Minnesota Supreme Court, 1977

State v. Larson

Minnesota Supreme Court · Decided May 13, 1977 · Per Curiam

254 N.W.2d 380; 1977 Minn. LEXIS 1559 (North Western Reporter, Second Series)

Counsel

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, David J. Twa, Asst. County Atty., Mankato, for appellant., Charles A. Adamson, Mankato, for respondent.

Can I rely on this case?

Citation treatment has not been reviewed for this case. The notes below come from the citation graph and the Minnesota Revisor's amendment records, not from a review of how later courts treated this decision.

(as of 9/30/2026)

Last cited by a Minnesota appellate court in 1986, among the opinions in this site’s citation index.

Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

See our Terms of Use before relying on these notes. Report an error

Cases that cite this one

3 later published cases cite this decision.

State v. Wiberg (Minn. 1980)
State v. Hendrickson (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
State v. Bradley (Minn. 1978)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the state pursuant to Rule 29.03, Rules of Criminal Procedure, from a pretrial omnibus hearing order of the district court denying a motion by the defendant to dismiss a felony prosecution on the ground that he was not brought before the magistrate within 36 hours after his arrest as required by Rule 4.02, subd. 5(1), Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court, although refusing to dismiss the case, ruled that the state had violated the 36-hour rule and that the proper sanction is to exclude any evidence obtained improperly on account of the delay.

*381 The order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss obviously was not adverse to the state. We accordingly have no occasion to decide the correctness of the trial court’s interpretation of the rule, except to note that the relevant rules for computation of time have since been amended, effective July 1, 1977.

The order suppressing any evidence obtained during that period does not in a practical sense appear to be adverse to the state, for there is nothing in this record to suggest that there was any evidence which would actually be suppressed. We accordingly have no occasion to now determine whether suppression is an appropriate sanction for violation by the 36-hour rule.

Defendant, having filed no brief on this appeal, is not entitled to any statutory award for attorneys fees.

Appeal dismissed.

Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.