this motion because they are “hearsay” as an “unsworn declaration from the attorney of 
record[.]” (Pl. Mot. to Dismiss Br. [Doc. No. 35] at 17.)                 
    Plaintiffs’ argument is unavailing. In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may 
also consider documents “necessarily embraced by the pleadings, including documents 
whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but 
which are not physically attached to the pleadings[,]” as such documents “are not matters 
outside the pleading.” Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 

 (8th Cir. 
2012)  (internal  citations  omitted).  The  Contracts  are  necessarily  embraced  by  the 
pleadings, despite Plaintiffs’ failure to attach them to the Complaint.  As such, the Court 
will consider them.                                                       
    Plaintiffs allege that “during [the] process” of these property transactions, they hired 
Williams to “review documents.”2 (Compl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs allege that “[d]uring review, 

[Williams]  noticed  that  some  of  the  instruments  were  collateral  securities”  allegedly 

    2 The Court takes judicial notice that Brandon Joe Williams is the principal of 
“Williams & WILLIAMS Law Group,” (“WWLG”) an entity that concedes that it engages 
in the unlicensed practice of law as a matter of course. (See Pl’s Mot. to Compel, Exs. A 
and B [Doc. Nos 23 and 24]; Questions and Answers, Williams & WILLIAMS Law Group, 
https://www.williamsandwilliamslawfirm.com/questionsandanswers (last visited: May 29, 
2024) (hereinafter, “WWLG, Questions and Answers”) (stating, for instance, that “[I am 
a]bsolutely  not  [licensed],  nor  will  I  ever  be.”);  see  generally  About,  Williams  & 
WILLIAMS  Law  Group,  https://www.williamsandwilliamslawfirm.com/about  (last 
visited: May 29, 2024) ((hereinafter, “WWLG, About”).                     
    According to their website, WWLG endorses beliefs concerning the U.S. legal 
system consistent with the Sovereign Citizen movement. (See WWLG, Questions and 
Answers; see also Caesar Kalinowski IV, A Legal Response to the Sovereign Citizen 
Movement, 

, 157-71 (2019) (hereinafter, “Kalinowski, A Legal 
Response”; The Sovereigns: A Dictionary of the Peculiar, Intelligence Report, Southern 
Poverty   Law    Center,   https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-
report/2010/sovereigns-dictionary-peculiar (Aug. 1, 2010) (hereinafter, “A Dictionary of 
the Peculiar”). As this Court has previously explained:                   
    As  explained  by  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,  the  “Sovereign 
    Citizens” movement is based on a theory where they view the “USG [U.S. 
    Government] as bankrupt and without tangible assets; therefore, the USG is 
    believed to use citizens to back U.S. currency. Sovereign citizens believe the 
    USG operates solely on a credit system using American citizens as collateral. 
    Members of this movement think that the federal government has tricked the 
    populace into becoming U.S. citizens by entering into ‘contracts’ embodied 
    in such documents as birth certificates and social security cards. With these 
    contracts, an individual unwittingly creates a fictitious entity (i.e., the U.S. 
    citizen) that represents, but is separate from, the real person. Through these 
    contracts,  individuals  also  unknowingly  pledge  themselves  and  their 
    property, through their newly created fictitious entities, as security for the 
    national debt in exchange for the benefits of citizenship.           
United States v. Graham, Case No. 19-cr-185(2) (SRN/KMM), 

 at *3 n.1 
(D. Minn. Feb. 10, 2020) (cleaned up and citations omitted).              
“exchangeable with the Federal Reserve pursuant to 

.” (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) 
Williams then “rescinded the original blank negotiation unknowingly done by plaintiffs[;]” 

“replaced the previously blank indorsements with special/restrictive indorsements via a 
Limited Power of Attorney[;]” and “informed other indorsing parties that they have the 
option to claim the collateral securities that were indorsed by them[;]” (Id. ¶¶ 13-15.) When 
“[n]o interest in claiming those collateral securities was expressed by any party besides 
plaintiffs[,]” Williams “gave  orders  to  have  those  collateral  securities  exchanged  for 
Federal Reserve Notes and to have those notes placed in escrow.” (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) The 

“collateral securities” in question appear to be various contract documents such as purchase 
agreements and listing contracts, which are allegedly either “promissory note[s]” and thus 
“unconditional  promise[s]  to  pay”  (Id.  ¶¶  18-47)  or  “bill[s]  of  exchange”  and  thus 
“unconditional order[s] to pay.” (Id. ¶¶ 47-60.)                          
    Plaintiffs  allege  that  Hollerman  “ignored  orders  to  have  collateral  securities 

exchanged for Federal Reserve Notes” on instruction from Compass lawyers. (Id. ¶¶ 65-
67.) For this reason, “plaintiffs were not able to complete the purchase of the requested 
home.” (Id. ¶ 68.)                                                        
    B.   Procedural History                                              
    On January 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint in this Court, seeking 

damages for breach of contract and fiduciary duties, a “civil money penalty” pursuant to 
the Federal Reserve Act, 

, and containing allegations that Defendants 
engaged in “laundering of monetary instruments” under 18 U.S.C § 1956; “transportation 
of stolen securities under 

; and “securities and commodities fraud” under 

. (Id. ¶¶ 61-93.)                                         

    Plaintiffs filed a notice of service of process on February 2, 2024, showing that Joey 
Kimbrough—another  individual  associated  with  WWLG—had  sent  copies  of  the 
Complaint to Defendants on January 16, 2024 via certified United States Postal Service 
mail, with Hollerman allegedly receiving his copy on January 22, 2024 and Compass 
allegedly receiving its copy on January 25, 2024. (Notice of Service of Process [Doc. No. 
9].) The certified mail receipt for the delivery to Hollerman was unsigned, while the 

certified mail receipt for the delivery to Compass was signed.            
    On February 15, 2024, Defendants’ counsel contacted Preston Knapp by email to 
set up a time to meet and confer concerning the Complaint. (Declaration of Tessa Mansfield 
Hirte (“Hirte Decl.”) [Doc. No. 37], Ex. C, at 9; see also Declaration of Robert J. Kouba 
(“Second Kouba Decl.”) [Doc. No. 38], Ex. F at 5.) Defendants refused to recognize 

Williams as Plaintiffs’ attorney-in-fact, although eventually agreed to speak with Preston 
Knapp while Williams was also on the phone. (Hirte Decl. at 4-8; Second Kouba Decl. at 
1-4.) The parties also disagreed about the calculation of Defendants’ deadlines to respond. 
(Id.) On February 20, 2024, the parties—as well as Williams and Kimbrough—met and 
conferred via telephone, but were unable to reach a resolution of the Complaint. (Hirte 

Decl. ¶¶ 16, 25.)                                                         
    In lieu of an answer, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on February 20, 2024, 
seeking to dismiss the Complaint for insufficient process and service of process under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4–5) and for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. 
No. 10.] In their briefing in support of their motion to dismiss, however, Defendants 
“generally deny the allegations set forth in the Complaint[,]” except for certain facts that 

they do not dispute. (Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss Br. [Doc. No. 12] at 2.)      
    On February 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel communication with 
Williams  as the Knapps’ “attorney-in-fact”  [Doc. No. 22] and motions for a default 
judgment against each defendant [Doc. Nos. 27 and 30].                    
II.  DISCUSSION                                                           
    A.   Plaintiffs’ Motions For A Default Judgment                      
    Plaintiffs argue that both Hollerman and Compass were properly served by certified 

mail on January 22 and January 25, 2024, respectively, that Hollerman’s counsel appeared 
on his behalf on January 18, 2024, and that neither Defendant answered the Complaint or 
obtained an extension of time to respond within 21 days of being served. (Mot. for Default 
for Hollerman [Doc. No. 27]; Mot. for Default for Compass [Doc. No. 30].) Defendants 
argue that neither party was properly served pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, and that even if 

it were, Compass responded within 21 days.                                
         1.   Legal Standard                                             
    Pursuant to Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may obtain a 
default judgment where “a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought 
has failed to plead or otherwise defend[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Default judgments are 
disfavored and should be granted sparingly. See In re Jones Truck Lines, Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted). “When determining whether a Default 
Judgment is appropriate, the Court must consider whether the assertedly defaulting party 
has filed a responsive Answer, or other pleading, prior to an entry of Default Judgment.” 
Semler v. Klang, 

 (D. Minn. 2009). Defendants also 

cannot be held in default for failing to respond when they have not been properly served 
by plaintiffs. See Norysn v. Dasai, 

, 829 (8th Cir. 2003).    
    Pursuant to Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, individuals and corporations have distinct 
rules for whether service is valid. Service on an individual is governed by Rule 4(e), and 
must be done by either:                                                   

    (1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts 
      of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or 
      where service is made; or                                          
    (2) doing any of the following:                                      
         A. delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the 
           individual personally;                                        
         B. leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place 
           of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides 
           there; or                                                     
         C. delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment 
           or by law to receive service of process.”                     
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Service on a corporation, partnership or association is governed by 
Rule 4(h), and for service within a judicial district of the United States, service can be 
effectuated by either:                                                    
    A. [following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts 
      of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or 
      where service is made]; or                                         
    B. by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, 
      a  managing  or  general  agent,  or  any  other  agent  authorized  by 
      appointment or by law to receive service of process and--if the agent is 
      one authorized by statute and the statute so requires--by also mailing a 
      copy of each to the defendant; or                                  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A)-(B).                                           
    Under Minnesota law, individuals and corporations also have distinct rules for 
whether service is valid. For personal service, service is effectuated:   
    A. Upon an individual by delivering a copy to the individual personally or 
      by leaving a copy at the individual's usual place of abode with some 
      person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein …      
    C. Upon a domestic or foreign corporation by delivering a copy to an officer 
      or  managing  agent,  or  to  any  other  agent  authorized  expressly  or 
      impliedly or designated by statute to receive service of summons, and if 
      the agent is one authorized or designated under statute to receive service 
      any statutory provision for the manner of such service shall be complied 
      with.                                                              
Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03. Certified mail is not a valid form of service under Minnesota law. 
See Melillo v. Heitland, 

 (Minn. 2016); Nieszner v. St. Paul School Dist. 
No. 625, 

 (Minn. 2002).3                                    
         2.   Analysis                                                   
    Plaintiffs cannot obtain a default judgment against Defendants, as Defendants were 
not properly served under Rule 4. According to Plaintiffs’ Notice of Service of Process, 
both Defendants were served through certified mail. Plaintiffs do not allege that they 
attempted to serve Defendants in any other way. As this form of service is improper, 
Defendants were not validly served, and therefore there is no basis on which the Court 

    3 While Minnesota previously allowed service by mail under certain circumstances, 
the 2018 amendments to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 4.05 have replaced this 
procedure with a “Waiver of Service.” See Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05, advisory committee's 
note to 2018 amendments.                                                  
would grant a default judgment. As such, the Court denies the motion, and need not reach 
the parties’ other arguments relating to Plaintiffs’ motion for a default judgment. 

