STATE OF MINNESOTA

                                    IN SUPREME COURT

                                        A22-1239


Court of Appeals                                                            Thissen, J.
                                            Concurring, McKeig, Chutich, Moore, III, JJ.
                                                             Took no part, Hennesy, J.
Sean Michael Wocelka,

                      Appellant,

vs.                                                                  Filed: July 17, 2024
                                                               Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

                      Respondent.

                              ________________________

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Robert J. Jarrett, Steele County Attorney, Julia A. Forbes, Assistant Steele County
Attorney, Owatonna, Minnesota, for respondent.
                            ________________________

SYLLABUS

      Minnesota Statutes section 609.343, subdivision 1 (2020), prohibits an actor’s use

of an object to make contact with a complainant’s intimate parts.

      Affirmed.




                                            1

OPINION

THISSEN, Justice.

              We consider here whether Minnesota Statutes section 609.343, subdivision 1

(2020), prohibits an actor’s use of an object to make contact with a complainant’s intimate

parts. That determination turns on the meaning of “sexual contact” which is defined in

Minnesota Statutes section 609.341, subdivision 11(a)(i) (2022), as “the intentional

touching by the actor of the complainant’s intimate parts.”

       Following a jury trial and a verdict of guilt, the district court convicted appellant

Sean Michael Wocelka of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of

Minnesota Statutes section 609.343, subdivision 1(a) (2020). 1 That provision criminalizes

sexual contact of a complainant under 13 years old by an actor who is more than 36 months

older than the complainant. Wocelka petitioned for postconviction relief, contending that

the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction because his conduct did not meet

the statutory definition of “sexual contact.” The postconviction court denied the petition

as untimely and also because it failed on the merits. The court of appeals did not address

whether the petition was untimely but rather affirmed the district court order on the merits.

Wocelka v. State, 

, 14–17 (Minn. App. 2023). We granted review.

       Because an actor’s use of an object to make contact with a complainant’s intimate

parts meets the definition of “sexual contact” under section 609.341, subdivision 11(a)(i),



1
        In 2021, the subdivisions of the statute were amended and reorganized. Act of
June 30, 2021, ch. 11, art. 4, § 17, 2021 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1947, 2041. We refer
to the version in effect at the time of Wocelka’s offense, which was unchanged until 2021.

                                             2
and the evidence at trial was sufficient to show that Wocelka touched the complainant’s

intimate parts with a toy giraffe, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals upholding

Wocelka’s conviction for violating section 609.343, subdivision 1(a) (2020).

                                           FACTS

       In late December 2015, during a forensic interview with a child protection

investigator, Wocelka’s daughter disclosed that her father had touched her “private parts”

using a toy giraffe. She described the location and timing of the touching, as well as how

it made her feel. The touching had occurred shortly before Christmas. After the interview,

officers obtained a search warrant. In the search of Wocelka’s home, officers found a toy

giraffe in the location that his daughter had described. The State charged Wocelka with

three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. 2

       Wocelka’s daughter testified at trial, consistent with her statement to the child

protection investigator. She testified that when she was at her father’s house, he touched

her vagina with the toy giraffe when he thought she was sleeping. She described the toy

and said that it made her “very, very scared” when Wocelka touched her at night. She

testified that the last time Wocelka touched her was the Thursday before Christmas in 2015.

The State also submitted a recording of the December 2015 forensic interview of

Wocelka’s daughter that was admitted without objection.


2
        Citing Minnesota Statutes section 609.343 (2020), the State charged the following:
Count I for multiple acts of sexual contact over an extended time, id., subd. 1(h)(iii); Count
II for sexual contact with a victim under 16 years of age with a significant relationship, id.,
subd. 1(g); and Count III for sexual contact with a victim under 13 by an actor more than
36 months older than the victim. Id., subd. 1(a). Counts II and III each arose out of the
December 2015, alleged touching.

                                              3
       Wocelka did not testify in his own defense.          The defense called a forensic

psychologist to testify to the “continuing process” of memory reconstruction and to

challenge the interviewing technique of the child protection investigator. The State called

a rebuttal witness, a forensic interviewer, and trainer at a child advocacy center, to bolster

the credibility of the forensic interview.

       The jury found Wocelka guilty of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual

conduct, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.343, subdivision 1(a), (g) (2020),

for the December 2015 incident. At sentencing, he was convicted of one count under

subdivision 1(a) for sexual contact of a complainant under 13 years old by an actor who is

more than 36 months older than the complainant.

