STATE OF MINNESOTA

                                  IN SUPREME COURT

                                      A24-0548
                                      A24-0549

Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals                                 Procaccini, J.

Bobby Lykins, by George Duranske,
conservator,

                    Respondent,

vs.                                                             Filed: May 21, 2025
                                                           Office of Appellate Courts
Anderson Contracting, Inc., and
SFM Mutual Insurance Co.,

                    Relators (A24-0548).

Bobby Lykins, by John Hoscheid,
conservator,

                    Relator,

vs.

Anderson Contracting, Inc., and
SFM Mutual Insurance Co.,

                    Respondents (A24-0549).

                               ________________________


John P. Bailey, Bailey Law Offices, Ltd., Bemidji, Minnesota, for respondent Bobby
Lykins, by George Duranske, conservator, and relator Bobby Lykins, by John Hoscheid,
conservator.

Timothy P. Jung, Rebecca M. Scepaniak, Lind, Jensen, Sullivan & Peterson P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, for relators/respondents Anderson Contracting, Inc., and SFM
Mutual Insurance Co.


                                           1
David O. Nirenstein, Sydney J. Harris, Fitch Johnson Larson, P.A., Roseville, Minnesota,
for amicus curiae Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association.

                              ________________________

SYLLABUS

      1.     The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals has discretion under

Minnesota Statutes section 176.521, subdivision 3 (2024), to set aside a workers’

compensation award made upon a settlement that is not valid under section 176.521,

subdivision 1(a) (2024).

      2.     Substantial evidence in the employee’s petition to set aside an award

supported a prima facie showing that the employee was an incapacitated person when he

signed agreements to settle his workers’ compensation claims.

      3.     Minnesota Statutes section 176.092, subdivision 3 (2024), does not apply

when the employee already has a conservator.

      4.     In a workers’ compensation proceeding involving allegations that an

employee was an incapacitated person when they signed a workers’ compensation

settlement, the workers’ compensation courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to determine

whether the employee was incapacitated.

      Affirmed in part; vacated in part.

OPINION

PROCACCINI, Justice.

      The parties ask us to clarify how the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals

(WCCA) should address an employee’s claims that they were incapacitated and did not



                                            2
have the benefit of a conservator when they settled their workers’ compensation claims. In

2015, Bobby Lykins suffered life-changing physical and cognitive injuries due to an

explosion at work. In 2017, Lykins, his employer, and his employer’s insurer, agreed to a

workers’ compensation-related settlement. Roughly a year later, the parties agreed to an

addendum to supplement the original settlement.         Each time, a compensation judge

approved and issued an award based on the parties’ agreement. In 2022, the district court

appointed a conservator for Lykins. The conservator petitioned the WCCA to set aside the

settlements. The petition alleged that the settlements between the parties are invalid or

should be set aside based on fraud because, when the parties signed the settlements and

submitted them to the court, the attorneys failed to abide by certain statutory safeguards

designed to protect the interests of incapacitated employees. See 

,

subds. 1, 3 (2024); 

, subds. 1(a), 3 (2024); 

(2024).

       After a hearing on the petition, the WCCA decided that further fact-finding by a

compensation judge was necessary to address the issues presented. Specifically, the

WCCA directed a compensation judge to determine whether Lykins appeared to be

incapacitated at the time of the settlements and, if so, to refer the matter to district court

for a determination of incapacity. Both parties have appealed and, for different reasons,

dispute the WCCA’s directions to the compensation judge. We take this opportunity to

clarify the statutory requirements in a situation like this, affirming the WCCA’s decision

to refer the matter to a compensation judge for fact-finding but vacating the part of the

WCCA’s decision contemplating referral to district court.


                                              3
                                          FACTS

       Bobby Lykins’s life changed in September 2015, when he suffered a traumatic

brain injury and other physical injuries from an explosion. His injuries required extensive

medical care and supervision. Because the explosion happened while he was working, he

was eligible for workers’ compensation benefits. See 

, subd. 1 (2024)

(“Every employer . . . is liable to pay compensation in every case of personal injury or

death of an employee arising out of and in the course of employment . . . .”). Attorney Van

R. Ellig was retained to pursue workers’ compensation for Lykins.

       Lykins’s employer, Anderson Contracting, Inc., and its insurer, SFM Mutual

Insurance Co., (collectively, Anderson) admitted liability for the injuries and paid

temporary total disability benefits, medical expenses, and nursing services of $5,000 per

month to Lykins’s wife. Ultimately, the parties disagreed about the amount of home

nursing care that Lykins needed. Anderson requested that Mitchell Disability Assessments

conduct a home care evaluation and prepare a report. A September 2016 report from

Mitchell Disability Assessments stated that Lykins did not need constant supervision at

home but did need supervision and assistance for around 25 hours per week due to his

cognitive deficits. The report also noted that Lykins’s cognition had improved earlier in

the year, while his physical abilities had declined.