    B.   Motion To Dismiss                                               
    Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any breach of contract 
or breach of fiduciary duty claim against them, but only alleged certain “unfounded legal 
conclusions” that “(1) the contracts in question are securities; (2) Hollerman and Compass 
are banks within the meaning of Title 12; (3) Defendants breached unidentified contracts 
and fiduciary duties by refusing to follow the “orders” of Williams; and (4) the Knapps can 

act as prosecutors to enforce the criminal code[.]” (Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 3.) 
Defendants argue that these contracts—alleged to be either “promissory note[s]” or “bill[s] 
of exchange” (Id. ¶¶ 18-60)—are not “collateral securities,” Defendants are not “reserve 
banks,” and 

 does not provide a private right of action, together making 
Plaintiffs’ alleged “orders” nonsensical and impossible. (Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 3-4.) 

Given that, Defendants argue that no facts are alleged that plausibly plead any breach of 
contract or fiduciary duty. (Id. at 10-12.) Moreover, Defendants argue that civil penalties 
under 

 are not legally available, and Plaintiffs’ alleged criminal claims—
the subject of Counts III-VI of the Complaint—have no basis in the law, as there is no 
private right of action under this civil or any relevant criminal statute and no claims are 

plausibly alleged.  (Id. at 12-17.)                                       
    Plaintiffs argue that their pleadings meet the standard to survive a motion to dismiss, 
due to the more lenient treatment accorded pro se plaintiffs. (Pl. Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 4.) 
Plaintiffs argue that under “broad definitions and existing case law,” the Contracts can be 
interpreted as collateral securities, that banking regulations provide “principles” that can 
be “analogously applied” to the Contracts, and that a private right of action could be found 

in the Federal Reserve Act. (Id. at 13-15.) Plaintiffs argue that as such, Defendants fail to 
“consider the broader fiduciary and contractual responsibilities that may arise from the 
agency relationship” between the parties, and that more information will be elucidated 
during discovery proving their claims. (Id. at 17-21.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Counts 
III-VI of the Complaint do not constitute distinct causes of action, but rather “are alleged 
to  provide  a  legal  basis  and  context  for Defendants'  conduct, which Plaintiffs  claim 

breached the standards of behavior expected under the civil obligations of contract and 
fiduciary duty.” (Id. at 27; see id. at 22-30.)                           
         1.   Legal Standard                                             
    When considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court 
accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and views those allegations in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Hager v. Ark. Dep’t of Health, 

 (8th 
Cir. 2013). However, the Court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations or 
legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. 

 To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

 (2007). Although a complaint need not 

contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must contain facts with enough specificity “to raise 
a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

. “Threadbare recitals of the elements 
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are insufficient. Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 

 (2009) (citing Twombly, 

).     
    Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, but they still must allege sufficient 
facts to support the claims advanced. See Stone v. Harry, 

 (8th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, “a court is under no obligation to repeatedly accept baseless filings, particularly 
those of the sovereign citizen fashion.” Siruk v. State of Minnesota, Case No. 20-CV-2373 
(WMW/KMM),   

  at  *3  (D.  Minn.  Feb  22,  2021),  report  and 
recommendation adopted 

(D. Minn. Apr. 22, 2021) (citing cases across 
Eighth Circuit district courts).                                          

         2.   Analysis                                                   
    Plaintiffs’ arguments are unavailing. As Defendants accurately argue, Plaintiffs 
have not alleged any facts plausibly demonstrating that the Contracts are “negotiable 
instruments”  or  “collateral  securities.”  As  the  Contracts  are  not  collateral  securities, 
Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Defendants breached their contractual or fiduciary 
duties by refusing to exchange the Contracts for Federal Reserve Notes and place those 

Federal Reserve Notes in escrow. Similarly, as there are no private rights of action under 
the civil and criminal statutes alleged, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any cause of 
action under these statutes.                                              
         a.   Nature of the Contracts                                    
    Minnesota  law,  mirroring  the  Uniform  Commercial  Code  (“UCC”),  defines  a 
negotiable instrument as “an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of 

money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it: (1) 
is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a 
holder; (2) is payable on demand or at a definite time[.]” 

. “[A] 
promise or order is unconditional unless it states (i) an express condition to payment.” 

(a).                                               

    Plaintiffs  have  not  plausibly  alleged  that  these  Contracts  are  “unconditional 
promises to pay.” Each Contract contains at least one express condition to payment. The 
Buyer and Seller Representation Contracts require that the seller find the buyer’s offer 
acceptable,  and  that  any  agreed-upon  transaction  must  successfully  close.  (Seller 
Representation  Contract  at  1,  4;  Buyer  Representation  Contract  at  2.)  The  Purchase 
Agreement and Sale Agreement include various conditions, including mortgage financing 

contingencies, inspection contingencies, and contingencies for the sale of the buyer’s 
property. (Purchase Agreement at 2-5; Sale Agreement at 2-9.)             
    Further, these Contracts are not “collateral  securities” subject to  exchange for 
Federal Reserve Notes pursuant to 

. Section 412, in full, provides that: 
    Any Federal Reserve bank may make application to the local Federal Reserve 
    agent for such amount of the Federal Reserve notes hereinbefore provided 
    for as it may require. Such application shall be accompanied with a tender to 
    the local Federal Reserve agent of collateral in amount equal to the sum of 
    the Federal Reserve notes thus applied for and issued pursuant to such 
    application. The collateral security thus offered shall be notes, drafts, 
    bills of exchange, or acceptances acquired under section 92, 342 to 348, 
    349 to 352, 361, 372, or 373 of this title, or bills of exchange endorsed by 
    a member bank of any Federal Reserve district and purchased under    
    the provisions of sections 348a and 353 to 359 of this title, or bankers' 
    acceptances purchased under the provisions of said sections 348a and 
    353 to 359 of this title, or gold certificates, or Special Drawing Right 
    certificates, or any obligations which are direct obligations of, or are 
    fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States or any 
    agency thereof, or assets that Federal Reserve banks may purchase or 
    hold under sections 348a and 353 to 359 of this title or any other asset of 
    a Federal Reserve bank. In no event shall such collateral security be less 
    than the amount of Federal Reserve notes applied for. The Federal Reserve 
    agent shall each day notify the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
    System of all issues and withdrawals of Federal Reserve notes to and by the 
    Federal Reserve bank to which he is accredited. The said Board of Governors 
    of the Federal Reserve System may at any time call upon a Federal Reserve 
    bank for additional security to protect the Federal Reserve notes issued to it. 
    Collateral shall not be required for Federal Reserve notes which are held in 
    the vaults of, or are otherwise held by or on behalf of, Federal Reserve banks. 
(emphasis added). The Contracts cannot plausibly be characterized as any of these defined 
“collateral securities.”                                                  
    Moreover, this provision plainly does not apply to Defendants. By its terms, 

 expressly applies to the right of “Federal Reserve bank[s]” to obtain Federal 
Reserve notes. Plaintiffs have expressly disclaimed the argument that Defendants are 
Federal Reserve banks within the meaning of the statute, and Defendants do not meet the 
definition of a “Federal Reserve bank”—nor any other kind of bank—under Title 12. 

.                                                             
    As the Contracts cannot be plausibly characterized as negotiable instruments or 
securities of any kind under state or federal law, and as Defendants are not banks, the 
Contracts cannot be redeemed as “bills of exchange” for Federal Reserve notes.4 


    4  Plaintiffs’  argument  appears  to  be  a  variation  on  the  “redemption”  scheme 
propounded by the sovereign citizen movement. This scheme, “equal parts revisionist legal 
history and conspiracy theory[,]” rests on the belief that through “contracts” with the 
Federal government such as birth certificates and Social Security cards, U.S. citizens 
maintain  both  a  flesh-and-blood  existence  and  a  fictitious  entity  or  “strawman”  that 
represents, but is separate from, the real person. See Bryant v. Washington Mutual Bank, 

 (W.D.Va. 2007) (discussing the sovereign citizen “redemption” 
scheme); see also Kalinowski, A Legal Response, at 164-67. Sovereign citizens believe 
that, beginning in 1933, the Federal Reserve “began issuing private commercial debt 
instruments known as ‘Federal Reserve Notes’[, and i]n order to meet the demand for ever 
growing federal spending, the government assigned all U.S. born citizens—present and 
future—as collateral.” Kalinowski, A Legal Response, at 164-67.           
         b.   Breach of Contractual And/Or Fiduciary Duties              
    Plaintiffs have not plausibly identified any specific contractual provision in the 
Contracts or any other Contract that Defendants have breached. On its own review, the 

Court notes that the only term that could possibly be construed to create such a duty is 
located in the Buyer Representation Contract, which Contract requires that Hollerman “act 
in [Plaintiffs’] best interest at all times, subject to any limitations imposed by law or dual 
agency.” (Buyer Representation Contract at 1.)                            