       In June 2021, Wocelka petitioned for postconviction relief. He argued that his

conduct was not prohibited under section 609.343, subdivision 1(a), and that his conviction

should therefore be vacated. The district court denied his petition both as untimely and on

the merits. Wocelka appealed both issues to the court of appeals. The court of appeals

concluded that his claim failed because the definition of “touching” was not as narrow as

he advocated and that bringing the toy into contact with his daughter’s intimate parts was

“touching” under section 609.341, subdivision 11(a)(i). Wocelka, 995 N.W.2d at 14–17.

The court of appeals did not reach the issue of timeliness. Id. at 14.

       We granted Wocelka’s petition for review of the decision of the court of appeals. 3


3
       Wocelka only petitioned for review of the statutory interpretation issue. In its brief,
the State raised the untimeliness of Wocelka’s petition for postconviction relief. The State
did not file a cross-petition for review of that issue. Although the State did not file a
cross-petition for review, we have discretion to decide the timeliness issue. See 

                                         ANALYSIS

       Wocelka was convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct for engaging in

sexual contact with his young daughter. 

, subd. 1(a) (2020). That

provision states:

       A person who engages in sexual contact with another person is guilty of
       criminal sexual conduct in the second degree if any of the following
       circumstances exists:

       (a)   the complainant is under 13 years of age and the actor is more than 36
       months older than the complainant.

, subd. 1(a) (emphasis added). The Legislature has defined “sexual

contact” as follows:

       (a) “Sexual contact,” for the purposes of section[] 609.343, subdivision 1,
       clauses (a) to (e) . . . includes any of the following acts committed without
       the complainant’s consent, except in those cases where consent is not a
       defense, and committed with sexual or aggressive intent:
       (i) the intentional touching by the actor of the complainant’s intimate parts,
       or . . .
       (iv) in any of the cases above, the touching of the clothing covering the
       immediate area of the intimate parts, or
       (v) the intentional touching with seminal fluid or sperm by the actor of the
       complainant’s body or the clothing covering the complainant’s body.

, subd. 11(a) (2022).




Crim. P. 29.04, subd. 6 (“The court may permit a party, without filing a cross-petition, to
defend a decision or judgment on any ground that the law and record permit that would not
expand the relief that has been granted to the party.”). Here, however, because the statutory
interpretation question is well-briefed, is appealed from a precedential court of appeals
decision, and is a matter of statewide importance, we believe that it is in the interests of
judicial economy and the interests of justice to, within our discretion, decline to consider
the timeliness issue and instead resolve this case on the merits of the statutory interpretation
issue.

                                               5
         Wocelka contends that the evidence supporting his conviction for second-degree

criminal sexual conduct is insufficient because bringing an object into contact with a

complainant’s intimate parts is not “touching” within the meaning of section 609.341,

subdivision 11(a). “A claim of insufficient evidence that turns on the meaning of the

statute under which the defendant was convicted presents an issue of statutory

interpretation that we review de novo.” State v. Stone, 

, 621–22 (Minn.

2023).

                                            A.

         Every member of the court agrees that Wocelka’s understanding of the word

“touching” in section 609.341, subdivision 11(a) is too narrow. We unanimously hold that

the term “touching” in Minnesota Statutes section 609.341, subdivision 11(a)(i), broadly

means bringing into contact with and does not require that the “touching” involve contact

by a body part of the perpetrator with the complainant’s intimate parts. Therefore, we hold

that Minnesota Statutes section 609.343, subdivision 1(a) (2020), prohibits an actor’s use

of an object to make contact with a complainant’s intimate parts. The evidence in this case

was sufficient to support Wocelka’s conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct.

                                            B.

         The disagreement in our positions is solely about the statutory interpretation

methodology we follow to reach our unanimous holding.              The aim of statutory

interpretation is to understand and effectuate the Legislature’s intent. Nash v. Comm’r of

Pub. Safety, l4 N.W.3d 812, 816 (Minn. 2024). Our relatively longstanding position has

been that “[t]he plain language of the statute controls when the meaning of the statute is


                                            6
unambiguous.” State v. Boecker, 

 (Minn. 2017). “The language of a

statute is unambiguous when there is only one reasonable way to read the text.” Nash,

14 N.W.2d at 816 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). Furthermore, we

determine plain meaning by looking to the text and textual context of the statute. See State

v. Pakhnyuk, 

 (Minn. 2019) (stating that the plain meaning of the

statute is determined by construing words and phrases according to the rules of grammar

and their common and approved use). Among the textual clues we may consider in

determining the meaning of the words of a statute are dictionary definitions. State v.

