Glover v. State of Minnesota

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota

Glover v. State of Minnesota

Trial Court Opinion

                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                               

Andrew Glover,                     Civil No. 24-cv-1125 (KMM/DJF)       

              Petitioner,                                               

v.                                        ORDER AND                     
                                REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION               
State of Minnesota,                                                     

              Respondent.                                               

   This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Andrew Glover’s:  (1) Petition Under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254
 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (“Petition”) 
(ECF No. 1); (2) Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs 
(“IFP Application”) (ECF No. 2); and (3) May 20, 2024 letter in response to the Court’s 
Order to Show Cause (“Letter”) (ECF No. 7).  For the following reasons, the Court 
recommends denying Mr. Glover’s Petition, dismissing this action without prejudice, and 
denying his IFP Application as moot.  The Court further denies certain requests asserted in 
the Letter.                                                               
   This action began when the Court received the Petition on April 2, 2024 (see ECF 
No. 1).  The Petition challenges Mr. Glover’s conviction on five counts, including one 
count of first-degree murder, in State v. Glover, No. 62-CR-21-1097 (Minn. Dist. Ct.).  
(See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 1–2.)                                            
   On May 2, 2024, the Court entered an order addressing the Petition.  The order 
observed that Mr. Glover did not appear to have exhausted his state court remedies with 
respect to the argument raised in the Petition (“May 2 Order”) (ECF No. 6 at 2–4).1  The 
Court therefore ordered Mr. Glover to show cause why it should not recommend dismissing 

this action based on his apparent failure to exhaust.  (See 
id. at 4
.)  The Court gave Mr. 
Glover until May 23, 2024 to respond, failing which the Court stated it would make its 
recommendation based on the existing record.  (Id.)                       
   The Letter says that Mr. Glover “would like to know if [the Court] can put a stop to 
this process, [a]nd d[i]rect [him] in the right area.”  (ECF No. 7 at 1.)  He also asks the 
Court to “turn the forms and document out to the right courts, or point [Mr. Glover] in the 

right direction.”  (Id.)                                                  
   The  Court  construes  these  statements  as  requests  for  guidance  and  to  send 
documents to the state court.  But the Court is limited in its ability to assist Glover directly, 
since “[d]istrict judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegals to pro se litigants.”  
Pliler v. Ford, 
542 U.S. 225, 231
 (2004); see also, e.g., Williamson v. Mo. Dep’t of Corrs., 


   1 As discussed in the May 2 Order, 
28 U.S.C. § 2254
(b)(1) imposes the relevant 
exhaustion requirement:                                                   
        (1)   [a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 
             a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State    
             court shall not be granted unless it appears that—         
             (A)   the  applicant  has  exhausted  the  remedies        
                  available in the courts of the State; or              
             (B)  (i)   there  is  an  absence  of  available  State    
                       corrective process; or                           
                  (ii)   circumstances  exist  that  render  such       
                       process ineffective to protect the rights of     
                       the applicant.                                   
740 F. App’x 513
, 515 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Pliler).  The Court directs Mr. Glover that 
under section 2254(b)(1), before he can successfully bring a section 2254 petition in this 
court, he must first present his arguments in an action in the Minnesota state courts.2  

Beyond that, the Court can offer him no further advice, and will not send documents from 
this action to any other courts.  To the extent the Letter asks the Court to forward documents 
in this way, that request is denied.                                      
   This leaves the Petition itself.  The Court has compared the Petition’s argument to 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision affirming Mr. Glover’s conviction.  Compare 

State v. Glover, 4 N.W. 3d 124, 128 (Minn. 2024) (stating grounds presented on appeal), 
with (ECF No. 1 at 5) (stating Mr.  Glover’s ground in this action).  Nothing in that 
comparison or elsewhere in the present record suggests Mr. Glover presented his current 
argument  to  the  Minnesota  Supreme  Court,  and  Mr.  Glover’s  Letter  provides  no 
information to the contrary.                                              

   As the Court’s May 2 Order noted, it is a petitioner’s burden to show that he has 
exhausted his state court remedies under section 2254(b)(1).  (See ECF No. 6 at 3, citing 
Carmichael v. White, 
163 F.3d 1044, 1045
 (8th Cir. 1998); Greene v. Ellison, No. 23-cv-
0155 (ECT/DLM), 
2023 WL 4409858
, at *1 n.3 (D. Minn. May 23, 2023), report and 
recommendation adopted, 
2023 WL 4407492
 (D. Minn. July 7, 2023).)  Mr. Glover has not 

met that burden here.  The Court therefore recommends denying the Petition.  And in light 


   2 As he proceeds, Mr. Glover should also keep in mind the statute of limitations for 
section 2254 petitions.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 2244
(d).                         
of that recommendation, the Court also recommends denying the IFP Application as moot 
and dismissing this action without prejudice.                             

