STATE OF MINNESOTA

                                   IN SUPREME COURT

                                         A22-1420


Court of Appeals                                                            Procaccini, J.
                                                         Took no part, Hennesy, Gaïtas, JJ.
Joseph Rued,

                     Appellant,

vs.                                                                Filed: October 23, 2024
                                                                 Office of Appellate Courts
Commissioner of Human Services,

                     Respondent.

                               ________________________


William J. Mauzy, William R. Dooling, Mauzy Law Office, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota,
for appellant.

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant Scott County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota, for respondent Scott County.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Mara J. Sybesma, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for the Minnesota Department of Human Services and the Office of the
Minnesota Attorney General.

                               ________________________

SYLLABUS

       1.      The 30-day time limit to serve a notice of appeal on an adverse party of

record required by Minnesota Statutes section 256.045, subdivision 7 (2022), is a waivable

limitations period rather than a requirement for subject matter jurisdiction.




                                             1
       2.     Adequate service of a notice of appeal on an adverse party of record under

section 256.045, subdivision 7, is necessary for a court to obtain personal jurisdiction over

the adverse party of record.

       Reversed and remanded.

OPINION

PROCACCINI, Justice.

       This case concerns the requirements for appealing an order of the Commissioner of

Human Services (the Commissioner). Any person aggrieved by such an order may appeal

to a district court by, among other things, serving a notice of appeal on the Commissioner

and any adverse party of record within 30 days. 

, subd. 7 (2022).

Appellant Joseph Rued, the party seeking to initiate judicial review under section 256.045,

subdivision 7, failed to serve an adverse party of record—Scott County. Scott County

nonetheless appeared at an early hearing, arguing in part that Rued’s failure to serve the

County with the notice of appeal meant that the district court did not have jurisdiction over

the matter. The district court concluded that the County had waived any objection to

personal jurisdiction by appearing at the hearing. The court of appeals vacated that

decision, concluding that the failure to serve the initial pleading on the County deprived

the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.

       The decisions by the district court and court of appeals prompt us to examine

whether section 256.045, subdivision 7, creates jurisdictional requirements. Specifically,

we must determine whether a party’s failure to serve a notice of appeal within 30 days of

an order of the Commissioner, as section 256.045, subdivision 7, requires, deprives the


                                               2
district court of subject matter jurisdiction. We hold that the time limit in section 256.045,

subdivision 7, is a waivable limitations period and not a requirement for subject matter

jurisdiction, and we therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals concluding

otherwise. Adequate service of the notice of appeal under section 256.045, subdivision 7,

however, is an independent statutory requirement related to personal jurisdiction.

Although the County forfeited appellate review of the district court’s determination

regarding personal jurisdiction by failing to raise it before the court of appeals, the County

has consistently maintained its challenge to Rued’s noncompliance with the statutory

service requirements in section 256.045, subdivision 7. Accordingly, the County has not

waived or forfeited its defense related to the limitations period. We therefore reverse the

decision of the court of appeals and remand this matter to the district court to allow the

County to either waive its defense related to the limitations period or move for dismissal

on that basis.

                                          FACTS

       Sometime before January 18, 2022, appellant Joseph Rued made a report to Scott

County Health and Human Services (the County) that his son may have been sexually

abused.    Rued made the report as a voluntary reporter under Minnesota Statutes

section 260E.06, subdivision 2 (2022).      As required by Minnesota law, the County

investigated whether the suspected sexual abuse had occurred and whether child protective

services were needed. The County concluded that no sexual abuse or other maltreatment

had occurred and notified Rued of its determination on January 18, 2022.




                                              3
       Rued requested reconsideration of the no-maltreatment determination under

Minnesota Statutes section 260E.33, subdivision 2(a) (2022). Two weeks later, the County

informed Rued by letter that it had conducted “[a]n independent review of the record” and

determined that the finding of no maltreatment was appropriate. The letter also stated that

Rued was entitled to appeal the maltreatment determination to the Minnesota Department

of Human Services (DHS) by requesting a fair hearing under Minnesota Statutes

section 256.045, subdivision 3 (2022).

       Rued appealed to DHS, requesting a fair hearing under section 256.045,

subdivision 3, and the request was assigned to a human services judge. After a prehearing

conference and briefing by the parties, the human services judge recommended that the

Commissioner dismiss Rued’s request for a fair hearing because section 256.045 does not

provide a right to a fair hearing with respect to a no-maltreatment determination. The

Commissioner adopted the human services judge’s decision as the agency’s final decision.

