STATE OF MINNESOTA

                               IN SUPREME COURT

                                   A23-0543
                                   A23-0544

Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals                        Procaccini, J.
                                                   Took no part, Hennesy, J.

Daniel Johnson (A23-0543),

                  Relator,
vs.                                                     Filed: May 29, 2024
                                                   Office of Appellate Courts
Concrete Treatments, Inc., and
Technology Insurance Company,

                  Respondents,
and

Furniture & Things, Inc., and
SFM Mutual Insurance Company,

                  Respondents.


Daniel Johnson (A23-0544),

                  Respondent,
vs.

Concrete Treatments, Inc., and
Technology Insurance Company,

                  Relators,
and

Furniture & Things, Inc., and
SFM Mutual Insurance Company,

                  Respondents.



                                         1
                              ________________________


James A. Batchelor, Mottaz & Sisk Injury Law, Coon Rapids, Minnesota, for
relator/respondent Daniel Johnson.

Christine L. Tuft, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering, Smetak & Pikala, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota, for relators/respondents Concrete Treatments, Inc. and Technology Insurance
Company.

M. Elizabeth Giebel Mandel, Lynn, Scharfenberg & Hollick, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
respondents Furniture & Things, Inc. and SFM Mutual Insurance Company.

                              ________________________

SYLLABUS

       1.     An injured employee’s right to assert a direct claim for unpaid medical

expenses is not precluded by a medical provider’s failure to intervene in a pending workers’

compensation proceeding under Minnesota Statutes section 176.361 (2022).

       2.     The compensation judge’s findings that the injured employee sustained a

permanent work injury on October 1, 2018, and the compensation judge’s apportionment

determination, are not manifestly contrary to the evidence.

       Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

OPINION

PROCACCINI, Justice.

       In this workers’ compensation case, we are asked to decide two issues: First, is

Daniel Johnson entitled to assert a direct claim for unpaid medical bills owed to two

non-intervening medical providers?      Second, were the compensation judge’s factual

findings about Johnson’s work-related injury in October 2018 manifestly contrary to the



                                             2
evidence?    The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed the

compensation judge’s factual findings but, contrary to the compensation judge, held that

Johnson could not assert a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses. Because we conclude

that Johnson is entitled to assert a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses and that the

compensation judge’s findings regarding the October 2018 injury are not manifestly

contrary to the evidence, we affirm in part and reverse in part the WCCA’s decision, and

we remand to the WCCA to determine whether further factual findings are necessary

regarding Johnson’s direct claim for unpaid medical expenses.

                                         FACTS

      In March 2005, employee Daniel Johnson injured his low back when lifting an

entertainment center while working for Furniture & Things, Inc.1 Johnson sought medical

treatment for his low back and leg pain, and an MRI scan showed an L5-S1 disc herniation.

He received a lumbar epidural steroid injection, which improved his symptoms for a time.

Furniture & Things accepted liability for the injury and paid workers’ compensation

benefits. After his injury, Johnson continued to work for Furniture & Things until 2011.

Throughout this time, Johnson’s low back and leg pain persisted, which he managed with

self-care treatments such as over-the-counter medication and physical therapy exercises.




1
       For simplicity, we refer to Furniture and Things, Inc. and its workers’ compensation
insurer, SFM Mutual Insurance Company, collectively as “Furniture & Things.”


                                            3
      In 2016, Johnson began working for Concrete Treatments, Inc.2 Johnson’s position

involved managing a crew and completing some manual labor, including running a

concrete grinder. He avoided heavy lifting to prevent aggravating his symptoms from the

2005 injury. In October 2018, Johnson sustained another injury to his low back while

bending down to remove a door hinge. He felt shooting pain and stiffness in his low back,

with radiating pain in his legs. Johnson kept working and did not immediately seek medical

treatment, but about a month later, he was treated by Dr. Garry Banks at Twin Cities

Orthopedics (TCO). Johnson reported that he had experienced chronic low back pain since

his 2005 work injury, which became unmanageable with self-care treatments after the

October 2018 injury. Dr. Banks diagnosed Johnson with a lumbar strain, though he also

suggested that Johnson might have a new disc herniation. Dr. Banks recommended an

MRI scan if Johnson’s pain did not improve in the next two months. Johnson testified that

after this visit with Dr. Banks, he returned to “baseline.” He did not receive an MRI

immediately after the October 2018 injury.