       Two doctors who examined and treated Lykins after the accident—Dr. Anthony

Odland and Dr. Jesse Heuer—expressed opinions that appeared to contradict the report

from Mitchell Disability Assessments. In an October 2016 report, Dr. Heuer—Lykins’s




                                              4
primary physician—wrote that Lykins suffered from left-sided hemineglect, 1 had

difficulties with executive functioning, and needed continuous supervision.             In an

April 2016 report, Dr. Odland—a clinical neuropsychologist—opined that Lykins

had significant impairments in complex attention, processing speed, and executive

functioning—including      “decreased     insight/self-awareness,     mental     flexibility,

disinhibition, [and] complex problem solving.”         Dr. Odland highlighted Lykins’s

behavioral issues, which included frustration, impulsivity, and irritability.              In

February 2017, Dr. Odland concluded that “the quality and severity of persistent residual

cognitive and behavioral/psychiatric symptoms from [Lykins’s] September 2015 head

injury are severe and debilitating, and will require that he receive 24/7 supervision and

supportive services on a long-term basis.”              Dr. Odland reiterated similar

conclusions—including an opinion that Lykins would require 24/7 care for the rest of his

life—in a March 2017 letter to attorney Ellig.

      Unable to agree on the necessary amount of home nursing care, the parties attended

a mediation in April 2017. Summarizing the mediation results in an email, the mediator



1
      “Hemineglect” or “hemispatial neglect” is:

      a common disabling condition following unilateral brain damage
      . . . . Patients with neglect often fail to be aware of or acknowledge items on
      their contralesional side (the left side for patients with right brain damage)
      and attend instead to items towards the same side as their brain
      damage—their ipsilesional side. Their neglect may be so profound that they
      are unaware of large objects, or even people, in extrapersonal space.

A. Parton, P. Malhotra & M. Husain, Hemispatial Neglect, 75 J. Neurology, Neurosurgery
& Psychiatry, Jan. 2004 at 13, 13.

                                            5
noted that the parties had reached a tentative settlement of $630,000 and that Anderson’s

attorney, Thomas Davern, would discuss the proposed terms with the insurer, SFM. The

mediator also stated that the parties would stipulate to the reasonableness of attorney Ellig’s

excess fees given the complexity of the issues and Lykins’s “intense need for guidance and

support throughout this process.” Less than a month later, however, the parties agreed to

settle the case for $438,000—a sum that was $192,000 less than the tentative amount set

at the mediation.

       The parties’ agreement included a full, final, and complete settlement of all past

or future claims for: “temporary total disability, temporary partial disability, permanent

impairment/permanent partial disability, permanent total disability . . . and nursing

services by either a family member or custodial service.” The settlement also included a

stipulation of $93,000 for Ellig’s fees divided into three categories: $26,000 in contingency

fees; $55,000 in excess fees; and $12,000 in non-contingent Roraff fees. 2 The parties

agreed that the contingency fees and the excess fees would be subtracted from the $438,000

payment to Lykins, but the Roraff fees would be paid by Anderson.

       On May 18, 2017, Ellig sent Davern a letter requesting that, when filing the

settlement with the compensation judge, Davern include “the Statement of Attorney Fees

and Excess Fee Exhibit with several attachments” (the Statement and Exhibits) as an

attachment. Ellig’s letter stated that he had attached the Statement and Exhibits to the



2
       Roraff fees are “fees based on and related to the recovery of medical expenses.”
Irwin v. Surdyk’s Liquor, 

 (Minn. 1999); see also Roraff v. State,
Dep’t of Transp., 

 (Minn. 1980).

                                              6
letter. The Statement and Exhibits included: Lykins’s retainer agreements with Ellig; a

form titled “Excess Fee Exhibit”; Dr. Heuer’s October 2016 Report; and a note from a

Qualified Rehabilitation Consultant opining that Ellig had shown professionalism in

handling Lykins’s workers’ compensation claim. On May 19, 2017, Davern submitted the

settlement, initialed by Lykins, to the compensation judge with a cover letter. Attachments

to the settlement submitted to the compensation judge included: notices of intervention; a

ledger of nursing services payments made to Lykins’s wife; and the report from Mitchell

Disability Assessments. Davern did not attach the Statement and Exhibits, or any medical

records, to the settlement. Davern’s cover letter expressed support for the excess fees

included in the settlement due to the complexity of the matter and the time that Ellig spent

helping Lykins, whom Davern called “a confused and upset client.”

