STATE OF MINNESOTA

                                  IN SUPREME COURT

                                         A23-0047

Original Jurisdiction                                                           Per Curiam
                                                                  Took no part, Hennesy, J.
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against
Richard S. Langree, a Minnesota Attorney,

.

                                                                       Filed: July 10, 2024
                                                                 Office of Appellate Courts

                               ________________________


Susan M. Humiston, Director, Joanna Labastida, Senior Assistant Director, Office of
Lawyers Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for petitioner.

Richard S. Langree, Minneapolis, Minnesota, pro se.

                               ________________________

SYLLABUS

       A 40-day suspension with a requirement to petition for reinstatement is the

appropriate discipline for an attorney who has demonstrated a lack of requisite legal skills,

asserted numerous frivolous claims, knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of

a tribunal, purposely delayed the judicial proceedings, engaged in conduct intended to

disrupt a tribunal, and engaged in behavior that was ultimately prejudicial to the

administration of justice—and who has shown a likelihood to continue the misconduct in

the future.

       Suspended.


                                             1

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

       The Director (Director) of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility

(OLPR) filed a petition for disciplinary action against respondent Richard Stephen

Langree, alleging various and repeated professional misconduct related to a single matter.

A referee was appointed and he held an evidentiary hearing. The referee found that in a

family law matter, Langree had engaged in a pattern of filing untimely, frivolous, or

otherwise improper motions and appeals and that he had intended to disrupt the tribunal

and burden the opposing party. The referee further found that some of the professional

misconduct Langree engaged in continued through the disciplinary process. The referee

found three aggravating factors and one mitigating factor. Based on the findings and

conclusions, the referee recommended Langree be suspended from practice for a minimum

of 40 days. The Director urges a slightly longer 60-day suspension subject to 2 years of

supervised probation.

       Langree makes no arguments regarding the measure of discipline recommended by

the referee or the Director. He obliquely attempts to contest the referee’s findings of fact

by making frivolous motions to both us and to the referee, accusing nearly everyone

involved in the underlying family law matter and in these disciplinary proceedings of being

corrupt or behaving unethically. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we

conclude that the recommended discipline is insufficient to protect the public, protect the

legal profession, and deter future misconduct. Accordingly, the appropriate discipline for




                                             2
Langree’s misconduct is a 40-day suspension with a requirement to petition for

reinstatement—a condition typically not required for suspensions of fewer than 90 days.

                                          FACTS

       Langree began practicing law in Minnesota in 1993 after moving to the state from

California, where he had worked as a public defender. Langree has extensive experience

in family law and child protection matters; he testified that he practices law “for the

community” by charging sliding fees or doing his work pro bono. The misconduct here

arises from a single child custody matter that took place between 2018 and 2022. We

address the facts of that matter below.

Custody Matter

       In 2010, a married couple (Father and Mother), neither of whom had legal

representation, filed a joint petition for marriage dissolution with children. Father and

Mother had a single child. Langree claims to have known the family since around the time

of the divorce.

       In 2018, Father retained Langree to attempt to modify the stipulated child custody

arrangement and child support. The motion to change custody alleged that the child was

being physically and verbally abused, so the assigned district court judge appointed a

guardian ad litem (GAL) in June 2018. Four months later, the GAL filed a report on the

matter. At the hearing to discuss the report, Langree objected to the report as incomplete

and led the court to believe that three specific healthcare providers—whose input was

essential to the issue—had not been consulted by the GAL before preparation of the report.

The court continued the matter for 2 months to allow the GAL to consult with those


                                            3
providers and potentially amend her report. The GAL then learned that she actually had

contacted these providers before the report’s preparation, with two providers mentioned by

name in the report. Accordingly, the GAL filed an amended report with recommendations.

       Two days before the rescheduled hearing, Langree filed two emergency motions: 1)

to remove the GAL; and 2) to temporarily change parenting time. Those motions were

both procedurally deficient, so the court did not consider them at the hearing at which the

court issued an order expressly following the recommendations of the GAL. Two months

later, Langree filed motions to vacate the court’s order, to change parenting time and legal

custody, and to remove and replace the GAL for cause. Several of these motions were

duplicative or procedurally deficient. A month later—March 2019—Langree filed two

emergency motions to ban international travel for the child and to prohibit the child from

being taken out of the country. The court denied these motions because there was no

evidence the child was in any danger, no circumstances warranting emergency relief, and

relief would have been available in the ordinary course were it not for Father’s own delays

in complying with court orders.