    Sovereign citizens believe that through “redemption,” “a process that looks similar 
to divestment from an artificial person, the Sovereign Citizen can separate himself from 
the fictitious strawman and make use of the funds that are located in the Treasury Direct 
Account [or TDA, a government account containing money borrowed by the Federal 
government based on pledging the property and assets of every U.S. citizen].” 

 A bill of 
exchange “purportedly accesses the [TDA], which [sovereign citizens] believe contains the 
balance of the strawman’s bond[.]” Id. at 166; see also A Dictionary of the Peculiar 
(describing a bill of exchange as a “fake check”).                        
    While most cases considered by this Court’s sister courts have concerned a party’s 
attempts  to  pay  for  goods  and  services  with  a  “bill  of  exchange,”  the  demand  that 
Defendants exchange the Contracts for Federal Reserve Notes, i.e., cash, is closely related. 
These versions of the “redemption” scheme are called the “vapor money” theory. “The 
essence of the ‘vapor money’ theory is that promissory notes (and similar instruments) are 
the equivalent of  ‘money’ that citizens literally ‘create’ with their signatures.” McLaughlin 
v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 

 (D. Conn. 2010).            
    This District and other courts across the country have consistently rejected the 
“redemption” and “vapor money” theories as frivolous and nonsensical. See Connell v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Civil No. 10–3133 (MJD/FLN), 

 at *2 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 19, 2011) (citing Hennis v. Trustmark Bank, No. CIV.A.210CV20KSMTP, 

, *5 (S.D. Miss. May 10, 2010)); Baker v. CitiMortgage, Inc., Civil No. 
16–1103(DSD/JSM), 

 at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2016) (“There is no legal 
authority that supports the “vapor money” theory.”); see also Bryant, 

; Harp v. Police, No. CV 23-2577, 

 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 10, 2023); 
Sanders  v.  MTC  Financial  Incorporated,  No.  CV-22-00066-TUC-SHR,  

 at *4 (D. Az. July 11, 2022); Robertson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, No. 10–
CV–1110–BR, 

 at *7-9 (D. Ore. May 20, 2011).               
    However,  Plaintiffs  have  not  plausibly  alleged  any  way  in  which  Defendants 
breached their duty to “act in Plaintiffs’ best interest[.]” Plaintiffs fail to identify any case 

law supporting the argument that Defendants could plausibly breach their contractual duty 
through their refusal to follow Williams’ “orders” to engage in an at-best fruitless effort to 
exchange the Contracts for Federal Reserve Notes. This is no surprise: a party’s failure to 
engage in unlawful or genuinely impossible acts cannot be the basis for a breach-of-
contract claim. See generally Robb v. Parten, 

, 516 (Minn. 1929) (Hilton, J., 
dissenting) (“In this state however the rule was early adopted, without qualification, that 

one who binds himself by express contract to do something in itself possible must perform 
his engagement unless prevented by an act of God, the law, or the other party.”) 
    Similarly, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege any breach of a fiduciary duty. “To 
prevail on a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must prove four elements: duty, 
breach, causation, and damages.” TCI Bus. Capital, Inc. v. Five Star Am. Die Casting, LLC, 

 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017). Real estate brokers like Defendants owe 
various fiduciary duties to their client, including duties of good faith and loyalty, to act in 
the clients’ best interests, carry out their clients’ lawful instructions, and to communicate 
“all  facts  of  which  he  has  knowledge  which  might  affect  the  principal’s  rights  or 
interests[,]” See White v. Boucher, 

 (Minn. 1982); see also 

.                                                                  
    Plaintiffs argue that “the discovery process will provide evidence that Defendants 
breached the fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty[,]” because Defendants’ argument 
that  the  exchange  of  the  Contracts  for  Federal  Reserve  Notes  was  “unlawful  and 
impossible” is baseless, and Plaintiffs can prove and have plausibly alleged that Defendants 
acted contrary to Plaintiffs’ best interests. (Pl. Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 20.) 

    As there is no legal support for the proposition that the Contracts are negotiable 
instruments, collateral securities, or otherwise exchangeable for Federal Reserve Notes, 
Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Defendants have violated any fiduciary duties to 
the Knapps by failing to perform a plainly impossible and unlawful act. As such, Plaintiffs’ 
claims that Defendants violated their fiduciary duties is unavailing, and the Court dismisses 
these claims.                                                             

         c.   Civil And Criminal Penalties                               
    Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Defendants are civilly liable pursuant to 
the Federal Reserve Act, or criminally liable for “laundering of monetary instruments” 
under 18 U.S.C § 1956; “transportation of stolen securities under 

; and 
“securities and commodities fraud” under 

.                

    Plaintiffs concede that Defendants are not civilly liable under 

, and 
that references to this statutory provision are “not intended to assert that Defendants are 
banks or that they are directly liable under these banking statutes[,]” but rather “[t]he 
reference to banking statutes within the Complaint is meant to provide context to the 
allegations regarding the nature of the breaches of contract and fiduciary duty.” (Pl. Mot. 

to Dismiss Br. at 23.) Similarly, Plaintiffs concede that they do not seek to invoke a private 
right of action to enforce the federal criminal statutes in question, but instead raise these 
criminal statutes to “provide a legal basis and context for Defendants' conduct, which 
Plaintiffs claim breached the standards of behavior expected under the civil obligations of 
contract and fiduciary duty.” (Id. at 27.)                                

    As discussed supra, Plaintiffs’ arguments that they have plausibly alleged a breach 
of contract and or breach of fiduciary duty by Defendants are unavailing. These civil and 
criminal statutory provisions provide no insight, context, or legal basis for the Court to find 
such a breach or violation. As such, the Court dismisses these claims.    
         d.   Conclusion                                                 
    Construing Plaintiffs’ complaint liberally, accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, 

and viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have, as a 
matter of law, not alleged any breach of contract or violation of a fiduciary duty, and thus 
not stated a claim on which relief can be granted. As such, the Court dismisses all of 
Plaintiffs’ claims, and grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.             
    C.   Motion To Compel Communication With Williams                    
    Plaintiffs argue that Defendants must communicate with Williams, as he is their 

“attorney-in-fact” pursuant to 

 as designated by “limited power of 
attorney” documents executed by Plaintiffs and Williams (See Pl’s Mot. to Compel [Doc. 
No. 22], Exs. A-C [Doc. Nos. 23-25].) They argue that Defendants’ refusal to communicate 
with Williams, despite his lack of licensure as an attorney, “obstructs Mr. Knapp's statutory 
rights  and  due process[,]”  and  that  Plaintiffs’  legitimate choice  of  representation”  is 

protected by their “fundamental due process rights[.]” (Id. at 2.; see also Pls’ Reply Br. 
[Doc. No. 43] at 2-3.)                                                    
    Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ motion, styled a “motion to compel” and thus 
falling under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, is entirely baseless. Defendants argue that the “limited 

power of attorney” documents do not create circumstances under which a party may be 
liable for refusing to accept the authority of an attorney-in-fact under Minnesota law, and 
that even if these documents validly created an attorney-in-fact relationship between the 
Knapps and Williams, Defendants are not obligated to communicate with Williams and 
therefore participate in his unlicensed practice of law. (Defs’ Mot. to Compel Br. [Doc. 
No. 36] at 6-11.) Defendants also argue that pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B), the 

Court must grant them reasonable expenses including attorney’s fees for the costs of 
defending Plaintiff’s motion. (Id. at 11-12.)                             
         1.   Legal Standard                                             
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 provides the standard for motions to compel. Pursuant to the rule, 
“On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may move for an order 

compelling disclosure or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). The Rule enumerates three 
types of motions that may be brought: 1) a motion “to compel disclosure”; 2) a motion “to 
compel a discovery response”; and 3) a motion “related to a deposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
37(a)(3). If such a motion is denied, the Court “must, after giving an opportunity to be 
heard, require the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or both to pay the party…who 

opposed the motion its reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including 
attorney's fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B). The fees provision does not apply if “the 
motion was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust.” 

