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Case 10710803

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota

Case 10710803

Trial Court Opinion

                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                   DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


DEVANTE CURTIS,                     Case No. 25-cv-727 (LMP/JFD)        



              Plaintiff,                                                

v.                                                                      



PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE;                                                  

HENNEPIN COUNTY MEDICAL                                                 

CENTER, doing business as Hennepin                                      
                                    ORDER DISMISSING CASE               
County Health Care; BRIAN D.                                            

MAHONEY, MD, in his official capacity;                                  
ZERIS STAMATIS, MD,1 in his official                                    
capacity; JUAN PABLO SANCHEZ                                            
RAMIREZ, MD, in his official capacity;                                  
SONIA KALIRAO, MD, in her official                                      
capacity; and BRADLEIGH J.                                              
DORNFELD, MD, in his official                                           
capacity,                                                               

              Defendants.                                               


Devante Curtis, pro se.                                                   
Stephen  M.  Warner,  Arthur,  Chapman,  Kettering,  Smetak  &  Pikala,  P.A., 
Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant Progressive Insurance.                     
Chase Webber, Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants 
Hennepin County Medical Center; Stamatis Zeris, MD; Juan Pablo Sanchez Ramirez, MD; 
and Bradleigh Dornfeld, MD.2                                              

1    Defendant Stamatis Zeris appears to be misidentified as “Zeris Stamatis” in the 
complaint.  See ECF No. 20 at 2.                                          
2    The Hennepin County Attorney’s Office does not represent Defendants Brian D. 
Mahoney, MD, or Sonia Kalirao, MD.  ECF No. 20 at 2 n.1.                  
   Pro se Plaintiff Devante Curtis (“Curtis”) was in a car accident in 2015 and was 
treated by doctors at Hennepin County Medical Center (“HCMC”) intermittently over the 

next several years.  ECF No. 1-1 at 2.  On February 24, 2025, Curtis brought this action 
against HCMC and the individual doctors who treated him (collectively the “HCMC 
Defendants”), alleging that they intentionally delayed diagnosing him with a traumatic 
brain injury (“TBI”).  Id. at 3.  They did so, Curtis alleges, in an act of discrimination in 
violation of Title VI and in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights.  Id. at 10.  
Curtis also contends that the allegedly inadequate care constituted medical malpractice and 

caused him extreme emotional distress.  Id.  Curtis separately sues Progressive Insurance 
(“Progressive”), alleging that it failed to properly manage a subsequent wage-loss claim in 
violation of Minnesota law.  Id. at 11–14.                                
   The HCMC Defendants and Progressive move to dismiss Curtis’s complaint under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  ECF Nos. 12, 18.  Progressive alternatively 

moves  to  dismiss  under  Rule  12(b)(1),  arguing  that  the  Court  lacks  subject-matter 
jurisdiction over Curtis’s claims against Progressive.  ECF No. 12.       
   Because Curtis’s complaint fails to state a constitutional violation, and because the 
Court  does  not  have  diversity  jurisdiction  and  declines  to  exercise  supplemental 
jurisdiction  over  the  remainder  of  Curtis’s  state-law  claims,  the  Court  dismisses  the 

complaint in its entirety without prejudice.                              
                       BACKGROUND3                                      
   In August 2015, Curtis was involved in a car accident that caused him to lose 

consciousness.  ECF No. 1-1 at 2, 5.  He sought medical attention at HCMC for shoulder 
and upper back pain.  Id. at 4–5.  His treating physician, Dr. Brian Mahoney, ordered an 
X-ray and prescribed Curtis ibuprofen but did not order any other testing.  Id. at 5. 
   Almost two years later, Dr. Juan Pablo Sanchez Ramirez admitted Curtis to HCMC 
for “worsening psychiatric psychosis & Tremors (seizures)” and ordered a CT scan, MRI, 
and EEG.  Id.  Afterwards, a non-party doctor reviewed the CT scan, and Dr. Sonia Kalirao 

reviewed the EEG results.  Id. at 6.  No follow-up testing was ordered.  Id. at 6–7.  During 
this time, Curtis was also a patient of Dr. Stamatis Zeris, who allegedly was aware that 
Curtis was experiencing symptoms of a TBI, but nevertheless did not diagnose him with 
one.  Id. at 8.                                                           
   Curtis alleges that HCMC finally diagnosed him with a TBI in July 2023.  Id. at 3, 

10.  According to Curtis, the delayed diagnosis was “targeted” in retaliation for various 
misconduct allegations he and his mother made against Hennepin County officials starting 
in 2013.  Id. at 3.                                                       
   Curtis also alleges that he submitted a claim to Progressive after the car accident.  
Id. at 11.  From August 2015 to October 2015, Progressive paid for certain chiropractic 

care Curtis underwent but otherwise failed to proceed on any other aspect of his claim.  Id. 
at 12.  After Curtis was diagnosed with a TBI, Progressive “reopened” his claim but 

3    The factual background is drawn from Curtis’s complaint, and the allegations are 
accepted as true at this stage.  Gorog v. Best Buy Co.,
760 F.3d 787, 792
 (8th Cir. 2014). 
ultimately denied his request for lost wages from 2015 to 2024.
Id.
 at 12–13.  Curtis alleges 
that Progressive’s actions violated
Minn. Stat. § 604.18
 which “allows policyholders to sue 

insurance companies for unreasonable denial of claims.”  ECF No. 6 at 1.  
                          ANALYSIS                                      
   In reviewing whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, “a 
court must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and make all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”  Martin v. Iowa,
752 F.3d 725, 727
 (8th Cir. 
2014).  The factual allegations in the complaint need not be detailed, but they must be 

sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555
 (2007).  In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court may 
disregard legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678
 (2009).  Finally, although pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, 
they still must allege sufficient facts to support the proposed claims, and the Court cannot 

“assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have 
formed a stronger complaint.”  Stone v. Harry,
364 F.3d 912, 915
 (8th Cir. 2004). 
   Relevant here, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and district courts 
“may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis.”  Home Depot U. S. A.., Inc. v. 
Jackson,
587 U.S. 435, 437
  (2019)  (citation  omitted).    Congress  has  provided  two 

categories of cases for which federal jurisdiction is appropriate.  First,
28 U.S.C. § 1331
 
provides jurisdiction for cases that arise under federal law, which is commonly known as 
federal-question jurisdiction.  Second,
28 U.S.C. § 1332
(a) provides jurisdiction over any 
claim when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is diversity of citizenship 
among  the  parties.    This  means  that  no  plaintiff and  defendant  are  domiciled  (legal 
residents) in the same state.  Further, while a court ordinarily has supplemental jurisdiction 

to  consider  state-law  claims  included  in  an  action  for  which  the  court  has  original 
jurisdiction, a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a 
claim” if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”
28 U.S.C. § 1367
(c)(3).                                                   
I.   Constitutional Claims Against HCMC Defendants                        
   Curtis asserts two constitutional claims: (1) a First Amendment retaliation claim 

under
42 U.S.C. § 1983
; and (2) a discrimination claim under Title VI.  ECF No. 1-1 at 3–
4, 10.  Before addressing the merits of those claims, however, the Court must consider a 
procedural matter.  Curtis explicitly names the individual doctors in their official capacities 
only.  See ECF No. 1 at 1.  An official-capacity suit is “in all respects other than name, to 
be treated as a suit against the entity.”4  Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 166
 (1985).  

Because the doctors are or were employees of HCMC, and because HCMC is a public 
employer, Curtis’s official-capacity claims against the HCMC doctors must be treated as 
“a suit against the public employer”—here, Hennepin County.  Johnson v. Outboard 
Marine Corp.,
172 F.3d 531, 535
 (8th Cir. 1999).  In other words, the claims against each 
of the individual doctors are, essentially, redundant to a claim against HCMC.  Artis v. 

Francis Howell N. Band Booster Ass’n, Inc.,
161 F.3d 1178, 1182
 (8th Cir. 1998); Placide 


4    Although a plaintiff may bring a claim for injunctive relief against a state actor in 
their official capacity, see Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123
, 159–60 (1908), Curtis does not 
seek injunctive relief, ECF No. 1-1 at 14.                                
Ayissi-Etoh v. Mae,
49 F. Supp. 3d 9, 14
 (D.D.C. 2014) (“As the individual Defendants are 
only being sued in their official capacities, the claims against them are redundant and 

should be dismissed entirely.”).  The Court will therefore consider Curtis’s constitutional 
claims as alleged as claims against HCMC only.                            
   A.   First Amendment Retaliation                                     
   To state a plausible Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must 
allege  facts  showing  that:  “(1)  the  plaintiff  engaged  in  protected  activity,  (2)  the 
government took adverse action against the plaintiff that would chill a person of ordinary 

firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least 
in part by the exercise of the protected activity.”  Wolk v. City of Brooklyn Center,
107 F.4th 854
, 859–60 (8th Cir. 2024).                                        
   Even  when  a  plaintiff  can  establish  a  constitutional  violation  by  a  municipal 
employee, the liability of the employer is not guaranteed.  That is because a “governmental 

entity is not liable under § 1983 based on actions of its employees under a theory of 
respondeat superior.”  Artis,
161 F.3d at 1181
 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City 
of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658, 694
 (1978)).  Instead, a municipal entity is liable under Section 1983 
only when the alleged constitutional violation resulted from “(1) an official municipal 
policy,  (2)  an  unofficial  custom,  or  (3)  a  deliberately  indifferent  failure  to  train  or 

supervise” employees.  Jackson v. Stair,
944 F.3d 704, 709
 (8th Cir. 2019) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).  A “policy” is an “official policy, a deliberate 
choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal official who has final 
authority regarding such matters.”  Malone v. Hinman,
847 F.3d 949, 955
 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Corwin v. City of Independence,
829 F.3d 695
, 699–700 
(8th  Cir.  2016)).    A  “custom”  is  a  “continuing,  widespread,  persistent  pattern  of 

unconstitutional conduct” to which an entity responds with tacit acceptance or deliberate 
indifference.  Mettler v. Whitledge,
165 F.3d 1197
, 1204–05 (8th Cir. 1999). 
   Here, even if Curtis sufficiently alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim against 
some of the employee doctors (had he named them in their individual capacities), his claim 
against HCMC fails because he does not allege that they acted pursuant to an official policy 
or unofficial custom, or that the individuals were insufficiently trained or supervised by 

HCMC.  Instead, he focuses his complaint exclusively on the actions of the individual 
doctors.  Accordingly, Curtis’s First Amendment claim is dismissed for failure to state a 
claim.  Wilson v. Miller,
86 F. Supp. 3d 1027, 1034
 (D. Minn. 2015) (dismissing retaliation 
claim against a city office because the plaintiff did not produce evidence of a “custom of 
retaliation”).                                                            

   B.   Title VI Discrimination                                         
   Turning to Curtis’s discrimination claim, the Court notes that Curtis does not specify 
a specific cause of action when he refers to “Title VI” discrimination.  The Court construes 
Curtis’s claim to reference Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.  
Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, 

or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000d.                                          
   To prevail on a Title VI claim, a plaintiff “must show that his race, color, or national 
origin motivated the defendant’s discriminatory conduct.”  Rowles v. Curators of Univ. of 

Mo.,
983 F.3d 345, 355
  (8th  Cir.  2020).    Where  there  is  no  direct  evidence  of 
discrimination,  courts  apply  the  McDonnell  Douglas  burden-shifting framework.
Id.
 
