In re Annexation of Certain Real Prop. to the City of Proctor from Midway Twp.
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In re Annexation of Certain Real Prop. to the City of Proctor from Midway Twp.
Opinion of the Court
*217Midway Township and the City of Duluth entered into an orderly annexation agreement pursuant to
FACTS
The relevant facts are undisputed. In 2013, Duluth and Midway entered into an orderly annexation agreement pursuant to
Duluth and Midway objected to the annexation by ordinance, and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), which had jurisdiction over the annexation, heard the dispute. The Chief ALJ issued a decision on October 10, 2016, ruling that Proctor's annexation by ordinance was valid under the statute. In particular, the Chief ALJ reasoned that:
There is no statutory basis upon which to conclude thatMinn. Stat. § 414.0325 trumps or otherwise preempts the annexation process set forth inMinn. Stat. § 414.033 , subd. 2(3), as long as the annexation-by-ordinance [that is, the section 414.033, subd. 2(3) proceeding] is commenced by a municipality not a party to an underlying orderly annexation agreement.
Duluth and Midway moved the district court to vacate the decision of the ALJ. The district court granted the motion, reasoning that
Proctor and the OAH
We granted the separate petitions for review of Duluth and Midway.
ANALYSIS
This case requires us to decide whether
Annexation by ordinance is governed by
Orderly annexations are governed by
*219An orderly annexation agreement is a binding contract upon all parties to the agreement and is enforceable in the district court in the county in which the unincorporated property in question is located. The provisions of an orderly annexation agreement are not preempted by any provision of this chapter unless the agreement specifically provides so. If an orderly annexation agreement provides the exclusive procedures by which the unincorporated property identified in the agreement may be annexed to the municipality, the municipality shall not annex that property by any other procedure.
Appellants argue that subdivisions 1(e) and 6 of section 414.0325 limit annexations of property within a designated area to the procedures either enumerated in subdivision 1(e) or otherwise allowed by the orderly annexation agreement that designated that area. Specifically, they first argue that subdivision 1(e)'s statement of the methods by which annexation may occur within a designated area is exclusive. Second, they argue that the statement in subdivision 6 regarding preemption unambiguously applies to everyone, not just to parties to an orderly annexation agreement. Appellants also point to section 414.01, subdivision 1a(5), which indicates the Legislature's intent that joint resolutions for orderly annexation and long-term regional planning "should be encouraged," and argue that interpreting chapter 414 to bind non-signatories to an orderly annexation agreement to its terms would be consistent with that preference. We are not persuaded.
As an initial matter, we see nothing in either statute that precludes a non-party to an orderly annexation agreement under section 414.0325 from conducting an annexation by ordinance under section 414.033. If the Legislature wanted section 414.0325 to have a preclusive effect on non-parties, it should have said so clearly. Although section 414.0325, subdivision 1(e) states that an annexation of property within a designated area "may" be started by a party to the annexation agreement submitting a resolution "or" by the Chief ALJ, no portion of section 414.0325 expressly or impliedly states that these options are exhaustive. Nor does section 414.0325 state that this provision trumps or precludes the process described in section 414.033. Specifically, appellants would have us read subdivision 1(e) as providing that an annexation of property within a designated area may be started "only" by the enumerated methods-a word that is not included in the subdivision. "We may not add words to a statute that the Legislature has not supplied." Johnson v. Cook County ,
Even if we were to conclude that section 414.0325 provides the exclusive means of initiating an annexation as to parties to an orderly annexation agreement, we would still be unable to extend that conclusion to non -parties, because section 414.0325 cannot fairly be read to limit the rights of non-parties to the agreement. "An orderly annexation agreement is a binding contract upon all parties to the agreement,"
Likewise, section 414.033 does not state that property within a designated area is not available for annexation by ordinance. To the contrary, subdivision 2(3) of section 414.033 contemplates that annexation by ordinance is a possibility for property within a designated area, because it limits annexation by ordinance "[e]xcept as provided for by an orderly annexation agreement."
Appellants argue that subdivision 6 of section 414.0325 contains an "express preemption" provision that precludes annexation by ordinance by a non-party. Subdivision 6 contains three sentences: (1) "An orderly annexation agreement is a binding contract upon all parties to the agreement and is enforceable in ... district court ...," (2) "[t]he provisions of an orderly annexation agreement are not preempted by any provision of this chapter unless the agreement specifically provides so," and (3) "[i]f an orderly annexation agreement provides the exclusive procedures by which the unincorporated property identified in the agreement may be annexed to the municipality, the municipality [that is, the party to the agreement] shall not annex that property by any other procedure." Appellants argue that the second sentence precludes non-parties to an orderly annexation agreement from annexing property through methods set out in other provisions of Chapter 414. We disagree.
The parties' dispute centers on whether the second sentence applies to non-parties to an orderly annexation agreement.
Appellants would have us read the second sentence in isolation, which we cannot *221do. When the three sentences of subdivision 6 "are read together, as they must be, the legislative intent is clear." Owens v. Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. ,
Finally, appellants' argument regarding the stated legislative purpose of Chapter 414 is unpersuasive. Appellants point to section 414.01, subd. 1a(5) (2018), which recites the Legislature's finding that "joint resolutions for orderly annexation, consolidation of municipalities, mergers of towns and municipalities, long-range joint powers planning or other cooperative efforts among counties, cities, and towns should be encouraged."
Moreover, the Legislature intended that, under chapter 414, controversies over the creation of municipalities, combinations of governmental units, and boundary alterations by annexation should be decided by the Chief ALJ.
Because we must give effect to the entirety of the statute, the plain meaning of sections 414.0325 and 414.033 indicates that the Legislature did not intend that either section preempt the other. Further, permitting one type of annexation to take precedence over another would be inconsistent with the legislative framework that allows the Chief ALJ to resolve conflicts between the annexation processes.
We therefore hold that orderly annexation agreements created under section 414.0325 do not prevent non-parties from annexing property by ordinance under section 414.033.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
The OAH may appeal from a district court order when the Chief ALJ "determines that the final order or judgment adversely affects the public interest."
Appellants assert that because the second sentence applies to non-parties to an orderly annexation agreement, Proctor's annexation by ordinance was not permitted. Respondents do not directly dispute that logical implication, instead denying its premise by arguing that the second sentence does not apply to non-parties. We accept the parties' framing for purposes of this opinion. But it is not clear that appellants' logic is correct. The second sentence of subdivision 6 states that the agreement is not preempted by other provisions of the statute. Appellants argue that under subdivision 6 the agreement itself precludes application of other provisions of the statute, which is not the same thing.
The Chief ALJ may not have been able to apply those statutory factors here. See Gilbert v. Minn. State Office of Strategic & Long-Range Planning , No. CX-01-1221,
Reference
- Full Case Name
- IN RE the Matter of the ANNEXATION OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY TO the CITY OF PROCTOR FROM MIDWAY TOWNSHIP
- Cited By
- 2 cases
- Status
- Published