Minnesota Supreme Court, 1942

In re Disbarment of Leonard L. Sutton

In re Disbarment of Leonard L. Sutton
Minnesota Supreme Court · Decided July 17, 1942 · PER CURIAM.
5 N.W.2d 396; 213 Minn. 76; 1942 Minn. LEXIS 485 (North Western Reporter, Second Series)

Counsel

Philip Neville , for State Board of Law Examiners. Arthur T. Nelson , for respondent.

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Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 1942, among the opinions in this site’s citation index.

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In re Disbarment of Leonard L. Sutton

Cases that cite this one

2 later published cases cite this decision.

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Opinion of the Court

Per Curiam.

Eespondent was convicted on his plea of nolo contendere of the crime of embezzlement in the United States district court, third division, of Minnesota, and sentence (suspended) for 15 months in a penitentiary imposed and respondent placed on probation for a period of two years.

Mason St. 1927, § 5697(1) (A) makes conviction of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude ground for removal or suspension of an attorney at law by this court and makes the record of conviction conclusive evidence of the crime. In response to an order to show cause why the respondent should not be immediately and forthwith disbarred, he filed an answer in which he sought to allege certain extenuating circumstances which resulted in his embezzlement of the money and ultimately in his federal court conviction.

So long as the conviction stands it cannot be questioned here by such evidence as respondent proposes to offer in defense in this disbarment proceeding. The crime of which he was convicted is a crime involving moral turpitude, and under the circumstances we are not convinced that there are any extenuating circumstances shown which would warrant the appointment of a referee to hear *77 any plea which respondent might make. We do not feel that respondent is entitled to leniency. He is therefore disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys entitled to practice in this state.

Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.