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792
 (1983)).  Under this framework, 
a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing, among other 
things, that “he is a member of a protected class” and that he “was treated differently” from 
similarly situated individuals.
Id.
                                      

   Curtis’s claim fails in the first instance because he has not alleged that he is a 
member of a protected class, nor has he provided the Court any factual basis on which to 
conclude that he is a member of a protected class.  Further, he fails to allege any facts 
suggesting that HCMC discriminated against him because of his membership in a protected 
class or that he was treated differently than other similarly situated individuals.  Curtis’s 

Title VI claim is instead entirely conclusory, and it therefore fails as a matter of law.  See 
Nleme v. Walden Univ., No. 15-cv-471 (JNE/TNL),
2015 WL 9703352
, at *7 (D. Minn. 
Nov. 25, 2015) (dismissing Title VI claim because plaintiff “does not specifically identify 
himself as a member of a protected class” and “fails to identify how he was discriminated 
against  based  on  his  membership  in  [any  such]  class”),  report  and  recommendation 

adopted in relevant part,
2016 WL 158518
 (D. Minn. Jan. 13, 2016).        
II.  Jurisdiction Over Curtis’s State-Law Claims                          
   The  remainder  of  Curtis’s  claims,  against  either  the  HCMC  Defendants  or 
Progressive, rest entirely on state law.5  Having dismissed Curtis’s constitutional claims, 

the Court must consider whether it retains jurisdiction to consider any of them. 
   A.   The Court Lacks Diversity Jurisdiction                          
   The only basis for the Court to exercise original jurisdiction over Curtis’s state-law 
claims is diversity jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332
(a).  Diversity jurisdiction of 
state law claims “requires an amount in controversy greater than $75,000 and complete 

diversity of citizenship among the litigants.”  OnePoint Sols., LLC v. Borchert,
486 F.3d 342, 346
 (8th Cir. 2007).  “Complete diversity of citizenship exists where no defendant 
holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship.”
Id.
 (citation 
omitted).  “To establish complete diversity of citizenship, a complaint must include factual 
allegations of each party’s state of citizenship, including allegations of any corporate 

party’s state of incorporation and principal place of business.”  Cigna Corp. v. Bricker, 
No. 4:23-cv-93 RLW,
2023 WL 1815658
, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2023) (first citing
28 U.S.C. § 1332
(a); and then citing Sanders v. Clemco Indus.,
823 F.2d 214, 216
 (8th Cir. 


5    Curtis asserts claims against the HCMC Defendants for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and medical malpractice, see generally ECF No. 1-1, and alleges that 
Progressive violated Minnesota law by denying him coverage for lost wages,
id.
 at 11–14.  
These claims are grounded in Minnesota state law.  See Kelly v. City of Minneapolis,
598 N.W.2d 657, 663
 (Minn. 1999) (defining the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress); MacRae v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc.,
753 N.W.2d 711, 717
 (Minn. 2008) (defining 
the “essential elements for medical malpractice claims”); Maddox v. Zera, No. 20-cv-2377 
(JRT/HB),
2021 WL 1732258
, at *3 (D. Minn. May 3, 2021) (claims such as “intent to 
cause emotional distress” and “intent to cause bodily harm” are “quintessential state law 
claims”).                                                                 
1987)).  A corporation such as Progressive has citizenship in two potential states: its state 
of incorporation and the state in which it has its principal place of business.
28 U.S.C. § 1332
(c)(1).  Curtis, “as the party invoking federal jurisdiction,” has the burden of proving 
the existence of diversity jurisdiction.  OnePoint Sols.,
486 F.3d at 347
. 
   There is no basis on which the Court can conclude that diversity jurisdiction exists.  
First and foremost, Curtis does not even try to invoke diversity jurisdiction, as the civil 
cover sheet attached to his complaint only indicates that the Court has federal-question 
jurisdiction.  ECF No. 1-2 at 1.  Even liberally construing Curtis’s filings, though, there is 

no diversity jurisdiction apparent from the face of the complaint.  To the contrary, Curtis 
identifies himself as a Minnesota citizen, ECF No. 1 at 1, ECF No. 1-2 at 1, and identifies 
each of the defendants as Minnesota residents, ECF No. 1-2 at 1.  Indeed, Curtis lists 
Progressive as having a Minnesota address, ECF No. 1 at 2, alleges that Progressive is 
incorporated and has its principal place of business in Minnesota, id. at 4, and served 

Progressive at a Minnesota address, ECF No. 11.  And even if Progressive was a citizen of 
a different state, diversity jurisdiction would still not exist because HCMC is a citizen of 
Minnesota.    Consequently,  all  defendants  would  not  be  diverse  from  all  plaintiffs.  
OnePoint Sols.,
486 F.3d at 346
.  Based on Curtis’s own allegations, complete diversity 
does  not  exist,  so  diversity  jurisdiction  is  unavailable.6    See  Davis  v.  Quality  Inn, 


