STATE OF MINNESOTA

                                       IN SUPREME COURT

                                           A24-0216


Original Jurisdiction                                                           Per Curiam
                                                      Took no part, Chutich, Procaccini, JJ.
Ken Martin,

                        Petitioner,

vs.                                                                   Filed: May 10, 2024
                                                                 Office of Appellate Courts
Steve Simon, Minnesota Secretary of State,

                        Respondent,

The Legal Marijuana Now Party,

                        Intervenor-Respondent.

                                 ________________________


Charles N. Nauen, David J. Zoll, Rachel A. Kitze Collins, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, for petitioner.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Nathan J. Hartshorn, Jon M. Woodruff, Assistant
Attorneys General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent Steve Simon, Minnesota
Secretary of State.

Erick G. Kaardal, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
intervenor-respondent Legal Marijuana Now Party.

                                 ________________________




                                              1

SYLLABUS

       1.     The court has subject matter jurisdiction over this petition under Minn. Stat.

§ 204B.44 (2022).

       2.     Because the Legal Marijuana Now Party (LMNP) did not maintain a state

central committee subject to the state convention’s control, as Minn. Stat. § 202A.12,

subd. 2 (2022), requires, and the LMNP’s constitutional challenge to Minn. Stat.

§ 202A.12, subd. 2, fails, the LMNP has not satisfied the requirements to be a major

political party under 

, subd. 7(a) (Supp. 2023).

       Petition granted; motion to dismiss denied.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

       Petitioner Ken Martin, the chair of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (DFL), filed

a petition under Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44 (2022), asking us to decertify the

Legal Marijuana Now Party (LMNP) as a major political party and to order that the

LMNP’s candidates for partisan offices cannot use the ballot access procedures for major

political parties in the 2024 state primary and general elections. The petition alleged that,

notwithstanding the LMNP’s certification to Secretary of State Steve Simon under a

recently amended state law that it meets the statutory requirements for a major political

party, the LMNP had failed to comply with certain requirements for major political parties.

According to the petition, the LMNP is not a major political party because it failed to

comply with provisions in Minnesota Statutes sections 202A.12 (2022) and 202A.13




                                             2
(Supp. 2023) concerning the establishment of a state central committee and a state

executive committee and providing for local conventions and local committees.

       We referred these issues to a referee, who held an evidentiary hearing and concluded

that the LMNP had failed to meet the requirements to be a major political party enumerated

in sections 202A.12 and 202A.13. The LMNP objects to these findings and argues that

sections 202A.12 and 202A.13 unconstitutionally infringe upon its First Amendment

associational rights. The LMNP also filed a motion to dismiss the petition for failure to

comply with the candidate-service requirement under section 204B.44.

       Because we conclude that there were no candidates upon whom to serve the petition,

we deny the LMNP’s motion to dismiss. On the merits, we start and stop our analysis with

the first statutory provision at issue, that “[s]ubject to the control of the state convention

the general management of the affairs of the state party is vested in the party’s state central

committee.” Minn. Stat. § 202A.12, subd. 2. We adopt the referee’s factual findings

regarding this provision and conclude that the LMNP failed to comply with

section 202A.12, subdivision 2, because its single committee, The Head Council, is not

subject to the control of the LMNP’s state convention. Instead, The Head Council has final

authority over all party decisions. We also reject the LMNP’s constitutional challenge to

section 202A.12, subdivision 2. The LMNP only makes broad assertions about the burdens

on its associational rights and fails to argue or otherwise demonstrate how any of the

purported burdens imposed upon it are specifically caused by the requirements in

section 202A.12, subdivision 2. Given that the United States Supreme Court has both

credited that a legitimate state interest “is served by a state statute requiring that a


                                              3
representative central committee be established” and upheld a law requiring that the state

convention governed over the state central committee, Marchioro v. Chaney, 

,

193–94, 196 (1979), the LMNP’s constitutional argument against section 202A.12,

subdivision 2, fails. Accordingly, we hold that the LMNP does not meet all the statutory

requirements to maintain its status as a major political party for purposes of the state

primary election in August 2024 and the state general election in November 2024.

                                           FACTS

       Before we turn to the facts, some background about the different types of political

parties in Minnesota will be helpful to understand the legal issues presented by this case.

       Minnesota’s election law recognizes political parties. A “political party” is simply

defined as “an association of individuals under whose name a candidate files for partisan

office.” 

, subd. 6 (2022). The law further provides for major political

parties and minor political parties. 

, subd. 7 (Supp. 2023) (major

political parties); 

, subd. 23 (2022) (minor political parties). For a

partisan office other than presidential elector, candidates of a major political party receive

a place on the ballot by filing an affidavit of candidacy, with nomination as the party’s

candidate in the general election then sought through a primary election.1 See Minn. Stat.

