STATE OF MINNESOTA

                                 IN SUPREME COURT

                                        A23-1218


Original Jurisdiction                                                        Per Curiam
                                                        Took no part, Hennesy, Gaïtas JJ.

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against
Madsen Marcellus, Jr., a Minnesota Attorney,

.

                                                               Filed: November 20, 2024
                                                               Office of Appellate Courts

                              ________________________


Susan M. Humiston, Director, Timothy M. Burke, Senior Assistant Director, Office of
Lawyers Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for petitioner.

Barry A. O’Neil, Nathan Z. Heffernan, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
respondent.

                              ________________________

SYLLABUS

       1.     An attorney who is licensed to practice law and is practicing law in

Minnesota at the time the Director of the Office of Lawyer’s Professional Responsibility

learns that the attorney has been publicly disciplined or is subject to public disciplinary

charges in another jurisdiction is subject to reciprocal discipline under Rule 12(d), Rules

on Lawyers Professional Responsibility.




                                            1
       2.     Reciprocal discipline of disbarment under Rule 12(d), Rules on Lawyers

Professional Responsibility, is appropriate where an attorney was disbarred in another

jurisdiction for participating in a fraudulent mortgage application that also violated a court

order in a dissolution proceeding, failing to inform a court of the fraudulent nature of that

application, willfully violating numerous court orders in a marital dissolution proceeding,

violating the terms of a final judgment in his marital dissolution proceeding, failing to pay

court-ordered fees and taking steps to avoid legal process, and failing to pay court-ordered

child support over a period of several years even after earlier discipline had been imposed

for that conduct.

       Disbarred.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

       In this case, we consider the request of the Director of the Office of Lawyers

Professional Responsibility (the Director) to impose reciprocal discipline on attorney

Madsen Marcellus, Jr., and disbar him from the practice of law under Rule 12(d) of the

Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR). The Director’s request arises out

of attorney discipline Marcellus received in the state of Florida.

       In 2018, the Florida Supreme Court suspended Marcellus for 18 months. Florida

Bar v. Marcellus, 

 (Fla. 2018) (Marcellus I). He was never reinstated.

In 2022, the Florida Supreme Court disbarred Marcellus. See Florida Bar v. Marcellus,

No. SC21-579, 

 (Fla. Sept. 7, 2022) (Marcellus II).               Marcellus’s

misconduct in Florida included participating in a fraudulent mortgage application that also


                                              2
violated a court order in a dissolution proceeding, failing to inform a court of the fraudulent

nature of that application, willfully violating numerous court orders in his marital

dissolution proceeding, violating the terms of a final judgment in his marital dissolution

proceeding, failing to pay court-ordered fees and taking steps to avoid legal process, and

failing to pay court-ordered child support over a period of several years even after earlier

discipline had been imposed for that conduct. Marcellus never reported the Florida

disciplinary proceedings to the Director.

       In 2022, the Director learned about the Florida disciplinary proceedings. Under

Rule 12(d), RLPR, the Director filed a petition for imposition of reciprocal discipline of

disbarment on Marcellus. Because we find that disbarment is appropriate reciprocal

discipline for his misconduct, we grant the Director’s petition and disbar Marcellus.

                                            FACTS 1

       Attorney Madsen Marcellus, Jr., was admitted to the Florida Bar in 2003. In 2005,

he was also admitted to practice law in Minnesota.           His Minnesota license entered

non-compliant status in 2009 because Marcellus did not comply with Continuing Legal

Education (CLE) requirements and did not pay annual registration fees.




1
       Facts relating to Marcellus’s conduct for which he was suspended and later
disbarred in Florida are derived from referee reports submitted to the Florida Supreme
Court in his disciplinary proceedings. “Unless the Court determines otherwise, a final
adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer had committed certain misconduct shall
establish conclusively the misconduct for purposes of disciplinary proceedings in
Minnesota.” Rule 12(d), RLPR. Marcellus does not provide any reason we should not
accept the findings of the Florida courts that he committed certain misconduct.

                                               3
       In 2009, K.P. filed for divorce from Marcellus. A Florida district court entered a

Final Order on Petition for Dissolution in 2010. Prior to the divorce, the couple owned a

home. Both K.P. and Marcellus were named on the mortgage for the home. K.P. was

awarded the home in the dissolution proceeding but could not afford the mortgage

payments. The Florida court issued an order requiring Marcellus to either refinance or sell

the home.

       K.P. negotiated a sale, but when she vacated the home prior to closing, Marcellus

moved himself and his belongings into the home and refused to leave or finalize the sale.

