U.S. Sprint Communications Co. v. Commissioner
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U.S. Sprint Communications Co. v. Commissioner
Opinion of the Court
OPINION
By Notice of Determination on Appeal dated March 8, 1996, the Minnesota Commissioner 'of Revenue (Commissioner) assessed an additional sales tax, with interest, and a penalty against respondent, U.S. Sprint Communications Company, Ltd. (Sprint) for the period July 31, 1990, through December 31, 1993. In the Notice, the Commissioner concluded that Sprint improperly excluded the federal excise tax on long-distance telephone service from the base amount for calculating the Minnesota state sales tax on its sales of long-distance telephone service. Sprint appealed to the Minnesota Tax Court which determined that the federal excise tax is not- part of the gross receipts Sprint receives from its sales of long-distance service or part of the sales price customers pay for long-distance telephone service. Therefore, the’tax court reversed the Commissioner’s determination and held that the federal excise tax is not includable in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax. Because we hold that the federal excise tax is not part of the consideration paid by the customer for long-distance telephone service, we affirm.
Sprint is a limited partnership that provides long-distance telephone service to customers throughout the United States. Federal law imposes a 3 percent excise tax on amounts paid for communications services,
The State of Minnesota imposes a 6.5 percent sales tax on gross receipts from retail sales of long-distance telephone service.
In 1994, the Department of Revenue audited Sprint’s sales tax remissions for the period July 31,1990, through December 31,1993. The audit revealed that Sprint did not include the amount of the federal excise tax it collected from long-distance telephone service cústomers during that period in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax. As a result, the Commissioner issued Sprint a notice of change in its Sales tax. In the notice, the Commissioner asserted that the federal excise tax should have been included in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax. After rejecting Sprint’s protest, the Commissioner issued the Notice of Determination on Appeal, assessing Sprint an additional tax of $482,796.04, interest in the amount of $130,376.26, and a penalty pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 289A.60, subd. 5 (1996), in the amount of $33,693.03.
The Commissioner contends that the federal excise tax is part of the sales price for Sprint’s long-distance telephone service and therefore must be included in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax on that long-distance telephone service. Whether the federal excise tax is includable in the base amount for calculating Minnesota’s sales tax is a question of statutory construction which we review de novo.
Minnesota Statutes section 297A.02 (1996) imposes a 6.5 percent sales tax on the gross receipts from sales at retail made within the state. A “sale at retail” includes furnishing long-distance telephone service for consideration.
The flaw in the Commissioner’s argument, however, is that the language of subdivision 8, as it exists today, is clear and unambiguous; therefore, in construing subdivision 8, this court will not look beyond its plain meaning.
Thus, if the federal excise tax does not constitute consideration paid for long-distance telephone service, it is not includa-ble in the base amount for calculating Minnesota’s sales tax. Consideration requires that one party to a transaction voluntarily assume an obligation on the condition of an act or forbearance by the other party.
In conclusion, we hold that the federal excise tax on long-distance telephone service,
Affirmed.
. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4251(a), 4291 (1989).
. Minn.Stat. § 297A.02, subd. 1 (1996); Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subds. 3(f) and 4 (1996).
. See Homart Dev. Co. v. County of Hennepin, 538 N.W.2d 907, 910-11 (Minn. 1995).
. See Minn.Stat. § 297A.01, subds. 3(f) and 4 (1996).
. Minn.Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 9 (1996).
. Minn.Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 8 (1996), provides;
[“Sales price” means] the total consideration valued in money, for a retail sale whether paid in money or otherwise, excluding therefrom any amount allowed as credit for tangible personal property taken in trade for resale, without deduction for the cost of the property sold, cost of materials used, labor or service cost, interest, or discount allowed after the sale is consummated, the cost of transportation incurred prior to the time of sale, any amount for which credit is given to the purchaser by . the seller, or any other expense whatsoever. A deduction may be made for charges of up to 15 percent in lieu of tips, if the consideration for such charges is separately stated. No deduction, shall be allowed for charges for services that are part of a sale. A deduction may also be made for interest, financing, or carrying charges, charges for labor or services used in installing or applying the. property sold or transportation charges if the transportation occurs after the retail sale of the property only if the consideration for such charges is separately stated. There shall not be included in "sales price” cash discounts allowed and taken, on sales or the amount refunded either in cash or in credit for property returned by purchasers.
.See Act of May 28, 1987, ch. 268, art. 4, § 3, 1987 Minn. Laws 1039, 1186.
. See Homart Dev. Co., 538 N.W.2d at 911 (if a statute is free from ambiguity, courts look only at a statute’s plain meaning).
. See Green Giant Co: v. Commissioner of Revenue, 534 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn. 1995) (stating ‘‘[w]e will not supply that which the legislature purposefully omits or inadvertently overlooks”); State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 269, 95 N.W.2d 6, 11-12 (1959) (where failure of expression, rather than ambiguity of expression, constitutes vice of statute, courts are not free to substitute amendment for construction, thereby supplying legislative omissions).
. See Minn.Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 8.
. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rumsey, 28 Minn. 531, 11 N.W. 69 (1881).
. Commissioner of Revenue v. Richardson, 302 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. 1981) (there is no room for judicial construction when the statute speaks for itself); Sterling Elec. Co. v. Kent, 233 Minn. 31, 34, 45 N.W.2d 709, 711 (1951) (where the meaning of a revised statute is free from ambiguity, prior law cannot be resorted to for purpose of creating an ambiguity).
. Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Minn. 1982).
. Cederstrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 263 Minn. 520, 535, 117 N.W.2d 213, 222-23 (1962).
. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4291, 7501 (1989).
. See 26 U.S.C. § 4251(a) (1989).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- U.S. SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, LTD. v. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE, Relator
- Cited By
- 5 cases
- Status
- Published