      On December 27, 2018, Johnson was involved in a car accident while driving a

company-owned car. Shortly after, Johnson sought chiropractic care with Dr. Howard

Johnson at Power Within Chiropractic (PWC) for neck pain related to the car accident and

for his continuing low back and leg pain. Johnson sought no other medical treatment

throughout 2019 and 2020. He continued to work for Concrete Treatments in the same




2
      We refer to Concrete Treatments, Inc. and its workers’ compensation insurer,
Technology Insurance Company, collectively as “Concrete Treatments.”

                                             4
position, without restrictions, but he testified that he obtained assistance in performing

certain activities, including repetitive heavy lifting.

       In April 2021, Johnson returned to Dr. Johnson at PWC because his low back and

leg pain severely increased. He could not sit in a car with his feet forward because of

shooting pain in both of his legs. Johnson underwent an MRI scan, which revealed a

moderate-sized central disc extrusion at L5-S1 contributing to severe spinal canal stenosis

with compression of the cauda equina nerve roots. Dr. Johnson recommended that Johnson

consult a spine specialist. Johnson then returned to Dr. Banks, who recommended surgery.

In May 2021, Dr. Banks performed the surgery. Following surgery and additional physical

therapy, Johnson’s low back and leg pain improved, and he eventually resumed working

at Concrete Treatments.

       Johnson filed a workers’ compensation claim petition in May 2021, listing the

March 2005, October 2018, and December 2018 injuries. He sought temporary total

disability benefits, rehabilitation assistance, and payment of outstanding medical expenses,

including those for Dr. Johnson’s treatment at PWC and for the MRI scan and surgery

performed by Dr. Banks at TCO.

       Johnson notified his medical providers of their right to intervene in the workers’

compensation proceeding in accordance with statutory requirements. TCO and PWC did

not respond or move to intervene. In September 2021, on a motion by Furniture & Things,

the compensation judge issued an order extinguishing the potential intervention interests

of TCO and PWC.           Reciting language from Minnesota Statutes section 176.361,

subdivision 2(a) (2022), which governs intervention, the extinguishment order stated that


                                               5
“the potential intervention interests of . . . [TCO] and [PWC] . . . are hereby extinguished

and said potential intervenors may not collect, or attempt to collect the extinguished interest

from the employee, employers, insurers, or any government program.” Neither Johnson

nor the affected providers objected to the order.

       The matter proceeded to a hearing in April 2022. At the hearing, Johnson withdrew

his claim for the December 2018 injury. Johnson also asserted a direct claim for payment

of the medical expenses he incurred at TCO and PWC. Counsel for both employers argued

that because those providers’ interests were extinguished by the court order, Johnson’s

right to assert a direct claim for payment was also eliminated.

       At the hearing, Johnson submitted the narrative reports of Dr. Banks and Dr.

Johnson; Furniture & Things submitted an independent medical examination (IME) report

by Dr. Mark Engasser; and Concrete Treatments submitted an IME report by Dr. Eric Deal.

In his narrative report, Dr. Banks concluded that both the 2005 injury and the October 2018

injury substantially contributed to Johnson’s low back condition and need for surgery, and

he apportioned liability as 50 percent to the 2005 injury and 50 percent to the October 2018

injury. Dr. Johnson concluded that the 2005 injury was the initial trauma for Johnson’s

low back condition and that the effects of the injury were never fully resolved. Dr. Johnson

apportioned liability as 40 percent to the 2005 injury and 60 percent to the December 2018

car accident. He did not address the October 2018 injury.

