Minnesota Supreme Court, 1923

State v. Nelson

Minnesota Supreme Court · Decided December 14, 1923

157 Minn. 506; 196 N.W. 279; 1923 Minn. LEXIS 929 (Minnesota Reports)

Counsel

Thomson & Williams, for appellant., Neil M. Cronin, City Attorney, and Luther W. Youngdahl, Assistant City Attorney, for respondent.

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Citation treatment has not been reviewed for this case. The notes below come from the citation graph and the Minnesota Revisor's amendment records, not from a review of how later courts treated this decision.

(as of 9/30/2026)

Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 1972, among the opinions in this site’s citation index.

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Cases that cite this one

14 later published cases cite this decision.

City of St. Paul v. Whidby (Minn. 1972)
State v. Hoben (Minn. 1959)
State v. McCabe (Minn. 1957)
State v. Ketterer (Minn. 1956)
State v. Wilson (Minn. 1955)
State v. End (Minn. 1950)
State v. Siporen (Minn. 1943)
State v. Jamieson (Minn. 1941)
State Ex Rel. Connolly v. Parks (Minn. 1937)
City of St. Paul v. Keeley (Minn. 1935)
State Ex Rel. Goff v. Minneapolis Brewing Co. (Minn. 1933)
Carter v. Duluth Yellow Cab Co. (Minn. 1927)
Lampert Lumber Co. v. Thanning (Minn. 1924)
City of Red Wing v. Nibbe (Minn. 1924)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was convicted of running a disorderly house in the city of Minneapolis, contrary to an ordinance. She appeals. The errors assigned are: (a) The evidence did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and (b) the only evidence of defendant’s connection with the house was her admission that she ran it.

*507This being a quasi criminal prosecution under an ordinance, sections 8462 and 8463, G. S. 1913, are not applicable. In State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445, 457, 13 N. W. 913, it was said of an ordinance against operating a house of ill-fame “this ordinance is satisfied with a less degree or quantity of evidence than is required on the trial of the offense under the general law, (which must be beyond reasonable doubt).” A defendant is not entitled to a jury trial when charged with an offense under a municipal ordinance. City of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 30 N. W. 305; State v. Harris, 50 Minn. 128, 52 N. W. 387, 531; State v. Grimes, 83 Minn. 460, 86 N. W. 449. In State v. Robitshek, 60 Minn. 123, 124, 61 N. W. 1023, 33 L. R. A. 33, it is said: “It has repeatedly been decided by this court, as it has elsewhere, that municipal ordinances are not criminal statutes; that violations thereof are not crimes, nor are such violations governed by the rules of the criminal law, save in certain specified exceptional particulars.” The evidence clearly established the house in question to have been a disorderly house. Its reputation was bad; it was frequented at all hours of the night by men and also women; drunken persons would issue therefrom; revelry and profanity were heard by passers on the street until the small hours of the morning; and when, after midnight, on the date the arrest was made, the officers entered, 5 persons were found drinking and carousing in one room, with defendant in an adjacent room, the door being open, lying on a bed, almost wholly undressed kicking, cursing and swearing in a maudlin way.

Defendant’s counsel seem to argue that there was no proof of the corpus delicti except by defendant’s admission. He is in error. The corpus delicti was the existence of a disorderly house. And, as to defendant being the one concerned in its operation, her admission, corroborated by the fact that she was found therein under the condition stated, was amply sufficient to support the conviction.

Judgment affirmed.

Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.