Minnesota Supreme Court, 1981 Playing with matches in a pickup truck, a five-year-old girl was severely burned; the Minnesota Supreme Court held the injuries did not arise out of the vehicle's maintenance or use and reversed the judgment finding no-fault coverage.

Playing with matches in a pickup truck, a five-year-old girl was severely burned; the Minnesota Supreme Court held the injuries did not arise out of the vehicle's maintenance or use and reversed the judgment finding no-fault coverage.

Tlougan v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co.
Minnesota Supreme Court · Decided September 18, 1981 · Simonett
310 N.W.2d 116; 1981 Minn. LEXIS 1426 (North Western Reporter, Second Series)

Outcome: Reversed for appellant.

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Counsel

James A. Reding, St. Paul, for appellant., Steward, Perry & Mahler and M. John Steward, Rochester, Eric J. Magnuson, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Tlougan v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co.

What happened

The facts of the case, in plain language.

While sitting in the cab of the truck, five-year-old Carrie Tlougan lit a match she found there, igniting her costume; the truck's motor was not running and her mother was still inside the house.

The matches had been left on the truck's dashboard by Carrie's father because the truck's cigarette lighter was not in working order.

Carrie Tlougan suffered third-degree burns on 40% of her body; her medical expenses to the time of trial were $20,714, and her doctor testified additional surgery would be required.

The trial court found Carrie Tlougan's injuries were covered by the no-fault insurance policy and not by the homeowners' policy, and Auto-Owners appealed from the judgment.

At the time of the accident Carrie was occupying the pickup as a passenger, preparatory to a trip into town, and was using the vehicle for transportation purposes.

What the court decided

Five-year-old Carrie Tlougan, dressed in a gunny-sack Indian costume, was sitting in the family pickup truck awaiting a trip to town when she lit a match left on the dashboard and ignited her costume, suffering third-degree burns on forty percent of her body. The trial court held the injuries covered by the parents' no-fault automobile policy with Auto-Owners and not by the Great Central homeowners' policy. On Auto-Owners' appeal, the supreme court reversed. Following its precedents requiring a connection between the injury and the vehicle's use for transportation purposes—less than proximate cause, more than the vehicle as mere situs—the court found the truck was not an "active accessory" to the injury, deeming the cab merely the situs of the match-playing, as in Boyer. Because the injury did not arise out of the vehicle's maintenance or use, the court held it removed from the exclusion of the homeowners' policy.

  1. Under Minnesota's no-fault statute, an injury is covered as arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle only when a sufficient causal connection exists between the injury and the vehicle's use for transportation purposes—a connection something less than proximate cause in the tort sense but something more than the vehicle being the mere situs of the injury. (*117)
  2. A motor vehicle contributes to an injury within the meaning of the no-fault statute only if it is an 'active accessory' to the injury—that is, its condition or positioning creates a hazardous situation contributing to the harm—not if it serves merely as the situs where the injury occurs. (*117)
  3. Occupying a motor vehicle as a passenger preparatory to a trip establishes use of the vehicle for transportation purposes, but such occupancy alone does not establish that an injury sustained while occupying the vehicle arose out of its use. (*117)
  4. Personal items left in a vehicle for convenience—in this case matches placed on the dashboard because the cigarette lighter was broken—remain common-use items that do not become part of the vehicle's equipment, and injuries involving them therefore lack a causal connection to the vehicle's use for transportation purposes. (*117)
  5. An injury that does not arise out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle falls outside the scope of no-fault automobile coverage and is removed from the motor-vehicle exclusion of a homeowners' policy. (*118)

How the court reached its decision

The court's reasoning, step by step.

Whether the child's burn injuries arose out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle within the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 1, and § 65B.43, subd. 3. Although Carrie occupied the pickup as a passenger preparatory to a trip into town, the cab of the truck was no more than the situs of the match-playing incident; unlike the pickup in Haagenson, whose position near downed powerlines created a hazardous situation contributing to the passenger's electrocution, this truck created no such hazard, and the incident is analogous to Boyer, where a shooting inside a car left the vehicle a mere situs of the injury. There is an insufficient causal connection between the use of the vehicle for transportation purposes and the injury; the injury did not arise out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, so the judgment against the no-fault insurer is reversed.