       In his IME report, Dr. Engasser concluded that the 2005 and October 2018

work-related injuries were permanent and substantial contributing causes of Johnson’s low

back condition and need for medical care. Dr. Engasser also concluded that Johnson’s


                                              6
December 2018 car accident injury was minor and temporary and not a substantial

contributing factor to his low back condition. Dr. Engasser apportioned liability as

40 percent to the 2005 injury and 60 percent to the October 2018 injury. Dr. Deal

concluded in his IME report that no substantial injury occurred in October or December

2018 and that those injuries were self-limited exacerbations of a preexisting condition

arising from the March 2005 injury. Dr. Deal apportioned liability as 100 percent to the

March 2005 injury.

       The compensation judge found the opinions of Dr. Banks and Dr. Engasser credible

and persuasive, and he accepted Dr. Johnson’s opinion as it related to the 2005 injury. The

compensation judge rejected Dr. Deal’s opinion as unpersuasive, given Johnson’s lack of

medical treatment between 2005 and 2018. Based on the expert opinions, along with

Johnson’s medical records and testimony, the compensation judge found, in relevant part,

that (1) Johnson sustained a permanent work-related injury in October 2018; (2) the March

2005 and the October 2018 work injuries were substantial contributing factors to Johnson’s

need for medical care and surgery to treat his low back condition; and (3) responsibility for

Johnson’s low back condition is apportioned 40 percent to the March 2005 injury and

60 percent to the October 2018 injury. The compensation judge also concluded that

Johnson was entitled to make a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses owed to TCO and

PWC because those medical providers did not intervene.

       Concrete Treatments appealed the compensation judge’s findings on liability and

conclusion regarding Johnson’s right to assert a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses.

In a split decision, the WCCA affirmed in part and reversed in part. The WCCA


                                             7
unanimously affirmed the compensation judge’s determination that Johnson sustained a

permanent work-related injury in October 2018 and that the injury was a substantial

contributing factor to his permanent low back condition and need for surgery. The WCCA

also unanimously affirmed the compensation judge’s apportionment determination. But

the WCCA divided on Johnson’s entitlement to assert a direct claim for medical expenses.

The WCCA majority, relying on its own precedent, reasoned that once the potential

intervenors’ interests had been extinguished, Johnson could not bring direct claims on the

providers’ behalf unless Johnson’s attorney unequivocally established that he was

representing Johnson, TCO, and PWC at the hearing. Because Johnson’s attorney made

no attempt to establish such representation, the majority reversed the compensation judge’s

conclusion that Johnson was entitled to make a direct claim for medical expenses. The

dissenting judge reasoned that the dual representation requirement relied upon by the

majority applies only where potential intervenors have actually intervened and the

employee is asserting a claim for the same bills and costs. According to the dissent,

Johnson was entitled to bring direct claims for medical expenses because TCO and PWC

never intervened.

      Both Johnson and Concrete Treatments filed timely petitions for writ of certiorari.

                                       ANALYSIS

      Two issues are before us. First, Johnson asks us to determine whether he may assert

a direct claim for unpaid medical bills when the unpaid medical providers’ intervention

interests were extinguished under Minnesota Statutes section 176.361 (2022). Second,

Concrete Treatments asks us to determine whether the WCCA erred in affirming the


                                            8
compensation judge’s findings that Johnson sustained a permanent work-related injury in

October 2018 and that 60 percent of the responsibility for Johnson’s low back condition is

properly apportioned to that injury.

                                             I.

       We begin with Johnson’s right to assert a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses.

The Workers’ Compensation Act, Minnesota Statutes chapter 176 (2022),3 gives an injured

employee the right to seek payment from the employer for the costs of medical treatment

that is reasonably required to cure or relieve the effects of an injury arising out of and in

the course of employment. 

; see Gamble v. Twin Cities Concrete

Prods., 

 (Minn. 2014); see also 

 (“It is the intent

of the legislature that chapter 176 be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient

delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to the

employers who are subject to the provisions of this chapter.”).