Accordingly, under the court’s order, Marcellus was required to refinance the home. In

2010, however, Marcellus pursued a loan modification rather than refinancing the home.

Under the loan modification, K.P. remained responsible for the mortgage and, therefore,

the loan modification required both Marcellus’s and K.P.’s signatures. When K.P. refused

to sign the loan modification, Marcellus allowed C.F., a notary and mutual friend of the

couple, to notarize the loan modification application on K.P.’s behalf. Marcellus knew that

K.P. did not approve the notarization. C.F. later lost his notary commission because of the

fraudulent notarization. In addition to failing to either refinance the mortgage or sell the

home as required by the court order, Marcellus submitted the loan modification agreement

to a bank for approval despite knowing that it was fraudulently notarized.

       K.P. did not learn about the loan modification agreement until the lender filed a

foreclosure complaint and served it on her. In 2013, K.P. filed a motion for contempt based

on Marcellus’s failure to remove her name from the loan modification and the mortgage.




                                             4
       Marcellus was served with pleadings in the contempt proceeding in May 2013. In

June 2013, he was served with discovery requests, notice of trial on the civil contempt

relating to the loan modification, and other documents. Further discovery requests were

served on Marcellus numerous times thereafter. Despite service to his verified home and

office addresses and via email to a verified email address, K.P.’s counsel received no

response from Marcellus. K.P.’s counsel attempted to subpoena him as a witness for an

evidentiary hearing to no avail. Overall, between May and July 2013, Marcellus did not

respond to any pleadings or discovery requests.

       At a July 2013 hearing, the court ordered Marcellus to provide responses to

outstanding discovery requests. Marcellus did not do so within the required timeframe,

nor at any later time. For this Marcellus was sanctioned and ordered to pay K.P.’s

attorney’s fees within 30 days. He ignored that order as well.

       Marcellus continued to disobey court orders and obstruct discovery, causing the

court to grant motions to compel in September 2013, July 2014, and September 2014. After

the third motion to compel discovery, the court ordered Marcellus to pay a daily $50 fine

until he proved compliance. He never provided such proof. Marcellus did not appear at

an order to show cause hearing in September 2014. The court issued a writ of bodily

attachment, which would permit his arrest in order to bring him before the court. See

Sanders v. Laird, 

, 651–52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). Rather than comply,

however, Marcellus exchanged vehicles with his then-wife and ceased attending his

children’s activities to avoid arrest.




                                            5
       In 2016, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against Marcellus in Florida. A

referee was appointed. The referee found that Marcellus’s conduct violated his ethical

obligations as a Florida lawyer. The referee determined that Marcellus violated Rule 3-4.3,

Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (RRFB) (“commission by a lawyer of any act that is

unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice”); Rule 4-3.4(a), RRFB (“unlawfully

obstruct[ing] another party’s access to evidence”); Rule 4-3.4(b), RRFB (“fabricat[ing]

evidence”); Rule 4-3.4(c), RRFB (“knowingly disobey[ing] an obligation under the rules

of a tribunal [unless asserting] that no valid obligation exists”); Rule 4-3.4(d), RRFB

(“mak[ing] a frivolous discovery request or intentionally fail[ing] to comply with a legally

proper discovery request”); Rule 4-8.4(c), RRFB (“engag[ing] in conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation”); and Rule 4-8.4(d), RRFB (“engag[ing] in

conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of

justice”). 2 See Marcellus I, 

.

       The referee recommended that Marcellus be suspended for 12 months, noting as

aggravating factors dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses,

submission of false statements or evidence or other deceptive practices during the

disciplinary process, vulnerability of the victim, substantial experience in the practice of

law, and indifference to making restitution. The referee also stated that Marcellus’s

obstruction of the discovery process preceded the post-dissolution proceedings discussed

above, as he had similarly obstructed proceedings in 2013 relating to avoiding paying child


2
        These rules most closely parallel Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4,
3.4(a), 3.4(b), 3.4(c), 3.4(d), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 3.4 generally.

                                             6
support.   The referee identified several mitigating factors: the absence of a prior

disciplinary record, personal or emotional problems (due to his emotional state during the

divorce), and otherwise good character or reputation based on testimony from two fellow

lawyers. Notwithstanding the referee’s recommended discipline, the Florida Supreme

Court opted to instead suspend Marcellus for 18 months, effective June 16, 2018.

Marcellus I, 

. Marcellus never sought reinstatement in Florida following

this suspension. He did not report the Florida discipline to the Director.