Whether the presence of matches in the pickup—left there because the cigarette lighter was broken—connected the child's injuries to the vehicle's use for transportation purposes. The matches were a common-use item; although brought into the pickup because the cigarette lighter did not work, their presence did not make them part of the pickup's equipment nor something that involved the vehicle when used for transportation purposes. The child's playing with a book of matches left in the pickup from the day before establishes no causal connection between her injuries and the truck's use for transportation purposes.

Whether Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. required coverage for the child's injuries. Nothing about the placement or condition of the Tlougan pickup contributed to the ignition of the child's costume; the circumstances resemble Boyer, where the vehicle was held to be no more than the situs of the injury. Haagenson does not establish coverage here because, unlike that case, the pickup truck cannot be said to have been an active accessory of the injury.

Key quotes from the opinion

Notable passages from the opinion, in the court's own words.

““the injury is a natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the vehicle.””
Causal-nexus standard: injury must be a natural and reasonable consequence of vehicle use — *117
““the vehicle itself must be an active accessory” to the injury sustained.”
"Active accessory" requirement quoted with approval from the Mississippi Supreme Court — *117
“We conclude, however, that coverage is not established since there is an insufficient causal connection between use of the vehicle for transportation purposes and the injury.”
Occupancy for transportation purposes alone does not establish coverage — *117
“Here, in our opinion, it cannot be said the pickup truck was an “active accessory” of the injury. The cab of the truck was no more than the situs of the match-playing incident.”
Application: truck was mere situs of the injury, not an active accessory — *117

Cases the court relied on

Earlier decisions the court cited as authority for its ruling.

  • Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. (277 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1979)) — The principal competing precedent: the court distinguished Haagenson, where coverage turned on the parked pickup's position near downed powerlines creating a hazard that contributed to the passenger's electrocution, from this case, where the truck created no comparable hazard.
  • National Family Insurance Co. v. Boyer (269 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1978)) — The closest analogue: Boyer held that a shooting inside a car left the vehicle no more than the situs of the injury, and the court deemed the match-playing incident analogous.
  • Holm v. Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co. (261 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 1977)) — Holm supplied the 'active accessory' requirement, quoted with approval from the Mississippi Supreme Court, and exemplifies the line of cases denying coverage where injuries did not relate to the vehicle's use for transportation purposes.
  • National Mutual Casualty Co. v. Clark (193 Miss. 27, 7 So.2d 800 (1942)) — The Mississippi decision originating the 'active accessory' formulation that this court adopted through Holm and applied to conclude the pickup was a mere situs of the injury.
  • Engeldinger v. State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters (306 Minn. 202, 236 N.W.2d 596 (1975)) — One of the earlier Minnesota decisions establishing that auto coverage requires a connection between the injury and the vehicle's use for transportation purposes.

Minnesota statutes cited

Sections of the Minnesota Statutes this opinion cites.

Cases that cite this one

58 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.

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Full opinion

The complete text of the court's opinion as published.

Opinion

SIMONETT, Justice.

Respondent Carrie L. Tlougan, a 5-year-old child who sustained burn injuries while playing with matches in a truck, brought suit for her injuries against her parents’ automobile insurer, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, and homeowners’ insurer, Great Central Insurance Company. The trial court found that Carrie Tlougan’s injuries were covered by the no-fault insurance policy and not by the homeowners’ policy. Auto-Owners appeals from the judgment. Since we find the injuries did not arise out of the use or maintenance of a motor vehicle, we reverse.

Betty Tlougan, Carrie’s mother, was planning to take her children to downtown Plainview on the morning of July 10, 1978, to participate in a “Crazy Days” celebration. Carrie was dressed in an Indian costume made from a gunny sack. The father had left a book of matches on the dashboard of the family pickup truck the previous day. The matches had been given to him by his wife because the truck’s cigarette lighter was not in working order.

