Stefannie Dyson and Sean Wells-El v. Luis Bartolomei, Sarah Lindahl-Pfieffer,...
Stefannie Dyson and Sean Wells-El v. Luis Bartolomei, Sarah Lindahl-Pfieffer,...
Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
STEFANNIE DYSON and SEAN Case No. 25-cv-2296 (LMP/JFD) WELLS-EL, Plaintiffs, v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATIONS TO PROCEED LUIS BARTOLOMEI, SARAH IFP ON APPEAL LINDAHL-PFIEFFER, HENNEPIN COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 4TH DISTRICT, and THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, Defendants.
On November 3, 2025, this Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice. ECF No. 23. Plaintiffs Stefannie Dyson and Sean Wells-El filed a notice of appeal, ECF No. 25, and filed three applications to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal, ECF Nos. 28, 29, 30.
A litigant who seeks IFP status on appeal must first “file a motion in the district court” and “state[] the issues that the party intends to present on appeal.” Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1). The central question when evaluating an application to proceed IFP “is whether the movant can afford the costs of proceeding without undue hardship or deprivation of the necessities of life.” Daramola v. Dungarvin Inc., Minn., No. 24-cv-0761 (KMM/DJF), 2024 WL 1444100, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2024) (citation omitted).
For several reasons, the Court cannot conclude that proceeding on appeal without a grant of IFP status would cause Plaintiffs undue hardship or deprive them of life’s necessities. First, Dyson reports a monthly income of $2,400, which for a household size of two, constitutes 136% of the federal poverty guidelines.1 ECF No. 30 at 2–3. Although not dispositive, that income suggests that paying the filing fee would not deprive Dyson of the “necessities of life.” Daramola, 2024 WL 1444100, at *1; see Simelton v. Xerox Corp., No. 98-35191, 1999 WL 115175, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 1999) (affirming denial of IFP status when litigant’s “annual income was above the poverty threshold and his debts [were] modest”). Dyson’s monthly income also exceeds her monthly expenses, ECF No. 30 at 2, 4, which further suggests that Dyson does not qualify for IFP status, see Webb v. Cessna Aircraft, No. Civ. 00-2229-JWL, 2000 WL 1025575, at *1 (D. Kan. July 17, 2000) (denying IFP status when litigant’s monthly income exceeded monthly expenses). Additionally, Dyson reports owning $200,000 in real estate, ECF No. 29 at 3, which undermines her claim of indigency, see Westley v. Alberto, No. 13-cv-2044 (PAM/AJB), 2013 WL 12155306, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2013) (denying IFP status when plaintiff reported owning real estate valued at $52,500).
Second, Dyson originally paid the $405 filing fee for this action in district court, ECF No. 1, and she reports spending $1,000 to $1,500 in bringing this lawsuit, ECF No. 29 at 5. Dyson “fails to explain what, if any, changes in circumstance occurred to render [her]
Additionally, in a cover letter to the Court, Dyson reports owning no real property, ECF No. 28 at 1, but in her IFP application, she reports owning $200,000 in real property and earning $2,400 a month in rental income, ECF No. 29 at 1, 3. Regardless of whether these inconsistencies are innocent or intentional, they undermine the credibility of Dyson’s IFP application. See Jackson v. Sexe, No. 25-cv-2688 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2676572, at *1 (D. Minn. July 29, 2025) (refusing to grant IFP status based on applications that were “not credible”).
Finally, Dyson is not the only plaintiff in this case: Wells-El is also a plaintiff and could conceivably contribute to paying the filing fee. However, Plaintiffs provide no information about Wells-El’s financial status and whether he might qualify for IFP status.
Because Plaintiffs’ IFP application is “incomplete and inconsistent”—and because the information that is provided suggests that Dyson alone does not qualify for IFP status—
Dated: December 3, 2025 s/Laura M. Provinzino Laura M. Provinzino United States District Judge
Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
STEFANNIE DYSON and SEAN Case No. 25-cv-2296 (LMP/JFD) WELLS-EL, Plaintiffs, v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATIONS TO PROCEED LUIS BARTOLOMEI, SARAH IFP ON APPEAL LINDAHL-PFIEFFER, HENNEPIN COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 4TH DISTRICT, and THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, Defendants.
On November 3, 2025, this Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice. ECF No. 23. Plaintiffs Stefannie Dyson and Sean Wells-El filed a notice of appeal, ECF No. 25, and filed three applications to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal, ECF Nos. 28, 29, 30.
A litigant who seeks IFP status on appeal must first “file a motion in the district court” and “state[] the issues that the party intends to present on appeal.” Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1). The central question when evaluating an application to proceed IFP “is whether the movant can afford the costs of proceeding without undue hardship or deprivation of the necessities of life.” Daramola v. Dungarvin Inc., Minn., No. 24-cv-0761 (KMM/DJF), 2024 WL 1444100, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2024) (citation omitted).
For several reasons, the Court cannot conclude that proceeding on appeal without a grant of IFP status would cause Plaintiffs undue hardship or deprive them of life’s necessities. First, Dyson reports a monthly income of $2,400, which for a household size of two, constitutes 136% of the federal poverty guidelines.1 ECF No. 30 at 2–3. Although not dispositive, that income suggests that paying the filing fee would not deprive Dyson of the “necessities of life.” Daramola, 2024 WL 1444100, at *1; see Simelton v. Xerox Corp., No. 98-35191, 1999 WL 115175, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 1999) (affirming denial of IFP status when litigant’s “annual income was above the poverty threshold and his debts [were] modest”). Dyson’s monthly income also exceeds her monthly expenses, ECF No. 30 at 2, 4, which further suggests that Dyson does not qualify for IFP status, see Webb v. Cessna Aircraft, No. Civ. 00-2229-JWL, 2000 WL 1025575, at *1 (D. Kan. July 17, 2000) (denying IFP status when litigant’s monthly income exceeded monthly expenses). Additionally, Dyson reports owning $200,000 in real estate, ECF No. 29 at 3, which undermines her claim of indigency, see Westley v. Alberto, No. 13-cv-2044 (PAM/AJB), 2013 WL 12155306, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2013) (denying IFP status when plaintiff reported owning real estate valued at $52,500).
Second, Dyson originally paid the $405 filing fee for this action in district court, ECF No. 1, and she reports spending $1,000 to $1,500 in bringing this lawsuit, ECF No. 29 at 5. Dyson “fails to explain what, if any, changes in circumstance occurred to render [her]
Additionally, in a cover letter to the Court, Dyson reports owning no real property, ECF No. 28 at 1, but in her IFP application, she reports owning $200,000 in real property and earning $2,400 a month in rental income, ECF No. 29 at 1, 3. Regardless of whether these inconsistencies are innocent or intentional, they undermine the credibility of Dyson’s IFP application. See Jackson v. Sexe, No. 25-cv-2688 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2676572, at *1 (D. Minn. July 29, 2025) (refusing to grant IFP status based on applications that were “not credible”).
Finally, Dyson is not the only plaintiff in this case: Wells-El is also a plaintiff and could conceivably contribute to paying the filing fee. However, Plaintiffs provide no information about Wells-El’s financial status and whether he might qualify for IFP status.
Because Plaintiffs’ IFP application is “incomplete and inconsistent”—and because the information that is provided suggests that Dyson alone does not qualify for IFP status—
Dated: December 3, 2025 s/Laura M. Provinzino Laura M. Provinzino United States District Judge
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.