       In April 2019, the court issued an order scheduling a June hearing to discuss the

preliminary arguments on the parties’ motions to change custody (the original issue in the

case), along with five of Father’s motions and two of Mother’s motions. Five days before

that scheduled hearing, Langree filed a motion to disqualify the presiding judge and a

motion to continue the issues listed in the court’s order for hearing. Because of the motion

to disqualify, the matters upon which the hearing was to focus were rescheduled until after

the removal decision. Langree’s removal motion was heard and denied. Langree then filed


                                             4
for reconsideration of his motion, and a month later, the chief judge of the district where

the case was filed denied the removal motion.

       An order for hearing was then issued setting a September 2019 date to discuss

Mother’s motions to quash two subpoenas served by Langree and to address the issue of

attorney’s fees. Time permitting, the court intended to hear preliminary arguments on the

foundational custody issue, Father’s numerous other motions, and one motion from

Mother. A week before that scheduled hearing, Langree filed a petition for a writ of

mandamus and prohibition 1 with the court of appeals, seeking to revoke many of the district

court’s orders and asking the court of appeals to direct the district court to take various

actions. Three days later, Langree wrote a letter to the court of appeals seeking an

extension, claiming to have become very ill, which caused him to submit only “draft”

versions of his documents. The court of appeals dismissed the petition for the writs of

mandamus and prohibition without prejudice, citing Langree’s request to file new

documents. Due to these events with the court of appeals, the district court had rescheduled

the September hearing for December.

       A month before the rescheduled hearing, Langree refiled a petition for writs of

mandamus and prohibition with the court of appeals asking for the same relief as the

previous filing. Consequently, the district court’s hearing was again delayed. The court

of appeals denied Langree’s writ petition, finding no extraordinary or emergency situation


1
       Writs of mandamus and prohibition are “extraordinary” writs to be used only when
the judicial system offers “no other adequate remedy” at law. Klapmeier v. Cirrus
Industries, Inc., 

 (Minn. 2017); see also 

 (2022)
(mandamus), Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 120 (prohibition).

                                             5
and observing that many of the arguments either lacked merit or were not properly before

the court. The court of appeals also noted that Langree had not cited to or applied any

relevant legal standards in the petition.

         Having regained jurisdiction, the district court then set a new hearing for April 2020,

limited to specific motions. However, Langree’s subsequent submissions to the court

included six additional issues beyond those contained in the limiting instructions.

Furthermore, these filings referenced the recent court of appeals decision on the requested

extraordinary writs and stated “[w]here a court of appeals has made a ruling which is

clearly erroneous, the District Court is not bound to follow it,” and that the court of appeals’

analysis “can also be ignored.” The district court found that Langree’s actions “showed

bad faith and intent to prolong the proceedings” and that his behavior had caused numerous

delays “by filing motions mere days before, and in one case the day of, a scheduled

hearing.”

         At that point, the district court allowed Mother to submit an affidavit regarding the

attorney’s fees she had accrued throughout the proceeding. Mother’s attorney filed the

affidavit in support of a claim for $32,907 in attorney’s fees. In July 2020, Langree filed

another, largely duplicative motion. When denying the motion, the district court cautioned

Langree against “further lengthy unsolicited pleadings as they may be considered to

contribute to the length and cost of [the] proceedings.” A month later, the district court

issued an order for Father to pay the requested $32,906.96 in “conduct-based attorney’s

fees.”    In October 2020, heedless of the district court’s warning, Langree filed an




                                                6
emergency motion that was, again, duplicative of an issue that had already been

addressed—which was, again, denied.

       Four days later, Langree appealed the award of attorney’s fees to the court of

appeals. Because no final judgment had yet been entered in the case below, the court of

appeals dismissed Langree’s appeal as premature. In December 2020, Langree filed

another appeal with the court of appeals seeking: 1) review of the district court’s rulings;

2) review of the court of appeals’ own ruling on the petition for writs of mandamus and

prohibition; and 3) court of appeals intervention in the district court case. The court of

appeals dismissed this appeal as premature as well.

       In January 2021, Langree filed a petition for review with our court seeking review

of all three court of appeals decisions in the custody matter. Because the petition for review

was filed more than 30 days after two of those decisions, we dismissed the petition as

untimely with respect to those decisions. We denied the petition for review with respect

to the third decision.