       Following his suspension in Florida, Marcellus returned to Minnesota. He complied

with Minnesota CLE and registration fee requirements and, in October 2020, he was

transferred to active status as a licensed attorney in Minnesota. See Rule 16, Rules for

Registration of Attorneys (RRA). He was hired as an Assistant Public Defender in Ramsey

County in April 2021. In January 2022, he was hired by the Hennepin County Public

Defender’s Office.

       In the same month that he was hired in Ramsey County, Florida instituted another

disciplinary proceeding against Marcellus. The misconduct in Marcellus II concerned

nonpayment of child support. On July 8, 2019, a Florida family court held Marcellus in

contempt for his willful failure to comply with that court’s orders requiring payment of

child support. Under Rule 4-8.4(h), RRFB, an attorney’s willful refusal to timely pay a

child support obligation, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, constitutes




                                             7
misconduct. 3 As noted above in the discussion of Marcellus I, Marcellus had been found

to have failed to pay child support obligations as early as 2013. The report in that

proceeding also found that Marcellus had remained deliberately underemployed. This does

not seem to have changed after his suspension, as the family court that held him in contempt

stated that Marcellus had only applied to be a substitute teacher. Marcellus’s arrearages

totaled $11,020.18 in August 2018, around the time of his suspension in Florida. By

October 2020, arrearages had grown to over $30,000.

       The second disciplinary proceeding was assigned to the same referee who made

recommendations in Marcellus I. The referee determined that Marcellus violated Rule

4-8.4(h), RRFB. The referee also found aggravating factors including prior disciplinary

offenses; dishonest or selfish motive; a pattern of misconduct; submission of false

evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;

vulnerability of the victim; and indifference to making restitution. The only mitigating

factor listed was imposition of other penalties or sanctions. The referee recommended a

three-year suspension, which the referee stated was the maximum suspension short of

disbarment. Among other things, the referee noted as reasons for the severity of the

punishment Florida’s movement toward more severe punishments, see Florida Bar v.

Rosenberg, 

 (Fla. 2015), a demonstrated lack of desire on the part of




3
      Rule 4-8.4(h), RRFB, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not . . . willfully refuse, as
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, to timely pay a child support obligation.”
Minnesota has no direct counterpart to this rule.

                                             8
Marcellus to meet his obligations and take care of and support his children, and the fact

that Marcellus’s first suspension was partially caused by nonpayment of child support.

       The Florida Supreme Court again imposed a heavier sanction than recommended.

In September 2022, it disbarred Marcellus.       Marcellus II, 

, at *1.

Marcellus did not inform the Director of his disbarment in Florida.           The Director

independently learned of Marcellus’s sanctions and misconduct from Florida discipline

counsel, after which the present petition was filed seeking reciprocal discipline under Rule

12(d), RLPR.

                                       ANALYSIS

       Under Rule 12(d), RLPR, once the Director learns that a lawyer licensed to practice

in Minnesota has been disciplined in another jurisdiction, the Director may investigate that

lawyer and file a petition for reciprocal discipline. The rule provides that we may impose

the same discipline imposed in the other jurisdiction “unless it appears that discipline

procedures in the other jurisdiction were unfair, or the imposition of the same discipline

would be unjust or substantially different from discipline warranted in Minnesota.” 

 If,

for any of those reasons, we may not impose identical discipline, we may in the alternative

order “such other discipline or such other proceedings as [we] deem[] appropriate.” 

       Marcellus makes two arguments that reciprocal discipline is inappropriate. First, he

argues that he was not a “lawyer licensed to practice in Minnesota” when he committed

the underlying conduct in Marcellus I nor when he was sanctioned for it, meaning that we

may only consider the conduct underlying the discipline imposed in Marcellus II. Second,

he argues that, whether we consider Marcellus I or not, disbarment would be “unjust or


                                             9
substantially different from discipline warranted in Minnesota,” meaning that we must

either impose an alternate sanction or order proceedings before the Office of Lawyers

Professional Responsibility (OLPR) to investigate appropriate sanctions. We address each

question in turn.

                                              I.

       We turn first to Marcellus’s argument that we cannot consider his conduct that led

to discipline in Marcellus I because he was on involuntary restricted status in Minnesota

from 2009 to 2020 for failing to meet CLE requirements and pay his annual registration

fee. Rules 2(A), 2(F), and 14(A), RRA. All of the conduct underlying his discipline in

Marcellus I occurred during that period.

