STATE OF MINNESOTA

                                IN SUPREME COURT

                                       A23-0213

Court of Appeals                                                         Moore, III, J.
                                                      Took no part, Hennesy, Gaïtas, JJ.
State of Minnesota,

                      Respondent,

vs.                                                           Filed: November 13, 2024
                                                              Office of Appellate Courts
Almanzo Ousley Cotton,

                      Appellant.
                              ________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
                             ________________________

SYLLABUS

      In determining whether to order an offender to pay restitution to the Minnesota

Crime Victims Reparations Board under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a) (2022), for

amounts paid by the Board to the victim under the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations

Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 611A.54–.68 (2022), courts may not apply the collateral-source

provision of the Reparations Act, which governs the eligibility of claimants to receive

reparations awards from the Board.

      Affirmed.


                                           1

OPINION

MOORE, III, Justice.

       We must determine here whether a district court may consider collateral sources

that offset a claimant’s economic loss under the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations

Act 1 (Reparations Act) when awarding restitution to the Minnesota Crime Victims

Reparations Board under the restitution statute, Minn. Stat. § 611A.04-.045 (2022), for

amounts paid by the Board to a victim. Because we conclude that the exclusive factors for

a district court to consider when awarding restitution do not include the collateral sources

available for purposes of reparations, we affirm.

                                         FACTS

       Appellant Almanzo Cotton was found guilty by a jury of one count of second-degree

intentional murder and one count of second-degree unintentional murder for beating his

girlfriend, Kim Laen Theng, to death. At sentencing, the district court sentenced Cotton to

306 months imprisonment on the second-degree intentional murder count and ordered

Cotton to pay $2,362 in restitution to the Minnesota Crime Victims Reparations Board (the

Board).

       The district court issued this order based on the Board’s request for restitution to

cover the amounts paid by the Board to Theng’s daughter, S.T. After the murder, S.T.

arranged for her mother’s cremation and paid $2,362 to a cremation service using her



1
      See Minn. Stat. §§ 611A.51–.68 (2022). This law was renamed the “Minnesota
Crime Victims Reimbursement Act” in 2023 after the relevant events in this case, but the
amendments to the law did not substantively change its provisions. See infra note 3.

                                             2
personal credit card. After S.T. paid for the cremation, an individual created a GoFundMe

campaign 2 in honor of Theng, which named S.T. as the beneficiary. The campaign

description contained a “general breakdown” of what the funds were intended to cover:

       $12,000 Lawyer expenses / Case expenses / Restraining order
       $1,000 Mom’s memorial in Massachusetts / Room and board
       $2,500 Cambodia / Scattering the ashes / Passport / Room and board
       $1,000 Housekeeping / Preparations to sell the house
       $2,000 Medical Expenses / Therapy / Group Therapy

       S.T. began receiving money from the campaign account and also submitted a claim

to the Board for $2,362 in reparations to cover the cremation expense. The Board approved

S.T.’s claim and awarded her the full amount. S.T. continued to periodically withdraw

money from the GoFundMe campaign account, which raised a total of $14,030.

       Cotton challenged the district court’s order requiring him to pay $2,362 in restitution

to the Board, filing a motion requesting a restitution hearing and an affidavit in support of

his motion. In his affidavit, Cotton argued that the reparations award from the Board to

S.T. “appear[ed] to be a windfall” because the GoFundMe campaign covered a variety of

expenses—including what Cotton described as “funeral expenses.” At the restitution

hearing, the district court received evidence regarding S.T.’s financial records and the

Board’s written crowdfunding policy. The Board’s policy read, in relevant part:

       Gifts/memorials, including GoFundMe accounts, are not deducted when the
       family indicates they are going to be used for expenses not covered by the

2
       GoFundMe is a company that offers an online platform for individuals to raise funds
for an objective by “crowdfunding” their campaigns via individual donations from a vast
network of people across the internet. See What is Crowdfunding? The Clear and Simple
Answer, GoFundMe, https://www.gofundme.com/c/crowdfunding (last visited Nov. 7,
2024) [opinion attachment].


                                              3
       Board, such as a memorial for the victim or a fund for the victim’s children.
       The victim is not obligated to inform the Board of amounts collected by
       social media accounts.