6    The Court notes that Progressive’s motion to dismiss argues, in part, that the Court 
lacks diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy cannot exceed $75,000.  
ECF No. 14 at 7.  Progressive did not contest that it is diverse from Curtis.  But “jurisdiction 
may not be conferred by consent and lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be 
waived by the parties or ignored by the court; if jurisdiction is lacking the trial court should 
No. 19-cv-97 (SRN/DTS),
2019 WL 2393420
, at *1 n.2 (D. Minn. Feb. 6, 2019) (holding 
diversity jurisdiction did not exist when plaintiff’s own allegations defeated claim of 

complete diversity), report and recommendation adopted,
2019 WL 2387805
 (D. Minn. 
Feb. 26, 2019).                                                           
   Because the Court has no basis on which to conclude that either defendant is diverse 
from Curtis, the Court cannot conclude that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over Curtis’s 
state-law claims.  And although the Court recognizes Curtis is a pro se litigant, even pro se 
litigants are required to sufficiently plead the basis for invoking the Court’s jurisdiction, 

and the Court cannot “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual 
allegation would have formed a stronger complaint.”  Stone,
364 F.3d at 915
; see also 
Williams v. Progressive Ins. Co., No. 4:16-cv-01214 JAR,
2017 WL 1155894
, at *2 
(D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2017) (explaining that, even in a pro se complaint, “the absence of 
sufficient averments or facts in the record showing such required diversity of citizenship is 

fatal and cannot be overlooked by the Court”).                            
   B.   The Court Declines To Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction        
   Because the Court has no original jurisdiction over any of Curtis’s claims, the only 
conceivable basis for the Court to consider them is through supplemental jurisdiction.  See
28 U.S.C. § 1367
.  However, a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental 



on its own motion decline to proceed.”  Pac. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Transp. Ins. Co.,
341 F.2d 514, 516
 (8th Cir. 1965).  Thus, even if Progressive “did not raise any jurisdictional issues, 
this court is obligated to raise such jurisdictional issues if it perceives any.”  White v. Nix,
43 F.3d 374, 376
 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation modified).                     
jurisdiction over a claim” if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 
original jurisdiction.”
28 U.S.C. § 1367
(c)(3).  And the Eighth Circuit has instructed courts 

not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims where, as here, all federal 
claims are dismissed prior to trial.  See Hervey v. County of Koochiching,
527 F.3d 711
, 
726–27 (8th Cir. 2008).  That is appropriate in this case, given that the Court dismisses 
Curtis’s federal claims well before trial.  Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over Curtis’s remaining state-law claims and dismisses those 
claims without prejudice “so that [they] may be considered, if at all, by the courts of 

Minnesota.”
Id. at 726
.                                                  
III.   Curtis’s Response Improperly Raises New, and Noncognizable, Claims 
   As a final matter, the Court notes that Curtis filed a brief in response to the motions 
to dismiss.  ECF No. 26.  The brief generally states that Curtis objects to the motions to 
dismiss but does not address any of the arguments raised by either HCMC or Progressive.  

Instead, Curtis appears to assert new claims against HCMC and Progressive.  He repeatedly 
suggests, for instance, that the defendants committed various forms of fraud in relation to 
billing him for healthcare.
Id.
 at 2–4.  He also specifies that his fraud claims are “both civil 
[and] criminal,” id. at 3, and he repeatedly asserts that the Court cannot dismiss his 
complaint because a “judge cannot dismiss criminal charges in a civil case,” id. at 5. 

   As to Curtis’s new civil claims, “a litigant, even one acting pro se, may not amend 
his  pleadings  in  his  brief  in  response  to  a  dispositive  motion.”    Perkins  v.  City  of 
Minneapolis, No. 23-cv-3810 (LMP/ECW),
2025 WL 331858
, at *5 n.6 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 
2025) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted); see also Morgan Distrib. Co., 
Inc. v. Unidynamic Corp.,
868 F.2d 992, 995
 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that a complaint 
cannot be amended by a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss).  If Curtis desired to 

amend his complaint, he was required to seek leave of court or consent of the opposing 
parties to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.7  He did not do so, so the Court 
cannot consider his newly raised claims now.                              
   As  to  Curtis’s  new  allegations  that  Progressive  and  the  HCMC  Defendants 
committed  criminal  violations,  not  only  were  those  allegations  not  included  in  the 
complaint, but more fundamentally, a private citizen like Curtis has no authority to bring 

criminal charges.  See Kunzer v. Magill,
667 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061
 (D. Minn. 2009) 
(“Simply stated, private citizens generally have no standing to institute federal criminal 
proceedings.”).    Accordingly,  Curtis’s  suggestion  that  the  HCMC  Defendants  and 
Progressive committed criminal acts does not save his complaint from dismissal.

ORDER

   Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED that:                                                   
   1.   Progressive’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED;        
   2.   The HCMC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED; 
   3.   Curtis’s Request for a Hearing (ECF No. 6) is DENIED;8          


7    Indeed, Curtis could have amended as a matter of course had he, within 21 days 
after the defendants filed their motions to dismiss, filed an amended complaint.  See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).                                                   

8    Under this District’s Local Rules, the decision whether to hold a hearing for a 
dispositive motion is firmly within the discretion of the Court.  D. Minn. L.R. 7.1(c)(5).  
 4.   Curtis’s Request to Dismiss Application to Proceed in District Court without 
      Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. 5) is GRANTED;                 

 5.   Curtis’s Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or 
      Costs (ECF No. 2) is DISMISSED; and                             
 6.   Curtis’s  Complaint  (ECF  No.  1)  is  DISMISSED  WITHOUT      
      PREJUDICE.                                                      
 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                 


Dated: October 24, 2025                                                 
                              s/Laura M. Provinzino                   

                              Laura M. Provinzino                     
                              United States District Judge

Trial Court Opinion

                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                   DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


DEVANTE CURTIS,                     Case No. 25-cv-727 (LMP/JFD)        



              Plaintiff,                                                

v.                                                                      



PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE;                                                  

