The issues in this case arise out of an action by Prior Lake State Bank to quiet title to land in Scott County, Minnesota,1 following foreclosure of a mortgage given by defendant to plaintiff and the expiration of the period of redemption. The mortgage was made in January 1966; foreclosure by advertisement was initiated on January 5, 1970; plaintiff bid in the property at the sheriff’s sale on February 20, 1970; and the action to quiet title was initiated by service upon defendant on August 24, 1971. Judgment was entered decreeing that plaintiff was the owner in fee simple of the described lands as against this defendant and all others named in the summons. Defendant appeals from the order denying his various post-trial motions.

Defendant contends, as principal issues, that the presiding district court judge should have disqualified himself for cause or, in any event, in response to an affidavit of prejudice filed against him 2 days in ad-*568vanee of the date set for trial. There is no merit to these contentions. No actual cause for disqualification within the meaning of Rule 63.02, Rules of Civil Procedure, was shown. The affidavit of prejudice was not timely filed in this multi-judge district as required by Rule 63.03. The clerk of district court had mailed notice dated March 22, 1972, advising that trial was scheduled for April 19,1972, in Scott County Court House, the Honorable John M. Fitzgerald presiding. The affidavit of prejudice against Judge Fitzgerald was not filed until April 17, 1972.

Defendant’s claim of right to be represented at trial by Jerome Daly, a disbarred lawyer, pursuant to power of attorney is frivolous. The alternative claim of Mr. Daly to appear himself as a party defendant, based upon his unauthenticated assertion of an interest in the land, is likewise without merit.

The judgment for plaintiff in its action to quiet title was sustained on the merits. No irregularity in the foreclosure proceedings was established and, in any event, the claimed irregularity, asserted only after the expiration of the period of redemption,2 constituted an impermis*569sible collateral attack. See, Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Riopelle, 298 Minn. 417, 216 N. W. 2d 674 (1974).

Affirmed.