       Rued then appealed the Commissioner’s decision to Scott County District Court.

Under Minnesota Statutes section 256.045, subdivision 7, a party aggrieved by an order of

the Commissioner “may appeal the order to the district court . . . by serving a written copy

of a notice of appeal upon the commissioner and any adverse party of record within 30 days

after the date the commissioner issued the order, the amended order, or order affirming the

original order, and by filing the original notice and proof of service with the court

administrator of the district court.” 1 Rued served the notice of appeal on the Commissioner



1
       The statute’s filing requirement is not at issue in this case.

                                              4
within the 30-day time limit, but he failed to serve the notice of appeal on the County, an

adverse party of record.

       In August 2022, after the 30-day time limit had expired, the district court held a

hearing. Rued and his attorney were present. Although the County had not been served

with the notice of appeal, an assistant Scott County attorney also appeared at the hearing.

Rued argued that he is entitled to a fair hearing under section 256.045, subdivision 3(6),

which affords the right to request a hearing to “any person to whom a right of appeal

according to this section is given by other provision of law.” The County argued that,

under section 256.045, subdivision 7, the district court did not have jurisdiction over the

matter because Rued did not serve the County with the notice of appeal. In the alternative,

the County argued that the Commissioner correctly determined that Rued was not entitled

to a hearing to contest a no-maltreatment determination.

       The district court denied Rued’s request for appeal. The district court reasoned that

the County waived the jurisdictional defect—which the district court treated as a matter of

personal jurisdiction—by appearing at the August 2022 hearing. On the merits, the district

court held that Rued is not entitled to a hearing to challenge a determination of no

maltreatment.

       Rued appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that he is entitled to a hearing to

challenge the no-maltreatment determination. The County argued that Rued’s failure to

serve the County deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction, and the district

court should have dismissed Rued’s appeal for that reason, regardless of the County’s

appearance at the August 2022 hearing. The County argued in the alternative that the


                                             5
district court properly ruled that Rued is not entitled to a fair hearing on the

no-maltreatment determination. The County did not separately appeal from or otherwise

argue that the district court erred by finding that the County had waived its challenge to

personal jurisdiction by appearing at the hearing.

       The court of appeals vacated the district court’s decision, concluding that the district

court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because Rued did not serve

the notice of appeal on the County as prescribed by section 256.045, subdivision 7. Rued

v. Comm’r of Hum. Servs., 

, 304 (Minn. App. 2023). Because the ruling

on the jurisdictional issue was dispositive, the court of appeals did not address whether

Rued is entitled to a hearing to contest the no-maltreatment determination. 

.

       We granted Rued’s petition for review. Following oral arguments, we ordered

supplemental briefing from the parties addressing several questions related to our case law

distinguishing jurisdictional requirements from ordinary procedural requirements and our

case law on administrative appeals. We invited the Commissioner and the Minnesota

Attorney General to file briefs expressing their views on the same questions. Both parties

filed supplemental briefs responding to our order, and DHS and the Attorney General filed

a joint brief.

                                        ANALYSIS

       Minnesota Statutes section 256.045, subdivision 7, allows a party to appeal an order

of the Commissioner to a district court “by serving a written copy of a notice of appeal

upon the commissioner and any adverse party of record within 30 days.” Rued failed to

serve a notice of appeal on the County—an adverse party of record—within 30 days or at


                                              6
any other time prior to the district court’s denial of the appeal. 2 Accordingly, Rued failed

to comply with two statutory requirements under section 256.045, subdivision 7:

(1) adequately serving a notice of appeal on an adverse party of record—the “service

requirement”—and (2) effecting such service within 30 days—the “30-day time limit.”

This case requires us to determine whether Rued’s failure to comply with either statutory

requirement prevented the district court from acquiring jurisdiction over his appeal.

       A court’s jurisdiction consists of two elements: subject matter jurisdiction and

personal jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority to hear and

determine cases that are presented to it. Giersdorf v. A&M Constr., Inc., 

 (Minn. 2012). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction “generally depends on

the scope of the constitutional and statutory grant of authority to the court.” McCullough

& Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais Heights, 

 (Minn. 2016). And defects

in subject matter jurisdiction may be raised “at any time” and cannot be waived or forfeited

by a party. Seehus v. Bor-Son Constr., Inc., 

 (Minn. 2010).

       Personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, refers to a court’s power to exercise control

over the parties. In re Giem, 

, 427 n.6 (Minn. 2007); see Scarborough v.