       Shortly thereafter—nearly 3 years after Langree began representing Father—the

district court judge who had been presiding over the custody case rotated out of the family

court, and a new judge was assigned. Langree filed to remove that judge and a family court

referee was ultimately assigned. 2


2
       There is a gap in the record here—which the referee notes—and the reasons for the
judicial officer changes are unclear. After the initial judge’s rotation out of family court, a
future hearing in the custody matter was then assigned to a different district court judge,
though there is no record of notice of judicial reassignment. The day after Langree filed to
have the apparently newly assigned district court judge removed, a family court referee
was assigned to the case for reasons not reflected in the record.

                                              7
       The newly assigned referee held a teleconference with the attorneys in March 2021,

where the referee stated that he would be retiring in June, at which point Langree advised

the referee that he planned to file numerous additional motions. The referee directed

Langree to file those motions as quickly as possible and scheduled a preemptive evidentiary

hearing on those motions for early May. Langree then filed a letter with the court seeking

an extension to file his motions until July—the month after Langree knew the assigned

referee was set to retire. The referee extended the deadline to April 9, 2021. On April 8,

Langree sought another extension to April 15, citing complications related to COVID and

travel, which was granted. However, rather than file any of the “numerous” motions

alluded to in the teleconference with the referee, Langree filed a motion to remove the

referee for cause, which was denied. Langree then told the referee and Mother’s attorney

that he intended to appeal the denial of removal, so the preemptive evidentiary hearing was

cancelled, and a new referee was required to assume the matter due to the retirement.

Langree never filed the threatened appeal.

       The new referee deemed the case ready for trial, which was scheduled for September

2021. During the scheduling teleconference, Langree asked for a motions hearing date, to

which Mother’s attorney responded that if Langree were to file additional motions, she

would move to have Father declared a frivolous litigant. A motion hearing was granted

and set for late June. Throughout June, Langree filed numerous motions, many of them

plainly duplicative of issues already decided, and most were untimely filed a week before

the motion hearing. On the date of the motion hearing, Mother’s attorney filed a motion

for Rule 11 sanctions against Langree and to have Father declared to be a frivolous litigant.


                                             8
The district court denied all of Langree’s motions, but granted Mother’s motions to

sanction Langree and have Father declared a frivolous litigant. 3 Langree himself was

ordered to pay attorney’s fees plus penalties for Mother’s response to his most recent

frivolous motions. 4

       In August 2021, Langree appealed again to the court of appeals, this time on the

issues of sanctions and designation as a frivolous litigant, as well as many issues that had

previously been dealt with by that court. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal because

most issues were not yet appealable. 5

       In November 2021, the referee granted Mother’s countermotion for custody

modification. In January 2022, the court issued its final order on the child support issue.

       In March 2022, Langree appealed only the order of sanctions against him,

personally. The court of appeals denied this appeal as premature because no judgment had

yet been entered on the sanctions order.

       In June 2022, Langree filed a notice of appeal with the court of appeals seeking

review of the district court’s orders regarding custody and child support, which was


3
       “A person who in any action or proceeding repeatedly serves or files frivolous
motions, pleadings, letters, or other documents, conducts unnecessary discovery, or
engages in oral or written tactics that are frivolous or intended to cause delay,” is a
“frivolous litigant.” Minn. R. Gen. P. 9.06(b)(2).
4
        Langree was ordered to pay attorney’s fees resulting specifically from Mother
having to respond to two filings Langree made in June 2021 and Mother’s attorney having
to draft and file the frivolous litigation motion. Father remained responsible for the nearly
$33,000 in attorney’s fees previously ordered.
5
      Though the imposition of sanctions was appealable at the time, the court of appeals
dismissed in the interest of judicial economy.

                                             9
dismissed as untimely. In a separate appeal, Langree again requested review of the

imposition of sanctions by the court of appeals. In December 2022, the court of appeals

found that the district court did not abuse its discretion because, among other reasons, the

fact that Langree had not prevailed on even one of his multitudinous motions was indicative

of their frivolousness.

       In January 2023, the Director petitioned us for disciplinary action against Langree

and requested an appointment of a referee. In Langree’s response to the petition, he asked

us to disqualify the Director, the assistant senior director of the OLPR, and “all of the

OLPR.” He also asked us to disqualify one of the district court judges from the custody

matter that led to the Director’s petition for discipline. We appointed a referee to Langree’s

disciplinary matter in February 2023.

