Minnesota Supreme Court, 1885

State ex rel. Mansfield v. Mayor of St. Paul

Minnesota Supreme Court · Decided November 11, 1885 · Berry

34 Minn. 250; 25 N.W. 449; 1885 Minn. LEXIS 207 (Minnesota Reports)

Counsel

C. W. Bunn, for relator., W. P. Murray and T. D. O’Brien, for respondent.

Can I rely on this case?

Citation treatment has not been reviewed for this case. The notes below come from the citation graph and the Minnesota Revisor's amendment records, not from a review of how later courts treated this decision.

(as of 9/30/2026)

Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 1908, among the opinions in this site’s citation index.

Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

See our Terms of Use before relying on these notes. Report an error

Cases that cite this one

5 later published cases cite this decision.

State ex rel. Ross v. Posz (Minn. 1908)
Moede v. County of Stearns (Minn. 1890)
State ex rel. Holden v. Village of Lamberton (Minn. 1887)
Kusel v. City of Chicago (Ill. App. Ct. 1905)
Comrs. of Mason v. Griffin (Ill. 1890)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

Berry, J.

In re Wilson, 32 Minn. 145, in effect holds that judicial or quasi judicial acts only of municipal officers can be reviewed upon certiorari. The act sought to be reviewed in this case is that of the mayor of the city of St. Paul, purporting to revoke an auctioneer’s license issued by the city authorities to the petitioner.

The city charter (chapter 4, section 3, Mun. Code, St. Paul) authorizes the common council “to license and regulate all auctioneers,” and to “at any time revoke any license granted under this act for malconduct in the course of trade.” As the charter contains no other provision for the revocation of licenses, this one is exclusive; and, as the council cannot delegate the authority thus delegated to it, (In re Wilson, supra,) it cannot, by ordinance or otherwise, confer the power of revocation upon the mayor. The mayor’s attempted revocation in this instance, though pursuant to an ordinance, was therefore unauthorized and void. The attempted revocation was not, however, a judicial or quasi judicial act. The subject-matter of revocation of auctioneers’ licenses was not, in any respect or in any circumstances, within his official jurisdiction.' He had no authority of any nature in matters of that kind. His act of attempted revocation, though doubtless well intended, was a clear usurpation. It was therefore not only not judicial or quasi judicial, but not even official. *251Hence certiorari will not lie to review it. Locke v. Selectmen of Lexington, 122 Mass. 290, appears to be precisely in point. There, Chief Justice Gray, speaking of an unauthorized act of the selectmen, which, if authorized, would have been of a judicial nature, says: “It is not a case of excess of jurisdiction by a court legally established, but a case of no jurisdiction and no court.” And upon this ground the writ of certiorari prayed for was refused. See, also, Ewing v. City of St. Louis, 5 Wall. 413; Wood v. Peake, 8 John. 54; In re Daws, 8 Adol. & El. 936; People v. Covert, 1 Hill, 674. The respondent’s motion to quash the writ issued in this case must be granted.

Writ quashed.

Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.