Otterness v. Botten
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Citation treatment has not been reviewed for this case. The notes below come from the citation graph and the Minnesota Revisor's amendment records, not from a review of how later courts treated this decision.
(as of 9/30/2026)
Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 1963, among the opinions in this site’s citation index.
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Cases that cite this one
1 later published case cites this decision.
- Elsberry v. Great Northern Railway Co. (Minn. 1963)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Action on a promissory note for $68.15. The summons was served on the defendant Paaverud only, who answered that he signed the note as surety for his co-defendant Botten; that the note was given for seed wheat, which was warranted to germinate; and that there was a. breach of warranty, in that the wheat was sown, but wholly failed to grow, whereby there was a failure of the consideration of the note. The affirmative allegations of the answer were put in issue by the reply. Verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant Paaverud appealed from an order denying his motion for a new trial.
The basis of the motion was that the appellant’s co-defendant Botten was a necessary and material witness, and that he was taken by surprise by the failure of Botten to appear at the trial.
The moving papers tend to establish these facts: As between themselves, Botten was the principal on the note, and Paaverud was his surety. The former resided in South Dakota, fourteen miles from Britton, his post-office address. The appellant, shortly
A new trial on the ground of accident or surprise should be-granted only in cases where it is very clear that the moving party has exercised due diligence in the premises. A motion for a new trial on this ground is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision thereon will not be reversed by this court except for an abuse of such discretion. Upon the appellant’s own showing in this case it must be held that the motion was properly denied by the trial court, for it falls far short of establishing any accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. Conceding, without so deciding, that the appellant, in view of the relation of Botten to the action and'to himself, was justified, in the first instance, in relying on his promise to be present at the trial if advised as to the time (see Mackubin v. Clarkson, 5 Minn. 193 [247]), still the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that he was wanting in ordinary prudence. The very fact that the first letter was answered at once, taken in connection with the further fact that twenty days had passed, and no response had been received to the second letter, would naturally suggest to a prudent man that Botten either had not received the second letter, or that
Order affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.