       When there is a dispute over the responsibility for an injured employee’s medical

treatment, as there is here as to Johnson’s employers’ responsibility, the employee has the

right, under Minnesota Statutes section 176.291, to file a petition directly asserting any

claims for compensation, including for medical expenses.          See Lagasse v. Horton,

, 198 (Minn. 2022) (“The claim petition is the procedural vehicle for

commencing an action regarding a dispute surrounding a claim for compensation.”); Minn.


3
       During the 2024 legislative session, the Legislature amended parts of chapter 176.
Act of May 8, 2024, ch. 97, §§ 1–50 (effective Aug. 1, 2024). The amendments did not
substantively change the language of the relevant provisions and therefore do not affect
our analysis of the issues on appeal.

                                             9
Stat. § 176.291(b)(10) (“The petition shall also state and include . . . the nature and extent

of the claim.”); see also Adams v. DSR Sales, Inc., 64 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 396,

397 (WCCA 2004) (“[T]his court has previously held that under 

 the

employee has the right to assert directly any claims for medical expenses.”). The Act also

gives medical providers who treat injured employees for work-related injuries the right to

assert their own claim for reimbursement directly from the employer. To do so, the medical

provider may intervene in the proceedings initiated by the employee. Minnesota Statutes

section 176.361 sets out the intervention procedure.

       The WCCA majority held—and Furniture & Things argues—that Johnson cannot

assert a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses owed to TCO and PWC (collectively, the

Providers) because to do so, his attorney was required to unequivocally establish dual

representation of Johnson and the Providers at the workers’ compensation hearing.

Concrete Treatments agrees with the WCCA’s conclusion on this score but approaches the

issue differently, arguing that section 176.361, subdivision 2, plainly prohibits Johnson

from asserting a direct claim for medical expenses because the Providers’ intervention

interests were extinguished by their failure to intervene by the statutory deadline. Johnson

argues that the WCCA erred by denying his direct claim because the dual representation

requirement relied upon by the WCCA is inapplicable here, and his right to assert a direct

claim is unaffected by the intervention procedures in section 176.361. We agree with

Johnson.

       To resolve this issue, we must interpret the Workers’ Compensation Act. Statutory

interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. J.D. Donovan, Inc. v.


                                             10
Minn. Dep’t of Transp., 

 (Minn. 2016). The objective of statutory

interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” 

 (2022). When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we interpret the words

of the statute according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 

 (Minn. 2016). A statute is ambiguous only if it is “susceptible to more

than one reasonable interpretation.” Harkins v. Grant Park Ass’n, 

, 386

(Minn. 2022).

                                             A.

       We first must determine whether the Providers’ decision not to intervene in the

workers’ compensation proceeding barred Johnson from asserting a claim for the

Providers’ unpaid medical bills.      This question requires us to decide whether the

intervention language in Minnesota Statutes section 176.361, subdivision 2(a), or the

compensation judge’s order reciting that language, affected Johnson’s right to claim the

unpaid medical expenses. The WCCA majority and dissent—along with the compensation

judge—all reasoned that Johnson did not lose his ability to pursue his direct claim in this

way, and we agree.

       Under section 176.361, subdivision 2, “[a] person desiring to intervene in a workers’

compensation case as a party, including but not limited to a health care provider who has

rendered services to an employee . . . shall submit a timely written motion to intervene.”

The motion must be “served and filed within 60 days after a potential intervenor has been

served with notice of a right to intervene.” 

, subd. 2(a). “Where a

motion to intervene is not timely filed under [section 176.361], the potential intervenor


                                             11
interest shall be extinguished and the potential intervenor may not collect, or attempt to

collect, the extinguished interest from the employee.” 

       The plain language of section 176.361, subdivision 2, does not distinguish between

potential intervenors who intervene late and those who do not intervene at all.4 We

therefore come to the straightforward conclusion that if a motion to intervene is not served

and filed within the required 60 days—including if it is never filed at all—then it is not

timely filed under section 176.361, and a potential intervenor’s intervention interest is

extinguished by operation of the statute. Because neither TCO nor PWC filed a motion to

intervene, they did not timely intervene under section 176.361, and their intervention

interests were extinguished.