Beganovic, 

, 643 (Minn. 2023) (stating that “we may consult dictionary

definitions as part of th[e] inquiry” into a statute’s plain meaning).

                                              1.

       We begin by examining whether the term “touching” in section 609.341,

subdivision 11(a) is ambiguous. Both parties point to dictionary definitions to support their

respective understandings of the ordinary meaning of the word “touching.” Wocelka relies

on a common dictionary definition that would require a part of the perpetrator’s body to

come into contact with the complainant’s intimate part so as to feel the contact. See The

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1892 (3d ed. 1992) (defining

“touch” as “[t]o cause or permit a part of the body, especially the hand or fingers, to come

in contact with so as to feel”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2415 (1976)

(defining “touch” as “to bring a bodily part briefly into contact with, so as to feel”). The

State maintains, by contrast, that the term “touching” has commonly been understood to

have a broad meaning that includes not only having a sensory feeling of touching, but also


                                              7
bringing something into contact with something else. See Wocelka, 995 N.W.2d at 15; The

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1357 (1969) (defining “touch” as

“to bring something into contact with”).

       By simply looking at the words of the statute, we cannot rule out either of these

common and accepted understandings of the ordinary meaning of the word “touching.”

                                             i.

       Wocelka makes several textual arguments that the definition offered by the State is

unreasonable. First, Wocelka claims that the meaning of “touching” urged by the State is

unreasonable because the provision specifies that the touching must be done “by the actor.”

In this case, he asserts that the touching was done by the object and not “by the actor.” We

do not find the argument persuasive. It was “the actor” who brought the object into contact

with the intimate parts. Wocelka draws too fine a distinction as a matter of ordinary

English.

       As importantly, Wocelka’s argument is only meaningful if one assumes Wocelka’s

definition is correct to begin with. If one accepts Wocelka’s definition—that touching

requires a part of the perpetrator’s body to come into contact with the complainant’s

intimate part so as for the perpetrator to feel the contact—then there may be a meaningful

difference between an actor’s hand touching the complainant’s intimate parts and an object

held by the actor touching the intimate parts. But that is not the proper starting point for

establishing that the State’s broader definition is unreasonable. To show that the State’s

definition is unreasonable, Wocelka must start with the definition offered by the State. And

if we start there, Wocelka’s argument does not withstand scrutiny. If the definition is to


                                             8
“bring something into contact with,” then the actor—by bringing an object into contact

with the intimate part—is doing the touching.

       Wocelka also points to a different definition in the same section—the definition of

sexual penetration in 

, subd. 12 (2018). We may consider this other

definition pre-ambiguity because the definitions for “sexual contact” in subdivision 11 and

the definition of “sexual penetration” in subdivision 12 were adopted at the same time as

part of the same enactment, Act of June 5, 1975, ch. 374, § 2, 

,

1245, and for the same purpose (to provide statutory definitions for Minnesota’s criminal

sexual conduct laws). See Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d at 645.

       Subdivision 12 provides:

       “Sexual penetration” means any of the following acts committed without the
       complainant’s consent, except in those cases where consent is not a defense,
       whether or not emission of semen occurs:
       (1) sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal intercourse; or
       (2) any intrusion however slight into the genital or anal openings:
       (i) of the complainant’s body by any part of the actor’s body or any object
       used by the actor for this purpose . . . .

, subd. 12 (2018). Wocelka observes that the definition of sexual

penetration expressly distinguishes between an “actor’s body” and “any object used by the

actor.” Wocelka contends that the Legislature did not intend the use of an object as a means

of sexual contact to be criminalized because the Legislature expressly mentioned an object

used by the actor in the definition of “sexual penetration” but did not mention the use of an

object in the definition of “sexual contact.”