                                                              
    There  is  no  provision  under  the  Rule  allowing  for  a  motion  to  compel 
communication with a third party. Plaintiffs also cite to this Court’s Local Rule 7.1, 

although no provision for such a motion exists under the Local Rules. As such, the Court 
considers this motion under the closest federal rule available, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. 
         2.   Liability For Refusal To Communicate With Williams         
    Defendant’s argument that they are not liable for their refusal to communicate with 
Plaintiffs’ desired representatives is persuasive. While 

 creates liability 
for a party who does not accept the authority of an attorney-in-fact, liability only exists if 

all six of the criteria enumerated under the statute are met.             
    First, for liability to exist, 

 requires that the power of attorney 
in question “is executed in conformity with section 523.23 or a form prepared under section 
523.231[.]” Pursuant to 

:                             
    Except for a form prepared under section 523.231, to constitute a “statutory 
    short form power of attorney [for military members in active service],” as 
    this phrase is used in this chapter the wording and content of the form in 
    subdivision 1 must be duplicated exactly and with no modifications, parts 
    First, Second, and Third must be properly completed, and the signature of 
    the principal must be acknowledged. Failure to name a successor attorney-
    in-fact, to provide an expiration date, or to complete part Fourth does not 
    invalidate the power as a statutory short form power of attorney. A power of 
    attorney that does not satisfy the requirements of this subdivision or a 
    form prepared under section 523.231, but purports to be a statutory  
    short form power of attorney, may constitute a common law power of   
    attorney  that  incorporates  by  reference  the  definitions  of  powers 
    contained in section 523.24; however, a party refusing to accept the 
    authority of the common law attorney-in-fact is not liable under section 
    523.20.                                                              

, Subd. 3. (emphasis added, and edited for clarity). Second, for powers 
of attorney executed on or after January 1, 2014, 

 requires that the 
power of attorney “contain[] an acknowledgement that the attorney-in-fact has read and 
understood the notice to the attorney-in-fact required under section 523.23 [,]” and 

, Subd. 1 provides specific language to this effect.        
    Plaintiffs’ limited power of attorney does not conform with the language of the form 
provided in 

, nor do they include the required acknowledgement. As 
such, Defendants have no liability for their refusal to communicate with Williams. 
         3.   Validity Of Plaintiffs’ Demand To Communicate              
    Regardless  of  whether  Defendants  can  be  held  liable  for  their  refusal  to 

communicate with Williams, Plaintiffs’ demand that they do so is itself unavailing, as 
Plaintiffs  cannot  validly  demand  that  Defendants  participate  in  Williams’  unlicensed 
practice of law.                                                          
    

 sets forth the types of powers that may be granted to an 
attorney-in-fact  pursuant  Minnesota’s  statutory  short  form  power  of  attorney,  which 

includes the ability of an attorney-in-fact to pursue legal claims on behalf of the principal. 
However, in In re Conservatorship of Riebel, 

 (Minn. 2001), the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that a power of attorney does not authorize a non-attorney to act as an 
attorney on behalf of the principal. 

; accord Prior Lake State Bank v. Mahoney, 

 (Minn. 1974). The court explained:                         

    The more reasonable interpretation of the statutory language is that a power 
    of attorney authorizes the attorney-in-fact to act on behalf of the principal as 
    the client in an attorney-client relationship. That is, the attorney-in-fact may 
    make  decisions  concerning  litigation  for  the  principal,  but  a  nonlawyer 
    attorney-in-fact is not authorized to act as an attorney to implement those 
    decisions. Consistent with this reading, 

, subd. 10(8) 
    authorizes an attorney-in-fact to hire an attorney-at-law to act on behalf of 
    the principal.                                                       
Id. at 482-83 (cleaned up and internal citations omitted).                
    

 describes the various forms of conduct that are considered the 
unauthorized practice of law under Minnesota law. These include:          
    [T]o appear as attorney or counselor at law in any action or proceeding in 
    any court in this state to maintain, conduct, or defend the same, except 
    personally as a party thereto in other than a representative capacity, or, by 
    word, sign, letter, or advertisement, to hold out as competent or qualified to 
    give legal advice or counsel, or to prepare legal documents, or as being 
    engaged in advising or counseling in law or acting as attorney or counselor 
    at law, or in furnishing to others the services of a lawyer or lawyers, or, for a 
    fee or any consideration, to give legal advice or counsel, perform for or 
    furnish to another legal services…                                   

, Subd. 1.; see also In re Disciplinary Action Against Ray, 

  (Minn.  1990)  (advising  clients  in  legal  matter  and  attempting  to  negotiate 
settlement is the practice of law); Fitchette v. Taylor, 

 (1934) (giving 
advice regarding legal status and rights of another is the practice of law). The State of 
Minnesota has a strong public policy against the unlicensed practice of law. Individuals or 
corporations engaged in the unlicensed practice of law are guilty of a misdemeanor, and 
county attorneys, the Minnesota Attorney General, and private parties injured by the 
unlicensed practice of law are authorized to seek injunctive and monetary relief. See 

, Subd. 8; 

.                              
    In his “representation” of Plaintiffs, Williams engaged in several of the activities 
proscribed for non-attorneys under Minnesota law. Williams has, based on both Plaintiffs’ 
representations and his own representations, provided legal advice to Plaintiffs such that 
he is “controlling…what is occurring.” (See Hirte Decl. ¶¶ 12-23; see also Second Kouba 
Decl., Ex. E.) While Williams does not hold himself out as a licensed attorney, he does 

hold himself out as competent to give legal advice, prepare legal documents, and furnish 
the services of a lawyer in exchange for a substantial fee on WWLG’s website. (See 
WWLG, Questions and Answers.) Similarly, while Kimbrough has not communicated in 
writing with Defendants, he holds himself out as competent to provide legal advice, joined 
the parties’ meet-and-confer while purporting to act as Plaintiffs’ attorney-in-fact, and has 
participated in this suit as the signatory for Plaintiffs’ affidavits of service. (See WWLG, 

About; Hirte Decl. ¶ 17; Notice of Service of Process.)5                  
    Plaintiffs’  argument  that  their  choice  of  legal  representative  is  protected  by 
“fundamental due process rights” is also unpersuasive. States’ right to regulate the practice 
of law within their jurisdiction, including prohibiting individuals who are not licensed to 
practice law from representing clients, is well-established. See Nowicki v. Voss, 

 (Table) at *2-3 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 

 (1995) (upholding Wisconsin law barring the unlicensed practice of law); see also 
Pilla v. American Bar Ass’n, 

 (8th Cir. 1976) (upholding that “federal and state 
requirements that the practice of law in the courts be limited to persons who are licensed 
attorneys  and  who  are  qualified  to  so  practice  by  training  and  by  character”  are 


    5 Kimbrough has also been previously warned by other courts to cease his attempts 
to engage in the unlicensed practice of law, which he has done in both state and federal 
courts. See JMC Prop. Grp., LLC v. Fortune Co., Inc., 

, *7-
8 (S. D. Ind. Mar. 14, 2023); Kimbrough v. Fortune Co., Inc., No. 23-2119, 

 (7th Cir. Dec. 21, 2023).                                         
constitutional). As a result, Plaintiffs do not have the absolute right to be represented by 
anyone.                                                                   

    In light of Minnesota’s strong public policy against the unlicensed practice of law, 
ordering Defendants to communicate with an individual engaged in the unlicensed practice 
of law would place Defendants in an absurd position. The Court will not do so, and denies 
Plaintiffs’ motion to compel communication with Williams.                 
         4.   Reward Of Costs And Fees                                   
    Defendants also request reasonable costs and fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

37(a)(5)(B).   The Court must grant Defendants their reasonable expenses incurred in 
opposing  Plaintiffs’  motion,  including  attorney's  fees,  unless  Plaintiffs’  motion  was 
substantially justified or the award of expenses would be unjust.  Plaintiffs’ motion to 
compel communication was not substantially justified, and an award of expenses would 
not be unjust. As such, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for costs and fees as related to 

the motion.                                                               
III.  ORDER                                                               
    Based  on  the  submissions  and  the  entire  file  and  proceedings  herein,  IT  IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that:                                                      

    1.   Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 10] is GRANTED, and the 
         claims against Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;         
    2.   Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Communication with Attorney-in-Fact [Doc. 
         No. 22] is DENIED;                                              
    3.   Plaintiffs’ Motions for Default Judgment as to Hollerman [Doc. No. 27] and 
         Compass [Doc. No. 30] are DENIED;                               

    4.   Defendants shall submit an affidavit and supporting evidence showing their 
         reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses associated with the Motion to 
         Compel Communication [Doc. No. 22] on or before June 14, 2024;  

    5.   Plaintiffs may file a responsive brief by not later than July 3, 2024, limited 
         to addressing the reasonableness of the defendants' attorneys' fees and costs. 


LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY                                       

Dated: June 4, 2024                  s/ Susan Richard Nelson              
                                    SUSAN RICHARD NELSON                 
                                    United States District Judge         

                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Preston Byron Knapp and Michelle   Case No. 24-cv-00100 (SRN-DTS)        
Nichole Knapp,                                                           

          Plaintiffs,                                                    
                                  MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND                
v.                                          ORDER                        

Compass Minnesota, LLC, and Daniel                                       
Philip Hollerman,                                                        

          Defendants.                                                    


Plaintiffs Preston Byron Knapp and Michelle Nichole Knapp, 2624 North Saunders Lake 
Drive, Minnestrista, MN 55364, pro se.                                   

Michael Kernstock and Tessa A. Mansfield, Foley & Mansfield, PLLP, 250 Marquette 
Ave S, Suite 1200, Minneapolis, MN 55401, for Defendant Compass Minnesota, LLC. 