       The day after the referee was appointed, Mother’s attorney reached out to Langree

about his nonpayment of the ordered attorney’s fees, and he responded that we had

“appointed a referee to consider the issue” of his request to “invalidate the judgment.”

When Mother’s attorney expressed her confusion, Langree responded with:

       Yes I am contesting the unlawful behavior of the judge’s [sic] through the
       mechanism of the attorney complaint. This gives me direct access to the
       Supreme Court and the ability to have hearings before a referee. I am
       confident now that I have the attention of the judicial officers with authority
       and the duty to correct the judicial misconduct, the proper result will be
       determined. The court has the obligation to address and correct misconduct
       below. I will keep you informed as to the process chosen by the referee.

       The referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed in September 2023,

and concluded that Langree had engaged in professional misconduct. The referee found

that Langree: 1) demonstrated a lack of requisite thoroughness, preparedness, and legal


                                             10
skill and knowledge in violation of Rule 1.1; 2) asserted numerous frivolous claims in

violation of Rule 3.1; 3) knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tribunal in

violation of Rule 3.4(c); 4) purposely delayed proceedings and burdened an opposing party

in violation of Rule 4.4(a); 5) engaged in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal in violation

of 3.5(h); and 6) engaged in conduct that was ultimately prejudicial to the administration

of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d). The referee recommended a minimum 40-day

suspension from the practice of law for the violations.

                                         ANALYSIS

         Neither party ordered a transcript of the hearing before the referee; therefore, the

referee’s factual findings are conclusive. Rule 14(e), Rules on Lawyers Professional

Responsibility (RLPR). Similarly, when no transcript has been ordered, the conclusions

drawn by the referee from the facts are accepted, including whether the Rules of

Professional Conduct have been violated. In re McCloud, 

, 765 (Minn.

2023).

         Langree does not deny any of the referee’s factual findings, though he does make a

blanket denial of “the validity of each of the charges offered against [him] by the

[Director].” It is unclear from Langree’s briefing what makes the Director’s charges

invalid, and in any event, the referee concluded they were valid. It appears that Langree

implicitly challenges the referee’s findings by attempting to relitigate the family court

matter at the root of these disciplinary proceedings through his briefs to us. But even if

these were among the findings of fact and conclusions of law that could be challenged,

raising any such challenges here requires ordering a transcript. Here, because neither


                                              11
Langree nor the Director ordered a transcript, we cannot entertain Langree’s challenge, and

the referee’s findings of fact are conclusive and his conclusions of law are accepted. 6 The

only issue for us to decide is the appropriate discipline.

       The purpose of attorney discipline is “not to punish the attorney but rather to protect

the public, to protect the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct by the disciplined

attorney as well as by other attorneys.” In re Siders, 

 (Minn. 2017)

(order) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We analyze four factors when

determining the appropriate discipline: A) the nature of the misconduct; B) the cumulative

weight of the disciplinary violations; C) the harm to the public; and D) the harm to the legal

profession. In re Greenman, 

 (Minn. 2015). We will also weigh any

aggravating or mitigating factors when considering the proper discipline. 

                                              A.

       The nature of Langree’s misconduct was serious. Though it only involved a single

matter, Langree’s behavior involved numerous frivolous arguments or failures to comply

with court rules. “[S]uch an abuse of the litigation process constitutes serious misconduct.”

In re Selmer, 

 (Minn. 2015) (citation omitted) (internal quotation

marks omitted).




6
       “We will, however, review the referee’s interpretation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, and other conclusions of law that do not rely on the referee’s factual findings, de
novo, whether or not a transcript is part of our record on review.” In re Montez, 

 (Minn. 2012). We discern no issue in this case with the referee’s
interpretation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and see no conclusions of law that were
not derived from the factual findings.

                                              12
       Many of Langree’s filings and appeals were untimely, demonstrating a lack of skill,

knowledge, thoroughness, and preparation. Langree filed at least 11 untimely motions and

made untimely or premature appeals to both the court of appeals and this court over the

course of this custody matter. Langree also filed multiple motions that were procedurally

deficient and accordingly not considered by the court. Many—if not most—of his motions

were also clearly frivolous.       In this contested, but fairly straightforward custody

modification matter, Langree made at least 25 separate motions, appealed to the court of

appeals six times, and submitted a PFR to this court. Many of Langree’s filings “were

unsupported by fact and/or law.” Many filings also included requests that had previously

been made to and decided by the court, and the court of appeals specifically found that the

fact Langree had not prevailed on a single motion was “indicative of the frivolousness of

his motions.”