       The compensation judge approved the settlement and issued an award on May 22,

2017. That same day, Ellig filed a request for excess fees, including the Statement and

Exhibits, with the Workers’ Compensation Division of the Department of Labor and

Industry.

       In 2018, the parties agreed to an addendum to the settlement. Anderson agreed “to

purchase one pair of hearing aids for [Lykins]” and to pay an additional $1,000 in Roraff

fees to Ellig.

       In July 2022, attorney John Bailey petitioned for appointment of a conservator to

represent Lykins in proceedings before the WCCA and the Office of Administrative




                                             7
Hearings.    The district court approved the appointment of a conservator 3 for those

proceedings as well as “in any other litigation that may be undertaken on [Lykins’s]

behalf,” effective September 22, 2022.

       On August 30, 2023, Conservator filed a petition asking the WCCA to set aside the

2017 settlement and the 2018 addendum (collectively, the Settlements). 4 Conservator

asserted two reasons for setting aside the Settlements. First, Conservator alleged that the

Settlements are invalid because, when Lykins signed them, he was an incapacitated person

and could not settle his claims without a conservator. See 

, subd. 1(a)

(stating that a settlement is “not valid if a . . . conservator is required under section 176.092

and an employee . . . has no . . . conservator”); 

, subd. 1 (requiring a

conservator for an injured employee who is an “incapacitated person”).                  Second,

Conservator alleged that Anderson’s failure to file relevant medical reports with the

proposed settlement amounted to fraud by omission, which was cause to set aside the

Settlements under Minnesota Statutes section 176.461. See 

 (stating

that the WCCA may set aside a workers’ compensation award and grant a new hearing “for



3
      The district court initially appointed George Duranske as Lykins’s conservator. It
appears that John Hoscheid has since replaced Duranske as Lykins’s conservator. We refer
to Duranske and Hoscheid collectively as “Conservator.”
4
       The WCCA hears petitions to set aside awards in the first instance. 

, subd. 3. The WCCA reviews the facts in the record during such proceedings.
Hudson v. Trillium Staffing, 

 (Minn. 2017) (reviewing the WCCA’s
decision on a petition to set aside an award to ensure the WCCA’s decision is not
inconsistent with the facts in the record). As happened here, the WCCA may also refer the
matter for additional fact-finding by a compensation judge. See 

,
subd. 3; 

, subd. 1 (2024).

                                               8
cause” and defining “for cause” to include “fraud”). Conservator asserted that, had those

medical reports been filed before the approval of the Settlements, the compensation judge

would have referred the matter to district court for consideration of appointment of a

conservator under Minnesota Statutes section 176.092, subdivision 3.

      Anderson responded, denying both claims. Anderson filed exhibits that it alleges

show that Lykins was not incapacitated when he signed the Settlements.

      After a hearing, the WCCA concluded that “[t]he evidence submitted with the

petition . . . raises significant questions of fact regarding [Lykins’s] capacity” when he

signed the Settlements. Lykins v. Anderson Contracting, Inc., No. WC23-6532, 

, at *5 (Minn. WCCA Mar. 8, 2024). The WCCA recognized that “[u]nder

Minnesota workers’ compensation law”—specifically Minnesota Statutes section 176.521,

subdivision 1(a)—“an ‘agreement to settle any claim is not valid if . . . a conservator is

required under section 176.092 and an employee has no . . . conservator.’ ” 

 at *4

(quoting 

, subd. 1(a)); see also 

, subd. 1

(requiring a conservator for an injured employee who is an “incapacitated person”). As a

result, the WCCA determined that it could not address the issues presented in the petition

without first knowing whether Lykins was in fact incapacitated when he signed the

Settlements. 

 To get an answer to that question, the WCCA referred the matter for

fact-finding by a compensation judge. 5 

 The WCCA further instructed that, if the


5
       The WCCA recognized that it had authority to refer the matter for factual findings
to a compensation judge under Minnesota Statutes section 176.381, subdivision 1 (2024).
Minnesota Statutes section 176.521, subdivision 3, provides similar authority specific to
the context of setting aside an award made upon settlement.

