Cochrane v. Quackenbush
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Citation treatment has not been reviewed for this case. The notes below come from the citation graph and the Minnesota Revisor's amendment records, not from a review of how later courts treated this decision.
(as of 9/30/2026)
Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 1997, among the opinions in this site’s citation index.
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Cases that cite this one
7 later published cases cite this decision.
- Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Nishika Ltd. (Minn. 1997)
- Walker v. Graham (Ala. 1937)
- Eifert v. Hartford Fire Insurance (Minn. 1921)
- White v. Western Assurance Co. (Minn. 1893)
- McPherson v. Runyon (Minn. 1889)
- Beyersdorf v. Sump (Minn. 1888)
- Solomon v. Vinson (Minn. 1883)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
In April, 1874, the plaintiffs in this action, who had been for several years established in partnership business in Le Sueur, in this state, purchased a stock of hardware of the defendant Livingston Quackenbush, and gave him their joint note therefor for the sum of $1,902, payable in two years, with interest. The note was afterwards transferred to defendant Peter Quaekenbush. Thereafter, in the year 1875, the plaintiffs sold to defendant Halsey
1. It is urged by the appellant that the complaint is fatally defective because it does not in terms negative the truth of the matters set forth in the affidavit annexed to the complaint. The plaintiffs rely upon the allegations that the attachment was sued out maliciously and without probable cause, and that the same was promptly vacated. This objection is made specifically for the first time in this court, and therefore ought not to be favored. The only objection to the complaint made in the court below was at the trial, on the general ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The complaint was sufficient as against the objection at that stage of the case. Smith v. Dennet, 15 Minn.
2. It is also objected that this action cannot be maintained by the plaintiffs jointly.' Where there is a joint injury, a joint action may be sustained, but the evidence and damage must be confined to such joint injury or cause of action. Here the plaintiffs are jointly sued upon a joint note, were jointly engaged in business, and jointly owned the attached property. If, then, their joint or partnership credit has-been injuriously affected, their business stopped, or assets depreciated, they may rightly join in an action to recover appropriate damages therefor. Donnell v. Jones, 13 Ala. (N. S.) 490; Patten v. Gurney, 17 Mass. 182; Medbury v. Watson, 6 Met. 257; Collyer on Partnership, (6th Ed.) § 689. When one partner colludes with a stranger to-injure his copartners, the latter may maintain a joint action for injury to their common interest In the partnership fund. Collyer on Partnership, supra; Longman v. Pole, 1 Moody & M. 225. Apart from the charge of collusion in this case, on account of which Halsey is made a defendant, the objection that all the members of the partnership were not joined as plaintiffs could only be raised by the pleadings. And the same is true of the alleged misjoinder of a cause of ac
3. On the question of damages, however, evidence was improperly received, against the defendant’s objection, of the disposition of the partnership property subsequent to the attachment, including the appointment of a receiver, (in a suit by plaintiffs for a dissolution of the partnership with Halsey,) the inventory of the stock, and the loss and shrinkage in the assets on the receiver’s sale. Whether the plaintiffs were constrained to take this course by the influence of creditors or otherwise, it was of their own election, and this particular disposition of the assets was not the proximate result of the attachment, and was too remote to be considered. Donnell v. Jones, supra, 513, 514. As there must be a new trial on this ground, it is not necessary for us to consider other questions which may not again arise in the form now presented. We therefore pass the consideration of the question as to the sufficiency of the evidence upon any of the' points raised, and the requests to charge in relation to the same matter.
We see no error in the general charge of the court, or in the instructions given in behalf of the plaintiffs as requested. It was proper for the court to specially limit the jury to the consideration of such matters as affected the plaintiffs jointly; and we doubt not the court would have done so had defendant’s request been in the proper form.
Order reversed.
Mitchell, J., did not sit in this case.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.