HENNEPIN COUNTY MEDICAL                                                 

CENTER, doing business as Hennepin                                      
                                    ORDER DISMISSING CASE               
County Health Care; BRIAN D.                                            

MAHONEY, MD, in his official capacity;                                  
ZERIS STAMATIS, MD,1 in his official                                    
capacity; JUAN PABLO SANCHEZ                                            
RAMIREZ, MD, in his official capacity;                                  
SONIA KALIRAO, MD, in her official                                      
capacity; and BRADLEIGH J.                                              
DORNFELD, MD, in his official                                           
capacity,                                                               

              Defendants.                                               


Devante Curtis, pro se.                                                   
Stephen  M.  Warner,  Arthur,  Chapman,  Kettering,  Smetak  &  Pikala,  P.A., 
Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant Progressive Insurance.                     
Chase Webber, Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants 
Hennepin County Medical Center; Stamatis Zeris, MD; Juan Pablo Sanchez Ramirez, MD; 
and Bradleigh Dornfeld, MD.2                                              

1    Defendant Stamatis Zeris appears to be misidentified as “Zeris Stamatis” in the 
complaint.  See ECF No. 20 at 2.                                          
2    The Hennepin County Attorney’s Office does not represent Defendants Brian D. 
Mahoney, MD, or Sonia Kalirao, MD.  ECF No. 20 at 2 n.1.                  
   Pro se Plaintiff Devante Curtis (“Curtis”) was in a car accident in 2015 and was 
treated by doctors at Hennepin County Medical Center (“HCMC”) intermittently over the 

next several years.  ECF No. 1-1 at 2.  On February 24, 2025, Curtis brought this action 
against HCMC and the individual doctors who treated him (collectively the “HCMC 
Defendants”), alleging that they intentionally delayed diagnosing him with a traumatic 
brain injury (“TBI”).  Id. at 3.  They did so, Curtis alleges, in an act of discrimination in 
violation of Title VI and in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights.  Id. at 10.  
Curtis also contends that the allegedly inadequate care constituted medical malpractice and 

caused him extreme emotional distress.  Id.  Curtis separately sues Progressive Insurance 
(“Progressive”), alleging that it failed to properly manage a subsequent wage-loss claim in 
violation of Minnesota law.  Id. at 11–14.                                
   The HCMC Defendants and Progressive move to dismiss Curtis’s complaint under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  ECF Nos. 12, 18.  Progressive alternatively 

moves  to  dismiss  under  Rule  12(b)(1),  arguing  that  the  Court  lacks  subject-matter 
jurisdiction over Curtis’s claims against Progressive.  ECF No. 12.       
   Because Curtis’s complaint fails to state a constitutional violation, and because the 
Court  does  not  have  diversity  jurisdiction  and  declines  to  exercise  supplemental 
jurisdiction  over  the  remainder  of  Curtis’s  state-law  claims,  the  Court  dismisses  the 

complaint in its entirety without prejudice.                              
                       BACKGROUND3                                      
   In August 2015, Curtis was involved in a car accident that caused him to lose 

consciousness.  ECF No. 1-1 at 2, 5.  He sought medical attention at HCMC for shoulder 
and upper back pain.  Id. at 4–5.  His treating physician, Dr. Brian Mahoney, ordered an 
X-ray and prescribed Curtis ibuprofen but did not order any other testing.  Id. at 5. 
   Almost two years later, Dr. Juan Pablo Sanchez Ramirez admitted Curtis to HCMC 
for “worsening psychiatric psychosis & Tremors (seizures)” and ordered a CT scan, MRI, 
and EEG.  Id.  Afterwards, a non-party doctor reviewed the CT scan, and Dr. Sonia Kalirao 

reviewed the EEG results.  Id. at 6.  No follow-up testing was ordered.  Id. at 6–7.  During 
this time, Curtis was also a patient of Dr. Stamatis Zeris, who allegedly was aware that 
Curtis was experiencing symptoms of a TBI, but nevertheless did not diagnose him with 
one.  Id. at 8.                                                           
   Curtis alleges that HCMC finally diagnosed him with a TBI in July 2023.  Id. at 3, 

10.  According to Curtis, the delayed diagnosis was “targeted” in retaliation for various 
misconduct allegations he and his mother made against Hennepin County officials starting 
in 2013.  Id. at 3.                                                       
   Curtis also alleges that he submitted a claim to Progressive after the car accident.  
Id. at 11.  From August 2015 to October 2015, Progressive paid for certain chiropractic 

care Curtis underwent but otherwise failed to proceed on any other aspect of his claim.  Id. 
at 12.  After Curtis was diagnosed with a TBI, Progressive “reopened” his claim but 

3    The factual background is drawn from Curtis’s complaint, and the allegations are 
accepted as true at this stage.  Gorog v. Best Buy Co.,
760 F.3d 787, 792
 (8th Cir. 2014). 
ultimately denied his request for lost wages from 2015 to 2024.
Id.
 at 12–13.  Curtis alleges 
that Progressive’s actions violated
Minn. Stat. § 604.18
 which “allows policyholders to sue 

insurance companies for unreasonable denial of claims.”  ECF No. 6 at 1.  
                          ANALYSIS                                      
   In reviewing whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, “a 
court must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and make all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”  Martin v. Iowa,
752 F.3d 725, 727
 (8th Cir. 
2014).  The factual allegations in the complaint need not be detailed, but they must be 

sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555
 (2007).  In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court may 
disregard legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678
 (2009).  Finally, although pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, 
they still must allege sufficient facts to support the proposed claims, and the Court cannot 

“assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have 
formed a stronger complaint.”  Stone v. Harry,
364 F.3d 912, 915
 (8th Cir. 2004). 
   Relevant here, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and district courts 
“may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis.”  Home Depot U. S. A.., Inc. v. 
Jackson,
587 U.S. 435, 437
  (2019)  (citation  omitted).    Congress  has  provided  two 

categories of cases for which federal jurisdiction is appropriate.  First,
28 U.S.C. § 1331
 
provides jurisdiction for cases that arise under federal law, which is commonly known as 
federal-question jurisdiction.  Second,
28 U.S.C. § 1332
(a) provides jurisdiction over any 
claim when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is diversity of citizenship 
among  the  parties.    This  means  that  no  plaintiff and  defendant  are  domiciled  (legal 
residents) in the same state.  Further, while a court ordinarily has supplemental jurisdiction 

to  consider  state-law  claims  included  in  an  action  for  which  the  court  has  original 
jurisdiction, a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a 
claim” if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”
28 U.S.C. § 1367
(c)(3).                                                   
I.   Constitutional Claims Against HCMC Defendants                        
   Curtis asserts two constitutional claims: (1) a First Amendment retaliation claim 

under
42 U.S.C. § 1983
; and (2) a discrimination claim under Title VI.  ECF No. 1-1 at 3–
4, 10.  Before addressing the merits of those claims, however, the Court must consider a 
procedural matter.  Curtis explicitly names the individual doctors in their official capacities 
only.  See ECF No. 1 at 1.  An official-capacity suit is “in all respects other than name, to 
be treated as a suit against the entity.”4  Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 166
 (1985).  

Because the doctors are or were employees of HCMC, and because HCMC is a public 
employer, Curtis’s official-capacity claims against the HCMC doctors must be treated as 
“a suit against the public employer”—here, Hennepin County.  Johnson v. Outboard 
Marine Corp.,
172 F.3d 531, 535
 (8th Cir. 1999).  In other words, the claims against each 
of the individual doctors are, essentially, redundant to a claim against HCMC.  Artis v. 

Francis Howell N. Band Booster Ass’n, Inc.,
161 F.3d 1178, 1182
 (8th Cir. 1998); Placide 


4    Although a plaintiff may bring a claim for injunctive relief against a state actor in 
their official capacity, see Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123
, 159–60 (1908), Curtis does not 
seek injunctive relief, ECF No. 1-1 at 14.                                
Ayissi-Etoh v. Mae,
49 F. Supp. 3d 9, 14
 (D.D.C. 2014) (“As the individual Defendants are 
only being sued in their official capacities, the claims against them are redundant and 

should be dismissed entirely.”).  The Court will therefore consider Curtis’s constitutional 
claims as alleged as claims against HCMC only.                            
   A.   First Amendment Retaliation                                     
   To state a plausible Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must 
allege  facts  showing  that:  “(1)  the  plaintiff  engaged  in  protected  activity,  (2)  the 
government took adverse action against the plaintiff that would chill a person of ordinary 

firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least 
in part by the exercise of the protected activity.”  Wolk v. City of Brooklyn Center,
107 F.4th 854
, 859–60 (8th Cir. 2024).                                        
   Even  when  a  plaintiff  can  establish  a  constitutional  violation  by  a  municipal 
employee, the liability of the employer is not guaranteed.  That is because a “governmental 

entity is not liable under § 1983 based on actions of its employees under a theory of 
respondeat superior.”  Artis,
161 F.3d at 1181
 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City 
of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658, 694
 (1978)).  Instead, a municipal entity is liable under Section 1983 
only when the alleged constitutional violation resulted from “(1) an official municipal 
policy,  (2)  an  unofficial  custom,  or  (3)  a  deliberately  indifferent  failure  to  train  or 

supervise” employees.  Jackson v. Stair,
944 F.3d 704, 709
 (8th Cir. 2019) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).  A “policy” is an “official policy, a deliberate 
choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal official who has final 
authority regarding such matters.”  Malone v. Hinman,
847 F.3d 949, 955
 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Corwin v. City of Independence,
829 F.3d 695
, 699–700 
(8th  Cir.  2016)).    A  “custom”  is  a  “continuing,  widespread,  persistent  pattern  of 

unconstitutional conduct” to which an entity responds with tacit acceptance or deliberate 
indifference.  Mettler v. Whitledge,
165 F.3d 1197
, 1204–05 (8th Cir. 1999). 
   Here, even if Curtis sufficiently alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim against 
some of the employee doctors (had he named them in their individual capacities), his claim 
against HCMC fails because he does not allege that they acted pursuant to an official policy 
or unofficial custom, or that the individuals were insufficiently trained or supervised by 

HCMC.  Instead, he focuses his complaint exclusively on the actions of the individual 
doctors.  Accordingly, Curtis’s First Amendment claim is dismissed for failure to state a 
claim.  Wilson v. Miller,
86 F. Supp. 3d 1027, 1034
 (D. Minn. 2015) (dismissing retaliation 
claim against a city office because the plaintiff did not produce evidence of a “custom of 
retaliation”).                                                            

   B.   Title VI Discrimination                                         
   Turning to Curtis’s discrimination claim, the Court notes that Curtis does not specify 
a specific cause of action when he refers to “Title VI” discrimination.  The Court construes 
Curtis’s claim to reference Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.  
Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, 

or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000d.                                          
   To prevail on a Title VI claim, a plaintiff “must show that his race, color, or national 
origin motivated the defendant’s discriminatory conduct.”  Rowles v. Curators of Univ. of 

Mo.,
983 F.3d 345, 355
  (8th  Cir.  2020).    Where  there  is  no  direct  evidence  of 
discrimination,  courts  apply  the  McDonnell  Douglas  burden-shifting framework.
Id.
 