   As a final matter, the Court addresses whether to grant Mr. Glover a certificate of 
appealability (“COA”).  A district court cannot grant a section 2254 petitioner a COA 
unless he “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2253
(c)(2).  To make such a showing in this context, Mr. Glover must show “that jurists 
of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural 
ruling.”  Slack v. McDaniel, 
529 U.S. 473, 484
 (2000).  The Court concludes it is unlikely 

that any other court, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, would 
disagree with the conclusions reached in this Report and Recommendation.  The Court 
therefore recommends against issuing Mr. Glover a COA.                    

ORDER

   Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 

HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Petitioner Andrew Glover’s request that the Court send 
materials to other courts (ECF No. 7) is DENIED.                          
                     RECOMMENDATION                                     
   Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:                                                  

        1.   Mr. Glover’s Petition Under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254
 for a Writ of Habeas 
             Corpus by a Person in State Custody (ECF No. [1]) be DENIED; 
        2.   Mr.  Glover’s  Application  to  Proceed  in  District  Court  Without 
             Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. [2]) be DENIED as moot;   
        3.   This action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and            
        4.   No certificate of appealability be issued.                 


Dated: June 14, 2024            s/ Dulce J. Foster                      
                                Dulce J. Foster                         
                                United States Magistrate Judge          
                           NOTICE                                       
Filing Objections:  This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the 
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.                                                                  
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a 
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being 
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.   A party may respond to those 
objections  within  14  days  after  being  served  a  copy  of  the  objections.    See  Local 
Rule 72.2(b)(2).  All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set 
forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).                                              

Trial Court Opinion

                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                               

Andrew Glover,                     Civil No. 24-cv-1125 (KMM/DJF)       

              Petitioner,                                               

v.                                        ORDER AND                     
                                REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION               
State of Minnesota,                                                     

              Respondent.                                               

   This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Andrew Glover’s:  (1) Petition Under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254
 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (“Petition”) 
(ECF No. 1); (2) Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs 
(“IFP Application”) (ECF No. 2); and (3) May 20, 2024 letter in response to the Court’s 
Order to Show Cause (“Letter”) (ECF No. 7).  For the following reasons, the Court 
recommends denying Mr. Glover’s Petition, dismissing this action without prejudice, and 
denying his IFP Application as moot.  The Court further denies certain requests asserted in 
the Letter.                                                               
   This action began when the Court received the Petition on April 2, 2024 (see ECF 
No. 1).  The Petition challenges Mr. Glover’s conviction on five counts, including one 
count of first-degree murder, in State v. Glover, No. 62-CR-21-1097 (Minn. Dist. Ct.).  
(See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 1–2.)                                            
   On May 2, 2024, the Court entered an order addressing the Petition.  The order 
observed that Mr. Glover did not appear to have exhausted his state court remedies with 
respect to the argument raised in the Petition (“May 2 Order”) (ECF No. 6 at 2–4).1  The 
Court therefore ordered Mr. Glover to show cause why it should not recommend dismissing 

this action based on his apparent failure to exhaust.  (See 
id. at 4
.)  The Court gave Mr. 
Glover until May 23, 2024 to respond, failing which the Court stated it would make its 
recommendation based on the existing record.  (Id.)                       
   The Letter says that Mr. Glover “would like to know if [the Court] can put a stop to 
this process, [a]nd d[i]rect [him] in the right area.”  (ECF No. 7 at 1.)  He also asks the 
Court to “turn the forms and document out to the right courts, or point [Mr. Glover] in the 

right direction.”  (Id.)                                                  
   The  Court  construes  these  statements  as  requests  for  guidance  and  to  send 
documents to the state court.  But the Court is limited in its ability to assist Glover directly, 
since “[d]istrict judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegals to pro se litigants.”  
Pliler v. Ford, 
542 U.S. 225, 231
 (2004); see also, e.g., Williamson v. Mo. Dep’t of Corrs., 


