Lavallee v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Co.
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Citation treatment has not been reviewed for this case. The notes below come from the citation graph and the Minnesota Revisor's amendment records, not from a review of how later courts treated this decision.
(as of 9/30/2026)
Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 1943, among the opinions in this site’s citation index.
Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
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Cases that cite this one
47 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough (Ind. 1907)
- Seamer v. Great Northern Railway Co. (Minn. 1919)
- Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Westby (8th Cir. 1910)
- Kiley v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. (Wis. 1909)
- Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Melton (Ky. Ct. App. 1907)
- State ex rel. Board of Education v. Brown (Minn. 1906)
- Gleason v. Geary (Minn. 1943)
- Kellerman v. City of St. Paul (Minn. 1941)
- Wendt v. Wallace (Minn. 1932)
- State Ex Rel. Williams v. St. Paul Fire Department Relief Ass'n (Minn. 1928)
- Herr v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. (Minn. 1923)
- State v. Moilen (Minn. 1918)
- Majavis v. Great Northern Railway Co. (Minn. 1913)
- Jelos v. Oliver Iron Mining Co. (Minn. 1913)
- Koecher v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co. (Minn. 1913)
- Nylund v. Duluth & Northeastern Railway Co. (Minn. 1913)
- Stoll v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co. (District Court, W.D. Washington 1913)
- Richey v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. (Ind. 1911)
- Hanson v. Northern Pacific Railway Co. (Minn. 1909)
- State ex rel. Mudeking v. Parr (Minn. 1909)
- Chandler Coal Co. v. Sams (Ind. 1908)
- Hardt v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. (Wis. 1907)
- Jemming v. Great Northern Railway Co. (Minn. 1905)
- Kibbe v. Stevenson Iron Min. Co. (8th Cir. 1905)
- Beleal ex rel. Beleal v. Northern Pacific Railway Co. (N.D. 1904)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff cannot recover, unless under chapter 13, Laws 1887. The deceased and the persons through whose negligence he received the injury from which he died were fellow-servants, and the injury occurred from their negligence, and no other cause, so that upon the principles of the common law there could be no recovery against defendant. Chapter 13 reads: “Every railroad corporation owning or operating a railroad in this state shall be liable for all damages sustained by any agent or servant thereof, by reason of the negligence of any other agent or servant thereof, without contributory negligence on his part, when sustained within this state; and no contract, rule, or regulation between such corporation and any agent or servant shall impair or diminish such liability: provided, that nothing in this act shall be so construed as to render any railroad company liable for damages sustained by any employe, agent, or servant while engaged in the construction of a new road, or any part thereof, not open to public travel or use.”
The question is whether this statute includes all employes, agents, and servants of a railroad corporation, without regard to the character of the business in which they are employed. Taken literally, it does. But it is evident that in some respects, at least, it cannot be taken literally; for, as the court below in its memorandum, in deciding the motion for a new trial, aptly says: “According to its terms, the company is liable without regard to whether the employe is injured in the course of his employment or not.” Of course, that could not have been intended. The plaintiff insists that the act applies to all employes; the defendant, that it applies only to those whose employment subjects them to the peculiar hazards pertaining to operating a railroad. *
From the authorities we get very little help in determining the question. Decisions from four states having statutes nearly similar to ours have been cited, to wit, Georgia, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Kansas. In Thompson v. Central R. R. and Banking Co., 54 Ga. 509, the supreme court held that the statute was not limited to any class of employes; and in Georgia R. Co. v. Ivey, 73 Ga. 499, when asked to reconsider its former decision, and the point was for the first time made that the act, if given unlimited operation, would be unconstitutional,
The objection made to the construction of the statute which the ap
The frequency and magnitude of the dangers to which those employed in operating railroads are exposed; the difficulty, sometimes impossibility, of escaping from them with any amount of care, when they come; the fact that a great number of men are employed, cooperating in the same work, so that no one of them can know all the others, their competency, skill, and care, so that he may be said to voluntarily assume the risk arising from the want of skill or care by any one of the number, — are a sufficient reason for applying a rule of liability on the part of the employer to the employe so employed different from that ordinarily applied between master and servant. But no just reason can be suggested why such difference should be founded, not on the character of the employment, ñor of the dangers to which those employed are exposed, but on the character only of the employer. We can see why the employer’s liability should be
Order affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.