                                            9
compensation judge were to conclude that Lykins appeared to lack capacity at the time the

Settlements were signed, the compensation judge “shall refer the matter to district

court . . . for a determination of whether [Lykins] was in fact incapacitated at the time of

the [Settlements].” 

 The WCCA explained that, under Minnesota Statutes section

176.092, subdivision 3, “the compensation judge has jurisdiction to refer the matter to

district court for a determination of whether the employee was incapacitated and in need

of a conservator at the time of the settlements.” 

 Given its decision to refer the matter

for fact-finding, the WCCA did not address the merits of Conservator’s claims.

       Both sides appealed the WCCA’s order on different grounds, asking for clarity and

challenging the authority of the WCCA to issue the order as drafted.

                                       ANALYSIS

       This case requires us to examine the interplay between several provisions of the

Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), Minnesota Statutes chapter 176 (2024), which

governs workers’ compensation claims.        The Act allows parties to settle workers’

compensation claims, subject to certain conditions and requirements.           

. The Act governs the validity of a workers’ compensation settlement between

an employee and an employer and sets forth the procedure by which such agreements may

be set aside. 

 Minnesota Statutes section 176.521, subdivision 1(a), sets forth the

requirements for a valid settlement agreement. In relevant part, subdivision 1(a) provides

that an agreement between an employee and employer or insurer to settle a work-related

injury claim is “not valid if a guardian or conservator is required under section 176.092

and an employee or dependent has no guardian or conservator.” 

,


                                            10
subd. 1(a). Subdivision 2 sets out the procedure for approval of a proposed settlement by

the commissioner, a compensation judge, or the district court. 

,

subd. 2. Subdivision 2 requires that “[s]ettlements shall be approved only if the terms

conform with this chapter.” 

, subd. 2. Subdivision 3 authorizes the

WCCA to “set aside an award made upon a settlement, pursuant to” the Act—even after a

settlement agreement is approved and benefits are awarded. 

, subd. 3.

Subdivision 3 also authorizes the WCCA to “refer the matter to the chief administrative

law judge for assignment to a compensation judge for hearing.” 

       The parties challenge the WCCA’s order on various bases. We start by addressing

Anderson’s contentions that the WCCA erred when it requested additional fact-finding

because, as a matter of law, the petition and evidence fail to establish grounds for setting

aside the Settlements. Because we conclude that the WCCA did not err when it requested

fact-finding, we then address whether the WCCA erred when it ordered a referral to the

district court to determine whether Lykins was incapacitated when he signed the

Settlements. 6 We further conclude that the evidence submitted to support the petition to


6
        The parties also ask us to clarify and then rule on the ultimate issues presented in
this case: whether the award should be set aside, either due to Lykins’ incapacity when he
signed the Settlements or because the Settlements were the result of fraud. But the WCCA
itself has not yet answered those questions. The WCCA “is a specialized agency of the
executive branch, its members selected for their experience and expertise . . . .”
Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 

 (Minn. 1984). In recognition of
the WCCA’s expertise—and also because the WCCA has yet to consider the ultimate
issues of this case and a compensation judge has yet to conduct the contemplated
fact-finding—our decision is limited to those issues that the WCCA has decided. See Lipka
v. Minn. Sch. Emps. Ass’n, Local 1980, 

 (Minn. 1996) (stating that
“judicial restraint bids us to refrain from deciding any issue not essential to the disposition
of the particular controversy before us”).

                                              11
set aside the awards made a sufficient prima facie showing that Lykins was incapacitated

when he signed the Settlements.       The WCCA, however, incorrectly concluded that

Minnesota Statutes section 176.092, subdivision 3, requires a compensation judge to refer

the issue to the district court under these circumstances. Instead, the WCCA should have

referred the matter to a compensation judge for a determination of Lykins’s capacity when

he signed the Settlements.

                                             I.

       Conservator’s petition presented the WCCA with two paths to set aside the

award: The WCCA could conclude that the Settlements are invalid under Minnesota

Statutes section 176.521, subdivision 1(a), or it could set them aside “for cause” under

Minnesota Statutes section 176.461. Both paths work in operation with Minnesota statutes

section 176.521, subdivision 3, which states that “upon the filing of a petition by any party

to the settlement, the [WCCA] may set aside an award made upon a settlement, pursuant

to this chapter.”   The basis of the first path, Minnesota Statutes section 176.521,

subdivision 1(a), provides that an agreement to settle “is not valid if a guardian or

conservator is required under section 176.092 and an employee or dependent has no

guardian or conservator.”     The second path is rooted in Minnesota Statutes section

176.461(a), which authorizes the WCCA to set aside a workers’ compensation award and

grant a new hearing “for cause.” Section 176.461(b) limits the phrase “for cause” to four

circumstances: “(1) a mutual mistake of fact; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; or

(4) a substantial change in medical condition since the time of the award that was clearly

not anticipated and could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of the award.”


