Minnesota Supreme Court, 1885

State ex rel. Simpson v. Dowlan

Minnesota Supreme Court · Decided July 8, 1885 · Gtlpillan

33 Minn. 536; 24 N.W. 188; 1885 Minn. LEXIS 143 (Minnesota Reports)

Counsel

Frederick Allis, for relator., John W. Willis, for respondent.

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Citation treatment has not been reviewed for this case. The notes below come from the citation graph and the Minnesota Revisor's amendment records, not from a review of how later courts treated this decision.

(as of 9/30/2026)

Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 1930, among the opinions in this site’s citation index.

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Cases that cite this one

10 later published cases cite this decision.

State ex rel. Young v. Village of Kent (Minn. 1905)
Dennistoun v. Davis (Minn. 1930)
Hawley v. Wallace (Minn. 1917)
State ex rel. Jarvis v. Craig (Minn. 1907)
State ex rel. Bell v. Moriarty (Minn. 1900)
Truelson v. City of Duluth (Minn. 1895)
State ex rel. Clapp v. Minnesota Thresher Manufacturing Co. (Minn. 1889)
State ex rel. Diepenbrock v. Gates (Minn. 1886)
State ex rel. Whitcomb v. Lockerby (Minn. 1894)
State ex rel. Bend v. Harrison (Minn. 1886)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

Gtlpillan, C. J.1

Application by relator, the attorney general consenting, but not participating, for leave to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto, to determine the title to the office of aider-man in the city of St. Paul, both relator and respondent claiming to have been elected. The respondent opposes it on two grounds:

First. That the charter of the city makes the common council the sole and exclusive judge of the election of its members, and therefore *537the writ cannot issue. The charter (Laws 1874, c. 1, sube. 4, § 2) reads: “The common council shall be the judge of the election and qualification of its own members, and in such case shall have power to send for persons and papers.” We are unable to agree whether this makes the council sole judge, so as to exclude the power of the courts; the four judges of this court who heard the matter oeing equally divided on the question.

Second. That Gen. St. 1878, c. 1, provides a mode for determining who is elected to any city office, when the election of any one is disputed.

We are agreed that section 76 of that chapter makes the provisions of section 52 applicable to elections for city officers, and that those provisions apply to the office of alderman, if it be not true that the council is the sole judge of the election of its members. We aré also agreed that the granting of leave to file an information (especially upon the application of a private person) is within the discretion of the eourt, and that leave ought not to be granted where the law furnishes another remedy, unless under special and exceptional circumstances, and none such exist in this case. So that we all agree, though for different reasons, that the leave ought not to be granted.

Application denied.

Mitchell, J., was absent and took no part in this case.

Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.