§§ 204B.03, 204D.10, subd. 1 (2022). In contrast, all other candidates for a partisan office,

including minor political party candidates, must be nominated by petition, which requires


1
       The chair of each major political party “certif[ies] to the secretary of state the names
of the persons nominated as presidential electors, the names of persons nominated as
alternate presidential electors, and the names of the party candidates for president and vice
president.” 

 (2022).

                                              4
obtaining a certain number of signatures before appearing on the general election ballot.

Minn. Stat. § 204B.03. In addition, both major and minor political parties can participate

in certain tax-generated subsidy programs.          See Minn. Stat. §§ 10A.31 (2022 &

Supp. 2023), 290.06, subd. 23 (Supp. 2023); see also Begin v. Ritchie, 

 (Minn. 2013).      Additional subsidies are available only to major political party

candidates. Minn. Stat. § 10A.31, subd. 7 (2022). Major political parties, likewise, have

their party name protected from being used by a candidate of another political party on the

ballot. Minn. Stat. § 202A.11, subd. 2 (2022).

       To qualify as a major political party, a political party must present a certain number

of candidates for certain offices at a state general election or have a candidate for a specific

office receive a certain percentage of voter support in a state general election.2 

, subd. 7(b). The law generally provides that a political party meeting either of

these requirements to be a major political party retains that status for at least two state

general elections. 

 subd. 7(c). A party can lose that status if it fails to meet these

requirements “at each of two consecutive state general elections.” 

 subd. 7(d).

       Minnesota has had laws addressing conventions and committees of major political

parties since 1981, when the Legislature added the term “major political party” to the

defined terms in Minnesota’s election law.3 Act of Apr. 14, 1981, ch. 29, art. 1, § 3, 1981


2
       A party can also qualify as a major political party by “presenting . . . a petition for
a place on the state partisan primary ballot” signed by enough party members. 

, subd. 7(b)(3).
3
       Minnesota Statutes sections 202A.12 and 202A.13 were enacted in 1975, Act of
Feb. 28, 1975, ch. 5, §§ 3–4, 

, 5, but these requirements go as far back

                                               5
Minn. Laws 38, 40 (codified as amended at 

, subd. 7 (Supp. 2023)).

Minnesota Statutes section 202A.12 states, in part, that the final authority of each major

political party is vested in the party’s state convention, to be held at least once every state

general election year, and that “[s]ubject to the control of the state convention the general

management of the affairs of the state party is vested in the party’s state central committee.”

Minn. Stat. § 202A.12, subds. 1–2. Before the Legislature amended the statute in 2023,

section 202A.13 stated that “[t]he rules of each major political party shall provide” for local

conventions at least once every state general election year for each congressional district,

county, and legislative district. Minn. Stat. § 202A.13 (2022). It also stated that each major

political party likewise must generally provide a local executive committee for each

congressional district, county, and legislative district. Id.

       In 2023, the Legislature amended some of the State’s election statutes. Minnesota

Statutes section 202A.12 was not amended. The provisions in section 202A.13 either

remained the same or were lightened. For section 202A.13, the specified number of local

conventions and executive committees was reduced. Instead of referring to a local

convention and local executive committee “for each congressional district and each county

or legislative district,” Minn. Stat. § 202A.13 (2022), the statute now refers to a local




as 1959. See Act of Apr. 24, 1959, ch. 675, art. 3, §§ 20–21, 

,
1142–43 (codified at 

.20–202.21 (1961)) (repealed 1975). Prior to 1981,
when the Legislature added the term “major political party” to Minnesota’s election law,
these requirements applied to a “political party.” See Minn. Stat. §§ 202A.12–202A.13
(1980).

                                               6
convention and local executive committee “for each congressional district and at least 45

counties or legislative districts,” Minn. Stat. § 202A.13 (Supp. 2023).

       The 2023 amendments, however, also for the first time made “major political party”

status dependent on compliance with the requirements of sections 202A.12 and 202A.13.

See 

, subd. 7(a). While still requiring a certain number of candidates

for specific offices or a candidate for a specific office who receives a certain percentage of

votes, 

, subd. 7(b),4 the definition of “major political party” in

section 200.02, subd. 7(a), now provides:

       “Major political party” means a political party that maintains a party
       organization in the state; has complied with the party’s constitution and
       rules; is in compliance with the requirements of sections 202A.12 and
       202A.13; files with the Secretary of State no later than December 1 of each
       odd-numbered year a certification that the party has met the foregoing
       requirements, including a list of the dates and locations of each convention
       held; and meets all other qualification requirements of this subdivision.

(Emphasis added to reflect language added by the 2023 amendments.)5

       These new amendments are what gave rise to this petition. The LMNP first

qualified as a minor political party after the 2014 state general election when its candidate

received 2.99 percent of the vote for attorney general and first qualified as a major political

party in 2018 after its candidate received 5.28 percent of the vote for state auditor. The


4
       The 2023 amendments also increased the percentage of votes required, starting with
the 2024 general election, from 5 percent to 8 percent. 

