STATE OF MINNESOTA

                                    IN SUPREME COURT

                                         A23-0036

Court of Appeals                                                            McKeig, J.
                                                              Took no part, Hennesy, J.
State of Minnesota,
by its Commissioner of Transportation,

                      Appellant,

vs.                                                               Filed: June 20, 2024
                                                             Office of Appellate Courts
David J. Schaffer, et al.,

                      Respondents Below,

Joseph Hamlin,

                      Respondent.

                              ________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, William Young, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for appellant.

Stuart T. Alger, Alger Property Law, P.L.L.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Douglas P. Seaton, James V.F. Dickey, Golden Valley, Minnesota, for amicus curiae The
Forum for Constitutional Rights.

Joseph G. Marek, Assistant County Attorney, Dakota County Attorney’s Office, Hastings,
Minnesota, for amici curiae Minnesota County Attorneys Association and Minnesota
Eminent Domain Counsel Association.

Leland J. Frankman, Harry A. Frankman, Frankman Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota;
and

Bradley J. Gunn, Malkerson Gunn Martin LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and




                                            1
Jon W. Morphew, Morphew Law Office, P.L.L.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus
curiae Minnesota Eminent Domain Institute.
                           ________________________

SYLLABUS

      An award of “reasonable attorney fees” under 

(a) (2022) is

determined by the lodestar method and thus is not limited to the amount owed pursuant to

an attorney fee agreement.

      Affirmed.

OPINION

MCKEIG, Justice.

      The issue for decision is whether attorney fees awarded under Minnesota Statutes

section 117.031(a) (2022), are capped at the amount set in a contingent fee agreement

between the landowner and the landowner’s attorney. When a landowner in an eminent

domain proceeding is awarded just compensation in an amount over 40 percent greater than

was offered by the government entity condemning their property, the landowner is entitled

to an additional award of “reasonable attorney fees.” See 

(a). Here,

Joseph Hamlin was awarded attorney fees after the State of Minnesota, through the

Department of Transportation, (“MnDOT”) took possession of some of Hamlin’s property

using the “quick take” provision of Minnesota eminent domain law. See 

 (2022). The attorney fees award under eminent domain procedures exceeded

the amount Hamlin owed his attorney under a contingent fee agreement. MnDOT argues

an award of “reasonable attorney fees” cannot exceed the amount owed to the landowner’s

attorney in a contingent fee agreement, while Hamlin claims an award of “reasonable

                                           2
attorney fees” in an eminent domain dispute is any amount calculated by the lodestar

method we applied to section 117.031(a) in County of Dakota v. Cameron, 

 (Minn. 2013).

      We reiterate what we held in Cameron: the phrase “reasonable attorney fees” in

section 117.031(a) refers to attorney fees calculated by the lodestar method, and thus we

hold an award of reasonable attorney fees is not capped by a contingent fee agreement.

                                         FACTS

      In 2018, MnDOT condemned a portion of Hamlin’s property and offered him

$43,000 in compensation. Hamlin refused this offer, and MnDOT seized the property

under the “quick-take” procedure in 

. 1 A court-appointed panel of


1
      The quick take procedure is as follows:
      Whenever the petitioner shall require title and possession of all or part of the
      owner’s property prior to the filing of an award by the court appointed
      commissioners, the petitioner shall, at least 90 days prior to the date on which
      possession is to be taken, notify the owner of the intent to possess by notice
      served by certified mail and before taking title and possession shall pay to
      the owner or deposit with the court an amount equal to petitioner’s approved
      appraisal of value. Amounts deposited with the court shall be paid out under
      the direction of the court. If it is deemed necessary to deposit the above
      amount with the court the petitioner may apply to the court for an order
      transferring title and possession of the property or properties involved from
      the owner to the petitioner. In all other cases, petitioner has the right to the
      title and possession after the filing of the award by the court appointed
      commissioners as follows:
            (1) if appeal is waived by the parties upon payment of the award;
            (2) if appeal is not waived by the parties upon payment or deposit of
      three-fourths of the award. The amount deposited shall be deposited by the
      court administrator in an interest bearing
             account no later than the business day next following the day on which
      the amount was deposited with the court. All interest credited to the amount
      deposited from the date of deposit shall be paid to the ultimate recipient of
      the amount deposited.
                                             3
condemnation commissioners heard the valuation dispute and awarded Hamlin $92,000 as

just compensation. Because the just compensation award was more than 40 percent of

MnDOT’s final offer, Hamlin was entitled to an award of attorney fees under section

117.031(a).

       When MnDOT refused to pay the full amount of attorney fees claimed by Hamlin,

Hamlin sought to recover $177,433.50 in attorney fees in district court. According to a

contingent fee agreement, Hamlin owed his attorney $16,333.33. The district court applied

the lodestar method and awarded Hamlin $63,228 in attorney fees. MnDOT appealed,

arguing that the word “reasonable” in section 117.031(a) means the amount owed in the

contingent fee agreement should set a maximum limit, or cap, on the attorney fees awarded.

The court of appeals affirmed in a precedential opinion, holding that “[t]he general term,

‘reasonable,’ does not expressly limit the amount based on any [existing] agreement

between the landowner and his attorney, and caselaw has defined ‘reasonable attorney fees’

in section 117.031(a) to mean reasonable as calculated under the lodestar method.” State

by Comm’r of Transp. v. Schaffer, 

, 181 (Minn. App. 2023). MnDOT

appealed, and we granted review.

                                       ANALYSIS

       In this case we must resolve the question of whether attorney fee awards under

section 117.031(a) are limited to the amount owed in a contingent fee agreement. The




      Nothing in this section shall limit rights granted in section 117.155.

.
                                             4
proper method of calculating attorney fees is a question of law we review de novo. State

v. Krause, 

 (Minn. 2019).