       We disagree.     First, Wocelka’s argument suffers from the same flaw as his

previous argument. He assumes his definition is the starting point for the analysis of


                                                9
the unreasonableness of the State’s definition. If we assume Wocelka’s definition is

correct—that touching means touching by part of the actor’s body—then the absence of a

reference to use of an object in the “sexual contact” definition is a meaningful silence. But

if one starts with the State’s definition of touching, which covers both contact by a body

part or by an object, the Legislature had no reason to draw such a distinction; “touching”

already includes both body part and object. Further, the definition of sexual penetration

upon which Wocelka focuses turns not on the act of “touching” but rather the act

of “intrusion.” Unlike definitions of the word “touching,” no definition of the word

“intrusion” identifies the type of things that do the intruding. Thus, the Legislature’s

specificity in the definition of sexual penetration was necessary in a way it was not in the

definition of “sexual contact.”

       Finally, Wocelka points out that in 2009, the Legislature added a more specific,

alternative definition of “sexual contact”: “the intentional touching with seminal fluid or

sperm by the actor of the complainant’s body or the clothing covering the complainant’s

body.” Act of May 11, 2009, ch. 59, art. 1, § 5, 

, 349 (codified at

, subd. 11(a)(v)). He notes that when the new definition was added,

the statute already defined “sexual contact” as “the intentional touching by the actor of the

complainant’s intimate parts . . . [including] the touching of the clothing covering the

immediate area of the intimate parts.” 

, subd. 11(a)(i), (iv) (2008).

       Wocelka argues that if we accept the broader ordinary meaning of touching—to

bring something into contact with—there was no reason for the Legislature to add the new

language. The conduct prohibited in the added provision—the actor is prohibiting from


                                             10
bringing seminal fluid or sperm into contact with the complainant’s body or the clothing

covering the complainant’s body—is already covered. But that is not true. The new

definition includes contact between seminal fluid or sperm and any part of the

complainant’s body or the clothing covering the complainant’s body; the definition in

section 609.341, subdivision 11(a)(i), is limited to the touching of intimate parts. The new

definition is not rendered superfluous if the State’s definition is accepted. In sum, we

conclude that the State’s position—that “touching” means bringing something into contact

with—is reasonable.

                                             ii.

       The State similarly asserts, based on the text of the statute, that Wocelka’s proposed

definition of “touching” is unreasonable.          We find the State’s arguments equally

unavailing.

       First, the State argues that to accept Wocelka’s definition, we would have to add the

words “with a body part” to the statute. But as with Wocelka’s second argument above,

the State is starting with the wrong definition. The argument only holds water if one starts

by assuming the State’s definition is correct. If one begins with the assumption that the

Legislature was using the word “touching” in the way Wocelka proposes, then the words

“with a body part” are already inherently embedded in the statute. According to Wocelka,

the word “touching” already includes the requirement that a part of the perpetrator’s body

come into contact with the complainant’s intimate parts. Thus, taking Wocelka’s definition

of the word “touching” as the starting point, we need add no words to the statute to find

Wocelka’s definition reasonable because those words are already there.


                                             11
       The State (following the court of appeals) next points out that the Legislature’s

definition of “sexual contact” in section 609.341, subdivision 11(a)(i), refers to the

complainant’s body part but does not mention a body part of the actor. The State argues

that this shows the Legislature knew how to refer to a body part and, because it did not do

so in relation to the actor, the Legislature did not intend that the touching had to be done

by a body part. But once again, the State is starting with the wrong definition. If you start

with Wocelka’s definition that touching means bringing a bodily part into contact with so

as to feel there would be no need for the Legislature to refer to the actor’s body part. In

other words, when the Legislature used the word “touching” it already understood the word

to mean touching with the actor’s body part. Thus, the Legislature did not need to refer to

the actor’s body part again. Consequently, the argument cannot be used to prove that

Wocelka’s definition is unreasonable.

       The concurrence offers a variation on this argument. It states that Wocelka’s

definition of section 609.341, subdivision 11(a)(i), reads out of the statute the words “of

the complainant’s intimate parts.” The argument is that “Wocelka focuses on only his

sensations and body parts, which reads the complainant and their intimate parts out of the

definition almost entirely.” Infra at C-5. We disagree.

       It is true that Wocelka’s understanding of the word “touching” requires that a body

part of the perpetrator touches so as to feel the complainant’s intimate parts. But that fact

does not mean that contact with the complainant’s intimate parts becomes irrelevant to the

analysis. Both things could be true. Focusing just on the text of the statute, one could

reasonably read it to say that the Legislature required two things: (1) intentional contact by


                                             12
a body part of the perpetrator so as to feel and (2) the body part made contact with the

complainant’s intimate parts. 4 The first requirement, even if it does require sensation, does

not of necessity exclude the second. In short, nothing in the words of the statute—“sexual

contact” includes “the intentional touching by the actor of the complainant’s intimate

parts”—excludes Wocelka’s interpretation as a matter of reading the text.