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792
 (1983)).  Under this framework, 
a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing, among other 
things, that “he is a member of a protected class” and that he “was treated differently” from 
similarly situated individuals.
Id.
                                      

   Curtis’s claim fails in the first instance because he has not alleged that he is a 
member of a protected class, nor has he provided the Court any factual basis on which to 
conclude that he is a member of a protected class.  Further, he fails to allege any facts 
suggesting that HCMC discriminated against him because of his membership in a protected 
class or that he was treated differently than other similarly situated individuals.  Curtis’s 

Title VI claim is instead entirely conclusory, and it therefore fails as a matter of law.  See 
Nleme v. Walden Univ., No. 15-cv-471 (JNE/TNL),
2015 WL 9703352
, at *7 (D. Minn. 
Nov. 25, 2015) (dismissing Title VI claim because plaintiff “does not specifically identify 
himself as a member of a protected class” and “fails to identify how he was discriminated 
against  based  on  his  membership  in  [any  such]  class”),  report  and  recommendation 

adopted in relevant part,
2016 WL 158518
 (D. Minn. Jan. 13, 2016).        
II.  Jurisdiction Over Curtis’s State-Law Claims                          
   The  remainder  of  Curtis’s  claims,  against  either  the  HCMC  Defendants  or 
Progressive, rest entirely on state law.5  Having dismissed Curtis’s constitutional claims, 

the Court must consider whether it retains jurisdiction to consider any of them. 
   A.   The Court Lacks Diversity Jurisdiction                          
   The only basis for the Court to exercise original jurisdiction over Curtis’s state-law 
claims is diversity jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332
(a).  Diversity jurisdiction of 
state law claims “requires an amount in controversy greater than $75,000 and complete 

diversity of citizenship among the litigants.”  OnePoint Sols., LLC v. Borchert,
486 F.3d 342, 346
 (8th Cir. 2007).  “Complete diversity of citizenship exists where no defendant 
holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship.”
Id.
 (citation 
omitted).  “To establish complete diversity of citizenship, a complaint must include factual 
allegations of each party’s state of citizenship, including allegations of any corporate 

party’s state of incorporation and principal place of business.”  Cigna Corp. v. Bricker, 
No. 4:23-cv-93 RLW,
2023 WL 1815658
, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2023) (first citing
28 U.S.C. § 1332
(a); and then citing Sanders v. Clemco Indus.,
823 F.2d 214, 216
 (8th Cir. 


5    Curtis asserts claims against the HCMC Defendants for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and medical malpractice, see generally ECF No. 1-1, and alleges that 
Progressive violated Minnesota law by denying him coverage for lost wages,
id.
 at 11–14.  
These claims are grounded in Minnesota state law.  See Kelly v. City of Minneapolis,
598 N.W.2d 657, 663
 (Minn. 1999) (defining the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress); MacRae v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc.,
753 N.W.2d 711, 717
 (Minn. 2008) (defining 
the “essential elements for medical malpractice claims”); Maddox v. Zera, No. 20-cv-2377 
(JRT/HB),
2021 WL 1732258
, at *3 (D. Minn. May 3, 2021) (claims such as “intent to 
cause emotional distress” and “intent to cause bodily harm” are “quintessential state law 
claims”).                                                                 
1987)).  A corporation such as Progressive has citizenship in two potential states: its state 
of incorporation and the state in which it has its principal place of business.
28 U.S.C. § 1332
(c)(1).  Curtis, “as the party invoking federal jurisdiction,” has the burden of proving 
the existence of diversity jurisdiction.  OnePoint Sols.,
486 F.3d at 347
. 
   There is no basis on which the Court can conclude that diversity jurisdiction exists.  
First and foremost, Curtis does not even try to invoke diversity jurisdiction, as the civil 
cover sheet attached to his complaint only indicates that the Court has federal-question 
jurisdiction.  ECF No. 1-2 at 1.  Even liberally construing Curtis’s filings, though, there is 

no diversity jurisdiction apparent from the face of the complaint.  To the contrary, Curtis 
identifies himself as a Minnesota citizen, ECF No. 1 at 1, ECF No. 1-2 at 1, and identifies 
each of the defendants as Minnesota residents, ECF No. 1-2 at 1.  Indeed, Curtis lists 
Progressive as having a Minnesota address, ECF No. 1 at 2, alleges that Progressive is 
incorporated and has its principal place of business in Minnesota, id. at 4, and served 

Progressive at a Minnesota address, ECF No. 11.  And even if Progressive was a citizen of 
a different state, diversity jurisdiction would still not exist because HCMC is a citizen of 
Minnesota.    Consequently,  all  defendants  would  not  be  diverse  from  all  plaintiffs.  
OnePoint Sols.,
486 F.3d at 346
.  Based on Curtis’s own allegations, complete diversity 
does  not  exist,  so  diversity  jurisdiction  is  unavailable.6    See  Davis  v.  Quality  Inn, 