Principi, 

, 413–14 (2004). A court generally obtains personal jurisdiction




2
       On appeal to the court of appeals, Rued argued that the County was not an adverse
party of record. The court of appeals concluded that “the county was an ‘adverse party of
record’ in the proceedings that led to the commissioner’s decision,” and Rued did not
dispute that conclusion in his appeal to our court. Rued v. Comm’r of Hum. Servs.,

, 301 (Minn. App. 2023).

                                              7
over a defendant through service of process. McCullough, 

. “Unlike

subject-matter-jurisdiction defects, parties can waive personal jurisdiction defects.” 

       The court of appeals concluded that the district court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over Rued’s appeal because Rued failed to comply with the 30-day time limit

provided in section 256.045, subdivision 7. Rued challenges this conclusion, arguing that

the 30-day time limit is a waivable limitations period rather than a requirement for subject

matter jurisdiction. We agree with Rued—but that does not end our analysis. We must

then consider whether the County waived Rued’s noncompliance with the 30-day time

limit. And we clarify that the service requirement is a requirement for personal jurisdiction.

                                              I.

       The threshold issue in this case is whether the district court had subject matter

jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s order that denied Rued a fair hearing. See 

, subd. 3. Specifically, we must determine whether the 30-day time limit

provided under section 256.045, subdivision 7, is a waivable limitations period or a

requirement for subject matter jurisdiction. Because we conclude that the 30-day time limit

is waivable, we must also determine whether the County waived Rued’s noncompliance

with the limitations period. We address these issues in turn.

       “The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de

novo.” Williams v. Smith, 

 (Minn. 2012). To resolve the question

before us, we must examine and interpret section 256.045, subdivision 7. And statutory

interpretation likewise presents a question of law that we review de novo. In re Krogstad,

, 334 (Minn. 2021).


                                              8
                                              A.

       We begin by examining the language of the statute under which Rued appealed the

Commissioner’s order. In relevant part, Minnesota Statutes section 256.045, subdivision 7,

provides the requirements to appeal from a Commissioner’s order:

       [A]ny party who is aggrieved by an order of the commissioner of human
       services . . . may appeal the order to the district court of the county
       responsible for furnishing assistance . . . by serving a written copy of a notice
       of appeal upon the commissioner and any adverse party of record within
       30 days after the date the commissioner issued the order . . . and by filing the
       original notice and proof of service with the court administrator of the district
       court.

       The statute grants district courts subject matter jurisdiction over appeals from orders

of the Commissioner. And the language explains that an appeal may be initiated by serving

a notice of appeal on the Commissioner and any adverse party of record within 30 days.

But the question remains whether compliance with the 30-day time limit is a prerequisite

to the district court acquiring jurisdiction. The statute’s plain language does not answer

this question.

       In one respect, the language and structure of section 256.045, subdivision 7, indicate

that the 30-day time limit is a jurisdictional requirement. Subdivision 7 is titled “Judicial

review” and describes the requirements to initiate an appeal from an order of the

Commissioner to the district court. 3 Such a structure is distinct from statutory requirements


3
        As we discussed in Buzzell v. Walz, 

, 264 n.7 (Minn. 2022),
statutory headnotes are catchwords used to show the contents of a section or subdivision,
and we do not use them to discern legislative intent. Consistent with this principle, we do
not use the headnote of section 256.045, subdivision 7, to determine legislative intent, but
rather to assess differences in statutory structure. We also note that the headnote discussed


                                              9
that we have deemed non-jurisdictional “claim-processing” rules.              See McCullough,

 (distinguishing between “claim-processing rules” and “jurisdictional

requirements”). For example, in Carlton v. State, we concluded that a two-year time limit

for the filing of a postconviction petition was non-jurisdictional. 

(Minn. 2012). In contrast to the 30-day time limit at issue here, the two-year time limit in

Carlton was included in a subdivision titled “Time limit” and was separate from the

subdivision establishing the right to file a petition for postconviction relief. 

; see

, subd. 4(c) (2010); see also Kingbird v. State, 

, 639–

41 (concluding that a two-year time limit was not a jurisdictional bar in part because it was

within a subdivision titled “Procedure”). Accordingly, the fact that the 30-day time limit

in section 256.045, subdivision 7, is structurally distinct from a typical claim-processing

rule supports interpreting that time limit as a jurisdictional requirement.

       But the 30-day time limit can also reasonably be read as non-jurisdictional.