       Marcellus relies on language in Rule 12(d), RLPR, stating that “[u]pon learning

from any source that a lawyer licensed to practice law in Minnesota has been publicly

disciplined or is subject to public disciplinary charges in another jurisdiction, the Director

may commence an investigation and, without further proceedings, may file a petition for

disciplinary action [in] this Court.” Marcellus argues that this sentence limits our authority

to impose reciprocal discipline under Rule 12(d) to those lawyers who have an active and

non-suspended license to practice law in Minnesota at the time they commit misconduct

and are subject to discipline in another jurisdiction. Accordingly, Marcellus argues we

lack power to impose reciprocal discipline under Rule 12(d) because, at the time he

engaged in the misconduct and was subject to the discipline Florida imposed in

Marcellus I, he was on involuntary restricted status in Minnesota for failing to pay lawyer




                                             10
registration fees and satisfy his CLE requirements. See Rule 14, RRA; Rule 12, Rules of

the Minnesota State Board of Continuing Legal Education.

       We disagree. Marcellus reads too much into the first sentence of Rule 12(d). The

sentence is a procedural provision that empowers the Director to initiate a reciprocal

discipline proceeding. And, in this case, at the time the Director learned that Marcellus

had been publicly disciplined in Florida, Marcellus was licensed to practice law (and was

in fact practicing law) in Minnesota.

                                            II.

       Having concluded that the entirety of Marcellus’s Florida misconduct is subject to

reciprocal discipline under Rule 12(d), RLPR, we must now determine whether imposition

of that reciprocal discipline—disbarment—is appropriate. Rule 12(d) states that we may

impose reciprocal discipline “unless it appears that discipline procedures in [Florida] were

unfair, or the imposition of the same discipline would be unjust or substantially different

from discipline warranted in Minnesota.”

       Marcellus does not argue that his proceedings in Florida were unfair. Accordingly,

we must determine whether disbarment would be unjust or if disbarment would be

substantially different from discipline warranted in Minnesota. See In re Jensen, 12

N.W.3d 731, 737 (Minn. 2024) (explaining the requirements for imposing reciprocal

discipline under Rule 12(d), RLPR).

                                            A.

       Before we address those questions, however, we consider Marcellus’s argument that

we must independently and separately consider (1) whether the 18-month suspension for


                                            11
the conduct in his divorce proceeding, including his nonpayment of child support through

2018, is unjust or substantially different from discipline warranted in Minnesota (the

misconduct at issue in Marcellus I); and (2) whether his disbarment for continuing to

intentionally fail to make child support payments is unjust or substantially different from

discipline warranted in Minnesota (the misconduct at issue in Marcellus II). We decline

to do so.

       In considering whether to impose reciprocal discipline, we consider an attorney’s

misconduct cumulatively; splitting the misconduct from Marcellus I and Marcellus II is

essentially impossible because Marcellus’s disbarment in Marcellus II was imposed in the

context of his earlier misconduct addressed in the Marcellus I proceeding. See In re

Overboe, 

 (Minn. 2015). Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court’s

decision to disbar Marcellus was premised in part on Marcellus’s conduct in Marcellus I.

Marcellus II, 

, at *1 (relying in part on the Report of Referee which

discussed Marcellus’s prior conduct and ongoing pattern of conduct as well as prior

disciplinary action in recommending discipline).

                                            B.

       Marcellus argues that reciprocal discipline of disbarment would be unjust due to

changed circumstances. He claims that his situation is analogous to In re Otis, 

 (Minn. 1998), in which we declined to impose reciprocal discipline of disbarment. 

. Otis was disbarred in New Hampshire for sexual misconduct. 

 at 561–62.

Following the disbarment, new information emerged suggesting that his conduct may have

resulted from a seizure disorder which he successfully treated through medication. 

 at


                                            12
563. We said that “[t]he facts surrounding Otis’s mitigation have significantly changed

since the time the New Hampshire Supreme Court disbarred him,” and the misconduct did

“not appear likely to recur.” 

. Therefore, “disbarment [was] not necessary to

protect the public.” 

       Under Otis, discipline imposed in another jurisdiction may be “unjust” under Rule

12(d), RLPR, if a lawyer shows that the circumstances that caused their misconduct have

changed, especially if evidence of those changed circumstances was not available in the

disciplinary proceeding in the other jurisdiction, and the discipline imposed in the other

jurisdiction is no longer necessary to protect the public. Jensen, 12 N.W.3d at 738–39.

       Marcellus claims that, since April 2021, when the hearing in Marcellus II occurred,

he has consistently paid child support. He included in the record before us receipts of child

support payment as well as affidavits from colleagues and family members attesting to his

change in character and compliance since returning to Minnesota.