6    The Court notes that Progressive’s motion to dismiss argues, in part, that the Court 
lacks diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy cannot exceed $75,000.  
ECF No. 14 at 7.  Progressive did not contest that it is diverse from Curtis.  But “jurisdiction 
may not be conferred by consent and lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be 
waived by the parties or ignored by the court; if jurisdiction is lacking the trial court should 
No. 19-cv-97 (SRN/DTS),
2019 WL 2393420
, at *1 n.2 (D. Minn. Feb. 6, 2019) (holding 
diversity jurisdiction did not exist when plaintiff’s own allegations defeated claim of 

complete diversity), report and recommendation adopted,
2019 WL 2387805
 (D. Minn. 
Feb. 26, 2019).                                                           
   Because the Court has no basis on which to conclude that either defendant is diverse 
from Curtis, the Court cannot conclude that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over Curtis’s 
state-law claims.  And although the Court recognizes Curtis is a pro se litigant, even pro se 
litigants are required to sufficiently plead the basis for invoking the Court’s jurisdiction, 

and the Court cannot “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual 
allegation would have formed a stronger complaint.”  Stone,
364 F.3d at 915
; see also 
Williams v. Progressive Ins. Co., No. 4:16-cv-01214 JAR,
2017 WL 1155894
, at *2 
(D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2017) (explaining that, even in a pro se complaint, “the absence of 
sufficient averments or facts in the record showing such required diversity of citizenship is 

fatal and cannot be overlooked by the Court”).                            
   B.   The Court Declines To Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction        
   Because the Court has no original jurisdiction over any of Curtis’s claims, the only 
conceivable basis for the Court to consider them is through supplemental jurisdiction.  See
28 U.S.C. § 1367
.  However, a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental 



on its own motion decline to proceed.”  Pac. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Transp. Ins. Co.,
341 F.2d 514, 516
 (8th Cir. 1965).  Thus, even if Progressive “did not raise any jurisdictional issues, 
this court is obligated to raise such jurisdictional issues if it perceives any.”  White v. Nix,
43 F.3d 374, 376
 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation modified).                     
jurisdiction over a claim” if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 
original jurisdiction.”
28 U.S.C. § 1367
(c)(3).  And the Eighth Circuit has instructed courts 

not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims where, as here, all federal 
claims are dismissed prior to trial.  See Hervey v. County of Koochiching,
527 F.3d 711
, 
726–27 (8th Cir. 2008).  That is appropriate in this case, given that the Court dismisses 
Curtis’s federal claims well before trial.  Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over Curtis’s remaining state-law claims and dismisses those 
claims without prejudice “so that [they] may be considered, if at all, by the courts of 

Minnesota.”
Id. at 726
.                                                  
III.   Curtis’s Response Improperly Raises New, and Noncognizable, Claims 
   As a final matter, the Court notes that Curtis filed a brief in response to the motions 
to dismiss.  ECF No. 26.  The brief generally states that Curtis objects to the motions to 
dismiss but does not address any of the arguments raised by either HCMC or Progressive.  

Instead, Curtis appears to assert new claims against HCMC and Progressive.  He repeatedly 
suggests, for instance, that the defendants committed various forms of fraud in relation to 
billing him for healthcare.
Id.
 at 2–4.  He also specifies that his fraud claims are “both civil 
[and] criminal,” id. at 3, and he repeatedly asserts that the Court cannot dismiss his 
complaint because a “judge cannot dismiss criminal charges in a civil case,” id. at 5. 

   As to Curtis’s new civil claims, “a litigant, even one acting pro se, may not amend 
his  pleadings  in  his  brief  in  response  to  a  dispositive  motion.”    Perkins  v.  City  of 
Minneapolis, No. 23-cv-3810 (LMP/ECW),
2025 WL 331858
, at *5 n.6 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 
2025) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted); see also Morgan Distrib. Co., 
Inc. v. Unidynamic Corp.,
868 F.2d 992, 995
 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that a complaint 
cannot be amended by a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss).  If Curtis desired to 

amend his complaint, he was required to seek leave of court or consent of the opposing 
parties to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.7  He did not do so, so the Court 
cannot consider his newly raised claims now.                              
   As  to  Curtis’s  new  allegations  that  Progressive  and  the  HCMC  Defendants 
committed  criminal  violations,  not  only  were  those  allegations  not  included  in  the 
complaint, but more fundamentally, a private citizen like Curtis has no authority to bring 

criminal charges.  See Kunzer v. Magill,
667 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061
 (D. Minn. 2009) 
(“Simply stated, private citizens generally have no standing to institute federal criminal 
proceedings.”).    Accordingly,  Curtis’s  suggestion  that  the  HCMC  Defendants  and 
Progressive committed criminal acts does not save his complaint from dismissal.

ORDER

   Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED that:                                                   
   1.   Progressive’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED;        
   2.   The HCMC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED; 
   3.   Curtis’s Request for a Hearing (ECF No. 6) is DENIED;8          


7    Indeed, Curtis could have amended as a matter of course had he, within 21 days 
after the defendants filed their motions to dismiss, filed an amended complaint.  See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).                                                   

8    Under this District’s Local Rules, the decision whether to hold a hearing for a 
dispositive motion is firmly within the discretion of the Court.  D. Minn. L.R. 7.1(c)(5).  
 4.   Curtis’s Request to Dismiss Application to Proceed in District Court without 
      Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. 5) is GRANTED;                 

 5.   Curtis’s Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or 
      Costs (ECF No. 2) is DISMISSED; and                             
 6.   Curtis’s  Complaint  (ECF  No.  1)  is  DISMISSED  WITHOUT      
      PREJUDICE.                                                      
 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                 


Dated: October 24, 2025                                                 
                              s/Laura M. Provinzino                   

                              Laura M. Provinzino                     
                              United States District Judge

Reference

Full Case Name
Devante Curtis v. Progressive Insurance; Hennepin County Medical Center, doing business as Hennepin County Health Care; Brian D. Mahoney, MD, in his official capacity; Zeris Stamatis, MD, in his official capacity; Juan Pablo Sanchez Ramirez, MD, in his official capacity; Sonia Kalirao, MD, in her official capacity; and Bradleigh J. Dornfeld, MD, in his official capacity
Status
Unknown
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