       After considering the information presented in Cotton’s restitution challenge, the

district court issued a final restitution order affirming the $2,362 restitution award. It

concluded that “[t]he funds raised by the GoFundMe campaign do not constitute

recoupment of the cremation expenses from a collateral source” and that Cotton had “the

ability to pay the entire amount of restitution awarded under a reasonable payment

schedule.”   The district court explained that the GoFundMe proceeds could not be

considered as a collateral source (which must be deducted from a reparations award under

Minn. Stat. § 611A.54 (2022)), because “[t]he only related expense included in the

GoFundMe request was the cost of bringing [Theng’s] ashes to scatter in Cambodia, which

would, by definition, occur after the cremation was complete.”

       Cotton appealed the district court’s order to the court of appeals. See State v. Cotton,

 (Minn. App. 2023). He argued that the district court erred by not

considering the GoFundMe proceeds available to S.T. when determining the amount of

restitution he must pay to the Board. 

. But before reaching that argument, the

court of appeals addressed what it identified as a “threshold issue”: whether the provision

in the Reparations Act mandating that reparations be reduced due to collateral sources

applied to a district court’s consideration of a restitution award. 

. The court of

appeals concluded in a precedential opinion that the statutory scheme governing restitution

and reparations define them as “distinct forms of relief” and that “the district court did not




                                              4
err in calculating restitution without consideration of collateral sources that may have been

available to or recouped by [Theng’s daughter].” 

 (emphasis added).

       Although the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s determination that Cotton

was required to pay the Board $2,362 in restitution, it concluded that the district court erred

by not including a payment schedule or structure in its final restitution order. 

 at 248–

49 (citing Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 2a (2022)). Accordingly, the court of appeals

remanded “for the limited purpose of issuing a corrected restitution order.” Id. After the

court of appeals issued its opinion, Cotton filed a petition for review, which we granted.

                                         ANALYSIS

       We review a district court’s award of restitution for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Andersen, 

 (Minn. 2015). But when a district court premises its

restitution award on an interpretation of Minnesota statutes, we review its legal conclusions

de novo. State v. Currin, 

, 571 (Minn. 2022). Our aim when interpreting

statutes is “to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” 

(2022). A statute is unambiguous if its language “is clear on its face.” Currin, 974 N.W.2d

at 572. “The plain language of the statute controls when the meaning of the statute is

unambiguous,” State v. Boecker, 

 (Minn. 2017), and “words and

phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and

approved usage.” 

 (2022). We may consider our prior interpretations

of a statute “in reviewing subsequent disputes over the meaning of the statute.” Caldas v.

Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 

 (Minn. 2012).




                                               5
       Minnesota Statutes chapter 611A provides for the rights of people affected by crime

as well as the programs and agencies designed to help them. See Minn. Stat. §§ 611A.01–

.95 (2022). Two separate mechanisms under this chapter are at issue in this case: restitution

and reparations. Restitution is part of a criminal proceeding, while reparations 3 can be

disbursed from a special account in the state treasury regardless of whether the perpetrator

of a crime was prosecuted. The interplay of these two statutory methods for compensating

persons affected by a crime is central to this case. We thus begin by summarizing each in

turn and then address Cotton’s arguments.

                                             A.

       Regarding restitution in criminal cases, as part of a sentence for a felony, gross

misdemeanor, or misdemeanor conviction, the district court may sentence the defendant to

payment of court-ordered restitution. 

, subd. 1(a)(5), 609.125, subd.

1(a)(4) (2022). “Restitution” for sentencing purposes includes “payment of compensation

to the victim or the victim’s family” and “if the victim is deceased or has been fully



3
        In 2023, the Legislature amended the Act, replacing the word “reparations” with
“reimbursement” in all instances. Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 5, §§ 56–73, 

, 907–914 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. §§ 611A.51–.68 (Supp.
2023)). The amendment does not substantively change these statutes; rather, the change in
terminology appears to have been made only to “better align with what the program does.”
Hearing on S.F. 1889, Sen. Judiciary and Pub. Safety Comm., 93rd Minn. Leg., March 6,
2023 (digital audio file) (comments of Sen. Oumou Verbeten, Senate author of the bill), at
16:34, https://www.lrl.mn.gov/media/file?mtgid=1047570. Cotton asks us to use the
current statutory term—reimbursement—“to avoid future confusion,” but acknowledges
that the outcome of this case does not depend on which term is used. For this opinion, we
use the term reparations, as it reflects the statutory language that was in effect when the
events relevant to this appeal occurred.