       In the end, the concurrence’s position is that Wocelka’s definition is unreasonable

because it may allow for outcomes where a perpetrator who has no sense of sensation is

not criminally liable; an outcome that it and perhaps many others would consider

unreasonable. Stated another way, the concurrence asserts that it is unreasonable to think

that the Legislature would have enacted, and the Governor would have signed, a statute

that so limited the meaning of “sexual contact.” But that is not the proper inquiry under

our current method for determining whether a statute is ambiguous. State v. Smith,

 (Minn. 2017) (stating that “[a]lthough it is odd, perhaps even

anomalous, for the Legislature to have included less-serious crimes as prior

impaired-driving convictions, but not Smith’s [more serious] 2005 offense, anomalous

results, even if they are the product of inadvertence, do not allow us to ignore the plain




4
          Moreover, the definition of “sexual contact” does not require as an element of the
State’s proof that complainants feel the contact with their intimate parts. See, e.g., 

, subd. 1(e)(ii) (2018) (providing that “[a] person who engages in sexual
contact with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree
if . . . (e) the actor causes personal injury to the complainant, and either of the following
circumstances exist: . . . (ii) the actor knows or has reason to know that the complainant
is . . . physically helpless”); 

, subd. 9(a) (2022) (defining “physically
helpless” to include a person who is “asleep or not conscious”).

                                             13
language of the statute”). The Legislature is free to enact statutes that are broader or more

limited than we (or the people of Minnesota) believe makes sense.

       In the threshold step of determining whether a statute is ambiguous, the question is

not whether we think a result authorized by the ordinary meaning of the words is

reasonable; the question is whether the words used by the Legislature plausibly support

more than one reasonable reading of the statute. And here, there are two ordinary meanings

of the word “touching,” and nothing in the text of the statutory provision rules out either

of those ordinary meanings as unreasonable.

       A case that the State cites, State v. Prigge, 

 (Minn. 2018), illustrates

this point. The State cites Prigge precisely for the general principle that not all plausible

definitions of a word are reasonable depending on context. The principle is undoubtedly

true, but it is of no assistance to the State here.

       In Prigge, we were asked to determine the meaning of the phrase “carry[ing] a pistol

on or about the person’s clothes or person” as used in 

, subd. 1

(2016). 907 N.W.2d at 637. The defendant was in a car and the pistol was found in the

vehicle’s center console. Id. The defendant argued that a pistol found in the center console

was not carried on or about the defendant’s clothes or person. Id.

       We rejected that argument. We looked to definitions of the word “carry” and

narrowed down those definitions to three: “(1) ‘[t]o hold or support while moving; bear,’

(2) ‘[t]o move or take from one place to another; transport: a train carrying freight,’ and

(3) ‘[t]o keep or have on one’s person.’ ” Id. at 638–39 (alterations in original) (citation

omitted). We then eliminated the third definition because the word “carry” was used in


                                               14
connection with the phrase “on or about.” Id. at 639. We observed that the disjunctive

“or” meant that “on” and “about” must mean different things. Id. Thus, we concluded that

the third definition of “carry”—limited as it was to keeping or having something on one’s

person—could not be the definition because the text itself stated that the pistol need not be

“on” the person. That definition ignored the word “about” in the provision. Id. The State

points to no similar textual context (as opposed to the perceived unreasonableness of an

outcome) that eliminates one of the two competing definitions of “touching” in section

609.341, subdivision 11(a)(i).

       Ultimately, as we discuss below, the entire court agrees that Wocelka’s definition

of “touching” is inconsistent with the broad purpose of Minnesota’s criminal sexual

conduct statutes. Our basic disagreement with the concurrence is that we cannot find

that broad purpose stated in the text of the specific section we are interpreting,

section 609.341, subdivision 11. And our conclusion is that our current method of statutory

interpretation does not extend to allow consideration of the broader purpose of 

.341–609.351. That is not to say that the concurrence’s approach is incorrect, but

we are not asked in this case to revisit how we have approached statutory interpretation

questions in recent decades.

                                             2.

       Having concluded that the statute is ambiguous because there are two reasonable

ordinary meanings of the word touching, we turn to other non-textual clues to resolve the

ambiguity. Pakhnyuk, 

. In this case, the purpose of the statute provides




                                             15
the strongest guidance on the Legislature’s intent. See Fordyce v. State, 

,

901 (Minn. 2023) (considering the purpose of a statute in resolving ambiguity).