,
subd. 7(b)(1)(ii).
5
        If a party was “recognized as a major political party” on May 25, 2023, then it had
to affirm in its December 1, 2023 certification “that the party was in compliance with
paragraph (a) during” 2022. Act of May 24, 2023, ch. 62, art. 4, § 9, 

, 2560–61.

                                              7
LMNP then maintained its major political party status when its candidate received 5.92

percent of the vote for U.S. Senator in the 2020 state general election. The LMNP, DFL,

and Republican Party of Minnesota are the only political parties in Minnesota currently

recognized as major political parties.

       On October 18, 2023, and again on November 8, 2023, the Secretary of State’s

general counsel notified the LMNP of the December 1, 2023 certification deadline under

the 2023 amendments to retain major political party status. The LMNP responded, but the

Secretary of State found these early responses to be an insufficient certification of

compliance with the requirements under the 2023 amendments. After various back-and-

forth communications, on December 5, 2023, the Secretary of State advised the LMNP that

his office had determined that the LMNP had complied with the statutory requirements and

would retain its status as a major political party.

       On February 6, 2024, Ken Martin, a registered voter and chair of the DFL, filed this

petition with our court under section 204B.44. The petition claimed that the LMNP failed

to satisfy the requirements to retain its status as a major political party because it did not

have the statewide structure required by section 202A.12 nor the local structure required

by section 202A.13. The petition alleged that the Secretary of State’s decision—to certify

the LMNP as a major political party notwithstanding its failure to comply with these

requirements—was a “wrongful act, omission, or error” by the Secretary of State for which

recourse could be sought under a section 204B.44 petition. The petition sought an order

declaring that the LMNP is not a major political party and ordering the Secretary of State

to not allow LMNP candidates to appear on the ballots for the 2024 state primary and


                                               8
general elections using the procedures available for candidates for partisan office who seek

the nomination of a major political party.

       After receiving responses to the petition from the Secretary of State and the LMNP

as well as other briefing, we concluded that we have jurisdiction over this matter under

section 204B.44, granted the LMNP’s motion to intervene, and appointed Hennepin

County District Court Judge Edward T. Wahl as referee. Martin v. Simon, No. A24-0216,

Order at 3–4 (Minn. filed Mar. 1, 2024). We authorized the referee to “determine all facts

relevant to, issue conclusions of law regarding, and make recommendations as to the

disposition of” three issues: (1) whether the LMNP “has the committees required by Minn.

Stat. § 202A.12 (2022)”; (2) whether the LMNP “has ‘provide[d] for each congressional

district and at least 45 counties or legislative districts an executive committee consisting of

a chair and such other officers as may be necessary,’ as required by Minn. Stat. § 202A.13

(Supp. 2023)”; and (3) whether the LMNP “held, in 2022, the conventions for each

congressional district and at least 45 counties or legislative districts, as required by Minn.

Stat. § 202A.13.” Martin, Order at 4 (alteration in original).

       The referee held an evidentiary hearing on March 11, 2024. He issued his findings

of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations on March 20, 2024, finding against the

LMNP on all three issues and recommending that the LMNP be declared to not meet the

statutory requirements to maintain its status as a major political party. The LMNP objected

to the referee’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations, including

raising a constitutional challenge to sections 202A.12 and 202A.13. The LMNP also filed

a separate motion to dismiss, claiming that we lack subject matter jurisdiction due to an


                                              9
alleged failure by Martin to comply with a service requirement in section 204B.44. Martin

filed responses in opposition to the LMNP’s arguments. The Secretary of State also filed

a response, limited to defending the constitutionality of the challenged laws.

                                        ANALYSIS

       Before us are the objections of the LMNP to the referee’s findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and recommendations, as well as the LMNP’s constitutional arguments

and motion to dismiss. When we refer a section 204B.44 petition to a referee to make

findings of fact, we “defer to the findings of the referee who heard the witnesses testify.”

Piepho v. Bruns, 

 (Minn. 2002) (per curiam); see also Lundquist v.

Leonard, 

 (Minn. 2002) (per curiam) (stating that “because the record

support[ed] the referee’s conclusions” about the candidate’s intent to establish residency

in a legislative district and the actions she took to establish residency there, we would not

“disturb the findings”). We have also explained that “[i]t is the role of the referee, and not

this court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Lundquist, 

. Issues

of statutory interpretation, however, like questions involving the constitutionality of a

statute and subject matter jurisdiction, are legal issues we review de novo. See Schatz v.

Interfaith Care Ctr., 

 (Minn. 2012); Daniel v. City of

Minneapolis, 

 (Minn. 2019).




                                             10
                                              I.

       Assessing our subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue that we consider first.6

After the referee issued his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations, the

LMNP filed a motion to dismiss, contending that we lack subject matter jurisdiction

because Martin did not comply with the service requirement for candidates in

section 204B.44. Martin opposed the motion, arguing there were no candidates that he

could have served.

       Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44(b) requires that “[t]he petitioner shall serve a

copy of the petition on the officer, board or individual charged with the error, omission, or

wrongful act, on all candidates for the office in the case of an election for state, federal,

county, municipal, or school district office, and on any other party as required by the court.”

(Emphasis added.)      We need not resolve in this case whether a petitioner under

section 204B.44 must serve all candidates for office at the commencement of the action for

a court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.7 Instead, the LMNP’s argument




6
       By order, we addressed a different jurisdictional issue and concluded that “[t]he
claims in the petition fall within the scope of section 204B.44 and have been properly
brought before this court.” Martin v. Simon, No. A24-0216, Order at 3 (Minn. filed Mar. 1,
2024).
7
        In Benda for Common-sense v. Anderson, the court of appeals addressed a similar
issue and concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
petition in that case because the petitioners did not serve all the candidates on the 2022
Rice County general election ballot. 

, 901 (Minn. App. 2023). That issue
was petitioned to our court, and we granted review and stayed further proceedings pending
final disposition in Rued v. Commissioner of Human Services, No. A22-1420. Benda for
Common-sense v. Anderson, No. A23-0302, Order (Minn. filed Feb. 28, 2024).

                                              11
fails because there are not yet any candidates for the elections at issue in the petition for

Martin to have served.

       The candidate-service requirement in section 204B.44(b) applies “in the case of an

election for state, federal, county, municipal, or school district office.” Minn. Stat.

§ 204B.44(b) (emphasis added).         Based on this language, the candidate-service

requirement is limited to candidates for the specific elections at issue in the petition. See

Minn. Majority v. Ritchie, No. A09-0950, Order at 5 (Minn. filed July 22, 2009) (relying

on the phrase “an election” in section 204B.44 to conclude that “[a]t a minimum, the plain

language of the statute requires that the claim relate to a duty concerning a specific

election” (emphasis added)). The specific elections at issue in this petition are the 2024

state primary and general elections.8 The LMNP has identified no candidate for either of

these elections who it claims should have been served and instead argues that candidates

from another election—the 2024 presidential nomination primary—should have been

served. The motion to dismiss fails on this basis alone.

       In addition, the candidate-service requirement applies to “all candidates for the

office in the case of an election.” Minn. Stat. § 204B.44(b) (emphasis added). But at this

point, for both the 2024 state primary and general elections, there are not yet candidates

for any partisan office. The period to file nominating petitions and affidavits of candidacy



8
       Our February 8, 2024 order specifically directed Martin to “address whether
petitioner is seeking any relief related to the 2024 Minnesota presidential nomination
primary.” Martin v. Simon, No. A24-0216, Order at 2 (Minn. filed Feb. 8, 2024). Martin
responded, expressly disclaiming that he was seeking any relief as to the 2024 Minnesota
presidential nomination primary.

                                             12
will not open until May 21, 2024. See Minn. Stat. § 204B.09, subd. 1(a), 1(c) (2022). And

no chair of any major political party has certified to the Secretary of State the names of the

party’s candidates for president and vice president.9 See 

 (2022). With

no candidates to serve, Martin did not fail to comply with section 204B.44’s candidate-

service requirement by not serving the petition on any specific candidates.

                                              II.

       We turn now to the petition itself. The LMNP does not dispute that under the 2023

amendments to the definition of “major political party” in section 200.02, subd. 7(a), a

political party is no longer a major political party if it fails to comply with the requirements

of sections 202A.12 and 202A.13. Instead, the LMNP argues that the Purcell principle

from federal courts calls for us to refrain from declaring that the LMNP is not a major

political party. Alternatively, on the merits, the LMNP challenges the referee’s findings of

fact and conclusions of law and argues that sections 202A.12 and 202A.13 are

unconstitutional. We address each argument below.

                                              A.

       The LMNP first suggests that the Purcell principle, an evolving federal court

abstention doctrine concerning the propriety of judicial interference in election matters,

compels this court to stay its hand rather than reach the merits of this case. According to

the LMNP, “[t]he Purcell principle should guide this Court by not giving the underlying

district court findings and recommendations and the § 204B.44 Petition the effect of


9
       In fact, the LMNP states in its objections that it will hold its national convention
and select its candidates for president and vice president in June or July 2024.

                                              13
changing elections [sic] laws on the eve of national conventions” where doing so would be

contrary to the ostensible “expectations of voters in the general election.” Martin contends

the Purcell principle has no application to this state court proceeding in which he is asking

us to apply Minnesota law.

       The Purcell principle, the name of which comes from the U.S. Supreme Court’s

decision in Purcell v. Gonzalez, 

 (2006) (per curiam), has been more recently

articulated by members of that Court as the principle that “federal courts ordinarily should

not enjoin a state’s election laws in the period close to an election, and this Court in turn

has often stayed lower federal court injunctions that contravened that principle.” Merrill

v. Milligan, 

, 880 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of applications

for stays); see Pierce v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 

 (4th Cir. 2024)

(addressing the concurrence in Milligan as the operative statement of the Purcell principle).