                                             6
compensated, payment of money to a victim assistance program or other program directed

by the court.” 

, subd. 2(a)(1)–(2); 609.125, subd. 2(a) (1)–(2). Under

Minnesota’s restitution statute, a restitution request from a victim “may include, but is not

limited to, any out-of-pocket losses resulting from the crime.” State v. Johnson, 

 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 611A.04).

       “The primary purpose of restitution is to ‘restore crime victims to the same financial

position they were in before the crime.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Palubicki, 

 (Minn. 2007)); see also State v. Fader, 

 (Minn. 1984) (noting that

“the word ‘restitution’ connotes restoring or compensating the victim for his loss”). The

Legislature has provided two factors that courts must weigh when considering whether to

order restitution: “(1) the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of

the offense; and (2) the income, resources, and obligations of the defendant.” Minn. Stat.

§ 611A.045, subd. 1(a). We have previously held that these factors are “exclusive,”

meaning that it would be error for a court to “consider[] factors other than those set forth

in the statute.” State v. Riggs, 

 (Minn. 2015).

       As to the first restitution factor, the “amount of economic loss sustained by the

victim” is calculated by considering “the total or aggregate diminution or deprivation of

money, goods, or services that a victim suffers as a direct result or natural consequence of

the defendant’s crime,” while also considering “the value of economic benefits, if any, [the

offender] conferred on the victim as a result of the offense.” Currin, 974 N.W.2d at 573

(emphasis added); see also id. at 575 (concluding that the offender did not confer any

economic benefit on the victim, Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS), by


                                             7
fraudulently billing DHS for nursing services DHS would have otherwise sought from

another provider). The offender bears the burden of production in challenging a restitution

request, but the State has the burden of “demonstrating the amount of loss sustained by a

victim as a result of the offense” by a preponderance of the evidence. Minn. Stat.

§ 611A.045, subd. 3(a).

                                             B.

       The reparations process, on the other hand, does not require any person to have been

prosecuted or convicted of the crime. Minn. Stat. § 611A.52, subd. 6(b). Reparations

awards are disbursed from a special account in the state treasury, rather than paid directly

from a criminal defendant. Minn. Stat. § 611A.612. Under this statute, a claimant 4 is

entitled to reparations for any economic loss incurred as a direct result of the crime. See

Minn. Stat. §§ 611A.52, subds. 4, 8, 10, 611A.53, subd. 1. Claims for reparations are

overseen by the Board. 5 Minn. Stat. §§ 611A.55–.57.


4
        The terms “victim” and “claimant” have particular definitions under Minnesota’s
laws—and these definitions are not synonymous. Under the Reparations Act, a person who
is entitled to reparations for economic losses resulting from a crime, whether or not any
person is prosecuted or convicted, is referred to as a “claimant.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.52,
subd. 4 (2022). By contrast, persons entitled to restitution as part of the disposition of a
criminal charge or a juvenile delinquency proceeding where the offender is convicted or
found delinquent are referred to as a “victim.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04 (2022). Notably, the
Reparations Act defines the word “victim” more narrowly than the restitution statute.
Compare Minn. Stat. § 611A.52, subd. 10 (2022), with Minn. Stat. § 611A.01(b) (2022).
For purposes of this opinion, we use the word “claimant” to refer to a person who is entitled
to reparations under the Reparations Act and the word “victim” to refer to a person who
falls within the statutory definition set forth in the restitution statute.
5
       The Board consists of five members appointed by the Commissioner of Public
Safety. Minn. Stat. § 611A.55, subd. 1. The Legislature’s 2023 amendment also changed


                                             8
       The Reparations Act directs that reparations “shall equal economic loss,” subject to

certain exceptions. Minn. Stat. § 611A.54. One of these exceptions is that “reparations

shall be reduced to the extent that economic loss is recouped from a collateral source.” Id.

(emphasis added). This includes “any private source as a voluntary donation or gift.”

Minn. Stat. § 611A.52, subd.5(9).

                                             C.

       Turning to the dispute in this case, Cotton’s primary objection to paying restitution

to the Board is that the Board is not a “victim” under the restitution statutes, but rather

serves only as an intermediary to the true victim of the crime. For the reasons stated below,

we disagree. Cotton then raises concerns that, unless the collateral-source provision from

the Reparations Act applies here, offenders will have “no recourse” against oversized

reparations awards by the Board to victims. This argument is overstated and lacks merit.