Section 256.045, subdivision 7, does not contain any language indicating that the

Legislature intended the 30-day time limit to act as a jurisdictional prerequisite. See

Carlton, 

 (concluding that a statutory time limit was waivable in part

because the statute did “not reference the jurisdiction of the [district] court in any way”);

Giem, 

 (holding that a hearing deadline was not jurisdictional because




in Buzzell “never appeared in any bill enacted by the Legislature,” which further
diminished its relevance because it was not part of the legislative process. 974 N.W.2d at
264 n.7. In contrast, the headnote “Judicial review” from section 256.045, subdivision 7,
appeared in the bill as enacted by the Legislature. See Act of Apr. 2, 1976, ch. 131, § 1,

, 312.

                                              10
“the legislature gave no clear indication” that it intended noncompliance with the deadline

to divest the district court of subject matter jurisdiction). 4

       Also absent from subdivision 7 is any mandatory language, such as “must” or

“shall.” See 

, subds. 15a, 16 (2022) (defining “must” and “shall” as

“mandatory”). This distinguishes the 30-day time limit at issue here from other statutory

requirements that we have construed as jurisdictional. For example, we have interpreted

the 30-day time limit for judicial review prescribed by the Minnesota Administrative

Procedure Act as jurisdictional. See, e.g., In re Midway Pro Bowl Relocation Benefits

Claim, 

, 428 (Minn. 2020). That act provides that a petition for a writ of

certiorari “must be filed with the court of appeals and served on all parties to the contested

case not more than 30 days after the party receives the final decision.” 

(2022) (emphasis added). And in Dennis v. Salvation Army, we concluded that a cost-bond

requirement prescribed by the Workers’ Compensation Act was jurisdictional, relying on

the statute’s language that “[t]o effect a review upon certiorari, the party shall serve . . . a

bond upon the administrator of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals within the

30-day period [for seeking review].” 

 (Minn. 2016) (emphasis added)

(quoting 

, subd. 3 (2014)). The lack of both mandatory and explicit




4
       The United States Supreme Court has adopted a bright-line “clear statement” rule
as to federal statutes, stating that it will “treat a procedural requirement as jurisdictional
only if Congress clearly states that it is.” Harrow v. Dep’t of Def., 

, 484
(2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)). Such a rule may have its
advantages and would likely be dispositive in a case like this one. But our court has not
adopted a bright-line rule in this context, and neither party has asked us to do so here.

                                                11
jurisdictional language in section 256.045, subdivision 7, suggests that the 30-day time

limit can also be reasonably interpreted as non-jurisdictional.

                                               B.

       Because the meaning of section 256.045, subdivision 7, is not discernible from the

plain language, we may look beyond the statute’s plain language to determine whether the

Legislature intended the 30-day time limit to be a jurisdictional bar or a waivable

limitations period. See Carlton, 

 (evaluating the legislative history of a

statute to determine whether the two-year time limit was a jurisdictional bar); State v.

Pakhnyuk, 

 (Minn. 2019) (“When a statute is ambiguous, we may

rely on the canons of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.”).

       The history of section 256.045, subdivision 7, shows that the Legislature intended

its current time limit to be a waivable limitations period. See Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud,

 (Minn. 2014) (reasoning that “[t]he Legislature’s history of enacting

and amending [the statute at issue] indicates its intent . . . .”); see also 

(5) (2022) (providing interpretive tools that consider “the former law . . . including other

laws upon the same or similar subjects”). An early version of the language now found in

section 256.045, subdivision 7, provided:

       Any applicant or recipient may . . . within thirty days after the date of the
       decision made by the State Agency, have the decision reviewed by the district
       court . . . . To render this appeal effective, the applicant or recipient shall,
       within thirty days . . . serve, by registered mail, a copy of the notice of
       appeal . . . on the State Agency.

Mason’s Minn. Stat. ch. 73A § 8688-11 (Supp. 1938) (emphasis added). The use of the

phrase “[t]o render this appeal effective” and the mandatory word “shall” in this early


                                               12
version of the statute is very similar to the language that we deemed jurisdictional in

Dennis. See Dennis, 

 (reading “[t]o effect a review upon certiorari, the

party shall serve . . . a bond upon the administrator of the [WCCA] within the 30-day

period” as jurisdictional).