       A broad purpose of Minnesota’s criminal sexual conduct statutes is to prevent the

harm suffered by persons who are subject to unwanted sexual contact by deterring such

unwanted sexual contact through criminal sanction. The harm to the complainant from

unwanted touching of the person’s intimate parts is the same whether done by a body part

of the perpetrator or an object held by the perpetrator. Wocelka’s narrow definition of

touching does not serve the purpose of Minnesota’s criminal sexual conduct as well as the

State’s broader definition; something the entire court agrees upon.

       Wocelka also asks us to invoke the rule of lenity and interpret the statute as he

proposes. The rule of lenity applies only if ambiguity remains after all the other available

canons of construction are applied and we still have not uncovered what the ambiguous

provision means. State v. Thonesavanh, 

 (Minn. 2017) (stating that

“the rule of lenity applies only after the other canons of construction have been exhausted

and what remains is a grievously ambiguous statute”). After considering the purpose of

Minnesota’s criminal sexual conduct statutes, we do not find the statute so grievously

ambiguous that we must resort to the rule of lenity.

       In sum, applying the proper meaning of “touching” in section 609.341,

subdivision 11, we hold that section 609.343, subdivision 1, prohibits an actor’s use of an

object to make contact with a complainant’s intimate parts.




                                            16
                                             C.

       Wocelka appeals his conviction solely on statutory interpretation grounds. He does

not claim that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he touched his daughter’s

intimate parts with an object. Nor does he raise any argument that he did not have the

required “sexual or aggressive intent.” See 

, subd. 11(a) (2018).

Because the jury found that he touched his daughter’s intimate parts with a toy, Wocelka

violated section 609.343, subdivision 1(a), and we affirm his conviction.

                                      CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

       Affirmed.



       HENNESY, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission,

took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.




                                             17
                                  C O N C U R R E NC E

MCKEIG, Justice (concurring).

       I agree with the result of the court’s opinion and join Parts A and C, which affirms

the holding that the evidence in this case was sufficient to show that Sean Michael

Wocelka’s conduct was “touching” within the meaning of the sexual-contact definition in

Minnesota Statutes section 609.341, subdivision 11 (2022). I disagree, however, with the

conclusion that the term “touching” is ambiguous because the only reasonable

interpretation of the term in its statutory context is a broad, common-sense definition. For

this reason, I respectfully concur.

       Wocelka was found guilty of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct

for visiting his young daughter’s bedroom when he thought she was sleeping and touching

her bare vagina with a toy giraffe. See 

, subd. 1(a), (g) (2020). An

element of those crimes requires “sexual contact with another person.” 

 “Sexual

contact,” for purposes of Wocelka’s crimes and of his appeal to this court, is defined as

“the intentional touching by the actor of the complainant’s intimate parts.” 

, subd. 11(a)(i) (emphasis added). The parties disagree on the meaning of the

term “touching,” which has no statutory definition, so we must engage in statutory

interpretation to discern its meaning.

       Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. State v. Abdus-Salam,

1 N.W.3d 871, 874 (Minn. 2024). “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws

is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” 

 (2022).

If the Legislature’s intent “is clear from the statute’s plain and unambiguous language, then


                                             C-1
we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning.” State v. Cummings, 2 N.W.3d 528,

533 (Minn. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). We find statutory

language to be unambiguous if it has only one reasonable interpretation. Abdus-Salam, 1

N.W.3d at 877.

       The State and Wocelka offer different definitions of the word “touch.” 1 The State

proposes a broad definition to mean, simply, bringing something into contact with

something else. All members of the court agree that the State’s definition is reasonable.

Wocelka claims that an alternative reasonable interpretation of the word “touch” requires

that the actor’s own body part physically come into contact with the complainant’s intimate

parts, and that the actor must experience a “sense of feeling” to have “touched” the

complainant under Minnesota’s criminal sexual conduct definitions. Although the court

comes to the appropriate conclusion today of affirming Wocelka’s guilt, the court’s opinion

also finds Wocelka’s definition of the word “touch” in the statutory definition section of

criminal sexual conduct to be reasonable, and the term to therefore be ambiguous.