       All of this is laudable. But it does not render imposition of reciprocal discipline

unjust. First, failure to pay child support is not the sole basis for Marcellus’s Florida

disbarment; that decision was also based on his conduct in his divorce proceeding

addressed in Marcellus I. The information Marcellus provided does not demonstrate that

the causes of that misconduct have been fully resolved. Moreover, the record is not clear

as to whether Marcellus has become fully compliant with his child support obligations or

has established a plan to do so. Cf. Rule 30, RLPR (requiring a lawyer in arrears in payment

of child support to be administratively suspended until the lawyer has paid the arrearages

or is in compliance with an approved payment plan). Further, much of the changed conduct


                                             13
Marcellus points to occurred after Florida initiated the second discipline proceeding—a

proceeding Marcellus failed to report to the Director. We are reluctant to allow a lawyer

to benefit from the passage of time that is the result of the lawyer’s failure to report the

initiation of disciplinary proceedings and imposition of discipline in another jurisdiction to

the Director. See In re Perez, 

 (Minn. 2004).

                                             C.

       Having concluded that reciprocal discipline of disbarment would not be unjust, we

now ask whether reciprocal discipline of disbarment would be substantially different from

what we would impose in Minnesota. Jensen, 12 N.W.3d at 740. This language does not

impose a cap on the reciprocal discipline we may impose equal to the maximum discipline

we would impose if the disciplinary proceedings occurred in Minnesota. Id.; see Overboe,

 (noting that the question “is not whether we might have imposed

different discipline had [the lawyer’s] disciplinary proceedings originated in Minnesota,

but rather whether the discipline imposed by [the other jurisdiction] is unjust or

substantially different from discipline warranted in Minnesota” (citation omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted)); In re Wolff, 

 (Minn. 2012) (noting that

reciprocal discipline is appropriate “only if similar discipline would be warranted in

Minnesota” (emphasis added)). Rather, the word “substantial” must carry some meaning.

Marcellus must show not only that disbarment is outside the range of discipline this court

would impose, but also that it is substantially so. Jensen, 12 N.W.3d at 740.

       On this record, Marcellus must show that disbarment is substantially different from

the discipline that might be imposed in Minnesota for a lawyer who (1) aided in procuring


                                             14
a forged signature for a loan modification agreement that (2) violated a court order

requiring him to either remove his former spouse’s name from their marital home’s

mortgage or otherwise sell that home, (3) filed the forged loan modification agreement with

the bank, (4) proceeded to defy and evade numerous court orders in a marriage-dissolution

proceeding to the extent that he was threatened with arrest and was assessed numerous

fines for non-compliance, (5) did not pay court-ordered fees for failure to respond to

discovery requests, (6) failed to pay court-ordered child support while intentionally

remaining underemployed to feign inability to pay, and (7) continued to resist paying child

support while running up significant arrearages despite already having his law license

suspended in Florida in part due to his earlier failure to pay. Once again, in assessing

appropriate discipline, we consider all the misconduct. See In re Lee, 3 N.W.3d 278, 283–

84 (Minn. 2024) (considering the “cumulative weight of the lawyer’s misconduct”). The

Florida court also found several aggravating factors which we must consider. 4 We


4
        The Florida court found as aggravating factors the existence of dishonest or selfish
motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, submission of false statements or
evidence or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process, the vulnerability of
the victim, substantial experience in the practice of law, and indifference to making
restitution. Many of these may also be aggravating factors in Minnesota discipline cases.
See In re Blomquist, 

, 916 (Minn. 2021) (stating that the existence of
dishonest or selfish motive may be an aggravating factor); In re Udeani, 

,
398–99 (Minn. 2020) (stating that a pattern of misconduct and the vulnerability of the
victim may be aggravating factors); In re Langree, 9 N.W.3d 159, 171, 172 (Minn. 2024)
(stating that substantial experience in the practice of law and submission of false statements
or evidence or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process may be aggravating
factors). In our disposition of a reciprocal discipline case, when considering the
aggravating factors the Florida court identified (for instance, the existence of multiple
offenses), we follow our rule that we do not double-count as aggravating factors any facts
that we already considered in assessing the proper discipline for violations of the Rules of


                                             15
conclude that disbarment is not substantially different from the discipline we would

impose.

       One comparable case among our precedents is the order we issued based on a

stipulation between the Director and a lawyer in In re Griffin, 

(Minn. 2015) (order). The lawyer in Griffin intentionally avoided service of process, failed

to pay child support obligations, failed to attend court hearings, provided legal advice while

suspended from the practice of law, implied that he had the ability to improperly influence

the Transportation Security Administration, and failed to cooperate during disciplinary

proceeding. 