Carl E. Christensen, Robert J. Kouba, and Ryan Supple, Christensen Sampsel PLLC 
305 North Fifth Avenue, Suite 375, Minneapolis, MN 55401 for Defendant Daniel Philip 
Hollerman.                                                               


SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge                        
    This  matter  is  before  the  Court  on  Defendants  Compass  Minnesota,  LLC 
(“Compass”) and Daniel Philip Hollerman’s (“Hollerman”) (collectively, “Defendants”) 
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint [Doc. No. 10]; Plaintiffs Preston Byron Knapp and 
Michelle  Nichole  Knapp’s  (the  “Knapps”  or  “Plaintiffs”)  Motion  to  Compel 
Communication with Attorney-in-Fact [Doc. No. 22]; the Knapps’ Motion for Default 
Judgment as to Hollerman [Doc. No. 27]; and the Knapps’ Motion for Default Judgment 
as to Compass [Doc. No. 30].                                              
    Based on a review of the files, submissions, and proceedings herein, and for the 
reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, and 

DENIES Plaintiffs’ motions.                                               
I.   BACKGROUND                                                           
    Plaintiffs’ Complaint (“Compl.”) [Doc. No. 1] concerns Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ 
involvement in a real property transaction. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants breached their 
contract with and fiduciary duties towards Plaintiffs and engaged in other malfeasance by 
refusing to follow the instructions of Brandon Joe Williams (“Williams”), Plaintiffs’ 

“attorney-in-fact,” to have “collateral securities exchanged for Federal Reserve Notes and 
to have those notes placed in escrow.” (Compl. ¶¶ 9-17.) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ 
complaint fails to plausibly allege a breach of contract and/or a breach of fiduciary duty, 
and that they have no legal responsibility to communicate with Williams.  
    A.   Factual Background                                              
    The Knapps reside in Hennepin County, Minnesota. (Compl. ¶ 1). Compass is a 

national real estate sales company operating in Minnesota, and Hollerman works as an 
agent for them. (Def’s Mot. to Dismiss Br. [Doc. No. 12] at 2.) The parties do not dispute 
that the Knapps engaged Hollerman to sell their then-current home as well as purchase a 
new home. (Id.)                                                           
    The  parties  executed  several  agreements  as  part  of  this  engagement.  (See 

Declaration of Robert J. Kouba (“First Kouba Decl.”) [Doc. No. 13], Exs. A-D (together, 
the “Contracts”.)1 Hollerman and the Knapps executed a buyer representation contract on 
August 29, 2023, granting Hollerman the exclusive right to “locate and/or to assist in 

negotiations for the purchase, exchange of or option to [purchase] property located in 
Minnesota at a price and with terms acceptable to Buyer[.]” (First Kouba Decl., Ex. B (the 
“Buyer Representation Contract”) at 1.) The parties also executed a listing contract on 
September 15, 2023, granting Hollerman the exclusive right to sell their home at 2624 
North Saunders Lake Drive in Minnetrista, Minnesota. (First Kouba Decl., Ex. A (the 
“Seller Representation Contract”).) Under representation, the Knapps signed a purchase 

agreement on August 29, 2023 for a property at 9350 Forest Road in Cannon Falls, 
Minnesota for $2,450,000. (First Kouba Decl., Ex. D (the “Purchase Agreement”).) The 
Knapps later accepted an offer for their North Saunders Lake Drive property in the amount 
of $1,150,000 on October 10, 2023. (First Kouba Decl., Ex. C (the “Sale Agreement”).)  





    1 Plaintiffs argue that the Court may not consider these documents for purposes of 
this motion because they are “hearsay” as an “unsworn declaration from the attorney of 
record[.]” (Pl. Mot. to Dismiss Br. [Doc. No. 35] at 17.)                 
    Plaintiffs’ argument is unavailing. In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may 
also consider documents “necessarily embraced by the pleadings, including documents 
whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but 
which are not physically attached to the pleadings[,]” as such documents “are not matters 
outside the pleading.” Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 

 (8th Cir. 
2012)  (internal  citations  omitted).  The  Contracts  are  necessarily  embraced  by  the 
pleadings, despite Plaintiffs’ failure to attach them to the Complaint.  As such, the Court 
will consider them.                                                       
    Plaintiffs allege that “during [the] process” of these property transactions, they hired 
Williams to “review documents.”2 (Compl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs allege that “[d]uring review, 

[Williams]  noticed  that  some  of  the  instruments  were  collateral  securities”  allegedly 

    2 The Court takes judicial notice that Brandon Joe Williams is the principal of 
“Williams & WILLIAMS Law Group,” (“WWLG”) an entity that concedes that it engages 
in the unlicensed practice of law as a matter of course. (See Pl’s Mot. to Compel, Exs. A 
and B [Doc. Nos 23 and 24]; Questions and Answers, Williams & WILLIAMS Law Group, 
https://www.williamsandwilliamslawfirm.com/questionsandanswers (last visited: May 29, 
2024) (hereinafter, “WWLG, Questions and Answers”) (stating, for instance, that “[I am 
a]bsolutely  not  [licensed],  nor  will  I  ever  be.”);  see  generally  About,  Williams  & 
WILLIAMS  Law  Group,  https://www.williamsandwilliamslawfirm.com/about  (last 
visited: May 29, 2024) ((hereinafter, “WWLG, About”).                     
    According to their website, WWLG endorses beliefs concerning the U.S. legal 
system consistent with the Sovereign Citizen movement. (See WWLG, Questions and 
Answers; see also Caesar Kalinowski IV, A Legal Response to the Sovereign Citizen 
Movement, 

, 157-71 (2019) (hereinafter, “Kalinowski, A Legal 
Response”; The Sovereigns: A Dictionary of the Peculiar, Intelligence Report, Southern 
Poverty   Law    Center,   https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-
report/2010/sovereigns-dictionary-peculiar (Aug. 1, 2010) (hereinafter, “A Dictionary of 
the Peculiar”). As this Court has previously explained:                   
    As  explained  by  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,  the  “Sovereign 
    Citizens” movement is based on a theory where they view the “USG [U.S. 
    Government] as bankrupt and without tangible assets; therefore, the USG is 
    believed to use citizens to back U.S. currency. Sovereign citizens believe the 
    USG operates solely on a credit system using American citizens as collateral. 
    Members of this movement think that the federal government has tricked the 
    populace into becoming U.S. citizens by entering into ‘contracts’ embodied 
    in such documents as birth certificates and social security cards. With these 
    contracts, an individual unwittingly creates a fictitious entity (i.e., the U.S. 
    citizen) that represents, but is separate from, the real person. Through these 
    contracts,  individuals  also  unknowingly  pledge  themselves  and  their 
    property, through their newly created fictitious entities, as security for the 
    national debt in exchange for the benefits of citizenship.           
United States v. Graham, Case No. 19-cr-185(2) (SRN/KMM), 

 at *3 n.1 
(D. Minn. Feb. 10, 2020) (cleaned up and citations omitted).              
“exchangeable with the Federal Reserve pursuant to 

.” (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) 
Williams then “rescinded the original blank negotiation unknowingly done by plaintiffs[;]” 

“replaced the previously blank indorsements with special/restrictive indorsements via a 
Limited Power of Attorney[;]” and “informed other indorsing parties that they have the 
option to claim the collateral securities that were indorsed by them[;]” (Id. ¶¶ 13-15.) When 
“[n]o interest in claiming those collateral securities was expressed by any party besides 
plaintiffs[,]” Williams “gave  orders  to  have  those  collateral  securities  exchanged  for 
Federal Reserve Notes and to have those notes placed in escrow.” (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) The 

“collateral securities” in question appear to be various contract documents such as purchase 
agreements and listing contracts, which are allegedly either “promissory note[s]” and thus 
“unconditional  promise[s]  to  pay”  (Id.  ¶¶  18-47)  or  “bill[s]  of  exchange”  and  thus 
“unconditional order[s] to pay.” (Id. ¶¶ 47-60.)                          
    Plaintiffs  allege  that  Hollerman  “ignored  orders  to  have  collateral  securities 

exchanged for Federal Reserve Notes” on instruction from Compass lawyers. (Id. ¶¶ 65-
67.) For this reason, “plaintiffs were not able to complete the purchase of the requested 
home.” (Id. ¶ 68.)                                                        
    B.   Procedural History                                              
    On January 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint in this Court, seeking 

damages for breach of contract and fiduciary duties, a “civil money penalty” pursuant to 
the Federal Reserve Act, 

, and containing allegations that Defendants 
engaged in “laundering of monetary instruments” under 18 U.S.C § 1956; “transportation 
of stolen securities under 

; and “securities and commodities fraud” under 

. (Id. ¶¶ 61-93.)                                         

    Plaintiffs filed a notice of service of process on February 2, 2024, showing that Joey 
Kimbrough—another  individual  associated  with  WWLG—had  sent  copies  of  the 
Complaint to Defendants on January 16, 2024 via certified United States Postal Service 
mail, with Hollerman allegedly receiving his copy on January 22, 2024 and Compass 
allegedly receiving its copy on January 25, 2024. (Notice of Service of Process [Doc. No. 
9].) The certified mail receipt for the delivery to Hollerman was unsigned, while the 

certified mail receipt for the delivery to Compass was signed.            
    On February 15, 2024, Defendants’ counsel contacted Preston Knapp by email to 
set up a time to meet and confer concerning the Complaint. (Declaration of Tessa Mansfield 
Hirte (“Hirte Decl.”) [Doc. No. 37], Ex. C, at 9; see also Declaration of Robert J. Kouba 
(“Second Kouba Decl.”) [Doc. No. 38], Ex. F at 5.) Defendants refused to recognize 

Williams as Plaintiffs’ attorney-in-fact, although eventually agreed to speak with Preston 
Knapp while Williams was also on the phone. (Hirte Decl. at 4-8; Second Kouba Decl. at 
1-4.) The parties also disagreed about the calculation of Defendants’ deadlines to respond. 
(Id.) On February 20, 2024, the parties—as well as Williams and Kimbrough—met and 
conferred via telephone, but were unable to reach a resolution of the Complaint. (Hirte 

Decl. ¶¶ 16, 25.)                                                         
    In lieu of an answer, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on February 20, 2024, 
seeking to dismiss the Complaint for insufficient process and service of process under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4–5) and for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. 
No. 10.] In their briefing in support of their motion to dismiss, however, Defendants 
“generally deny the allegations set forth in the Complaint[,]” except for certain facts that 

they do not dispute. (Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss Br. [Doc. No. 12] at 2.)      
    On February 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel communication with 
Williams  as the Knapps’ “attorney-in-fact”  [Doc. No. 22] and motions for a default 
judgment against each defendant [Doc. Nos. 27 and 30].                    
II.  DISCUSSION                                                           
    A.   Plaintiffs’ Motions For A Default Judgment                      
    Plaintiffs argue that both Hollerman and Compass were properly served by certified 

mail on January 22 and January 25, 2024, respectively, that Hollerman’s counsel appeared 
on his behalf on January 18, 2024, and that neither Defendant answered the Complaint or 
obtained an extension of time to respond within 21 days of being served. (Mot. for Default 
for Hollerman [Doc. No. 27]; Mot. for Default for Compass [Doc. No. 30].) Defendants 
argue that neither party was properly served pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, and that even if 

it were, Compass responded within 21 days.                                
         1.   Legal Standard                                             
    Pursuant to Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may obtain a 
default judgment where “a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought 
has failed to plead or otherwise defend[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Default judgments are 
disfavored and should be granted sparingly. See In re Jones Truck Lines, Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted). “When determining whether a Default 
Judgment is appropriate, the Court must consider whether the assertedly defaulting party 
has filed a responsive Answer, or other pleading, prior to an entry of Default Judgment.” 
Semler v. Klang, 