                                             12
       Anderson argues that the WCCA erred when it requested fact-finding because the

petition and evidence submitted fail as a matter of law to establish that the Settlements are

invalid under section 176.521, subdivision 1(a), or that the Settlements should be set aside

for cause under section 176.461. As we have long recognized, one way a party may seek

relief under section 176.521, subdivision 3, is by petitioning the WCCA to set aside an

award made upon a settlement for cause under section 176.461. See Maurer v. Braun’s

Locker Plant, 

, 441–42 (Minn. 1980). But we have not yet had the

opportunity to consider whether establishing “cause” under section 176.461 is the only way

the WCCA may set aside an award made upon a settlement under section 176.521,

subdivision 3. For that reason, we turn our attention to clarifying whether Minnesota

Statutes section 176.521, subdivision 3, authorizes the WCCA to set aside an award

because it is invalid under section 176.521, subdivision 1(a). 7

       To resolve this issue, we must interpret section 176.521, subdivision 3, which

provides that “upon the filing of a petition by any party to the settlement, the [WCCA] may

set aside an award made upon a settlement, pursuant to this chapter.” Our goal is to

“ascertain and effectuate the intention of the [L]egislature.”         State v. Beganovic,

, 643 (Minn. 2023) (citing 

 (2024)). “To do so, we



7
       Neither party squarely addresses this threshold issue. But it is important because
the WCCA’s referral order appears to rest upon the language in Minnesota Statutes section
176.521, subdivision 1(a), stating that a settlement agreement is not valid if the employee
has no conservator when one is required. We address this issue in reliance on our inherent
authority to consider issues raised below but “not articulated in precisely the manner
necessary to clearly present the issues for appellate review.” Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth.
v. Anda, 

 (Minn. 2010).

                                             13
first examine the plain meaning of the text—the word[s’] plain and ordinary meaning . . . .”

Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d at 643. An application of our tools of statutory interpretation

shows that the language in subdivision 3 gives the WCCA discretion to set aside an award

that is “not valid” under Minnesota Statutes section 176.521, subdivision 1(a).

       To start, subdivision 3 broadly authorizes the WCCA to use its discretion to set aside

awards made upon settlement “pursuant to” the Act. 

, subd. 3; see

Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d at 643 (noting that a term in a statute “is to be read broadly” where

the term “is not modified or limited in any way”). There is no dispute here that Conservator

seeks to set aside the Settlements based on section 176.521, subdivision 1(a), a provision

within the Act.

       And the scope of section 176.521, subdivision 3, becomes even clearer when we

consider it alongside section 176.461. When two statutes “were enacted at the same time

and for the same purpose, we may properly consider both in our effort to understand the

plain language of the statute.” Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d at 645. Here, both statutes were

adopted at the same time as part of the same enactment and for the same purpose—to

provide a means for seeking relief from a workers’ compensation award. See Act of

Apr. 24, 1953, ch. 755, §§ 63, 69, 

, 1146–47, 1150 (codified as

amended at 

, subd. 3 (2024); 

 (2024)). Because

the Legislature enacted the two statutes at the same time and for the same purpose, “it is

reasonable to assume that all of the provisions inform the legislators’ understanding of the

text of the statute[s].” Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d at 645.




                                             14
       If the Legislature intended to restrict the “pursuant to” language in section 176.521,

subdivision 3, solely to section 176.461, “the Legislature would have taken a much more

direct path to do so.” Buzzell v. Walz, 

, 265 (Minn. 2022); see Sterry v.

Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 8 N.W.3d 224, 234 (Minn. 2024) (rejecting an interpretation because

“[i]f the Legislature had intended [to adopt such an interpretation], it would be reasonable

to expect it would have done so in the language of the statute”). Although the Legislature

could have written the statute to limit the WCCA’s ability to set aside an award solely to

the provisions of section 176.461, it did not do so. “When a question of statutory

construction involves a failure of expression rather than an ambiguity of expression, courts

are not free to substitute amendment for construction and thereby supply the omissions of

the [L]egislature.” Botler v. Wagner Greenhouses, 

 (Minn. 2008)

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). And “[w]e will not read into the

statute any modifying or limiting language.” Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d at 643 (citing Gen.