       Section 117.031(a), reads:

       If the final judgment or award for damages, as determined at any level in the
       eminent domain process, is more than 40 percent greater than the last written
       offer of compensation made by the condemning authority prior to the filing
       of the petition, the court shall award the owner reasonable attorney fees,
       litigation expenses, appraisal fees, other experts fees, and other related costs
       in addition to other compensation and fees authorized by this chapter.

(a) (emphasis added). MnDOT’s central argument is that the word

“reasonable” limits an attorney fee award to the amount owed to the attorney in a fee

agreement. 2 We disagree.

       We already defined the phrase “reasonable attorney fees” as it is used in section

171.031(a) in Cameron, 

, so we decline to apply MnDOT’s dictionary

definitions of the word “reasonable” to interpret section 117.031(a). See State v. Anderson,

 (Minn. 2003) (“We have recognized that when the legislature does

not amend our construction of a statute, the court’s construction stands.”). In Cameron,

“we conclude[d] that the lodestar approach governs the determination of the reasonableness

of an award of attorney fees under 

(a).” 

. The


2
        MnDOT also argues that the modifier “reasonable” applies to all the types of fees
listed in the statute; thus, because appraisal and expert fees are limited to reimbursement,
attorney fees must also be limited to reimbursement. See 

(a) ( “[T]he
court shall award the owner reasonable attorney fees, litigation expenses, appraisal fees,
other experts fees, and other related costs . . . . ”). But we differentiated “reasonable
attorney fees” from all other professional fees when we applied the lodestar method in
Cameron. See 

. Accordingly, no matter whether or how the word
“reasonable” impacts the other fees listed, “reasonable attorney fees” means attorney fees
calculated by the lodestar method.
                                              5
lodestar method is a two-part inquiry: (1) the court “determine[s] the number of hours

reasonably expended on the litigation and multipl[ies] that number by a reasonable hourly

rate,” and then (2) the court “evaluates the overall reasonableness of the award by

considering such factors as the time and labor required; the nature and difficulty of the

responsibility assumed; the amount involved and the results obtained; the fees customarily

charged for similar legal services; the experience, reputation, and ability of counsel; and

the fee arrangement existing between counsel and the client.” 

 (emphasis added)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing the factors listed in State v. Paulson, 

 (Minn. 1971); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 

 (1983)

(developing what would later be known as the “lodestar method.”).

       Because the district court, consistent with Cameron, applied the lodestar method to

award Hamlin $63,228 in attorney fees, and the district court’s lodestar findings are

undisputed, 3 the award is reasonable under section 117.031(a).

       Although the district court’s findings applying the lodestar method here were not

challenged, we observe that applying the lodestar method does not require the district court

to disregard the contingent fee agreement. Rather, one of the factors for the court to



3
       The court of appeals held that MnDOT conceded the district court’s lodestar
findings were accurate because it failed to address the issue in its brief or at oral argument.
Schaffer, 995 N.W.2d at 184 (“MnDOT accepts as appropriate the district court’s finding
that $325 was a reasonable hourly rate and its implicit finding that 194.5 hours was a
reasonable amount of time for Hamlin’s counsel’s work on the case, resulting in its $63,228
award.”). Therefore, we declined to grant review on the district court’s lodestar findings,
instead accepting the court of appeal’s holding on that issue. State by Comm’r of Transp.
v. Schaffer, No. A23-0036, Order at 1 (Minn. filed Nov. 14, 2023).

                                              6
consider in the second part of the lodestar method inquiry is “ ‘the fee arrangement existing

between counsel and the client.’ ” Cameron, 

 (quoting State by Head

v. Paulson, 

 (Minn. 1971)). Importantly, however, it is to be just one

factor.

          The lodestar method does not prioritize one factor over any of the others,

particularly not contingent fee agreements. Krause, 

 (“[T]he lodestar

amount may not be enhanced for the risk of non-recovery inherent in a contingent-fee

agreement . . . To do so would duplicate the consideration of the fee agreement existing

between counsel and the client, which is one factor to be considered in determining the

reasonable hourly rate that is used to calculate the lodestar amount.”); see also Paulson,

 (holding that fee agreements are not the controlling factor in calculating

attorney fees under 

); City of Minnetonka v. Carlson, 

 (Minn. 1980) (affirming the district court’s fee award under 

because it did not prioritize the contingent fee agreement over the other Paulson factors).

The lodestar method already requires the district court to weigh fee agreements among

other factors. Cameron, 

. To use a fee agreement as a cap on fees

awarded would contravene the lodestar method by giving double weight to the fee

agreement factor. As we explained in Krause, “[d]uplicate consideration of any factor

would produce an inappropriate windfall.” 

.

          MnDOT further argues that attorney fee awards must be limited to the amount the

owner actually owes their attorney because the award is granted to “the owner.” But

awarding attorney fees to “the owner” in no way limits the award to reimbursement costs.

                                             7
Rather, granting the award to the owner simply establishes the owner as the recipient of

the attorney fee award. The statute does not include any language limiting the reasonable

attorney fee award to only the amount owed to the attorney by the owner. See 

(a). Other provisions in Chapter 117, such as 

, are explicitly

limited to “reimbursement.” Had the Legislature intended to so limit section 117.031(a),

it could have included the word “reimbursement.”

       In summary, a landowner’s fee agreement with their attorney does not cap an award

of attorney fees because “reasonable attorney fees” under section 117.031(a) means

attorney fees calculated using the lodestar method. Cameron, 

. Because

“reasonable attorney fees” awarded under 

(a) are attorney fees

calculated using the lodestar method, the district court properly applied the lodestar method

in calculating the award of attorney fees.

                                      CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

       Affirmed.



       HENNESY, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission,

took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.




                                              8