Minnesota Supreme Court, 1982 Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict finding a Minneapolis police officer liable for assaulting an arrested suspect, upholding awards of compensatory and punitive damages.

Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict finding a Minneapolis police officer liable for assaulting an arrested suspect, upholding awards of compensatory and punitive damages.

Melina v. Chaplin
Minnesota Supreme Court · Decided December 10, 1982 · Kelley
327 N.W.2d 19; 1982 Minn. LEXIS 1873 (North Western Reporter, Second Series)

Outcome: Affirmed for respondent.

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Melina v. Chaplin

What happened

The facts of the case, in plain language.

William Chaplin was a Minneapolis police officer.

Martin Melina, Sr., was arrested, handcuffed with his hands behind him, and placed in the rear seat of a Minneapolis police squad car.

Melina testified that after his arrest and placement in the squad car, Chaplin entered the car and assaulted him with "sap" gloves, while Chaplin testified that he did not enter the car.

The jury resolved the credibility dispute in Melina's favor, finding that Chaplin had assaulted and battered Melina in the rear of the police squad car.

No evidence regarding Chaplin's ability to pay the punitive damages award was presented during trial or at post-trial motions.

What the court decided

On June 12, 1976, a jury found that Minneapolis police officer William Chaplin assaulted Martin Melina, Sr., during the arrest of Melina. Melina claimed that after being handcuffed and placed in a police squad car, Chaplin entered the vehicle and attacked him with "sap" gloves; Chaplin denied entering the car. The jury resolved the credibility dispute in Melina's favor, awarding $2,000 compensatory damages and $35,000 in punitive damages. The trial court denied Chaplin's motion for a new trial or remittitur of the punitive award. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the jury's verdict was not manifestly contrary to the evidence and that the punitive damages award was not excessive as a matter of law, though the court noted that Chaplin's ability to pay was not established at trial.

  1. A jury verdict will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
  2. The determination of witness credibility is exclusively the jury's function and is not subject to appellate reweighing.
  3. Where no evidence of a defendant's ability to pay was presented at trial or at post-trial proceedings, an appellate court confined to the record cannot vacate or remit a punitive damages award on that basis.
  4. An appellate issue not argued in the briefs is deemed waived and will not be addressed on appeal. (*21)

How the court reached its decision

The court's reasoning, step by step.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that Officer Chaplin committed an assault and battery on Melina after his arrest. The evidence was sharply disputed: Melina and his witnesses testified that Chaplin entered the squad car and attacked the handcuffed Melina with 'sap' gloves; Chaplin denied ever entering the vehicle. To resolve that dispute, the jury was required to weigh the credibility of each side's witnesses, a function belonging exclusively to the jury. Viewed in the light most favorable to Melina, the jury's verdict was not manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence, and the court affirmed the finding of assault and battery.

Whether the $35,000 punitive damages award was excessive as a matter of law, requiring a new trial or remittitur. Neither during trial nor at the post-trial motion hearing was any evidence presented concerning Chaplin's ability to pay the punitive award. The trial court noted the absence of such evidence in denying the remittitur motion, and the appellate court, confined to the same record, similarly had no basis on which to find excessiveness tied to inability to pay. The trial court's denial of a new trial or remittitur on the punitive damages award was affirmed; although several justices questioned whether the award was excessive, the complete absence of ability-to-pay evidence in the record precluded a remand on that basis.

Key quotes from the opinion

Notable passages from the opinion, in the court's own words.

“It is the jury's function to determine credibility.”
Jury's function in credibility determination —
“we cannot conclude the jury's verdict was manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence.”
Standard for reviewing jury verdicts —
“By its verdict, the jury indicated that, in its opinion, respondent and his witnesses were more credible and that, in fact, respondent was viciously assaulted and battered by appellant Chaplin in the rear of the police squad car.”
Jury's finding on the assault —
“The purpose of punitive damages is to both punish and deter according to the gravity of the act giving rise to a punitive damage award, but an award should not exceed the level necessary to properly punish and deter.”
Purpose and limits of punitive damages —

Cases the court relied on

Earlier decisions the court cited as authority for its ruling.

  • Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co. (297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980)) — Establishes the standard that on appellate review of a jury verdict, evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
  • Carpenter v. Mattison (300 Minn. 273, 219 N.W.2d 625 (1974)) — Supplies the 'manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence' formulation as the threshold for overturning a jury verdict on appeal.
  • Young v. Wlazik (262 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 1977)) — Cited for the rule that determining witness credibility is the jury's exclusive function, supporting the court's deference to the jury's resolution of the parties' conflicting testimony.
  • Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange (21 Cal.3d 910, 582 P.2d 980 (Cal. 1978)) — Cited in the court's footnote for the principle that punitive damages must not exceed the level necessary to properly punish and deter, informing the court's discussion of the award's potential excessiveness.
  • Pautz v. American Insurance Co. (268 Minn. 241, 128 N.W.2d 731 (1964)) — Cited as authority for the rule that an appellate issue not argued in the briefs is deemed waived.

Full opinion

The complete text of the court's opinion as published.

Opinion

KELLEY, Justice.

A Hennepin County jury found that on June 12, 1976 appellant William Chaplin, a Minneapolis police officer, had assaulted and battered respondent during the course of and following an arrest of the respondent. Following entry of judgment awarding respondent $2,000 in compensatory damages and $35,000 in punitive damages, the trial court denied appellants’ motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a remittitur of the punitive damages award. Appellants appeal from that order. We affirm.

Appellants first contend that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that appellant William Chaplin (Chaplin) had committed an assault and battery on respondent Martin Melina, Sr. (Melina). It was the claim of respondent and his witnesses that after he had been placed under arrest, handcuffed with his hands behind him, and placed in the rear seat of a Minneapolis police squad car, Chaplin entered the car and assaulted him with “sap” gloves, causing respondent personal injuries. On the other hand, it was the claim of Chaplin that at no time after the respondent had been arrested and placed in the squad car did he enter the squad car. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, as we must, Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Minn. 1980), we cannot conclude the jury’s verdict was manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence. Carpenter v. Mattison, 300 Minn. 273, 276, 219 N.W.2d 625, 629 (1974). The evidence on this issue was sharply disputed. To resolve the dispute, the jury had to weigh the credibility of appellant Chaplin and his witnesses and of respondent Melina and his witnesses. It is the jury’s function to determine credibility. Young v. Wlazik, 262 N.W.2d 300, 310 (Minn. 1977). The jury resolved the credibility issue in favor of respondent. By its verdict, the jury indicated that, in its opinion, respondent and his witnesses were more credible and that, in fact, respondent was viciously assaulted and battered by appellant Chaplin in the rear of the police squad car.

Next, appellants contend the award of punitive damages was excessive as a matter of law. In denying appellants’ motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a remittitur, on this issue the trial court noted that “[n]o testimony was offered in relation to Chaplin’s ability to pay * * *.” An examination of the record shows that neither during the trial nor at the time of the post-trial motion was any evidence presented concerning Chaplin’s ability to pay a punitive damage award. In reviewing an order of the trial court, we are confined to an examination of the record to ascertain whether there is evidence to sustain the judge’s action. As indicated, neither the trial court nor this court has been furnished with any evidence submitted by either party respecting Chaplin’s ability to pay the punitive damage award. 1

Appellants appeal also from an order of the trial court taxing costs and disbursements. This issue was not argued in the briefs and accordingly must be deemed waived. Pautz v. American Insurance Co., 268 Minn. 241, 251-52, 128 N.W.2d 731, 738 (1964); Haugen v. Swanson, 222 Minn. 203, 207, 23 N.W.2d 535, 537 (1946); Louden v. Louden, 221 Minn. 338, 339, 22 N.W.2d 164, *21 166 (1946); Kaehler v. Kaehler, 219 Minn. 536, 537, 18 N.W.2d 312, 313 (1945).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying a new trial and in denying a remittitur.

1

. Some members of this court question whether the punitive damage award here was excessive. Had there been any evidence furnished to the jury or the court reflecting on Chaplin’s lack of ability to pay, we might well have remanded for a new trial or remittitur. The purpose of punitive damages is to both punish and deter according to the gravity of the act giving rise to a punitive damage award, but an award should not exceed the level necessary to properly punish and deter. See Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 21 Cal.3d 910, 928, 148 Cal.Rptr. 389, 399, 582 P.2d 980, 990 (1978).

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