   1 As discussed in the May 2 Order, 
28 U.S.C. § 2254
(b)(1) imposes the relevant 
exhaustion requirement:                                                   
        (1)   [a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 
             a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State    
             court shall not be granted unless it appears that—         
             (A)   the  applicant  has  exhausted  the  remedies        
                  available in the courts of the State; or              
             (B)  (i)   there  is  an  absence  of  available  State    
                       corrective process; or                           
                  (ii)   circumstances  exist  that  render  such       
                       process ineffective to protect the rights of     
                       the applicant.                                   
740 F. App’x 513
, 515 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Pliler).  The Court directs Mr. Glover that 
under section 2254(b)(1), before he can successfully bring a section 2254 petition in this 
court, he must first present his arguments in an action in the Minnesota state courts.2  

Beyond that, the Court can offer him no further advice, and will not send documents from 
this action to any other courts.  To the extent the Letter asks the Court to forward documents 
in this way, that request is denied.                                      
   This leaves the Petition itself.  The Court has compared the Petition’s argument to 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision affirming Mr. Glover’s conviction.  Compare 

State v. Glover, 4 N.W. 3d 124, 128 (Minn. 2024) (stating grounds presented on appeal), 
with (ECF No. 1 at 5) (stating Mr.  Glover’s ground in this action).  Nothing in that 
comparison or elsewhere in the present record suggests Mr. Glover presented his current 
argument  to  the  Minnesota  Supreme  Court,  and  Mr.  Glover’s  Letter  provides  no 
information to the contrary.                                              

   As the Court’s May 2 Order noted, it is a petitioner’s burden to show that he has 
exhausted his state court remedies under section 2254(b)(1).  (See ECF No. 6 at 3, citing 
Carmichael v. White, 
163 F.3d 1044, 1045
 (8th Cir. 1998); Greene v. Ellison, No. 23-cv-
0155 (ECT/DLM), 
2023 WL 4409858
, at *1 n.3 (D. Minn. May 23, 2023), report and 
recommendation adopted, 
2023 WL 4407492
 (D. Minn. July 7, 2023).)  Mr. Glover has not 

met that burden here.  The Court therefore recommends denying the Petition.  And in light 


   2 As he proceeds, Mr. Glover should also keep in mind the statute of limitations for 
section 2254 petitions.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 2244
(d).                         
of that recommendation, the Court also recommends denying the IFP Application as moot 
and dismissing this action without prejudice.                             

   As a final matter, the Court addresses whether to grant Mr. Glover a certificate of 
appealability (“COA”).  A district court cannot grant a section 2254 petitioner a COA 
unless he “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2253
(c)(2).  To make such a showing in this context, Mr. Glover must show “that jurists 
of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural 
ruling.”  Slack v. McDaniel, 
529 U.S. 473, 484
 (2000).  The Court concludes it is unlikely 

that any other court, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, would 
disagree with the conclusions reached in this Report and Recommendation.  The Court 
therefore recommends against issuing Mr. Glover a COA.                    

ORDER

   Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 

HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Petitioner Andrew Glover’s request that the Court send 
materials to other courts (ECF No. 7) is DENIED.                          
                     RECOMMENDATION                                     
   Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:                                                  

        1.   Mr. Glover’s Petition Under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254
 for a Writ of Habeas 
             Corpus by a Person in State Custody (ECF No. [1]) be DENIED; 
        2.   Mr.  Glover’s  Application  to  Proceed  in  District  Court  Without 
             Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. [2]) be DENIED as moot;   
        3.   This action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and            
        4.   No certificate of appealability be issued.                 


Dated: June 14, 2024            s/ Dulce J. Foster                      
                                Dulce J. Foster                         
                                United States Magistrate Judge          
                           NOTICE                                       
Filing Objections:  This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the 
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.                                                                  
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a 
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being 
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.   A party may respond to those 
objections  within  14  days  after  being  served  a  copy  of  the  objections.    See  Local 
Rule 72.2(b)(2).  All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set 
forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).                                              

Reference

Status
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