 (D. Minn. 2009). Defendants also 

cannot be held in default for failing to respond when they have not been properly served 
by plaintiffs. See Norysn v. Dasai, 

, 829 (8th Cir. 2003).    
    Pursuant to Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, individuals and corporations have distinct 
rules for whether service is valid. Service on an individual is governed by Rule 4(e), and 
must be done by either:                                                   

    (1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts 
      of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or 
      where service is made; or                                          
    (2) doing any of the following:                                      
         A. delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the 
           individual personally;                                        
         B. leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place 
           of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides 
           there; or                                                     
         C. delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment 
           or by law to receive service of process.”                     
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Service on a corporation, partnership or association is governed by 
Rule 4(h), and for service within a judicial district of the United States, service can be 
effectuated by either:                                                    
    A. [following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts 
      of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or 
      where service is made]; or                                         
    B. by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, 
      a  managing  or  general  agent,  or  any  other  agent  authorized  by 
      appointment or by law to receive service of process and--if the agent is 
      one authorized by statute and the statute so requires--by also mailing a 
      copy of each to the defendant; or                                  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A)-(B).                                           
    Under Minnesota law, individuals and corporations also have distinct rules for 
whether service is valid. For personal service, service is effectuated:   
    A. Upon an individual by delivering a copy to the individual personally or 
      by leaving a copy at the individual's usual place of abode with some 
      person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein …      
    C. Upon a domestic or foreign corporation by delivering a copy to an officer 
      or  managing  agent,  or  to  any  other  agent  authorized  expressly  or 
      impliedly or designated by statute to receive service of summons, and if 
      the agent is one authorized or designated under statute to receive service 
      any statutory provision for the manner of such service shall be complied 
      with.                                                              
Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03. Certified mail is not a valid form of service under Minnesota law. 
See Melillo v. Heitland, 

 (Minn. 2016); Nieszner v. St. Paul School Dist. 
No. 625, 

 (Minn. 2002).3                                    
         2.   Analysis                                                   
    Plaintiffs cannot obtain a default judgment against Defendants, as Defendants were 
not properly served under Rule 4. According to Plaintiffs’ Notice of Service of Process, 
both Defendants were served through certified mail. Plaintiffs do not allege that they 
attempted to serve Defendants in any other way. As this form of service is improper, 
Defendants were not validly served, and therefore there is no basis on which the Court 

    3 While Minnesota previously allowed service by mail under certain circumstances, 
the 2018 amendments to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 4.05 have replaced this 
procedure with a “Waiver of Service.” See Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05, advisory committee's 
note to 2018 amendments.                                                  
would grant a default judgment. As such, the Court denies the motion, and need not reach 
the parties’ other arguments relating to Plaintiffs’ motion for a default judgment. 

    B.   Motion To Dismiss                                               
    Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any breach of contract 
or breach of fiduciary duty claim against them, but only alleged certain “unfounded legal 
conclusions” that “(1) the contracts in question are securities; (2) Hollerman and Compass 
are banks within the meaning of Title 12; (3) Defendants breached unidentified contracts 
and fiduciary duties by refusing to follow the “orders” of Williams; and (4) the Knapps can 

act as prosecutors to enforce the criminal code[.]” (Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 3.) 
Defendants argue that these contracts—alleged to be either “promissory note[s]” or “bill[s] 
of exchange” (Id. ¶¶ 18-60)—are not “collateral securities,” Defendants are not “reserve 
banks,” and 

 does not provide a private right of action, together making 
Plaintiffs’ alleged “orders” nonsensical and impossible. (Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 3-4.) 

Given that, Defendants argue that no facts are alleged that plausibly plead any breach of 
contract or fiduciary duty. (Id. at 10-12.) Moreover, Defendants argue that civil penalties 
under 

 are not legally available, and Plaintiffs’ alleged criminal claims—
the subject of Counts III-VI of the Complaint—have no basis in the law, as there is no 
private right of action under this civil or any relevant criminal statute and no claims are 

plausibly alleged.  (Id. at 12-17.)                                       
    Plaintiffs argue that their pleadings meet the standard to survive a motion to dismiss, 
due to the more lenient treatment accorded pro se plaintiffs. (Pl. Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 4.) 
Plaintiffs argue that under “broad definitions and existing case law,” the Contracts can be 
interpreted as collateral securities, that banking regulations provide “principles” that can 
be “analogously applied” to the Contracts, and that a private right of action could be found 

in the Federal Reserve Act. (Id. at 13-15.) Plaintiffs argue that as such, Defendants fail to 
“consider the broader fiduciary and contractual responsibilities that may arise from the 
agency relationship” between the parties, and that more information will be elucidated 
during discovery proving their claims. (Id. at 17-21.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Counts 
III-VI of the Complaint do not constitute distinct causes of action, but rather “are alleged 
to  provide  a  legal  basis  and  context  for Defendants'  conduct, which Plaintiffs  claim 

breached the standards of behavior expected under the civil obligations of contract and 
fiduciary duty.” (Id. at 27; see id. at 22-30.)                           
         1.   Legal Standard                                             
    When considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court 
accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and views those allegations in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Hager v. Ark. Dep’t of Health, 

 (8th 
Cir. 2013). However, the Court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations or 
legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. 

 To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

 (2007). Although a complaint need not 

contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must contain facts with enough specificity “to raise 
a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

. “Threadbare recitals of the elements 
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are insufficient. Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 

 (2009) (citing Twombly, 

).     
    Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, but they still must allege sufficient 
facts to support the claims advanced. See Stone v. Harry, 

 (8th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, “a court is under no obligation to repeatedly accept baseless filings, particularly 
those of the sovereign citizen fashion.” Siruk v. State of Minnesota, Case No. 20-CV-2373 
(WMW/KMM),   

  at  *3  (D.  Minn.  Feb  22,  2021),  report  and 
recommendation adopted 

(D. Minn. Apr. 22, 2021) (citing cases across 
Eighth Circuit district courts).                                          

         2.   Analysis                                                   
    Plaintiffs’ arguments are unavailing. As Defendants accurately argue, Plaintiffs 
have not alleged any facts plausibly demonstrating that the Contracts are “negotiable 
instruments”  or  “collateral  securities.”  As  the  Contracts  are  not  collateral  securities, 
Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Defendants breached their contractual or fiduciary 
duties by refusing to exchange the Contracts for Federal Reserve Notes and place those 

Federal Reserve Notes in escrow. Similarly, as there are no private rights of action under 
the civil and criminal statutes alleged, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any cause of 
action under these statutes.                                              
         a.   Nature of the Contracts                                    
    Minnesota  law,  mirroring  the  Uniform  Commercial  Code  (“UCC”),  defines  a 
negotiable instrument as “an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of 

money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it: (1) 
is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a 
holder; (2) is payable on demand or at a definite time[.]” 

. “[A] 
promise or order is unconditional unless it states (i) an express condition to payment.” 

(a).                                               

    Plaintiffs  have  not  plausibly  alleged  that  these  Contracts  are  “unconditional 
promises to pay.” Each Contract contains at least one express condition to payment. The 
Buyer and Seller Representation Contracts require that the seller find the buyer’s offer 
acceptable,  and  that  any  agreed-upon  transaction  must  successfully  close.  (Seller 
Representation  Contract  at  1,  4;  Buyer  Representation  Contract  at  2.)  The  Purchase 
Agreement and Sale Agreement include various conditions, including mortgage financing 

contingencies, inspection contingencies, and contingencies for the sale of the buyer’s 
property. (Purchase Agreement at 2-5; Sale Agreement at 2-9.)             
    Further, these Contracts are not “collateral  securities” subject to  exchange for 
Federal Reserve Notes pursuant to 

. Section 412, in full, provides that: 
    Any Federal Reserve bank may make application to the local Federal Reserve 
    agent for such amount of the Federal Reserve notes hereinbefore provided 
    for as it may require. Such application shall be accompanied with a tender to 
    the local Federal Reserve agent of collateral in amount equal to the sum of 
    the Federal Reserve notes thus applied for and issued pursuant to such 
    application. The collateral security thus offered shall be notes, drafts, 
    bills of exchange, or acceptances acquired under section 92, 342 to 348, 
    349 to 352, 361, 372, or 373 of this title, or bills of exchange endorsed by 
    a member bank of any Federal Reserve district and purchased under    
    the provisions of sections 348a and 353 to 359 of this title, or bankers' 
    acceptances purchased under the provisions of said sections 348a and 
    353 to 359 of this title, or gold certificates, or Special Drawing Right 
    certificates, or any obligations which are direct obligations of, or are 
    fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States or any 
    agency thereof, or assets that Federal Reserve banks may purchase or 
    hold under sections 348a and 353 to 359 of this title or any other asset of 
    a Federal Reserve bank. In no event shall such collateral security be less 
    than the amount of Federal Reserve notes applied for. The Federal Reserve 
    agent shall each day notify the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
    System of all issues and withdrawals of Federal Reserve notes to and by the 
    Federal Reserve bank to which he is accredited. The said Board of Governors 
    of the Federal Reserve System may at any time call upon a Federal Reserve 
    bank for additional security to protect the Federal Reserve notes issued to it. 
    Collateral shall not be required for Federal Reserve notes which are held in 
    the vaults of, or are otherwise held by or on behalf of, Federal Reserve banks. 
(emphasis added). The Contracts cannot plausibly be characterized as any of these defined 
“collateral securities.”                                                  
    Moreover, this provision plainly does not apply to Defendants. By its terms, 

 expressly applies to the right of “Federal Reserve bank[s]” to obtain Federal 
Reserve notes. Plaintiffs have expressly disclaimed the argument that Defendants are 
Federal Reserve banks within the meaning of the statute, and Defendants do not meet the 
definition of a “Federal Reserve bank”—nor any other kind of bank—under Title 12. 

