Boyer v. St. Paul City Ry. Co.
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Citation treatment has not been reviewed for this case. The notes below come from the citation graph and the Minnesota Revisor's amendment records, not from a review of how later courts treated this decision.
(as of 9/30/2026)
Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 1952, among the opinions in this site’s citation index.
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Cases that cite this one
5 later published cases cite this decision.
- Peterson v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co. (Minn. 1952)
- Heiden v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co. (Minn. 1922)
- Riley v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co. (Minn. 1900)
- Gourlay v. Insurance Co. of North America (Mich. 1914)
- Mercantile National Bank of Cleveland v. Parsons (Minn. 1893)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
This action against the defendants, for a personal injury, sustained by plaintiff, was dismissed at the trial because the court deemed that the plaintiff was clearly shown to be guilty of contributory negligence by the evidence. On a review cf the evidence upon a motion for a new trial the trial court became convinced that the question was one for the jury, and accordingly granted a new trial. The plaintiff, who lived in Wisconsin, was a stranger in the vicinity, and unacquainted with the street-car lines between St. Paul and Minneapolis. On the 12th day of June, 1892, in company with a friend, he boarded a street car running between the cities named, early in the evening of that day. On the way a severe storm of wind and rain arose, and continued with increasing severity until the car reached a point on Washington avenue, in the city of Minneapolis, between Second and Third streets, where the car was stopped by the storm. The
2. The evidence tended to show that the car which struck and injured the plaintiff was running at a very high rate of speed,-— fifteen or twenty-five miles an hour. The jury might very properly find such rate of speed to be dangerous, and the question of defendants’ negligence was very clearly for them. The storm and darkness also imposed the additional duty of caution while proceeding on a street where pedestrians might be expected to be crossing at any time in the evening.
Order affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.