. He had an extensive private disciplinary history and one prior

60-day suspension, based in part on the same type of misconduct at issue in the case. 

The lawyer in Griffin also committed some of his misconduct while on disciplinary

probation and failed to comply with the conditions of discipline that we ordered in prior

cases. 

 at 567–68. This court imposed an indefinite suspension of a minimum of four

months, stating that, because of his conduct, the lawyer “must petition for reinstatement.”

.

       There are some similarities between this case and Griffin—the failure to pay child

support, the avoidance of court process, and the refusal to obey court orders. The lawyer

in Griffin also committed some misconduct that Marcellus did not commit—providing

legal advice while suspended from the practice of law and implying that he had the ability




Professional Conduct. In re Nwaneri, 

, 890 n.7 (Minn. 2022) (stating that
“because we consider [the client’s] vulnerability as an immigrant in assessing the
seriousness of Nwaneri’s conduct, we will not also consider it as an aggravating factor”).

                                             16
to improperly influence a federal agency. On the other hand, the lawyer in Griffin did not

engage in some of the most serious forms of Marcellus’s misconduct, including fraud

through forgery to accomplish an end that was in direct violation of a court order.

Marcellus disobeyed and evaded court orders to the extent that he was threatened with

arrest and fined. And he remained underemployed in an effort to feign an inability to pay

child support.

       Turning to the aggravating factors in each case, we observe that, although

Marcellus’s disciplinary history (an aggravating factor here and in Griffin) is less

voluminous than the lawyer’s disciplinary history in Griffin, Marcellus’s disciplinary

history has resulted in more serious discipline. Additionally, like the lawyer in Griffin,

Marcellus committed some misconduct while on probation for the same type of

misconduct. Marcellus also failed to fully cooperate with disciplinary proceedings in

Florida by submitting false statements and evidence and engaging in other deceptive

practices. We also note that, unlike the record before us, the record in Griffin does not

reflect that the lawyer had a dishonest or selfish motive or engaged in a pattern of

misconduct.

       In short, in Griffin, we recognized that conduct including failure to pay child

support, avoiding service of process, and ignoring court orders—in addition to other

misconduct—was sufficiently serious to warrant a minimum four-month suspension with

the requirement that the lawyer petition for reinstatement. See 

 at 567–68. Marcellus’s

misconduct, along with aggravating factors, is more extensive and more serious than the

misconduct in Griffin.


                                           17
       We also consider In re Giberson, 

 (Minn. 1998).             Giberson

involved an attorney accused of willful nonpayment of child support who accrued

arrearages of over $170,000 in child support and spousal maintenance. 

 at 352–53. The

lawyer practiced in Minnesota for several years, but at the time of his dissolution

proceeding, he had moved to New York. When the lawyer failed to appear for a hearing,

a warrant for his arrest was issued in New York. 

. The lawyer then apparently

moved to California to avoid arrest. 

 The lawyer also failed to show up to or otherwise

cooperate with a disciplinary proceeding in Minnesota and failed to respond to an order to

show cause. 

 We indefinitely suspended the lawyer and provided that he could not be

reinstated unless he submitted a petition for reinstatement and demonstrated that he had

either paid off his arrearages or was in compliance with an approved payment plan. 

.

       As with Griffin, there are obvious similarities between this case and Giberson,

particularly with regard to both lawyers’ misconduct during dissolution and child support

proceedings, efforts to evade court process, and willful and egregious refusal to pay child

support.   Moreover, although the lawyer in Giberson accrued significantly greater

arrearages than Marcellus, the lawyer in Giberson did not commit any unrelated

misconduct. See 

 (stating that the disciplinary case involving Giberson was

“based primarily on an attorney’s failure to comply with a court order to pay child support

and spousal maintenance”). By contrast, here Marcellus separately engaged in fraud

through forgery to accomplish an end that was in direct violation of a court order. And

there is no mention in Giberson of aggravating factors. As in Griffin, the conduct in


                                            18
Giberson was sufficiently serious to warrant an indefinite suspension, and Marcellus’s

misconduct, taken as a whole, is more serious than the misconduct in Giberson.