       Langree also repeatedly refused to obey his obligations under court rules. In April

2020, after the district court explicitly limited a scheduled hearing to specified issues,

Langree submitted materials to the court that raised six issues beyond those the court had

limited the hearing to. These were also the same filings in which Langree instructed the

district court to ignore the ruling of the court of appeals. A few months later, Langree

again filed motions in anticipation of a hearing pertaining to issues outside the scope of the

hearing, as limited by the district court.

       Langree also abused the litigation process in order to delay the tribunal. He caused

numerous delays by filing to have the GAL and nearly every judicial officer involved in

the custody matter removed. Langree also filed frivolous emergency motions for non-


                                             13
emergency issues, and petitions for writs of mandamus and prohibition for non-

extraordinary matters.

                                              B.

       When considering the cumulative weight of a lawyer’s misconduct, we “distinguish

between a brief lapse in judgment or a single, isolated incident and multiple instances of

misconduct occurring over a substantial amount of time.” In re Igbanugo, 

, 329 (Minn. 2023) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Multiple

instances over a substantial span of time “warrants greater discipline.” In re Capistrant,

, 621 (Minn. 2018). Accordingly, the “cumulative weight and severity of

multiple disciplinary rule violations may compel severe discipline even when a single act

standing alone would not have warranted such discipline.” In re Oberhauser, 

 (Minn. 2004).

       Langree’s misconduct involved only the one custody matter, though the matter

dragged on for approximately 4 years as a direct result of his misconduct. During that time,

Langree filed dozens of mostly frivolous motions, incorrectly or inappropriately appealed

the district court’s decisions numerous times, and sought to remove nearly every judicial

officer involved in the custody case. We agree with the referee’s conclusion that Langree’s

instances of misconduct were “numerous and extended over a significant period of time.

His actions over three plus years in the family file establish a pattern of conduct that cannot




                                              14
be ignored.” Langree’s behavior provides a model example of “multiple instances of

misconduct occurring over a substantial amount of time.” Igbanugo, 989 N.W.2d at 329.

                                            C.

       “We measure harm to the public based on the quantity (the number of clients

harmed) and the quality (the extent of the clients’ injuries).” In re Udeani, 

, 397 (Minn. 2020). Father was harmed by Langree, and Mother, a nonclient, was also

harmed. Father was harmed in that he was ordered to pay $32,906.96 to Mother for

“conduct-based attorney’s fees” and was declared a frivolous litigant, which required him

to post a bond for any further filings. Mother was harmed by facing significantly increased

attorney’s fees and the uncertainty of the legal morass wrought by Langree’s frivolous

motions and appeals.

                                            D.

      Harm to the legal profession is measured by considering whether an attorney’s

breach of trust “reflects poorly on the entire legal profession and erodes the public’s

confidence in lawyers.” Udeani, 945 N.W.2d at 398 (citation omitted) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “Misconduct that undermines the public’s confidence in the ability of

attorneys to abide by the rule of law harms the legal profession.” In re Kennedy, 

, 581 (Minn. 2020) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks and alterations

omitted). Additionally, frivolous claims harm the legal profession because they are “a

waste of court resources.” Selmer, 

.

      Langree’s behavior represented multiple instances of misconduct, which erodes

public confidence in lawyers and the legal profession. See In re Lennington, 

76, 84 (Minn. 2022) (finding that the attorney’s “multiple instances of misconduct eroded

the public confidence in lawyers and the legal profession”). Also, Langree’s actions

harmed the legal system itself because the significant judicial resources expended when

the custody case took significantly longer than it should have wasted resources and required

other judicial officers to take up the slack.

                                                E.

       Next, we consider any aggravating or mitigating factors. Here, the referee found

three aggravating factors: 1) Langree lacked remorse or recognition for the wrongfulness

of his conduct; 2) his misconduct continued during the discipline proceeding; and 3) he

had substantial experience.

