Ebel v. Village of South International Falls
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Citation treatment has not been reviewed for this case. The notes below come from the citation graph and the Minnesota Revisor's amendment records, not from a review of how later courts treated this decision.
(as of 9/30/2026)
Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 1979, among the opinions in this site’s citation index.
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Cases that cite this one
2 later published cases cite this decision.
- Kossak v. Stalling (Minn. 1979)
- Mount v. City of Vermillion (S.D. 1977)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Plaintiff appeals from summary judgment dismissing his complaint against defendant municipality for failure to comply with the following provisions of Minn. St. 1971, § 466.05, subd. 1:
“Every person who claims damages from any municipality for or on account of any loss or injury within the scope of section 466.02 shall cause to be presented to the governing body of the municipality within 30 days after the alleged loss or injury a written notice stating the time, place and circumstances thereof, and the amount of compensation or other relief demanded. * * * No action therefor shall be maintained unless such notice has been given and unless the action is commenced within one year after such notice.”
The complaint alleges that plaintiff was seriously injured and mutilated on January 1, 1972, when a snowmobile which he was operating collided with a bale of barbed wire which had been negligently left at
In Kelly v. City of Rochester, 304 Minn. 328, 333, 231 N. W. 2d 275, 277 (1975), we construed Minn. St. 1971, § 466.05, subd. 1, to mean that no formal notice from the injured plaintiff is required if the municipal defendant has actual notice from another source. We remand for a determination by the trial court as to whether the defendant here had actual notice within the statutory 30-day period.
We note that the injury here involved occurred on January 1, 1972. Suit was not commenced until February 1,1973. Thus, even though the city had actual notice within the statutory 30-day period, it may be that, in the absence of circumstances adequate to toll the 1-year statute of limitations, plaintiff’s cause of action is barred.
If actual notice is not established, or if it is, and the action is barred for failure to commence the action within 1 year, then this court will, upon application for review and notice to the attorney general, consider the claim that § 466.05, subd. 1, is unconstitutional.
Remanded.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.