       Although section 176.361 makes clear that a failure to intervene by the deadline

results in extinguishment of the potential intervenor’s intervention interest, the question

here is what effect such extinguishment has on the employee’s right to assert a direct claim

for unpaid medical expenses. Nothing in the language of section 176.361 impairs the right

of the employee to seek direct payment of medical expenses. In fact, section 176.361 is

entirely focused on the potential intervenor, not the employee. Accordingly, we conclude

that the plain language of section 176.361 does not limit an employee’s right to seek direct




4
        We do not suggest that it would be unreasonable for the Legislature to distinguish
between those who attempt to intervene late and those who do not intervene at all. The
plain language, however, does not include such a distinction.

                                            12
payment of medical expenses, even when a medical provider has failed to intervene to

assert a claim in accordance with the statute.5

       This plain language interpretation aligns with the Legislature’s directive “that

chapter 176 be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and

medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to the employers who are subject

to the provisions of this chapter.” 

 (emphasis added). Longstanding

WCCA case law is likewise consistent in holding that an injured employee’s right to assert

a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses is not barred by the unpaid medical provider’s

failure to intervene. In Adams v. DSR Sales, Inc., the injured employee asserted a direct

claim for medical expenses. 64 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 396, 397 (WCCA 2004). The

employee’s attorney notified several health care providers of their right to intervene, but

only one intervened. 

 Relying on the extinguishment language in section 176.361,


5
        Although the statutory language is unambiguous, and we need not resort to
legislative history in our analysis, the purpose of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain
and effectuate the intention of the legislature,” and we have found nothing to suggest that
the Legislature intended to prevent an employee from asserting a claim for unpaid medical
bills when the unpaid provider does not intervene. See 

 (“The object
of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of
the legislature.”). Instead, the legislative history shows that the extinguishment language
in section 176.361, subdivision 2(a), was intended simply to avoid tardy intervention—a
purpose that is achieved by preventing potential intervenors from joining the proceeding
after the statutory deadline. See Hearing on S.F. 3136, S. Comm. Jobs, Hous. & Cmty.
Dev., 82nd Minn. Leg., Feb. 27, 2002 (Workers’ Compensation Advisory Council bill
summary) (stating that the extinguishment language sets “stricter standards for third parties
wanting to intervene” to address “continuing problems with third parties, typically health
care providers, attempting to intervene in workers’ compensation cases late in the
process”); see also Hearing on H.F. 3348, H. Comm. Com., Jobs & Econ. Dev.,
82nd Minn. Leg., Feb. 20, 2002 (committee minutes and House Research bill summary)
(stating that the extinguishment language “[s]pecifically provides for the extinguishing of
an intervenor’s rights if the intervenor fails to intervene in a timely fashion”).

                                             13
subdivision 2(a), the employer and insurer argued that the employee could not assert a

direct claim for unpaid medical expenses owed to the non-intervening health care providers

because of the providers’ failure to intervene. 

.

       The WCCA squarely rejected this argument, stating, “[t]he employer and insurer

contend that the statute now requires a medical provider to intervene, regardless of whether

or not the employee has asserted a direct claim for payment of the [provider’s] bill. We

disagree.” 

 The WCCA reasoned that “ ‘[t]he employee’s claim and the health care

provider’s claim is the same – that is, entitlement to payment of the medical or chiropractic

bills incurred by the employee – and in the usual case, a provider relies on the employee

and the employee’s attorney to pursue payment of the claim. In such a situation, there is

normally little or no need for a separate intervention by the healthcare provider.’ ” 

 at

398–99 (quoting Stoia v. Seagate Tech., 52 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 417, 424 (WCCA

1995)). The WCCA concluded that the employee could assert a direct claim for payment

of medical expenses even if the medical providers had not intervened, and the medical

providers were not barred from payment. 

 at 398–99. The analysis in Adams is

consistent with the statute’s plain language.