.                                                             
    As the Contracts cannot be plausibly characterized as negotiable instruments or 
securities of any kind under state or federal law, and as Defendants are not banks, the 
Contracts cannot be redeemed as “bills of exchange” for Federal Reserve notes.4 


    4  Plaintiffs’  argument  appears  to  be  a  variation  on  the  “redemption”  scheme 
propounded by the sovereign citizen movement. This scheme, “equal parts revisionist legal 
history and conspiracy theory[,]” rests on the belief that through “contracts” with the 
Federal government such as birth certificates and Social Security cards, U.S. citizens 
maintain  both  a  flesh-and-blood  existence  and  a  fictitious  entity  or  “strawman”  that 
represents, but is separate from, the real person. See Bryant v. Washington Mutual Bank, 

 (W.D.Va. 2007) (discussing the sovereign citizen “redemption” 
scheme); see also Kalinowski, A Legal Response, at 164-67. Sovereign citizens believe 
that, beginning in 1933, the Federal Reserve “began issuing private commercial debt 
instruments known as ‘Federal Reserve Notes’[, and i]n order to meet the demand for ever 
growing federal spending, the government assigned all U.S. born citizens—present and 
future—as collateral.” Kalinowski, A Legal Response, at 164-67.           
         b.   Breach of Contractual And/Or Fiduciary Duties              
    Plaintiffs have not plausibly identified any specific contractual provision in the 
Contracts or any other Contract that Defendants have breached. On its own review, the 

Court notes that the only term that could possibly be construed to create such a duty is 
located in the Buyer Representation Contract, which Contract requires that Hollerman “act 
in [Plaintiffs’] best interest at all times, subject to any limitations imposed by law or dual 
agency.” (Buyer Representation Contract at 1.)                            

    Sovereign citizens believe that through “redemption,” “a process that looks similar 
to divestment from an artificial person, the Sovereign Citizen can separate himself from 
the fictitious strawman and make use of the funds that are located in the Treasury Direct 
Account [or TDA, a government account containing money borrowed by the Federal 
government based on pledging the property and assets of every U.S. citizen].” 

 A bill of 
exchange “purportedly accesses the [TDA], which [sovereign citizens] believe contains the 
balance of the strawman’s bond[.]” Id. at 166; see also A Dictionary of the Peculiar 
(describing a bill of exchange as a “fake check”).                        
    While most cases considered by this Court’s sister courts have concerned a party’s 
attempts  to  pay  for  goods  and  services  with  a  “bill  of  exchange,”  the  demand  that 
Defendants exchange the Contracts for Federal Reserve Notes, i.e., cash, is closely related. 
These versions of the “redemption” scheme are called the “vapor money” theory. “The 
essence of the ‘vapor money’ theory is that promissory notes (and similar instruments) are 
the equivalent of  ‘money’ that citizens literally ‘create’ with their signatures.” McLaughlin 
v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 

 (D. Conn. 2010).            
    This District and other courts across the country have consistently rejected the 
“redemption” and “vapor money” theories as frivolous and nonsensical. See Connell v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Civil No. 10–3133 (MJD/FLN), 

 at *2 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 19, 2011) (citing Hennis v. Trustmark Bank, No. CIV.A.210CV20KSMTP, 

, *5 (S.D. Miss. May 10, 2010)); Baker v. CitiMortgage, Inc., Civil No. 
16–1103(DSD/JSM), 

 at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2016) (“There is no legal 
authority that supports the “vapor money” theory.”); see also Bryant, 

; Harp v. Police, No. CV 23-2577, 

 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 10, 2023); 
Sanders  v.  MTC  Financial  Incorporated,  No.  CV-22-00066-TUC-SHR,  

 at *4 (D. Az. July 11, 2022); Robertson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, No. 10–
CV–1110–BR, 

 at *7-9 (D. Ore. May 20, 2011).               
    However,  Plaintiffs  have  not  plausibly  alleged  any  way  in  which  Defendants 
breached their duty to “act in Plaintiffs’ best interest[.]” Plaintiffs fail to identify any case 

law supporting the argument that Defendants could plausibly breach their contractual duty 
through their refusal to follow Williams’ “orders” to engage in an at-best fruitless effort to 
exchange the Contracts for Federal Reserve Notes. This is no surprise: a party’s failure to 
engage in unlawful or genuinely impossible acts cannot be the basis for a breach-of-
contract claim. See generally Robb v. Parten, 

, 516 (Minn. 1929) (Hilton, J., 
dissenting) (“In this state however the rule was early adopted, without qualification, that 

one who binds himself by express contract to do something in itself possible must perform 
his engagement unless prevented by an act of God, the law, or the other party.”) 
    Similarly, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege any breach of a fiduciary duty. “To 
prevail on a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must prove four elements: duty, 
breach, causation, and damages.” TCI Bus. Capital, Inc. v. Five Star Am. Die Casting, LLC, 

 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017). Real estate brokers like Defendants owe 
various fiduciary duties to their client, including duties of good faith and loyalty, to act in 
the clients’ best interests, carry out their clients’ lawful instructions, and to communicate 
“all  facts  of  which  he  has  knowledge  which  might  affect  the  principal’s  rights  or 
interests[,]” See White v. Boucher, 

 (Minn. 1982); see also 

.                                                                  
    Plaintiffs argue that “the discovery process will provide evidence that Defendants 
breached the fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty[,]” because Defendants’ argument 
that  the  exchange  of  the  Contracts  for  Federal  Reserve  Notes  was  “unlawful  and 
impossible” is baseless, and Plaintiffs can prove and have plausibly alleged that Defendants 
acted contrary to Plaintiffs’ best interests. (Pl. Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 20.) 

    As there is no legal support for the proposition that the Contracts are negotiable 
instruments, collateral securities, or otherwise exchangeable for Federal Reserve Notes, 
Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Defendants have violated any fiduciary duties to 
the Knapps by failing to perform a plainly impossible and unlawful act. As such, Plaintiffs’ 
claims that Defendants violated their fiduciary duties is unavailing, and the Court dismisses 
these claims.                                                             

         c.   Civil And Criminal Penalties                               
    Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Defendants are civilly liable pursuant to 
the Federal Reserve Act, or criminally liable for “laundering of monetary instruments” 
under 18 U.S.C § 1956; “transportation of stolen securities under 

; and 
“securities and commodities fraud” under 

.                

    Plaintiffs concede that Defendants are not civilly liable under 

, and 
that references to this statutory provision are “not intended to assert that Defendants are 
banks or that they are directly liable under these banking statutes[,]” but rather “[t]he 
reference to banking statutes within the Complaint is meant to provide context to the 
allegations regarding the nature of the breaches of contract and fiduciary duty.” (Pl. Mot. 

to Dismiss Br. at 23.) Similarly, Plaintiffs concede that they do not seek to invoke a private 
right of action to enforce the federal criminal statutes in question, but instead raise these 
criminal statutes to “provide a legal basis and context for Defendants' conduct, which 
Plaintiffs claim breached the standards of behavior expected under the civil obligations of 
contract and fiduciary duty.” (Id. at 27.)                                

    As discussed supra, Plaintiffs’ arguments that they have plausibly alleged a breach 
of contract and or breach of fiduciary duty by Defendants are unavailing. These civil and 
criminal statutory provisions provide no insight, context, or legal basis for the Court to find 
such a breach or violation. As such, the Court dismisses these claims.    
         d.   Conclusion                                                 
    Construing Plaintiffs’ complaint liberally, accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, 

and viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have, as a 
matter of law, not alleged any breach of contract or violation of a fiduciary duty, and thus 
not stated a claim on which relief can be granted. As such, the Court dismisses all of 
Plaintiffs’ claims, and grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.             
    C.   Motion To Compel Communication With Williams                    
    Plaintiffs argue that Defendants must communicate with Williams, as he is their 

“attorney-in-fact” pursuant to 

 as designated by “limited power of 
attorney” documents executed by Plaintiffs and Williams (See Pl’s Mot. to Compel [Doc. 
No. 22], Exs. A-C [Doc. Nos. 23-25].) They argue that Defendants’ refusal to communicate 
with Williams, despite his lack of licensure as an attorney, “obstructs Mr. Knapp's statutory 
rights  and  due process[,]”  and  that  Plaintiffs’  legitimate choice  of  representation”  is 

protected by their “fundamental due process rights[.]” (Id. at 2.; see also Pls’ Reply Br. 
[Doc. No. 43] at 2-3.)                                                    
    Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ motion, styled a “motion to compel” and thus 
falling under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, is entirely baseless. Defendants argue that the “limited 

power of attorney” documents do not create circumstances under which a party may be 
liable for refusing to accept the authority of an attorney-in-fact under Minnesota law, and 
that even if these documents validly created an attorney-in-fact relationship between the 
Knapps and Williams, Defendants are not obligated to communicate with Williams and 
therefore participate in his unlicensed practice of law. (Defs’ Mot. to Compel Br. [Doc. 
No. 36] at 6-11.) Defendants also argue that pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B), the 

Court must grant them reasonable expenses including attorney’s fees for the costs of 
defending Plaintiff’s motion. (Id. at 11-12.)                             
         1.   Legal Standard                                             
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 provides the standard for motions to compel. Pursuant to the rule, 
“On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may move for an order 

compelling disclosure or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). The Rule enumerates three 
types of motions that may be brought: 1) a motion “to compel disclosure”; 2) a motion “to 
compel a discovery response”; and 3) a motion “related to a deposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
37(a)(3). If such a motion is denied, the Court “must, after giving an opportunity to be 
heard, require the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or both to pay the party…who 

opposed the motion its reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including 
attorney's fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B). The fees provision does not apply if “the 
motion was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust.” 