But a principle that federal courts should not enjoin a state’s election laws in the immediate

lead-up to an election is inapplicable in the context of a section 204B.44 petition, which

expressly permits a petition to be filed in state court to correct election-related errors that

“have occurred or are about to occur.” Minn. Stat. § 204B.44(a). As a result, the Purcell

principle does not preclude us from addressing the merits of Martin’s petition.

                                              B.

       We thus turn to the merits of the petition. Judge Wahl, as referee, issued thorough

and carefully considered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations, nearly

50 pages in length. After making findings of fact and conclusions of law, he answered in

the negative the referred questions: (1) whether the LMNP “has the committees required


                                              14
by Minn. Stat. § 202A.12 (2022)”; (2) whether the LMNP “has ‘provide[d] for each

congressional district and at least 45 counties or legislative districts an executive committee

consisting of a chair and such other officers as may be necessary,’ as required by Minn.

Stat. § 202A.13 (Supp. 2023)”; and (3) whether the LMNP “held, in 2022, the conventions

for each congressional district and at least 45 counties or legislative districts, as required

by Minn. Stat. § 202A.13.” Martin v. Simon, No. A24-0216, Order at 4 (Minn. filed Mar. 1,

2024) (alteration in original). The LMNP, in its objections, challenges those findings and

conclusions and also argues that “[t]he statutes at issue, Minn. Stat. § 202A.12, and the

first two lines of § 202A.13, are unconstitutional.”

       Because constitutional issues have been raised, we are mindful of our “general

practice,” which is “to avoid a constitutional ruling if there is another basis on which a case

can be decided.” State v. Bourke, 

 (Minn. 2006) (quoting Erlandson

v. Kiffmeyer, 

, 732 n.7 (Minn. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As a result, we start with the referee’s findings and conclusions, since the constitutional

issues only need to be reached if the referee’s findings and conclusions that the LMNP

failed to comply with the statutory requirements for a major political party are confirmed.

We observe that adoption and confirmation of the referee’s findings that the LMNP failed

to comply with any one of the statutory requirements in sections 202A.12 and 202A.13—

along with a conclusion that the specific statutory requirement is constitutional—would be

a sufficient basis to determine that the LMNP does not qualify as a major political party

under section 200.02, subdivision 7(a).




                                              15
                                             1.

       We begin with the referee’s findings and conclusions regarding the requirement that

“[s]ubject to the control of the state convention the general management of the affairs of

the state party is vested in the party’s state central committee.” Minn. Stat. § 202A.12,

subd. 2. There is no meaningful dispute as to the plain meaning of this language, and under

our well-established principles of statutory interpretation, we apply that plain meaning.

See Larson v. State, 

 (Minn. 2010). Pursuant to section 202A.12,

subdivision 2, a party’s state central committee must be subject to the control of the state

convention.

       Applying this statutory requirement to the LMNP, the referee found that the sole

committee provided for in the LMNP constitution, The Head Council, “functions as

LMNP’s state central committee for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 202A.12, subd. 2.” But the

referee also concluded that The Head Council is “not subject to the control of the LMNP

state convention under the LMNP constitution.” The referee found that “[t]he party

constitution vests [The Head Council] with the power to make ‘[a]ll decisions on important

organizational and financial subjects, including candidate endorsements.’ ”           (Third

alteration in original.) The referee also found that The Head Council has “explicit

constitutional authority to override decisions by the party’s state convention, including

amending the LMNP constitution.” The referee concluded that The Head Council retains

the ultimate authority over LMNP party affairs and is not subject to the control of the state

convention.




                                             16
       The LMNP does not challenge that its constitution creates one committee, The Head

Council, or that under its party constitution, The Head Council is not subject to the control

of the state convention. This is for good reason; the referee’s findings fully comport with

the language of the LMNP constitution. Rather than making The Head Council subject to

the state convention’s control, the LMNP constitution provides that “[a]ll decisions on

important organizational and financial subjects, including candidate endorsements, must

be reached by The Head Council.” The LMNP constitution further provides that “[t]his

document may be amended by unanimous vote of the entire [Head Council] at any time,

or by a two-thirds vote of the members attending the annual convention, except as specified

in Article I respecting the party’s official name.” Thus, instead of The Head Council being

subject to the control of the state convention, the inverse is true. The Head Council makes

all important decisions for the party, and any amendment to the party constitution by the

convention can be overridden by The Head Council acting unanimously.

       The LMNP instead argues that “the statutory provision does not state how the party

is to implement this directive” and further, that there is nothing in the law compelling that

the requirements of section 202A.12, subdivision 2, be adopted or reflected in the party’s

constitution. We do not find persuasive the LMNP’s argument that the language of its

constitution is irrelevant because section 202A.12 does not require a party’s constitution to

contain certain language about the authority of its state convention.         The fact that

section 202A.12 does not require a party’s constitution to contain certain language does

not mean that the language a party chooses to put in its constitution is irrelevant. This is

especially true when the party’s constitution contains language inconsistent with the


                                             17
provision in section 202A.12 that the state central committee is subject to the control of the

state convention. Moreover, at the evidentiary hearing, LMNP Chair Dennis Schuller

admitted that the LMNP constitution is the only form of written rules the party has. As a

result, the LMNP constitution is probative as to whether its state convention has final

authority over the party’s affairs and whether The Head Council is subject to the control of

the state convention.