Mills, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 

 (Minn. 2019) (noting that we

cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted)).

Interpreting the “pursuant to” language in section 176.521, subdivision 3, solely as a

reference to section 176.461 “works too hard and unduly strains the ordinary meaning

of the language adopted by the Legislature.”        State v. Fugalli, 

, 78

(Minn. 2021).

       Section 176.521, subdivision 1(a), also guides our interpretation of subdivision 3.

When it was enacted in 1953, it contemplated that certain agreements were not “valid.”

The Legislature understood that certain agreements were not “valid” when it passed


                                             15
subdivision 3, because it passed both provisions at the same time. Act of Apr. 24, 1953,

ch. 755, § 69, 

, 1149–50 (codified as amended at 

, subds. 1(a), 3); cf. Nash v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 4 N.W.3d 812, 819

(Minn. 2024) (“The Legislature plainly understood the rule set forth in [Minnesota Statutes

section 171.177,] subdivision 2—the Legislature enacted the language at the same time it

enacted [Minnesota Statutes section 171.177,] subdivision 1.”). The requirements in

subdivision 1(a), declaring only certain agreements “valid,” would lose their intended

effect if a party could not enforce them by requesting that the WCCA set aside an invalid

award. This cannot be what the Legislature intended. Because we interpret statutes to give

effect to all of their provisions, our interpretation of subdivision 3 is necessary to give effect

to the requirements in subdivision 1(a).

       In a similar vein, interpreting section 176.521, subdivision 3, as limiting the

WCCA’s ability to set aside an award only “for cause” under section 176.461 risks

rendering subdivision 3 superfluous. If the Legislature had intended to narrow the relief

available under section 176.521, subdivision 3, to include only the relief available under

section 176.461, the Legislature could have stated as much—either in section 176.461 or

in section 176.521, subdivision 3—or it could have omitted section 176.521, subdivision

3, altogether. See Buzzell, 974 N.W.2d at 265; Nash, 4 N.W.3d at 819. But the Legislature

did not do so. Instead, the Legislature enacted both section 176.521, subdivision 3, and

section 176.461, and we must give effect to both provisions.

       In recognition of the broad language of Minnesota Statutes section 176.521,

subdivision 3 (that the WCCA may set aside an award made upon a settlement pursuant to


                                               16
chapter 176) and the plain language of section 176.521, subdivision 1(a) (that “[a]n

agreement to settle any claim is not valid if a guardian or conservator is required under

section 176.092 and an employee or dependent has no guardian or conservator”), we

conclude that the WCCA may set aside an award made upon a settlement under section

176.521, subdivision 3, when the settlement is invalid under section 176.521, subdivision

1(a). 8

                                             II.

          Because we conclude that Minnesota Statutes section 176.521, subdivisions 1(a)

and 3, allow the WCCA to set aside an award upon an invalid settlement, we next turn to

Anderson’s argument that the WCCA erred when it found that Conservator made a prima

facie showing that Lykins was incapacitated when he signed the Settlements.

          We begin by clarifying the applicable law. Minnesota Statutes section 176.521,

subdivision 1(a), provides that “[a]n agreement to settle any claim is not valid if a guardian

or conservator is required under section 176.092 and an employee or dependent has no

guardian or conservator.” Section 176.092, subdivision 1, in turn, addresses when a

conservator is required and does so by incorporating by reference the definition of

“incapacitated person” found in Minnesota Statutes section 524.5-102, subdivision 6.

When conducting its analysis, the WCCA referred to the 2022 version of Minnesota

Statutes section 524.5-102, subdivision 6. Lykins, 

, at *5. Conservator


8
       To be clear, we hold only that the WCCA may set aside an award that is invalid
under section 176.521, subdivision 1(a). We have no occasion to decide, and expressly do
not decide, whether the WCCA’s authority to set aside an award extends beyond invalidity
under section 176.521, subdivision 1(a), and the circumstances set forth in section 176.461.

                                             17
asserts that the WCCA should have applied the version of Minnesota Statutes section

524.5-102, subdivision 6, that was in effect when the parties signed the Settlements in 2017

and 2018. We agree.