       A lack of recognition by an attorney of their misconduct—and a lack of remorse for

such conduct—constitutes an aggravating factor. See In re Nathanson, 

(Minn. 2012). An attorney who fails to acknowledge their wrongful conduct is concerning

to us because it indicates the attorney “might engage in similar conduct in the future unless

they are appropriately sanctioned.” In re Blomquist, 

, 915–16 (Minn.

2021) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Throughout the disciplinary

proceeding and in his briefs to us, Langree has exhibited no remorse or acknowledgment

of the harm done by his misconduct. Moreover, he apparently does not comprehend the

disciplinary process, as he is attempting to use these proceedings as an avenue to relitigate

the family court matter, rather than acknowledge his misconduct in any capacity.

       Failure to cooperate after a disciplinary petition has been filed is an aggravating

factor. In re Taplin, 

 (Minn. 2013). Frivolous conduct during


                                                16
disciplinary proceedings may also contribute as an aggravating factor. In re Laver, 

, 567 (Minn. 2023) (citing In re Ulanowski, 

 (Minn.

2011). In proceedings before the referee, Langree moved to disqualify the Director and

OLPR staff, and he made the same request to us—with an additional request to remove the

referee. Further, rather than cooperate with the referee or with us in this proceeding,

Langree requested both the referee and this court to provide relief and/or intervene in the

underlying family law matter through these disciplinary proceedings with no rationale or

support in the law. Langree’s frivolous conduct from the family law matter has carried

through to the disciplinary matter and is an aggravating factor.

       “Substantial practice in the law is also an aggravating factor because it is assumed

that an experienced attorney has had an opportunity to become familiar with the law.” In

re Fett, 

 (Minn. 2010). We also consider an “attorney's experience

in a particular area of the law to be an aggravating factor when the misconduct arises from

that area of practice.” 

. The referee concluded that Langree has “substantial

experience in the family law, child welfare and child abuse areas of law.” Langree’s

misconduct in light of this experience is an aggravating factor.

       The referee found one mitigating factor: good character.           Evidence of good

character, pro bono legal work, and volunteer activities may be considered a mitigating

factor. In re Rooney, 

 (Minn. 2006). Langree does a significant

portion of his legal work for little to no pay, and he does substantial volunteer work in Haiti




                                              17
and Venezuela. Langree also cares for his special needs adult adoptive son, which speaks

to his good character in his personal and family life.

                                              F.

       Having considered these factors, we now must determine the appropriate discipline.

Though we are “the sole arbiter of the discipline to be imposed for professional misconduct

by Minnesota lawyers,” In re Stoneburner, 

 (Minn. 2016) (citation

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), “we give ‘significant weight’ to a referee’s

recommendation,” In re Riehm, 

 (Minn. 2016) (quoting In re Singer,

 (Minn. 1996)). Ultimately, when determining discipline, we attempt

to be consistent with prior cases, but also recognize that the “proper discipline is ultimately

determined based on the unique facts and circumstances of each case.” In re Nielson, 

, 612 (Minn. 2022) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

       This case is similar in many respects to In re Graham, 

 (Minn.

1990). There, the attorney alleged a conspiracy involving a federal judge, a federal

magistrate judge, a county attorney, the county attorney’s attorney, and others. 

.

He also accused a judge of judicial misconduct when attempting to have the magistrate

judge recused from considering an award of attorney’s fees. 

 at 318–19. Those

allegations were found to be false and without merit. 

 Also, the attorney in that case

moved during the disciplinary proceedings for this court to remove the then-Director of the

OLPR and his assistant. 

. “By repeatedly entering frivolous motions to remove

those who oppose him,” the attorney was found to be in continuing violation of Rule 3.1.

. We imposed a 60-day suspension. 

.


                                              18
       The case found most similar by the referee was In re MacDonald, 

(Minn. 2018), in which nearly all of the attorney’s rule violations were like those of

Langree. There, the attorney filed frivolous claims, repeatedly disrupted and delayed a

tribunal, and incompetently represented her client, among other things. 

 at 241–43. The

referee in MacDonald found four aggravating factors (which we reduced to two), no

mitigating factors, and recommended a 60-day suspension, 2 years of probation, and a

mental health evaluation. 

 at 248–49. This court did not require the mental health

evaluation, but agreed with the 60-day suspension, followed by 2 years of supervised

probation. 

. Granted, the underlying behavior in MacDonald is not totally

analogous to Langree’s behavior, but the rule violations are largely comparable, and the

delays caused were no less serious.