        Furthermore, even if we overlook the language of the LMNP constitution, there is

no support in the record for the LMNP’s claim that the party’s state convention has final

authority over the party’s affairs or that The Head Council is subject to the control of its

state convention. The referee found that Schuller’s testimony “about matters associated

with . . . [LMNP] committees . . . was not credible,” and we defer to the referee’s credibility

determination, see Lundquist, 

. Moreover, even if Schuller’s testimony

was credited, it does not support the LMNP’s claim. Schuller admitted that “The Head

Council is not subject to the state convention.” Schuller also agreed that if the state

convention voted to amend the party’s constitution, The Head Council could override that

amendment. When Schuller was asked how the LMNP complied with section 202A.12,

subdivision 2, Schuller testified that The Head Council fulfilled this requirement, but he

provided no explanation how The Head Council is subject to the control of the state

convention.

        We thus adopt the referee’s factual findings about the LMNP’s state central

committee.    We conclude that the LMNP did not comply with the requirement of

section 202A.12, subd. 2, because the LMNP’s state central committee, The Head Council,


                                              18
retains the ultimate authority over LMNP party affairs and is not subject to the control of

the state convention.

                                              2.

       Because the LMNP failed to comply with the requirement of section 202A.12,

subd. 2, that the state central committee is subject to the control of the state convention,

the LMNP fails to satisfy the requirements to be a major political party under

section 200.02, subd. 7(a). Thus, we are compelled to declare that the LMNP is not a major

political party unless, as the LMNP argues, this requirement is unconstitutional. It is to

this issue that we turn, focusing our attention solely on the constitutionality of

section 202A.12, subd. 2, notwithstanding the LMNP’s broad challenge to the

constitutionality of sections 202A.12 and 202A.13 more generally.10               See In re

Senty-Haugen, 

, 269 n.3 (Minn. 1998) (“It is well-settled law that courts

should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise.”).

       The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he First Amendment protects the

right of citizens to associate and to form political parties for the advancement of common

political goals and ideas.” Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 

(1997). But “[o]n the other hand, it is also clear that States may, and inevitably must, enact

reasonable regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to reduce election- and campaign-

related disorder.” 

. The LMNP argues that section 202A.12, subdivision 2, is


10
       Notably, however, the LMNP, in its objections, does not make any argument that
the 2023 amendments to section 200.02, subd. 7(a), are unconstitutional. And when
pressed at oral argument, the LMNP disclaimed a challenge to the constitutionality of those
amendments. We thus do not consider or pass on that issue.

                                             19
unconstitutional under the “Anderson-Burdick balancing test” established by the Supreme

Court to balance these competing interests. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 

(1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 

 (1992). “Under this balancing test, we first

consider the ‘character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the

First and Fourteenth Amendments.’ ” DSCC v. Simon, 

, 295 (Minn. 2020)

(quoting Anderson, 

). “We then identify and evaluate the State’s ‘precise

interests’ that justify the burden.” 

 (quoting Anderson, 

). Different

standards of scrutiny then apply depending on the degree of the burden imposed on the

party’s rights. “State regulations that impose a severe restriction ‘must be narrowly drawn

to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’ ” 

 (quoting Burdick, 

). “Lesser burdens, however, trigger less exacting review, and a State’s ‘important

regulatory interests’ will usually be enough to justify ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory

restrictions.’ ” Timmons, 

 (quoting Burdick, 

); see also

DSCC, 950 N.W.2d at 295.

       We first consider the LMNP’s claimed injury to its associational rights. The LMNP

cites generally to the Court’s decision in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central

Committee, 

 (1989), for the broad principle that “[s]tate laws may not interfere

or restrict how a party governs itself.” Eu recognized that the California laws at issue in

that case—which imposed “restrictions on the organization and composition of official

governing bodies, the limits on the term of office for state central committee chair, and the

requirement that the chair rotate between residents of northern and southern California”—

“directly implicate[d] the associational rights of political parties and their members.”


                                             20


. But this conclusion, on its own, did not eschew in that case the need for

balancing that burden against the state’s interests. See 

 at 231–33. Instead, as the Court

explained in Marchioro v. Chaney, 

 (1979) and noted in Eu, when party

members challenge a statute imposing organizational requirements on a party but fail to

“claim that these statutory requirements impose any impermissible burdens, we have no

occasion to consider whether whatever burdens they do impose are justified by the

legitimate state interests served by these requirements.” Marchioro, 

 n.12

(emphasis added); see Eu, 

 n.22 (discussing Marchioro). Thus, in order to

raise a valid constitutional challenge, a party must articulate how a specific statutory

provision results in a particularized burden on its associational rights.