       Concrete Treatments contends that the facts here are distinguishable because the

compensation judge in Adams did not extinguish the medical providers’ intervention

interests by court order, as the compensation judge did here. But the compensation judge’s

order in this case did nothing more than recite the language of section 176.361, subdivision

2(a), which relates only to the Providers, not to Johnson. The employer in Adams tried to

rely on the same language from section 176.361, and in that case, the WCCA properly


                                                14
concluded that this language did not limit the employee’s right to make a direct claim for

unpaid medical bills.    The extinguishment order issued by the compensation judge

therefore does not distinguish this case from Adams or prevent Johnson from asserting a

claim for his unpaid medical bills in his workers’ compensation claim.

       Furthermore, since Adams, the WCCA has correctly reiterated the general principle

that injured employees retain the right to assert a direct claim for medical expenses

regardless of non-intervention by the medical providers. See Stanford v. Shaw Stewart

Lumber Co., No. WC08-206, 

, at *7 (Minn. WCCA Jan. 8, 2009) (“[A]n

employee may independently pursue and obtain payment for medical expenses, regardless

of whether the providers rendering the treatment have intervened in the matter.”); Erven v.

Magnetation, LLC, 76 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 433, 440 n.2 (WCCA 2016) (“[A]

health care provider is not required to intervene to have its bill paid. Medical treatment is

one of the benefits owed to an injured employee under the statute and an employee may

assert a claim for that treatment directly.”). Adams, Stanford, and Erven confirm what we

hold: The extinguishment provided in section 176.361, subdivision 2(a), relates to the

Providers’ procedural right to intervene in the workers’ compensation matter, not to the

employee’s freestanding substantive right to have their qualifying medical expenses paid

by their employer.

       Accordingly, we conclude that Johnson is entitled to assert a direct claim for

medical expenses, regardless of the extinguishment of the Providers’ intervention interests

under Minnesota Statutes section 176.361.




                                             15
                                            B.

       We next resolve whether Johnson lost his ability to assert his direct claim for his

unpaid medical bills because his attorney did not unequivocally establish that he also

represented the Providers at the time of the hearing. Here the judges of the WCCA parted

ways. Although the WCCA majority concluded that Johnson could not bring this claim

because his attorney had not satisfied this “dual representation” requirement, we agree with

the WCCA dissent that the dual representation requirement is inapplicable here.

       The dual representation requirement is not expressly contained in the language of

Minnesota Statutes section 176.361. Rather, the requirement was recognized by the

WCCA in a line of cases interpreting section 176.361. The WCCA majority and Furniture

& Things cite three WCCA cases to support the dual representation requirement’s

applicability here. See Fischer v. ISD 625, 76 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 889 (WCCA

2016); Xayamongkhon v. ISD 625, 77 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 81 (WCCA 2016), aff’d

without opinion (Minn. 2017); Duehn v. Connell Car Care, Inc., 77 Minn. Workers’ Comp.

Dec. 201 (WCCA 2017).

       In Fischer and Xayamongkhon, the medical providers intervened by the statutory

deadline but did not appear at the hearing, and the employee’s attorney did not establish

dual representation of the employee and the providers. Fischer, 76 Minn. Workers’ Comp.

Dec. at 890; Xayamongkhon, 77 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. at 82. The WCCA, therefore,

denied the medical providers’ claims for medical expenses and the injured employee’s

claim for medical expenses.      Fischer, 76 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. at 891–92;

Xayamongkhon, 77 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. at 83–84.


                                            16
       But at the time of the hearings in Fischer and Xayamongkhon, section 176.361

required intervenors to attend the workers’ compensation hearing.6 The WCCA reasoned

that “once a provider has intervened in a pending claim, the provider is a party and like all

parties has an obligation to attend conferences and hearings.” Xayamongkhon, 77 Minn.

