Minnesota Supreme Court, 1889

State v. Vorey

Minnesota Supreme Court · Decided June 27, 1889 · Mitchell

41 Minn. 134; 43 N.W. 324; 1889 Minn. LEXIS 288 (Minnesota Reports)

Counsel

Moses E. Clapp, Attorney General, and W. B. Douglas, for the State., Greene é Hildreth, for defendant.

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Citation treatment has not been reviewed for this case. The notes below come from the citation graph and the Minnesota Revisor's amendment records, not from a review of how later courts treated this decision.

(as of 9/30/2026)

Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 1999, among the opinions in this site’s citation index.

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Cases that cite this one

10 later published cases cite this decision.

State v. DeVerney (Minn. 1999)
State v. Bancroft (N.D. 1912)
State v. Hann (Minn. 1898)
State v. Jones (Minn. 1963)
State v. Nuser (Minn. 1937)
State v. Taran (Minn. 1929)
State v. Christofferson (Minn. 1921)
State v. Rhoades (N.D. 1908)
State v. Fallon (N.D. 1892)
State v. Farrington (Minn. 1894)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

Mitchell, J.

Under Penal Code, § 235, there are five several distinct acts or ways by which a person may commit the crime of rape, the second of which is when the resistance of the female is overcome by force, and the third “when her resistance is prevented by fear of immediate and great bodily harm which she has reasonable cause to *136believe will be inflicted upon her.” The indictment should charge the acts constituting the alleged rape so as to advise the'accused in which one of these different ways he is charged with having committed the crime. State v. Henn, 39 Minn. 464; (40 N. W. Rep. 564;) People v. Demar, 106 N. Y. 502; People v. Dimick, 107 N. Y. 13.

The indictment in this case was evidently framed as an indictment under the third subdivision of the section, viz., where the resistance of the female was prevented by fear, etc., and, if good at all, it is under that subdivision. The allegations peculiar to an indictment for rape committed in that way cannot be treated as surplus-age; and, even if they could, there would not be enough left in this case to constitute a good indictment under the second subdivision.

Upon the trial the court instructed the jury that there was no evidence to justify a conviction under the third subdivision, "but that they might convict the defendant, under the second subdivision, of rape committed by overcoming the resistance of the prosecutrix by force. This last was clearly error, because, for the reasons already suggested, this was not the offence charged in the indictment.

Judgment reversed.

Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.