       Marchioro is instructive as to what constitutes a burden on a political party’s

associational rights imposed by the statute being challenged, as opposed to a burden

imposed by something else. In that case, party members challenged a long-standing

Washington statute that “required each major political party to have a State Committee

consisting of two persons from each county in the State.” 

. The Court

further observed that “[u]nder both party rules and state law, the State Convention rather

than the State Committee is the governing body of the party.” 

. On one side of

the ledger, the Court credited that “[t]he State’s interest in ensuring that [the process of

selecting and electing candidates for state and national office] is conducted in a fair and

orderly fashion is unquestionably legitimate” and “is served by a state statute requiring that

a representative central committee be established, and entrusting that committee with

authority to perform limited functions.” 

 at 196–97. But the Court could not engage in


                                             21
any balancing of those interests against any burdens to the party members, because “all of

the ‘internal party decisions’ which appellants claim should not be made by a statutorily

composed Committee are made not because of anything in the statute, but because of

delegations of authority from the Convention itself.” 

 at 198–99. In other words, to

even engage in the constitutional analysis, the asserted burden on associational rights must

be one imposed by the specific statute whose constitutionality is being challenged.

       Here, none of the LMNP’s claimed burdens upon its associational rights are burdens

imposed by the statutory requirement that a state central committee be subject to the control

of the state convention. See Minn. Stat. § 202A.12, subd. 2. Instead of focusing on

section 202A.12, subdivision 2, specifically, the LMNP generally claims that

sections 202A.12 and 202A.13 burden its associational rights by creating unique

disadvantages based on the LMNP’s small membership, the fact that its members play a

number of roles within the party, and the party’s tradition of participatory decision making

under its “doobie rules.”11 The requirement in section 202A.12, subdivision 2, that the

state central committee be subject to the control of the state convention does not inhibit the

LMNP from operating with fewer members, allowing members to perform multiple roles,

or adhering to its doobie rules. The same is true for the LMNP’s general assertion that

“[m]andating when and where a party’s committee will meet or how it meets intrudes upon

a party’s internal affairs.” Minnesota Statutes section 202A.12, subdivision 2, says nothing


11
       As explained by the LMNP, the party “operates by its ‘doobie rules,’ ” which “is a
form of consensus, based upon the . . . tradition of the talking stick, passing [a ‘doobie’]
along to participants. Everyone has an opportunity to participate and talk in an orderly
way.”

                                             22
about when, where, or how a party’s state central committee meets, instead only requiring

that it be subject to the state convention’s control. Similarly, the LMNP broadly argues

that sections 202A.12 and 202A.13 “severe[ly] burden” the LMNP’s associational rights

by limiting its “discretion in how it selects its leaders.” But the LMNP fails to advance

any argument as to how the provision in section 202A.12, subdivision 2, requiring the

central committee to be subject to the control of the state convention—which is entirely

silent as to the selection of the party’s leaders—somehow burdens the party’s associational

rights.

          In sum, all the burdens claimed by the LMNP are either created by virtue of the

party itself or are burdens created by other statutory provisions—whether that be the other

provisions in sections 202A.12 and 202A.13, or the 2023 amendments to section 200.02,

subdivision 7(a)—that we do not reach or were not challenged. Here, the LMNP does “not

claim that these statutory requirements” found in section 202A.12, subdivision 2—that a

state central committee be responsible for general management of the party and subject to

the state convention’s control—impose any impermissible burdens, so “we have no

occasion to consider whether whatever burdens they do impose are justified by the

legitimate state interests served by these requirements.” Marchioro, 

 n.12

(emphasis added); see also Eu, 

 n.22.

          Even if we were to assume that the requirement in section 202A.12, subdivision 2,

of a state central committee subject to the control of the state convention does impose some

burden upon the associational rights of a major political party, under the Anderson-Burdick

balancing test, any such burden is justified by the state’s legitimate interest in fair and


                                             23
orderly elections.12 Because the LMNP made no showing that section 202A.12, subd. 2,

imposes a severe burden, the statute is subject to “less exacting review,” and “the State’s

asserted regulatory interests need only be ‘sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation’

imposed on the party’s rights.”13 Timmons, 

, 364 (quoting Norman v. Reed,

, 288–89 (1992)). Here, the Supreme Court has already credited that a state

has a “legitimate” interest in ensuring that the process by which political parties select and

elect candidates for office “is conducted in a fair and orderly fashion,” and that this “interest

is served by a state statute requiring that a representative central committee be established.”