Mrs. Tlougan told her two children to sit in the truck and wait for her while she cleared dishes from the breakfast table. Carrie found the matches while sitting in the cab of the truck. She lit one of them and it ignited her costume. The truck’s motor was not running and Mrs. Tlougan was still inside the house at the time of the accident.

As a result of the accident, Carrie Tloug-an suffered third-degree burns on 40% of her body. Her medical expenses to time of trial were $20,714, and her doctor testified additional surgery would be required in the future.

Minnesota’s no-fault statute states that basic economic loss benefits “shall provide reimbursement for all loss suffered through injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.” Minn.Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 1 (1980). The issue here is whether Carrie’s injuries arose “out of the mainte *117 nance or use of a motor vehicle.” This phrase is further defined by the statute as “maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle, including, incident to its maintenance or use as a vehicle^ occupying, entering into, and alighting from it.” Minn.Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 3 (1980) (emphasis added).

This court has long recognized there must be some connection between the injury and the use of the vehicle for transportation purposes. See, e. g., Holm v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co., 261 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn. 1977); Engeldinger v. State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters, 306 Minn. 202, 208, 236 N.W.2d 596, 600 (1975); Associated Independent Dealers, Inc. v. Mutual Service Ins. Cos., 304 Minn. 179, 182, 229 N.W.2d 516, 518 (1975). In these three cases we denied auto insurance coverage since the injuries did not relate to use of the vehicle for transportation purposes. In Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co., 277 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1979), however, we found the connection sufficient to afford coverage.

In this case, the plaintiff was using the pickup truck for transportation purposes at the time of the accident. She was occupying the pickup, as a passenger, preparatory to a trip into town. We conclude, however, that coverage is not established since there is an insufficient causal connection between use of the vehicle for transportation purposes and the injury.

This “connection” between use and injury is something less than proximate cause in the tort sense and something more than the vehicle being the mere situs of the injury. It is enough if “the injury is a natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the vehicle.” Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652; National Family Ins. Co. v. Boyer, 269 N.W.2d 10, 15 (Minn. 1978). In Holm, 261 N.W.2d at 603, we quoted with approval the requirement of the Mississippi Supreme Court that “the vehicle itself must be an active accessory” to the injury sustained. See National Mutual Casualty Co. v. Clark, 193 Miss. 27, 40, 7 So.2d 800, 805 (1942) (emphasis in the original).

Here, in our opinion, it cannot be said the pickup truck was an “active accessory” of the injury. The cab of the truck was no more than the situs of the match-playing incident. The incident is analogous to that in Boyer where we held that the shooting of a pistol by a person in the front seat of a car which resulted in injury to- a passenger entering the back seat of the car was not an incident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. We said there the vehicle was no more than the situs of the injury.

Respondent relies, as did the trial court, on Haagenson. There we found coverage for a passenger who was electrocuted when he slipped while opening the door of a pickup truck and came in contact with a live wire. In Haagenson, however, the pickup truck was an active accessory of the injury. A car had left the road, knocking down a powerline pole. A pickup, in which plaintiff was a passenger, came to the rescue and was parked on the side of the road near the disabled car. We pointed out the pickup was parked next to the ditch with the downed powerlines only 6 to 12 feet from the passenger’s side of the truck and with the lowest powerline 3 to 4 feet above the ground; that the ditch sloped down from a narrow 1-foot shoulder; that dew or frost had formed on the grassy slope; and that it was nighttime. Id., 277 N.W.2d at 650. In other words, the circumstances in Haagen-son were such that the positioning of the vehicle created a hazardous situation for the passenger which contributed to his injury-

Nor do we think the fact the child was playing with a book of matches left in the pickup from the day before establishes any causal connection between the child’s injuries and the use of the truck for transportation purposes. While the matches had been brought into the pickup because the cigarette lighter did not work, this would not make the matches, a common-use item, part of the pickup’s equipment nor something that involved the vehicle when used for transportation purposes.

We therefore reverse the judgment against the no-fault insurer. Since we hold *118 the injury did not arise out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, the injury is removed from the exclusion of the homeowners’ policy contrary to the determination of the trial court.

Reversed.

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