       In 1939, the Legislature amended the statute, removing the jurisdictional

hallmark “[t]o render this appeal effective” and the mandatory “shall.” 5 In their place, the

Legislature added language similar to that of the current statute:

              If a decision or determination by the state agency is not, in the opinion
       of the county agency or applicant or recipient, in conformity with this act,
       either may within thirty days after such decision appeal from the decision or
       determination of the state agency to the district court . . . by serving a copy
       of a written notice of such appeal upon the state agency and adverse party.

Mason’s Minn. Stat. ch. 73A § 8688-11 (Supp. 1940); see Act of Apr. 12, 1939, ch. 195,

§ 3, 

, 277. That language remained the same until 1976 when the

Legislature replaced it with the current language of section 256.045, subdivision 7, which

states that a person aggrieved by an order of the Commissioner “may appeal the order to

the district court . . . by serving a written copy of a notice of appeal upon the commissioner




5
       Although the Minnesota statute defining “shall” as mandatory was enacted in 1947,
see Act of Apr. 2, 1947, ch. 201, § 4, 

, 362, our court explained in
1937 that “shall” and “must” were “suggestive of a mandatory meaning,” particularly when
the statute “declare[s] the consequences of a failure of compliance.” See Wenger v.
Wenger, 

 (Minn. 1937). Here, the statute declared that an appeal would
not be “render[ed] effective” without satisfaction of the service requirement. Mason’s
Minn. Stat. ch. 73A § 8688-11 (Supp. 1938); see also Champ v. Brown, 

(Minn. 1936) (discussing “the clear distinction in law between the meaning of the
mandatory word ‘shall’ as compared with the permissive word ‘may’ ”).

                                             13
and any adverse party of record within 30 days.” 

, subd. 7 (1976);

see Act of Apr. 2, 1976, ch. 131, § 1, 

, 312.

       We presume that “the adoption of an amendment is indicative of legislative intent

to effect some change in the existing law.” Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Perry, 

 (Minn. 2008) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). By removing

the phrase “[t]o render this appeal effective” and the word “shall,” the Legislature likely

intended to eliminate any indication that the 30-day time limit represented a jurisdictional

requirement. Cf. Champ v. Brown, 

 (Minn. 1936) (“[A]n amendment

substituting ‘may’ for ‘shall’ manifests a clear intent to make the act referred to optional

and permissive instead of mandatory.”); see also 

 (“It seems to us that there can be

no doubt that the revisers knew the clear distinction in law between the meaning of the

mandatory word ‘shall’ as compared with the permissive word ‘may.’ ”). Accordingly, the

evolution of section 256.045, subdivision 7, resolves the ambiguity regarding the 30-day

time limit in favor of Rued’s position that the time limit is a claim-processing rule—a

waivable limitations period—rather than a jurisdictional requirement.

       Because of our lack of clarity in distinguishing claim-processing rules from

jurisdictional requirements, the County finds some support in our case law for its argument

that the 30-day time limit is jurisdictional. For example, in Dennis, we relied on “the

long-established principle that we adhere strictly to the statutory requirements for appeals

from an executive branch agency.” 

. And in Langer v. Commissioner

of Revenue, we stated that “statutory time limits for administrative appeals are to be ‘strictly

construed,’ and that such time limits are ‘jurisdictional.’ ” 

, 80 (Minn. 2009)


                                              14
(quoting Kearns v. Julette Originals Dress Co., 

 (Minn. 1964)). But

none of those cases arose in the same context or under the statute relevant here. And we

decline to extend the principle of strict construction to our interpretation of the

requirements to initiate an appeal to a district court under section 256.045, subdivision 7.

Cf. Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 

, 26–27 (2017) (“The

mandatory and jurisdictional formulation is a characterization left over from days when we

were less than meticulous in our use of the term jurisdictional.” (citation omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

       We therefore hold that the 30-day time limit in section 256.045, subdivision 7, is a

non-jurisdictional and waivable limitations period. 6 Accordingly, we reverse the court of

appeals’ holding that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Rued’s

action for judicial review of the Commissioner’s order under section 256.045,

subdivision 7.

                                             C.

       Having concluded that the 30-day time limit in section 256.045, subdivision 7, is a

waivable limitations period, we need to consider whether the County waived Rued’s



6
       In coming to the opposite conclusion, the court of appeals largely relied on our
holding in Woodhall v. State, 

 (Minn. 2007). In Woodhall, we concluded
that a party’s failure to serve a notice of appeal on all necessary parties within the
prescribed 40-day time limit deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. 

at 362–63. But Woodhall was decided in the specific context of eminent domain
proceedings. “We have repeatedly held that failure to comply with the statute governing
appeals from eminent domain proceedings is a jurisdictional defect.” 