      In his discussion of Giberson, Marcellus also points to Rule 30, RLPR. The rule

permits administrative suspension of an attorney’s license until they pay child support

arrearages or are in compliance with an approved payment plan. Rule 30(a), RLPR. 5

Contrary to Marcellus’s argument, however, Giberson itself was not an administrative

suspension case. The Director proceeded by filing a petition alleging violations of the

Rules of Professional Conduct. Giberson, 

 (noting that because the

lawyer could not be found, the Director proceeded under Rule 12(c), RLPR). Further, we



5
      Rule 30, RLPR, provides for an administrative suspension:

      (a) Upon receipt of a district court order or a report from an Administrative
      Law Judge or public authority pursuant to [Minnesota Statutes, section]
      518A.66 finding that a licensed Minnesota attorney is in arrears in payment
      of maintenance or child support and has not entered into or is not in
      compliance with an approved payment agreement for such support, the
      Director’s Office shall serve and file with the Supreme Court a motion
      requesting the administrative suspension of the attorney until such time as
      the attorney has paid the arrearages or entered into or is in compliance with
      an approved payment plan. The Court shall suspend the lawyer or take such
      action as it deems appropriate.
      ...
      (c) An attorney administratively suspended under this rule may be reinstated
      by filing an affidavit with supporting documentation averring that he or she
      is no longer in arrears in payment of maintenance or child support or that he
      or she has entered into and is in compliance with an approved payment
      agreement for payment of such support. Within 15 days of the filing of such
      an affidavit the Director’s Office shall verify the accuracy of the attorney’s
      affidavit and file a proposed order for reinstatement of the attorney
      requesting an expedited disposition.
      (d) Nothing in this rule precludes disciplinary proceedings, if the attorney’s
      conduct also violates the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.

                                           19
concluded that the lawyer’s failure to pay child support and spousal maintenance violated

Rules 3.4(c) and 8.4(d), Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct. 

; see Rule

30(d), RLPR (providing that “[n]othing in this rule precludes disciplinary proceedings, if

the attorney’s conduct also violates the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct”). We

also noted that the misconduct in Giberson included actions—non-cooperation—in

addition to failure to pay child support. Giberson, 

. In short, in

Giberson, although the conditions on reinstatement we imposed reflected some of the

requirements of Rule 30, RLPR, we did not proceed under Rule 30, RLPR. We are not

compelled to proceed under Rule 30, RLPR, in this case. 6 And while we did not disbar the

lawyer in Giberson, we imposed a serious sanction of an indefinite suspension.

       Based on our imposition of indefinite suspensions in Griffin and Giberson and the

fact that Marcellus’s misconduct is more extensive and serious than the misconduct in those

cases, we conclude that the disbarment imposed by the Florida Supreme Court is not

substantially outside the range of discipline we would impose in Minnesota.

       Of course, no two discipline cases are exactly alike, and each may involve different

combinations of violations. Accordingly, we also consider cases involving the specific

types of distinct misconduct in which Marcellus engaged. For instance, in cases of

attorneys who engaged in forgery that did not also involve misappropriation from a client,

we have imposed discipline ranging from a suspension of 90 days to an indefinite

suspension of no less than six months. See, e.g., In re Aitken, 

, 155–57


6
      It is worth noting that the record does not make it clear that Marcellus has satisfied
Rule 30(c), RLPR.

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(Minn. 2010) (imposing a 90-day suspension on an attorney who forged his client’s

signature on a plea petition, submitted that plea petition to the court without the client’s

knowledge or consent, and failed to cooperate with the OLPR’s disciplinary investigation),

reinstatement granted, 

 (Minn. 2013) (order); In re Ruffenach,

, 388–89, 391 (Minn. 1992) (imposing suspension of not less than 90 days

on a lawyer who submitted a court-ordered financial disclosure form grossly

underrepresenting and misrepresenting his assets to a judgment creditor); In re Boyd, 

, 663–64, 667 (Minn. 1988) (imposing a six-month suspension on a lawyer

who, to benefit his client rather than himself, prepared a false deed; caused it to be forged,

notarized, and filed; and later issued a false title opinion based on that deed), reinstatement

granted, 

 (Minn. 1989) (order); In re Danna, 

 (Minn.

1987) (imposing a 90-day suspension on lawyer who, without his client’s knowledge or

consent and without her appearing before him, signed the client’s name to an affidavit he

had drafted, then executed and attached his notary public certificate to the affidavit); see

also In re Chacon, 

, 356–58 (Minn. 1998) (disbarring an attorney who had

two felony convictions for passing forged checks, failed to communicate with clients, and

neglected client affairs by ignoring court orders, substantially prejudicing the clients).