Marchioro, 

. That is precisely what section 202A.12, subdivision 2, does

by requiring a state central committee.14           The additional statutory requirement in


12
        The LMNP conceded in its objections that the severity of the burden imposed on its
associational rights is a question on which it bears the burden of proof. See Democratic
Party of Haw. v. Nago, 

 (9th Cir. 2016). And the LMNP’s arguments
that it was prevented from being able to adequately present constitutional affirmative
defenses fail. The LMNP made no showing or offer of proof, either before the referee or
this court, as to what additional facts it needed to develop or factual disputes it needed
resolved. See State v. Wolf, 

 (Minn. 2000) (“We have held that a
party fails to preserve for appeal a ruling excluding evidence when that party fails to make
an offer of proof showing the nature of the evidence excluded.”); State v. Myhre,

 (Minn. 2016) (“We have also declined to address issues that were
raised in a brief to our court, but were not adequately argued or explained.”). Notably, we
have previously addressed constitutional challenges in section 204B.44 petitions without a
referral to a referee. See De La Fuente v. Simon, 

, 486–97 (Minn. 2020)
(per curiam) (rejecting three constitutional challenges to procedures established by Minn.
Stat. § 207A.13 (2020) for the presidential nomination primary).
13
      Because the LMNP failed to show that section 202A.12, subdivision 2, imposes any
burden upon its associational rights, we have no occasion to consider, and do not address,
whether that statutory section could withstand a higher level of scrutiny.
14
     The requirement in section 202A.12, subdivision 2, that a party establish a central
committee, also serves an important public purpose by helping “provide the means by

                                               24
section 202A.12, subdivision 2, that the state central committee be subject to the control of

the state convention is likewise constitutionally permissible under this less exacting degree

of scrutiny.   The primacy placed on the convention is entirely consistent with the

requirement upheld in Marchioro, where the Court highlighted that Washington law made

the state convention rather than the state central committee the party’s governing body.

See 442 U.S. at 193–94. And ensuring that the state convention has authority over the state

central committee also helps further the recognized state interest “to assure that intraparty

competition is resolved in a democratic fashion.” Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 

 (2000).

       In sum, the LMNP has failed to articulate any burden, much less a severe burden,

upon its associational rights that is specifically created by the requirements in

section 202A.12, subd. 2. As such, to the extent there is any balancing for this court to


which government officials can determine the identity of the legal representatives of
political parties.” Ariz. Libertarian Party v. Schmeral, 

 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2001). Other election-related statutes, whose constitutionality is not being questioned by
the LMNP, demonstrate why Minnesota election officials need to know who has the
authority to act on behalf of a major political party. Some statutes specifically reference
the role of the state central committee with respect to elections. See 

(nomination of presidential electors and alternates), 202A.155 (2022) (reimbursement of
interpreters), 202A.18, subd. 4 (2022) (announcement and certification of election results),
202A.11, subd. 1 (2022) (party name). Even where the state central committee is not
explicitly referenced by a statute, the State has an interest in knowing who can speak for
the party because statutes provide that major political parties perform duties or have
privileges with respect to elections. See Minn. Stat. §§ 204B.21, subd. 1 (2022) (requiring
each major political party “[o]n May 1 in a year in which there is an election for a partisan
political office” to provide the Secretary of State with a list of election judges), 204C.07,
subd. 1 (2022) (authorizing “the chair of an authorized committee of each major political
party” to appoint voters from that party “to act as challengers of voters at the polling
place”), 204B.13, subd. 2 (2022) (authorizing a major political party to fill a vacancy in
nomination for a partisan office).

                                             25
conduct, under the Anderson-Burdick test the LMNP invokes, section 202A.12,

subdivision 2, survives the LMNP’s constitutional challenge.

                                      *      *      *

       Having concluded that the LMNP failed to maintain a state central committee

subject to the state convention’s control, as required by section 202A.12, subdivision 2,

and having upheld subdivision 2 against the LMNP’s constitutional challenge, we thus hold

that the LMNP has failed to satisfy the requirements to be a major political party under

section 200.02, subdivision 7(a).

       Accordingly, based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein,

       IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

       1.     The petition of Ken Martin, filed pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 204B.44, is

granted.

       2.     The Legal Marijuana Now Party does not meet all the statutory requirements

set forth in 

, subd. 7, and Minn. Stat. § 202A.12 to maintain its status

as a major political party for purposes of the state primary election in August 2024 and the

state general election in November 2024.

       3.     The Secretary of State must take all appropriate actions necessary to reflect

that the Legal Marijuana Now Party is not a major political party in Minnesota for purposes

of the state primary election in August 2024 and the state general election in

November 2024.

       4.     The Secretary of State must not allow Legal Marijuana Now Party candidates

to appear on the ballot for the 2024 state primary and general elections using the procedures


                                             26
available to candidates for partisan office who seek the nomination of a major political

party pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 204B.03 or allow the Legal Marijuana Now Party to

designate a presidential candidate using the procedures available to major political parties

pursuant to 

.

        5.    The Secretary of State must consider whether the Legal Marijuana Now Party

has met the requirements to be a minor political party in Minnesota.

        6.    The motion of the Legal Marijuana Now Party to dismiss the petition for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction is denied.

        CHUTICH, PROCACCINI, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this

case.




                                            27