 (emphasis
added). Woodhall is therefore not dispositive, and we decline to extend our analysis in
Woodhall to the statute here.

                                             15
noncompliance with the 30-day limitations period in section 256.045, subdivision 7. See

Carlton, 

 (“Because we find that the limitations period in subdivision

4(c) is not jurisdictional, the State’s failure to assert that Carlton’s petition was untimely

under the 2–year statute of limitations in subdivision 4(c) waived this defense.”). Statutory

requirements like the 30-day time limit at issue here are “more in the nature of a statute of

limitations” and “create[] a defense which might be waived by a defendant who fails to

assert it.” Albers v. Fitschen, 

 (Minn. 1966); see also Reed v.

State, 

 (Minn. 2010) (“[A] statute-of-limitations defense is a

claim-processing rule, which is subject to waiver.”).           Waiver is the “intentional

relinquishment of a known right” or “an estoppel from enforcing it.” Giem, 

 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant waives such a

defense “by answering to the merits and going to trial without in any manner attempting to

avail himself of a statute of limitations.” Albers, 

.

       Here, the County challenged Rued’s untimely service at the August 2022

hearing—the first and only proceeding on the matter. And the parties do not argue, nor

does the record suggest, that equitable principles might apply to toll the limitations period.

We therefore conclude that the County did not waive its defense by merely appearing at

the August 2022 hearing. But neither the district court nor the Court of Appeals squarely

considered a defense based on the limitations period. We therefore remand to the district




                                             16
court so that the County may either waive its limitations defense or move for dismissal on

that basis. 7

                                              II.

        We also clarify that the service requirement provided under section 256.045,

subdivision 7, is a requirement for personal jurisdiction, independent of the 30-day time

limit. See Larson v. Dunn, 

 (Minn. 1990) (stating that “whether a claim

is time barred is an issue separate from the issue of personal jurisdiction” (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted)). “[A]s we have long held, service of process is the

means by which a court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant.” McCullough,

. A failure to comply with a statutory service requirement is therefore

properly characterized as a defect in personal jurisdiction. See 

 at 590 n.3 (noting “our

long line of decisions treating insufficient service of process as a defect relating to personal

jurisdiction”); Andrusick v. City of Apple Valley, 

, 767–68 (Minn. 1977)

(concluding that a district court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over a party because

the party was improperly served).

        Here, the district court properly characterized Rued’s failure to comply with the

service requirement as a defect in personal jurisdiction.          The district court further

concluded, however, that the County waived insufficient service by appearing at the

August 2022 hearing. A party may waive untimely or otherwise inadequate service of



7
      Because Rued’s noncompliance with the limitations period was not an issue
appealed to us, we take no position on the merits of any future motion for dismissal by the
County on those grounds.

                                              17
process “by submitting itself to the court’s jurisdiction and affirmatively invoking the

court’s power.” Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 

 (Minn. 2008). We

are dubious that the County’s mere appearance at the hearing—where it challenged Rued’s

insufficient service—was sufficient to waive lack of personal jurisdiction. See Patterson

v. Wu Fam. Corp., 

 (Minn. 2000) (“Our case law demonstrates that a

defendant is free to proceed on the merits of a case without fear of waiving the [personal

jurisdiction] defense so long as the court has been provided an opportunity to determine

the validity of the defense.”). Ultimately, however, the County forfeited appellate review

of the district court’s determination regarding personal jurisdiction because it failed to raise

that issue before the court of appeals. State v. Myhre, 

 (Minn. 2016)

(“Issues not raised in the court of appeals are usually forfeited here.”). We therefore

decline to reach that issue.

                                       *       *      *

       In sum, the 30-day time limit in section 256.045, subdivision 7, is a waivable

limitations period—not a requirement for subject matter jurisdiction.             The service

requirement provided in section 256.045, subdivision 7, however, remains the means by

which a court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant. And although the County

forfeited review of the district court’s ruling that the County waived its defense to lack of

personal jurisdiction, we see no indication in the record that the County waived or forfeited

its defense regarding the limitations period. We therefore reverse the decision of the court

of appeals and remand to the district court so that the County may either waive its defense

related to the limitations period or move for dismissal on that basis.


                                              18
                                     CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and

remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

       Reversed and remanded.



       HENNESY and GAЇTAS, JJ., not having been members of this court at the time of

submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.




                                            19