                                                              
    There  is  no  provision  under  the  Rule  allowing  for  a  motion  to  compel 
communication with a third party. Plaintiffs also cite to this Court’s Local Rule 7.1, 

although no provision for such a motion exists under the Local Rules. As such, the Court 
considers this motion under the closest federal rule available, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. 
         2.   Liability For Refusal To Communicate With Williams         
    Defendant’s argument that they are not liable for their refusal to communicate with 
Plaintiffs’ desired representatives is persuasive. While 

 creates liability 
for a party who does not accept the authority of an attorney-in-fact, liability only exists if 

all six of the criteria enumerated under the statute are met.             
    First, for liability to exist, 

 requires that the power of attorney 
in question “is executed in conformity with section 523.23 or a form prepared under section 
523.231[.]” Pursuant to 

:                             
    Except for a form prepared under section 523.231, to constitute a “statutory 
    short form power of attorney [for military members in active service],” as 
    this phrase is used in this chapter the wording and content of the form in 
    subdivision 1 must be duplicated exactly and with no modifications, parts 
    First, Second, and Third must be properly completed, and the signature of 
    the principal must be acknowledged. Failure to name a successor attorney-
    in-fact, to provide an expiration date, or to complete part Fourth does not 
    invalidate the power as a statutory short form power of attorney. A power of 
    attorney that does not satisfy the requirements of this subdivision or a 
    form prepared under section 523.231, but purports to be a statutory  
    short form power of attorney, may constitute a common law power of   
    attorney  that  incorporates  by  reference  the  definitions  of  powers 
    contained in section 523.24; however, a party refusing to accept the 
    authority of the common law attorney-in-fact is not liable under section 
    523.20.                                                              

, Subd. 3. (emphasis added, and edited for clarity). Second, for powers 
of attorney executed on or after January 1, 2014, 

 requires that the 
power of attorney “contain[] an acknowledgement that the attorney-in-fact has read and 
understood the notice to the attorney-in-fact required under section 523.23 [,]” and 

, Subd. 1 provides specific language to this effect.        
    Plaintiffs’ limited power of attorney does not conform with the language of the form 
provided in 

, nor do they include the required acknowledgement. As 
such, Defendants have no liability for their refusal to communicate with Williams. 
         3.   Validity Of Plaintiffs’ Demand To Communicate              
    Regardless  of  whether  Defendants  can  be  held  liable  for  their  refusal  to 

communicate with Williams, Plaintiffs’ demand that they do so is itself unavailing, as 
Plaintiffs  cannot  validly  demand  that  Defendants  participate  in  Williams’  unlicensed 
practice of law.                                                          
    

 sets forth the types of powers that may be granted to an 
attorney-in-fact  pursuant  Minnesota’s  statutory  short  form  power  of  attorney,  which 

includes the ability of an attorney-in-fact to pursue legal claims on behalf of the principal. 
However, in In re Conservatorship of Riebel, 

 (Minn. 2001), the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that a power of attorney does not authorize a non-attorney to act as an 
attorney on behalf of the principal. 

; accord Prior Lake State Bank v. Mahoney, 

 (Minn. 1974). The court explained:                         

    The more reasonable interpretation of the statutory language is that a power 
    of attorney authorizes the attorney-in-fact to act on behalf of the principal as 
    the client in an attorney-client relationship. That is, the attorney-in-fact may 
    make  decisions  concerning  litigation  for  the  principal,  but  a  nonlawyer 
    attorney-in-fact is not authorized to act as an attorney to implement those 
    decisions. Consistent with this reading, 

, subd. 10(8) 
    authorizes an attorney-in-fact to hire an attorney-at-law to act on behalf of 
    the principal.                                                       
Id. at 482-83 (cleaned up and internal citations omitted).                
    

 describes the various forms of conduct that are considered the 
unauthorized practice of law under Minnesota law. These include:          
    [T]o appear as attorney or counselor at law in any action or proceeding in 
    any court in this state to maintain, conduct, or defend the same, except 
    personally as a party thereto in other than a representative capacity, or, by 
    word, sign, letter, or advertisement, to hold out as competent or qualified to 
    give legal advice or counsel, or to prepare legal documents, or as being 
    engaged in advising or counseling in law or acting as attorney or counselor 
    at law, or in furnishing to others the services of a lawyer or lawyers, or, for a 
    fee or any consideration, to give legal advice or counsel, perform for or 
    furnish to another legal services…                                   

, Subd. 1.; see also In re Disciplinary Action Against Ray, 

  (Minn.  1990)  (advising  clients  in  legal  matter  and  attempting  to  negotiate 
settlement is the practice of law); Fitchette v. Taylor, 

 (1934) (giving 
advice regarding legal status and rights of another is the practice of law). The State of 
Minnesota has a strong public policy against the unlicensed practice of law. Individuals or 
corporations engaged in the unlicensed practice of law are guilty of a misdemeanor, and 
county attorneys, the Minnesota Attorney General, and private parties injured by the 
unlicensed practice of law are authorized to seek injunctive and monetary relief. See 

, Subd. 8; 

.                              
    In his “representation” of Plaintiffs, Williams engaged in several of the activities 
proscribed for non-attorneys under Minnesota law. Williams has, based on both Plaintiffs’ 
representations and his own representations, provided legal advice to Plaintiffs such that 
he is “controlling…what is occurring.” (See Hirte Decl. ¶¶ 12-23; see also Second Kouba 
Decl., Ex. E.) While Williams does not hold himself out as a licensed attorney, he does 

hold himself out as competent to give legal advice, prepare legal documents, and furnish 
the services of a lawyer in exchange for a substantial fee on WWLG’s website. (See 
WWLG, Questions and Answers.) Similarly, while Kimbrough has not communicated in 
writing with Defendants, he holds himself out as competent to provide legal advice, joined 
the parties’ meet-and-confer while purporting to act as Plaintiffs’ attorney-in-fact, and has 
participated in this suit as the signatory for Plaintiffs’ affidavits of service. (See WWLG, 

About; Hirte Decl. ¶ 17; Notice of Service of Process.)5                  
    Plaintiffs’  argument  that  their  choice  of  legal  representative  is  protected  by 
“fundamental due process rights” is also unpersuasive. States’ right to regulate the practice 
of law within their jurisdiction, including prohibiting individuals who are not licensed to 
practice law from representing clients, is well-established. See Nowicki v. Voss, 

 (Table) at *2-3 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 

 (1995) (upholding Wisconsin law barring the unlicensed practice of law); see also 
Pilla v. American Bar Ass’n, 

 (8th Cir. 1976) (upholding that “federal and state 
requirements that the practice of law in the courts be limited to persons who are licensed 
attorneys  and  who  are  qualified  to  so  practice  by  training  and  by  character”  are 


    5 Kimbrough has also been previously warned by other courts to cease his attempts 
to engage in the unlicensed practice of law, which he has done in both state and federal 
courts. See JMC Prop. Grp., LLC v. Fortune Co., Inc., 

, *7-
8 (S. D. Ind. Mar. 14, 2023); Kimbrough v. Fortune Co., Inc., No. 23-2119, 

 (7th Cir. Dec. 21, 2023).                                         
constitutional). As a result, Plaintiffs do not have the absolute right to be represented by 
anyone.                                                                   

    In light of Minnesota’s strong public policy against the unlicensed practice of law, 
ordering Defendants to communicate with an individual engaged in the unlicensed practice 
of law would place Defendants in an absurd position. The Court will not do so, and denies 
Plaintiffs’ motion to compel communication with Williams.                 
         4.   Reward Of Costs And Fees                                   
    Defendants also request reasonable costs and fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

37(a)(5)(B).   The Court must grant Defendants their reasonable expenses incurred in 
opposing  Plaintiffs’  motion,  including  attorney's  fees,  unless  Plaintiffs’  motion  was 
substantially justified or the award of expenses would be unjust.  Plaintiffs’ motion to 
compel communication was not substantially justified, and an award of expenses would 
not be unjust. As such, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for costs and fees as related to 

the motion.                                                               
III.  ORDER                                                               
    Based  on  the  submissions  and  the  entire  file  and  proceedings  herein,  IT  IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that:                                                      

    1.   Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 10] is GRANTED, and the 
         claims against Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;         
    2.   Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Communication with Attorney-in-Fact [Doc. 
         No. 22] is DENIED;                                              
    3.   Plaintiffs’ Motions for Default Judgment as to Hollerman [Doc. No. 27] and 
         Compass [Doc. No. 30] are DENIED;                               

    4.   Defendants shall submit an affidavit and supporting evidence showing their 
         reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses associated with the Motion to 
         Compel Communication [Doc. No. 22] on or before June 14, 2024;  

    5.   Plaintiffs may file a responsive brief by not later than July 3, 2024, limited 
         to addressing the reasonableness of the defendants' attorneys' fees and costs. 


LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY                                       

Dated: June 4, 2024                  s/ Susan Richard Nelson              
                                    SUSAN RICHARD NELSON                 
                                    United States District Judge