       The court’s opinion bases its finding of ambiguity solely on the fact that dictionaries

offer differing commonly understood and accepted definitions of the word “touch,” and its

analysis goes no deeper than simply acknowledging that multiple, common definitions

exist for the word. I agree that Wocelka provides a definition of the word “touch” that is

commonly understood and accepted. But I do not agree that this is enough for the court to


1
      The term, as used in the statute, is technically the active form: “touching.” See

, subd. 11(a)(i) (2022). However, the parties analyze and often refer
more generally to the root word “touch.” Here, I use the terms interchangeably.


                                            C-2
find ambiguity. By relying on dictionary definitions alone, finding the State’s arguments

regarding Wocelka’s interpretation unavailing, and summarily declaring ambiguity, the

analysis in the court’s opinion does not engage with the statutory context informing the

meaning of the word at issue or our other pre-ambiguity canons of statutory interpretation.

In other words, the court’s opinion rejects certain arguments that suggest Wocelka’s

definition is unreasonable, but never quite explains how his preferred definition is

reasonable—other than citing its presence in a dictionary.

       When interpreting statutes, we must construe words and phrases “according to rules

of grammar and according to their common and approved usage,” unless such “observance

would involve a construction . . . repugnant to the context of the statute.” 

(1) (2022) (emphasis added). The whole-statute canon explains this concept, and

“provides that a statute should be read and construed as a whole so as to harmonize and

give effect to all its parts.” State v. Johnson, 

, 160 (Minn. 2023); see also

State v. Friese, 

, 212 (Minn. 2021)). Because this canon applies when

determining whether statutory language is ambiguous, it is a pre-ambiguity canon. See

State v. Beganovic, 

, 645 (Minn. 2023).

       When looking for ambiguity, we often turn to dictionaries to find reasonable

interpretations. See Abdus-Salam, 1 N.W.3d at 877. To that end, when determining which

of multiple “dictionary definitions apply, we consider the statutory context.” Johnson, 995

N.W.2d at 160. But we must also “set aside dictionary definitions when context makes

clear that dictionary definitions may not fit.” State v. Scovel, 

 (Minn.

2018) (emphasis added); see also City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship,


                                           C-3


 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“[W]e must not look simply

at a dictionary definition . . . . Instead, we must assess whether applying the dictionary

definition makes sense in context.”).      Accordingly, when determining the common

meaning of a word as it relates to the statute in which it is found, the “words of a statute

are to be viewed in their setting, not isolated from their context.” Chiodo v. Bd. of Educ.

of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 

 (Minn. 1974). Because Wocelka’s

dictionary-supported interpretation of the word “touch” is simply not reasonable in the

context of the whole statute in which it is found, I disagree with the conclusion that the

term is ambiguous.

       Our analysis in State v. Alarcon, 

, 645–47 (Minn. 2019), is

instructive, where we analyzed the phrase “leaves a primary address.” See 

, subd. 3a(a) (2018). The term “leave” was found to have more than one logical

dictionary definition—either a permanent departure or a temporary one—so we were

required to “look beyond the dictionary to ascertain what the Legislature meant by the

phrase.” Alarcon, 

. There, we found separate provisions in Minnesota

Statutes section 243.166 (2018), to be helpful when analyzing the language at issue.

Alarcon, 

. First, the court considered that the statute only applied if a

person “leaves a primary address and does not have a new primary address.” Alarcon, 

. We reasoned that “for an offender to leave a primary address and no longer

have a primary address, the circumstances of his departure must show that his living

arrangement at the address has ended.” 

 Also, the inclusion of a distinction between a

“primary address” and a “secondary address” in the statute was indicative of the


                                            C-4
Legislature’s intent that those addresses be considered distinct from one another, which

supported the “permanent” interpretation of “leave.” 

 We ultimately concluded that the

term “leaves” in the context of the statute unambiguously meant a permanent departure—

despite dictionary definitions that suggested otherwise. 

       Here, analyzing the entire phrase at issue is also helpful. As noted, “sexual contact”

is defined, in part, as “the intentional touching by the actor of the complainant’s intimate

parts.” 