       Marcellus points to Boyd to support his argument that disbarment is substantially

different from the discipline we would impose in Minnesota. In Boyd, we suspended a

lawyer for a minimum of six months for preparing a false deed, presenting it to his client

for a forged signature, directing a notary to certify the signature, allowing the deed to be

recorded, and later issuing a false title opinion based on that deed. 430 N.W.2d at 663–64.


                                              21
While Marcellus’s conduct parallels one aspect of the attorney’s conduct in Boyd—causing

the execution and processing of a forged document—Marcellus engaged in additional

misconduct, including filing the loan modification agreement that itself contradicted a

court order and engaging in ongoing failure to pay child support. Therefore, although the

six-month suspension imposed in Boyd resulted from misconduct comparable to a portion

of Marcellus’s, the extent and continuing nature of misconduct at issue in Marcellus’s case

is greater than the misconduct at issue in Boyd.

       For attorneys who, like Marcellus, have not been honest with the court, we have

imposed discipline ranging from a public reprimand to an indefinite suspension of not less

than one year. See, e.g., In re Gallatin, 4 N.W.3d 91 (Minn. 2024) (order) (public

reprimand for attorney who forged opposing pro se parties’ signatures on settlement

documents, resulting in the case’s dismissal, with three judges dissenting and arguing for

a 30-day suspension); In re Brehmer, 

 (Minn. 2001) (imposing suspension

of not less than one year on attorney who, among other things, perpetrated fraud on the

court by making false statements in a pretrial hearing, denied the existence of medical

records which he knew existed, and fraudulently executed client affidavits).

       Marcellus points us to In re Scott, 

 (Minn. 2003) (order), where we

imposed a stipulated 30-day suspension on an attorney for making false statements of fact

in court during his own marital dissolution and custody matter. 

. Again, while

relevant, the lawyer in Scott engaged in substantially less misconduct than Marcellus and

a 30-day suspension is at the lower end of the range of discipline we have imposed for false

statements to the court.


                                            22
       We have imposed indefinite suspension for a lawyer’s refusal to comply with a court

order. For instance, in another case Marcellus cites, In re Nelson, 

 (Minn.

2019) (order), the attorney failed to pay a law-related judgment, failed to respond to court

orders, and failed to comply with court orders to show cause why he should not be held in

contempt, in addition to failing to appear for a court hearing, failing to communicate with

a client, and making improper solicitations to provide legal services. 

. We

indefinitely suspended the lawyer for a minimum of six months. 

 Marcellus’s conduct

is more serious than the conduct of the lawyer in Nelson. Nelson did not involve an attorney

executing a fraudulent document for personal gain, nor a repeated and willful failure to

comply with child support orders for many years. See also, e.g., In re Jensen, 

 (Minn. 1996) (imposing indefinite suspension on attorney who refused to pay

court-ordered attorneys fees in addition to abusing his position as an attorney to harass the

person to whom he owed the fees during his continued nonpayment), reinstatement

granted, 

 (Minn. 1999) (order).

       Based on our review of our prior cases, we conclude that disbarment is not

substantially different from the discipline we would impose if the disciplinary proceedings

had initially occurred in Minnesota.

                                       *     *       *

       The varied ways and fact-specific circumstances in which attorneys commit

misconduct means that no case with perfectly analogous facts exists to compare to

Marcellus’s misconduct and aggravating behavior. Based on our review of Marcellus’s




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misconduct and our past cases, we cannot say that disbarment is unjust or substantially

different from discipline warranted in Minnesota.

       We caution that this opinion should not stand as precedent that we would necessarily

disbar a lawyer who engaged in the same misconduct as Marcellus if we faced the question

independently and directly. Such a decision is left for other cases. We also observe that

we are encouraged that Marcellus appears to be making positive changes in rebuilding his

relationship with his family and making progress on paying his child support arrearages.

Should Marcellus choose to seek reinstatement to practice in Minnesota under Rule

18(e)(1) and (4), RLPR (setting forth the conditions under which a disbarred lawyer may

be reinstated to the practice of law), his alleged recent payment of child support and

reconciliation with his family prior to the issuance of this opinion should be favorably

considered.

                                     CONCLUSION

       We hold that reciprocal discipline is appropriate. We order that Madsen Marcellus,

Jr., is disbarred from the practice of law in the State of Minnesota, effective upon the date

of this opinion. Marcellus must comply with Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice to clients,

opposing counsel, and tribunals), and must pay to the Director the sum of $900 in costs

and disbursements pursuant to Rule 24, RLPR.

       Disbarred.



       HENNESY and GAÏTAS, JJ., not having been members of this court at the time of

submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


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