Workers’ Comp. Dec. at 83; see Fischer, 76 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. at 891. By

properly intervening, the providers in Fischer and Xayamongkhon essentially took

ownership of the employee’s claim for unpaid medical expenses. When the providers then

failed to attend the hearing as required, the WCCA correctly concluded that the presence

of the employee’s attorney at the hearing could not save the providers’ claims for

reimbursement or unpaid medical expenses unless it was clearly established that the

employee’s attorney represented both the injured employee and the intervenor. Although

the dual representation requirement was sensible under those circumstances, it is

inapplicable here because the Providers did not intervene by the statutory deadline and also

because section 176.361 no longer requires intervenors’ attendance at the hearing.7

       In Duehn, a medical provider failed to intervene by the deadline after receiving

proper notice. 77 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. at 211. The WCCA concluded that the


6
       See 

, subd. 4 (2015) (“Unless a stipulation has been signed
and filed or the intervenor’s right to reimbursement has otherwise been established, the
intervenor shall attend all settlement or pretrial conferences, administrative conferences,
and the hearing. Failure to appear shall result in the denial of the claim for
reimbursement.”).
7
       In 2016, the Legislature amended section 176.361, subdivision 4, to require
intervenors to attend settlement or pretrial conferences and the hearing only when ordered
by the compensation judge. Act of May 12, 2016, ch. 110, art. 3, § 9, 

, 124.

                                             17
employee could not assert a claim for medical expenses owed to that medical provider

because the employee’s attorney did not establish dual representation of the employee and

the untimely intervenor at the hearing. 

. This conclusion conflicts with the

WCCA’s holding in Adams, our holding today, and the plain language of section 176.361,

which does not distinguish between those who attempt to intervene late and those who

never intervene. We reiterate that even if a medical provider itself is barred from bringing

a claim for medical expenses because it sought to intervene after the statutory deadline, the

employee’s right to assert a direct claim for those medical expenses endures.

       Because we conclude that the dual representation requirement is inapplicable here,

and Johnson’s direct claim is otherwise unaffected by the extinguishment of the Providers’

intervention interests, we reverse the WCCA’s conclusion that Johnson is not entitled to

assert a direct claim for unpaid medical bills owed to the Providers. We accordingly

remand this matter to the WCCA to determine whether additional factual findings are

necessary regarding Johnson’s direct claim for his unpaid medical expenses.

                                             II.

       We turn next to the dispute about the compensation judge’s findings. When the

WCCA affirms the compensation judge’s factual findings, as it did here, we must uphold

the affirmance unless it is manifestly contrary to the evidence, or the evidence clearly

requires reasonable minds to conclude otherwise. Lagasse, 982 N.W.2d at 202. We review

the WCCA’s legal determinations de novo. Bruns v. City of St. Paul, 

 (Minn. 1996).




                                             18
       Concrete Treatments challenges the compensation judge’s findings that Johnson

sustained a permanent work-related injury in October 2018 and that the October 2018

injury was 60 percent responsible for Johnson’s low back condition. We address Concrete

Treatments’ arguments in turn.

       First, Concrete Treatments argues that the WCCA erred in affirming the

compensation judge’s findings because the compensation judge applied an incorrect legal

standard in finding that Johnson sustained a permanent work-related injury in October

2018. Concrete Treatments argues that the compensation judge applied the causation

standard for a “Gillette injury,”8 despite the fact that Johnson alleged that he sustained a

“specific injury.” The compensation judge did not state that he was treating Johnson’s

injury as a Gillette injury, nor did he refer to Johnson’s ordinary job duties as the cause of

the injury. In fact, the compensation judge referred to Johnson’s 2018 injury as occurring

on a specific date—October 1. But, because the compensation judge cited a case that

involved a Gillette-type injury, Concrete Treatments argues that the compensation judge

applied the incorrect legal standard for causation.

       In setting out the causation standard, the compensation judge correctly stated that

“[i]njuries are compensable if the employment is a substantial contributing factor not only

to the cause of the condition but also to the aggravation or acceleration of a pre-existing

condition.” To support this proposition, the compensation judge cited Vanda v. Minn.



8
       A Gillette injury is an injury that occurs because of repetitive, minute trauma
brought about by the performance of ordinary job duties, rather than one specific injury
event. Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 

 (Minn. 1960).