, subd. 11(a)(i) (emphasis added). Wocelka focuses on only

his sensations and body parts, which reads the complainant and their intimate parts out of

the definition almost entirely. Whether a complainant is touched on their intimate parts

with a hand or with a toy makes no difference to whether the complainant’s intimate parts

were touched or whether the actor did that touching. According to the court’s opinion, my

argument is that Wocelka’s interpretation would “mean that contact with the complainant’s

intimate parts becomes irrelevant to the analysis”—but that misses the point. If, as the

court’s opinion suggests, the Legislature may have “required two things: (1) intentional

contact by a body part of the perpetrator so as to feel and (2) the body part made contact

with the complainant’s intimate parts,” the complainant’s body part would still have to be

touched. If we accept Wocelka’s definition as reasonable, we then find reasonable the idea

that a person could put on a pair of gloves, prod a complainant’s intimate parts, and be

found not to have “touched” them under the plain language of the statute. That, to me,

stretches reasonability beyond its outer limits. 2


2
       Wocelka’s interpretation raises the question: if a father causes a toy giraffe to come
into contact with his daughter’s vagina, was she even touched?

                                             C-5
       Delving further into absurdity, Wocelka argues that “[w]hen an actor brings an

object into contact with the complainant’s intimate parts, the touching has been done by

the object, not ‘by the actor.’ ” See 

, subd. 11(a)(i). If a complainant

was touched in their intimate parts by something other than a body part, this interpretation

would illogically transform the inanimate object into the “actor,” and seemingly absolve

the actual actor of any affirmative act.

       Additionally, if the Legislature had intended for the touching to be limited to only

an offender’s body part, it could have simply said so. Under the statutory definition,

“sexual contact” may also include “the intentional touching with seminal fluid or sperm by

the actor of the complainant’s body or the clothing covering the complainant’s body,” so

the Legislature clearly knows how to specify when touching with a specific “thing” is

essential. 

, subd. 11(a)(v). This clear specification—which also

requires the act of “touching”—effectively narrows what thing the actor must cause to

come into contact with the complainant. Notably absent in subdivision 11(a)(i) is any

similar narrowing, nor present is the crucial “with” found in subdivision 11(a)(v). The

definition at issue does not specify intentional touching by the actor with anything in

particular, instead requiring a broad, unrestricted interpretation. See 

,

subd. 11(a)(i). We interpret the omission of language from one provision of a statute which

exists in a distinct, similar provision as “intentional and decline to add . . . words where the

Legislature did not.” State v. Schwartz, 

, 419 (Minn. 2021). 3 To narrow


3
      Note that the Legislature has specified precisely the broad definition that the State
proposes in the “sexual penetration” definition. There, “any intrusion however slight into

                                              C-6
the “touching” in section 609.341, subdivision 11(a)(i) to anything other than the causing

of a physical object to come into contact with the complainant’s intimate parts

inappropriately adds a restriction that is simply not present in the statute.

       Ultimately, the court comes to the correct conclusion today. After all, the purpose

behind the criminal sexual assault statutes—to protect complainants from sexual assault—

shows that the object with which an actor touches a complainant’s intimate parts is

irrelevant when finding that criminal “sexual contact” has occurred. 4 But performing a

post-ambiguity purpose analysis is unnecessary because, based on the context of the statute

in which it is found, the only reasonable interpretation of “touching” in Minnesota Statutes

section 609.341, subdivision 11(a)(i), is the broad, plain-language definition “to bring

something into contact with.”




the genital or anal openings . . . of the complainant’s body by any part of the actor’s body
or any object used by the actor for this purpose” is considered sexual penetration. 

, subd. 12(2)(i) (2022) (emphasis added). If this language had been included
in the “sexual contact” definition at issue, this discussion would obviously be unnecessary.
But I would argue that the meaning of “intrusion” is less obvious than “touching” in this
context, so the further explanation by the Legislature in the “sexual penetration” definition
makes sense.
4
       The court also claims that my argument is simply that “it is unreasonable to think
that the Legislature would have enacted, and the Governor would have signed, a statute
that so limited the meaning of ‘sexual contact.’ ” It is, in fact, true that this would be
unreasonable, but it is unclear where, exactly, in this writing I have considered the
Legislature’s or the Governor’s thoughts, or the purpose behind Minnesota’s sexual assault
statutes—apart from the lone sentence this footnote appends. My argument focuses solely
on whether Wocelka’s definition is reasonable within the context of the statute itself. But
because his definition is simply not reasonable, considering the purpose of the statute is
unnecessary.

                                             C-7
CHUTICH, Justice (concurring).

      I join Parts A and C of the majority opinion and in the concurrence of Justice

McKeig.



MOORE, III, Justice (concurring).

      I join Parts A and C of the majority opinion and in the concurrence of Justice

McKeig.




                                       C-8