The state appeals from an order of the St. Paul municipal court dismissing a speeding charge against defendant on the ground that Minn. St. 609.035, which deals with the problem of multiple prosecution and punishment of unitary criminal conduct, barred the prosecution. We reverse.

Defendant was arraigned in St. Paul municipal court on charges of operating a motor vehicle without a license, Minn. St. 171.02, and speeding, Minn. St. 169.14. Defendant, without aid of counsel, pled guilty to operating without a license. The judge, after accepting the plea, sentenced defendant to a fine of $40 or 4 days in jail. 1 Defendant pled not guilty to the remaining charge.

Defendant, represented by counsel, appeared for trial on the speeding charge before a different judge and, relying on Minn. St. 609.035, moved to dismiss. The state stipulated to the fact that the acts with which defendant had been charged occurred *99 at the same time and place. The court granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the speeding charge.

We hold that the judge erred in granting the motion to dismiss. In State v. Reiland, 274 Minn. 121, 142 N. W. 2d 635 (1966), we held that the conduct constituting the offense of driving after revocation was separate and distinct from the conduct constituting the offense of criminal negligence, and, therefore, that a conviction for driving after revocation did not bar a subsequent prosecution for criminal negligence even though the offenses occurred at the same time and place. That case controls our disposition of the instant case.

Reversed.