       The cumulative nature of Langree’s misconduct in the custody matter caused a

routine family law matter to drag on for 4 years and cost his own client nearly $33,000 in

conduct-based attorney’s fees. The Director urges we adopt a 60-day suspension. The

referee—despite finding MacDonald and its 60-day suspension “most instructive” as to the

level of discipline—recommended a 40-day suspension because Langree’s behavior did

“not reach the same level” as the attorney in MacDonald. In light of the deference we

show to a referee’s recommendation, we agree that a 40-day suspension is appropriate here.

       But because there is no one-size-fits-all discipline—even in cases of identical rule

violations—our inquiry continues. Generally, an attorney suspended for 90 days or fewer

will not be required to petition for reinstatement. See Rule 18(f), RLPR (“Unless otherwise

ordered by this Court, [requirements pertaining to the process of reinstatement by petition]


                                            19
shall not apply to lawyers who have been suspended for a fixed period of ninety (90) days

or less.”). However, if we find a compelling reason to believe that future misconduct may

be likely, we may require reinstatement proceedings for suspensions of 90 days or fewer.

See McCloud, 998 N.W.2d at 771 (requiring petition for reinstatement from a 90-day

suspension because we did not “feel sufficiently comfortable that [the attorney] w[ould]

reform his practices in response to the . . . discipline”); In re Nathanson, 

(requiring a petition for reinstatement for a 90-day suspension when the attorney did not

adequately account for why the misconduct occurred or for client harm and had not taken

steps to prevent future misconduct); see also In re Gurstel 

 (Minn.

1995) (requiring a petition for reinstatement for a 60-day suspension).

       Here, Langree’s behavior during the disciplinary proceedings creates serious doubt

that he has accepted or will accept responsibility for his misconduct. Rather than address

his own misconduct, Langree has continuously focused on the conduct of nearly everyone

else involved in the underlying family law matter. His conduct at oral argument is

representative of this behavior. Langree brought Father to our courtroom, introduced him

to us, and argued that the underlying custody case involved the rampant fraud and

misconduct of others, while failing to substantively address the disciplinary matter or

answer the questions of the court. Langree also continued to engage in the exact type of

misconduct he committed in the family law matter in his disciplinary case by making

frivolous arguments that the Director, the entire OLPR staff, and the referee should be




                                             20
disqualified from his disciplinary case or that we should issue substantive rulings in the

family law matter in this discipline case. 7

       Nor has Langree “adequately explained why the misconduct occurred,” “addressed

how clients were harmed,” or set forth “what steps he has taken to prevent further

misconduct,” which we have found instructive when determining whether a petition for

reinstatement should be required for suspensions of 90 days or less. Nathanson, 

 (quoting In re Crandall, 

 (Minn. 2005)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Because we are concerned that further misconduct is likely, we

conclude that Langree must petition for reinstatement pursuant to Rule 18(a)–(d), RLPR.

       Accordingly, we order that:

       1. Respondent Richard S. Langree is suspended from the practice of law, effective

           14 days from the date of this opinion, with no right to petition for reinstatement

           for 40 days;

       2. Respondent must petition for reinstatement pursuant to Rule 18(a)-(d), RLPR.

           Reinstatement is conditioned on satisfaction of continuing legal education

           requirements, see Rule 18(e)(4), RLPR, and successful completion of the written

           examination required for admission to the practice of law by the State Board of

           Law Examiners on the subject of professional responsibility, see Rule 18(e)(2),


7
       For example, Langree argued to us that the referee is disqualified because he denied
Langree’s request to disqualify the Director and the staff of the OLPR from his disciplinary
case and because he rejected Langree’s arguments that his actions in the family law matter
were not misconduct. A judge’s adverse rulings, however, are not enough to show bias.
See State v. Mouelle, 

, 716 (Minn. 2019). Langree’s claim that the referee
should be disqualified has no basis in law or fact and is frivolous.

                                               21
          RLPR; Rule 4.A(5), Rules for Admission to the Bar (requiring evidence that an

          applicant has successfully completed the Multistate Professional Responsibility

          Examination).

       3. Respondent must pay $900 in costs, see Rule 24(a), RLPR, and must comply

          with Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice of suspension to clients, opposing counsel,

          and tribunals).

       Suspended.



       HENNESY, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission,

took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.




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