       “Where settlements must conform to the law at the time of settlement, the law at the

time of settlement applies for purposes of reopening awards.” Monson v. White Bear

Mitsubishi, 

 (Minn. 2003). Further, when an act incorporates a

provision of another statute, the act includes the language of the incorporated statute as if

it had been written into the act itself. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 

(Minn. 2019). Minnesota Statutes section 176.092, subdivision 1, has not been amended

since the Settlements were signed in 2017 and 2018. But that section incorporates the

definition of “incapacitated person” found in Minnesota Statutes section 524.5-102,

subdivision 6, which the Legislature amended in 2020. See Act of May 16, 2020, ch. 86,

art. 1, § 3, 

, 295. The 2016 version of Minnesota Statutes section

524.5-102, subdivision 6, is the definition relevant here, because it was the definition

incorporated into section 176.092, subdivision 1, at the time of the Settlements.

       Although the WCCA applied the wrong version of the statute, we decline

Conservator’s request that we reverse the WCCA on that basis. The differences between

the 2016 and 2022 versions of the statute are minor. Compare 

,

subd. 6 (2016), with 

, subd. 6 (2022). The WCCA’s findings and

reasoning are applicable to both versions of the statute.

       We next consider Anderson’s argument that the WCCA erred when it concluded

that Conservator made a prima facie showing that Lykins was an incapacitated person when


                                             18
he signed the Settlements. 9 See 

, subd. 6 (2016) (defining an

“incapacitated person” as a person who “lack[s] sufficient understanding or capacity to

make or communicate responsible personal decisions, and who has demonstrated deficits

in behavior which evidence an inability to meet personal needs . . . .”); Monson,

 (requiring a prima facie showing on petition to set aside an award). A

party required to make a prima facie showing must submit evidence or allege facts that, if

unchallenged or accepted as true, would be sufficient to prove that the party is entitled to

the requested relief. State v. Hinckley, 5 N.W.3d 680, 685–86 (Minn. 2024); State v.

Larson, 

 (Minn. 1979).

       Here, when the WCCA referred the question of whether Lykins was an incapacitated

person when he signed the Settlements, it implicitly found that the evidence submitted

made a prima facie showing. And the WCCA expressly found that there was no dispute

that the evidence demonstrated that Lykins could not meet his personal needs when the

Settlements were signed and that there was “compelling evidence in the record to put into



9
        Anderson asserts that allowing a retroactive inquiry into an employee’s capacity at
the time of settlement will require judges to determine an employee’s “appearance” years
after the fact. The amicus brief submitted by the Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association
also raises concerns that this approach will “inject uncertainty” into the settlement process.
Although we appreciate these concerns, our job is to apply the statute as written by the
Legislature. Meils ex rel. Meils v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 

 (Minn. 1984)
(“Since workers’ compensation is solely a creature of statute, policy decisions regarding
the scope of the Workers’ Compensation Act are properly for the [L]egislature . . . .”). The
statutes at issue reflect the “legislative balancing of the interests of employees and
employers.” Profit v. HRT Holdings, 

, 584 (Minn. 2023). Resulting policy
concerns are better addressed to the Legislature. Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc.,

 (Minn. 2003) (“[I]f policy considerations favor a different result, that
determination is more properly left to the [L]egislature to make.”).

                                             19
question whether [Lykins] lacked the understanding or capacity to make personal decisions

at the time of the [Settlements].” Lykins, 

, at *5.

       We review a WCCA order to determine whether its factual findings “were

unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.” 

, subd. 1(3); see also Lagasse v. Horton, 

, 201 (Minn. 2022).

We will disturb those findings “only if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the

findings, it appears that the findings are manifestly contrary to the evidence or that it is

clear reasonable minds would adopt a contrary conclusion.” Sershen v. Metro. Council,

, 7 (Minn. 2022) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here,

the record supports the WCCA’s findings. Most of the documents in the record, including

those submitted by Anderson, consistently reflect that Lykins’s medical providers were

concerned about his cognitive functioning at the relevant time.

       Anderson’s contention that Lykins does not meet the definition of an incapacitated

person because Lykins “participated in numerous court proceedings” without a conservator

does not undermine the WCCA’s determination. With one exception, each of the court

proceedings highlighted by Anderson occurred after Lykins signed the Settlements. These

later proceedings do not conclusively establish Lykins’s capacity when he signed the

Settlements. And it appears from the record that the only court proceeding that occurred

during the relevant time was Lykins’s 2017 bankruptcy. This fact, to the extent that it is

relevant to whether Lykins was an incapacitated person, does not require us to conclude

that the WCCA erred when it found that Conservator made a prima facie showing that

Lykins was an incapacitated person when he signed the Settlements. To accept Anderson’s


                                             20
argument at this stage would require us to weigh conflicting evidence. That task is properly

reserved for the compensation judge. See 

; Lagasse, 982 N.W.2d at

201 (noting that we leave “basic fact-finding to the compensation judge who presides at

the evidentiary hearing” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

       For these reasons, we cannot conclude that the WCCA’s findings—that there is no

dispute that Lykins could not meet his personal needs and there was sufficient evidence in

the record to create a dispute of fact as to Lykins’s capacity to make personal decisions

when he signed the Settlements—are “manifestly contrary to the evidence.” Sershen,

974 N.W.2d at 7 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

                                            III.

