Steffes v. Lemke
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Citation treatment has not been reviewed for this case. The notes below come from the citation graph and the Minnesota Revisor's amendment records, not from a review of how later courts treated this decision.
(as of 9/30/2026)
Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 1924, among the opinions in this site’s citation index.
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Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- Maryland Casualty Co. v. Portland Const. Co. (2d Cir. 1934)
- Valley Fruit Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (Wash. 1931)
- Bartles-Scott Oil Co. v. Western Surety Co. (Minn. 1924)
- Webb v. Freng (Wis. 1923)
- Brioschi-Minuti Co. v. Elson-Williams Construction Co (N.D. 1919)
- Victoria Lumber Co. v. Wells (La. 1916)
- Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Indianapolis Mortar & Fuel Co. (Ind. 1912)
- Getchell & Martin Lumber & Manufacturing Co. v. Peterson & Sampson (Iowa 1904)
- United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Omaha Bldg. & Const. Co. (8th Cir. 1902)
- Griffith v. Rundle (Wash. 1900)
- United States ex rel. Anniston Pipe & Foundry Co. v. National Surety Co. (8th Cir. 1899)
- Cherry v. Charles Benson, Inc. (Ill. App. Ct. 1931)
- People ex rel. Reynolds v. Banhagel (Mich. 1908)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
These actions were brought against Bruecker, the contractor, as principal, and the other defendants as sureties, in a bond executed by them to Gardner S. Moore, as owner, conditioned that Bruecker would pay all just claims for work done and to be done, and all material furnished and to be furnished, pursuant to a contract between Moore, as owner, and Bruecker as contractor, for the construction of a certain building, and in the execution of the work therein provided for as they should become due, which bond was made and filed under Gen. St. 1878, c. 90, § 3, in order to prevent a lien attaching to such building for the work so done and material so furnished. The bond is joint and several. The plaintiffs are mechanics who worked for Bruecker in doing the work required by his contract. The plaintiffs had-judgment below, and the cases come here on bills of exceptions. There are 20 assignments of error, some too trivial to require specific mention. All that need be particularly referred to may be grouped under a few heads.
First. As to who need be made parties defendant. The language of the statute is too explicit to admit of a question: “Persons severally liable upon the same obligation or instrument * * * may all or any of them be included, in the same action." Gen. St. 1878, c. 66, § 36. This means nothing else than that the plaintiff may bring his action against all or one or more of the persons so severally liable. This bond, being joint and several, comes within the rule thus expressed.
Second. In an action on the bond it is immaterial what interest in the land the nominal obligee in the bond may have. The obligors cannot be permitted to allege want of title to the land in such nominal obligee, for the purpose of defeating those who, on the security of the bond, have furnished material for and done labor in doing the
Such a bond being executed and filed, the principal obligor and the nominal obligee cannot, either by agreement or act, affect the right or interest of the parties really interested in and secured by it, to wit, those doing work on, or furnishing material for, the building. Without the consent of those parties, they cannot discharge it, nor impair its obligation. It is true such work must be done and material furnished pursuant to — that is, in fulfilment of — the contract between the owner and contractor. Whether and how far the terms of the original contract existing when the bond was executed may be changed by them, the building to be constructed continuing substantially the one originally contracted for, without affecting the claims of those doing work and furnishing material, it is unnecessary to decide. Certainly a mere extension of the time to complete the contract would have no such effect. The work and material would still be done and furnished in fulfilment of the original contract. If the bond were for the performance of that contract, an agreement between the principals, without the consent of the sureties, extending the time for its performance, or changing any of its material terms,might have the effect to discharge the sureties. But this is no such bond. It is not conditioned that the contractor will perform his contract to construct the building, but that he will pay for all labor and material which, to fulfil that contract, he employs or procures.
Judgments affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.