Minnesota Supreme Court, 1875

Robbins v. St. Paul, Stillwater & Taylor's Falls Railroad

Minnesota Supreme Court · Decided November 22, 1875 · Gtlfillan

22 Minn. 286; 1875 Minn. LEXIS 80 (Minnesota Reports)

Counsel

A. B. SticJcney and O’Brien & Bller, for appellant., Lamprey & James, for respondent.

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Citation treatment has not been reviewed for this case. The notes below come from the citation graph and the Minnesota Revisor's amendment records, not from a review of how later courts treated this decision.

(as of 9/30/2026)

Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 1920, among the opinions in this site’s citation index.

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Cases that cite this one

6 later published cases cite this decision.

Chicago Great Western Railroad v. Zahner (Minn. 1920)
Otter Tail Power Co. v. Brastad (Minn. 1915)
Delisha v. Minneapolis, St. Paul, Rochester & Dubuque Electric Traction Co. (Minn. 1910)
A. & S. C. R. Co. v. Hill (Or. 1890)
Pilcher v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railroad (Kan. 1888)
Witt v. St. Paul & Northern Pacific Railway Co. (Minn. 1888)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

Gtlfillan, C. J.

The only question in this case not disposed of by previous decisions of this court is that upon the proper measure of damages. That question is raised by the chai’ge of the court below to the jury, that the question for them to determine was what was the value of the property in question on August 5, 1873, (the date of filing the report of the commissioners,) and that it was their duty to return a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount so determined.

The objection made to the rule thus laid down is, that .as this company, which is organized under the general laws of the state, acquired, by these proceedings, only an easement in the property for so long a time as the company should continue, and as by its articles of incorporation it was to continue only for fifty years, four of which had elapsed when the proceedings were instituted, it is the value of such *287easement, and not of the fee, which furnishes the proper measure of damages. If the company acquires merely an easement, to .continue for that period, this proposition is theoretically correct. It is the damage caused by imposing the easement on the land which the owner is entitled to receive. But Gen. St. ch. 34, § 5, (under which statute this company was organized,) gives it authority to renew the term of its existence, from time to time, for periods not longer than fifty years. The easement which it imposes on land by these proceedings is not one for a definite period, but one which, at its pleasure, it may make practically perpetual. ■ The jury are to estimate the damages caused by imposing such an easement on the land. The value of the fee of land burdened by such an easement is, presumptively at least, only nominal, and there was nothing in the case to rebut the presumption. The difference between the measure of damages as laid down by the court and the theoretically accurate measure is, therefore, only nominal, and, admitting that the rule was inaccurately stated, the maxim de minimis will apply.

Order affirmed.

Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.