We address each of Cotton’s arguments in turn.

       First, Cotton posits that the Board is not a “victim,” meaning that his payment to the

Board is not restitution (which may only be requested by victims), and the reparations

statutes control this case instead. Cotton’s assertion, however, is soundly refuted by both

the statutory text and our case law. It is true that as a claimant, S.T. was awarded

reparations by the Board. But under the Reparations Act, the State assumes a subrogation

right “to all the claimant’s rights to recover benefits or advantages for economic loss from



the name of this Board to the “Crime Victims Reimbursement Board.” Act of May 19,
2023, ch. 52, art. 5, § 62, 

, 910 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat.
§ 611A.55 (2023)).


                                             9
a source which is . . . a collateral source.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.61, subd. 1; see Minn. Stat.

§ 611A.52, subd. 5(1) (including “the offender” as a collateral source); see also Evans v.

State, 

 (Minn. 2016) (stating that, once the Board has awarded

reparations to a victim, “it steps into the shoes of the victim”). And under the restitution

statute, the “Board may request restitution on behalf of a victim,” which may be

“considered to be both on its own behalf and on behalf of the victim.” Minn. Stat.

§ 611A.04, subd. 1a. The restitution statute expressly provides that, “[i]f the board has

paid reparations to the victim or on the victim’s behalf, the court shall order restitution

payments to be made directly to the board.” Id. Accordingly, we have recognized that

“Minnesota law explicitly empowers the Crime Victims Reparations Board to seek

restitution on behalf of the Board or on behalf of victims.” Hughes v. State, 

 (Minn. 2012).

       Essentially, the Board can compensate a claimant through reparations before

criminal guilt is ascertained, see 

.A52, subd. 6(b), 611A.53; then, the

Board can seek restitution on its own behalf from an offender to recoup the money to which

the victim would have been entitled to as restitution. See Evans, 

(holding that “the term ‘reparations’ . . . is not synonymous with the term ‘restitution’ ”

because “ ‘[r]eparations’ refers to payments by [the Board] to the five listed entities for

economic losses [under Minn. Stat. § 611A.53, subd. 1], whereas restitution refers to

payments by the defendant to the victim for qualified economic losses”). Because under

the restitution statute, the Board takes the role of a victim, and because Cotton is an

offender, any payment by Cotton to the Board for qualified economic losses should be


                                             10
treated as restitution—not reparations—meaning that the district court was obligated to

follow the Legislature’s directions for awarding restitution. Accordingly, the district court

could only consider the two exclusive restitution factors set forth in the restitution statute:

“(1) the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense; and (2)

the income, resources, and obligations of the defendant.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd.

1(a).

        The central question here is whether the Reparations Act’s collateral-source

provision—requiring that “reparations shall be reduced to the extent that economic loss is

recouped from a collateral source”—plays any role in the exclusive factors to be considered

by a district court when deciding whether the Board is entitled to restitution from an

offender under the restitution statute. We hold that it does not. In State v. Riggs, we

concluded that “the plain language of section 611A.045, subdivision 1, provides an

exclusive list of factors for determining the amount of restitution to award.” 

. In considering whether the contributory misconduct of the victim could be included

for consideration under these factors, we reasoned that Legislature expressly included fault

as a relevant factor in the reparations context, “but it did not include the victim’s fault as

a relevant factor in the restitution context. Without more, we cannot glean from the

Legislature’s omission its intention to include an unstated factor.” 

 (emphasis added).

        Our reasoning in Riggs applies with equal force to the application of the chapter

611A collateral-source provision at issue here, which is contained in the same statutory

section as the contributory-misconduct provision and whose precise directives are similarly

absent from the factors that may be considered for restitution awards. Compare Minn. Stat.


                                              11
§ 611A.54(1)–(2) (providing that reparations “shall be reduced to the extent that economic

loss is recouped from a collateral source or collateral sources” and “shall be denied or

reduced to the extent, if any, that the board deems reasonable because of the contributory

misconduct of the claimant”) with Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a) (stating that “[t]he

court, in determining whether to order restitution and the amount of the restitution, shall

consider” the two restitution factors, which only include “the amount of economic loss

sustained by the victim as a result of the offense” and “the income, resources, and

obligations of the defendant”). We observe, however, that although the collateral-source

provision itself is not implicated in the determination of economic loss for restitution

purposes, certain benefits received by a person affected by the crime may be relevant under

both the collateral-source provision of the reparations statutes and the economic-loss

calculation of the restitution statutes. Our decision today merely clarifies which rule

governs here—we do not foreclose the potential for overlap between a benefit that may

trigger the collateral-source provision for purposes of reparations and a benefit that may

affect the aggregate economic loss sustained by a victim for purposes of restitution.