                                             19
Mining & Mfg. Co., 

 (Minn. 1974), which involved a Gillette-type injury,

and Wallace v. Hanson Silo Co., 

 (Minn. 1975).

       In Vanda, we recited the “longstanding rule . . . that when the usual tasks ordinary

to an employee’s work substantially aggravate . . . a preexisting disease or latent condition

to produce a disability, the entire disability is compensable . . . .” 

. And

although the employee in Vanda had a Gillette-type injury, the rule we stated there is not

exclusive to one category of injury. When a work injury, whether Gillette or specific,

aggravates a preexisting condition, the entire disability is compensable. Wallace illustrates

this point because that case involved a specific injury, and we cited Vanda for the same

principle. Wallace, 

.

       The WCCA has also cited Vanda and Wallace for the same causation principle in

cases involving specific injuries.    See, e.g., Parker v. Foley Locker, Inc., 77 Minn.

Workers’ Comp. Dec. 367 (WCCA 2017) (involving a work-related injury from a slip and

fall that aggravated a preexisting back condition); Jarveis v. Carroll Distrib., 76 Minn.

Workers’ Comp. Dec. 999 (WCCA 2016) (involving an injury from a work-related car

accident that aggravated a preexisting back condition). Because the legal standard cited by

the compensation judge applies to specific injuries, we conclude that the compensation

judge applied the correct legal standard for causation.

       Next, Concrete Treatments argues that the WCCA erred in affirming the

compensation judge’s finding that Johnson sustained a permanent work-related injury in

October 2018 because the finding is manifestly contrary to the evidence. A compensation

judge’s finding of whether a permanent injury occurred is a question of fact, reversible


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only if it is manifestly contrary to the evidence.       Kirchner v. County of Anoka,

 (Minn. 1983). To support its argument, Concrete Treatments relies

on an error in Dr. Banks’s narrative report and parts of Johnson’s testimony. In the

narrative report, Dr. Banks refers to an October 2018 MRI scan that was not actually

performed. A single misstated fact, though, does not discredit an entire opinion. Gianotti

v. ISD 152, 

 (Minn. 2017) (concluding that a single statement taken

out of context did not discredit an expert’s entire report). The compensation judge relied

on expert opinions, medical records, and Johnson’s testimony to conclude that Johnson

sustained an initial work injury in March 2005 that was permanently aggravated in October

2018. And although more than one inference may be drawn from some of Johnson’s

testimony, the compensation judge’s finding is not manifestly contrary to the evidence.

      Finally, Concrete Treatments argues that the compensation judge’s apportionment

decision is manifestly contrary to the evidence. This is another question of fact for the

compensation judge, reversible only when manifestly contrary to the evidence. DeNardo

v. Divine Redeemer Mem’l Hosp., 

 (Minn. 1990).                Concrete

Treatments relies on a mistake in Dr. Engasser’s opinion to advance its argument. Dr.

Engasser stated, “I agree with Dr. Johnson’s apportionment of 40 percent due to the

March 4, 2005, injury and 60 percent due to the October 1, 2018, injury.” But Dr.

Johnson’s apportionment determination was 60 percent to the December 2018 car accident

injury, not to the October 2018 injury. The WCCA concluded that the compensation judge

could have reasonably inferred that Dr. Engasser misread Dr. Johnson’s report as referring

to the October 2018 injury and incorrectly stated that he agreed with Dr. Johnson.


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       We agree with the WCCA’s assessment. At another point in his report, Dr. Engasser

opined that the October 2018 injury was a substantial contributing factor to Johnson’s

condition, while the December 2018 injury was a minor injury. Although the record could

also have supported other apportionment determinations (like the 50/50 apportionment that

Dr. Banks suggested), the WCCA did not err in affirming the compensation judge’s

apportionment determination.

       Because the compensation judge applied the correct legal standard for causation,

and the findings at issue are not manifestly contrary to the evidence, we uphold the

WCCA’s affirmance of the compensation judge’s findings.

                                      CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the

Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals, and we remand this matter to the Workers’

Compensation Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

       Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.



       HENNESY, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission,

took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.




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