Therefore, the district court in this case properly considered only “the amount of economic

loss sustained by the [Board] as a result of the offense” and “the income, resources, and

obligations of the defendant.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a).

       Anticipating our conclusion on this point, Cotton expresses concern that our holding

will lead to a system where offenders “have no recourse” against erroneous reparations

awards from the Board to claimants. Effectively, Cotton argues, the Board could be

incentivized to not investigate a claimant’s reparations claim and to simply seek repayment


                                            12
from a defendant in a restitution proceeding, regardless of whether the claimant is actually

entitled to the total amount of the reparations claim. We disagree.

       The Reparations Act mandates that the State “shall be subrogated” to a claimant’s

right to recover “benefits or advantages for economic loss” from an offender. Minn. Stat.

§§ 611A.61, subd. 1, 611A.52, subd. 5(1). The effect of these provisions is that the Board

(acting on the State’s behalf) is limited to seeking restitution for only the amount the victim

would be entitled to had the victim sought restitution directly from the offender. From the

perspective of the district court, which, when ordering restitution, must consider “the

amount of economic loss sustained by the victim,” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a), the

restitution determination must naturally be centered around the economic loss of the victim

of the crime, and not the loss of the Board, which simply assumes the claimant’s right to

recover benefits. In addition, as we have just held, the economic loss of the victim is

analyzed under the restitution statutes—not the reparations statutes—so the collateral-

source provision remains inapplicable.

       Accordingly, if the Board erroneously awards reparations to a claimant who was

ineligible to receive them, an offender can still challenge the Board’s subsequent restitution

request on the grounds that the victim would not be entitled to restitution under section

611A.045, subdivision 1(a), had the victim sought restitution directly. In effect, the Board

bears the potential cost if it awards reparations to a claimant under the Reparations Act that

are greater than the amount the victim would be authorized to recover directly from the

offender under the restitution statute. However, Cotton made no challenge as to S.T.’s

hypothetical eligibility for restitution. In fact, he seems to concede that an award to S.T.


                                              13
would have been proper had she sought restitution directly. 6 Instead, Cotton argues only

that “even if a defendant’s payment to [the Board] is restitution,” he “still prevails because

[the Board] is not a ‘victim’ that can recover under the restitution statute.” As we have

stated above, however, the Board is considered a victim under the restitution statute.

       Accordingly, we conclude that the statutory directives of the collateral-source

provision under Reparations Act do not apply when considering whether to order an

offender to pay restitution to the Board under the restitution statute in the amount paid by

the Board to the victim in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1a. Rather, if an

offender wishes to challenge an award of restitution to the Board, they must do so on the

grounds that the restitution statute would have precluded or reduced recovery of the victim

had the victim sought restitution directly. Because all of Cotton’s challenges to the

sufficiency of the restitution award fail, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.




6
       Although we are not required here to determine whether it would have been proper
to award S.T. restitution to recoup the cremation expenses she incurred, we note the limited
scope of her reparations request. S.T. did not seek reimbursement for the “total or
aggregate diminution or deprivation of money, goods, or services that [she] suffer[ed] as a
direct result or natural consequence of [Cotton]’s crime.” Currin, 974 N.W.2d at 573.
Rather, her reparations request sought compensation for one discrete expense that was not
otherwise reimbursed. In seeking to restore S.T. “to the same financial position” she was
in before the crime, Palubicki, 

, it would make little sense to credit any
donations S.T. received that were not made for the purpose of reimbursing the cremation
expenses specifically. Cotton’s contention that a court would be required to deduct the
GoFundMe donations from a restitution award simply because they were “received or
readily available to S.T., regardless of how she used the donations,” rings hollow. Cf. State
v. White, ___ N.W.3d ___, No. A23-0126, slip op. at 11 (Minn. Nov. 13, 2024) (reasoning
that “an economic loss is . . . felt” when “a cash asset that would have been available for
other purposes is no longer available”).


                                             14
                                     CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

       Affirmed.


       HENNESY and GAÏTAS, JJ., not having been members of this court at the time of

submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.




                                            15
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