       Having determined that the claims alleged in Conservator’s petition to set aside the

award—and the evidence submitted to support those claims—made a prima facie showing

that Lykins was an incapacitated person when he signed the Settlements, we next address

whether the WCCA nonetheless erred in its instructions to the compensation judge. The

WCCA directed that, if the compensation judge makes a preliminary finding that Lykins

appeared to be incapacitated when he signed the Settlements, the compensation judge must

refer the matter to the district court to determine whether Lykins was in fact incapacitated.

The WCCA relied on Minnesota Statutes section 176.092, subdivision 3, in concluding

that the compensation judge must make such a referral. Both parties assert that section

176.092, subdivision 3, does not authorize the WCCA to mandate a referral to district court

to determine whether a conservator should have been appointed in earlier proceedings.




                                             21
       To resolve this issue, we interpret section 176.092, subdivision 3, another question

that we review de novo. Block v. Exterior Remodelers, Inc., 

, 737

(Minn. 2019). We start with the plain meaning of the text. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d at 643.

Minnesota Statutes section 176.092, subdivision 3, requires a compensation judge to make

a referral to the district court when it appears that an employee is incapacitated: “When,

in a proceeding before them, it appears to the . . . compensation judge . . . that an injured

employee . . . [is] an incapacitated person without a guardian or conservator,

the . . . compensation judge, or court of appeals shall refer the matter to district court.”

       The plain language of section 176.092, subdivision 3, limits the compensation

judge’s responsibility and authority to refer a matter to district court to instances

when: (1) in a proceeding before the compensation judge; (2) the employee appears to be

an incapacitated person; and (3) is without a guardian or conservator. This provision does

not contemplate referral to district court when, as is the case here, the issue is whether an

employee who now has a conservator met the definition of an incapacitated person several

years ago. For this reason, we conclude that the WCCA’s instructions to the compensation

judge relied on an incorrect interpretation of the law and that a referral by the compensation

judge to the district court would be improper here.

                                              IV.

       A final question remains: If the referral language in section 176.092, subdivision 3,

does not apply to this situation, may the WCCA and compensation judges (collectively,

the workers’ compensation courts) determine whether Lykins was incapacitated when he

signed the Settlements?


                                              22
       As a threshold matter, the WCCA has clear authority to refer questions of fact to a

compensation judge. Minnesota Statutes section 176.381, subdivision 1, broadly permits

that “[i]n the hearing of any matter before the [WCCA], the chief judge of the [WCCA]

may refer any question of fact . . . for assignment to a compensation judge . . . to hear

evidence and make findings of fact and report them to the [WCCA].” And the statutory

provision giving specific authority to the WCCA to set aside an award made upon a

settlement, further permits that “[i]n appropriate cases, the Workers’ Compensation Court

of Appeals may refer the matter to the chief administrative law judge for assignment to a

compensation judge for hearing.” 

, subd. 3.

       To answer the specific question of whether the workers’ compensation courts may

determine whether Lykins was incapacitated when he signed the Settlements, we must

examine the subject matter jurisdiction of the workers’ compensation courts. This is a

question of law that we review de novo. Giersdorf v. A & M Constr., Inc., 

 (Minn. 2012).

       “Subject matter jurisdiction is the court’s authority to hear the type of dispute at

issue and to grant the type of relief sought.” Musta v. Mendota Heights Dental Ctr.,

, 317 (Minn. 2021) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The subject matter jurisdiction of the workers’ compensation courts is limited by statute

and “does not extend to interpretation of laws outside of legal questions and facts arising

under the workers’ compensation law.” 

. The workers’ compensation courts’

“powers are plenary” in cases arising under the Workers’ Compensation Act, allowing

those courts to hear and determine the legal and factual questions presented by a case.


                                            23
Hagen v. Venem, 

 (Minn. 1985). The workers’ compensation courts

lack authority, however, to construe Minnesota statutes other than the Workers’

Compensation Act.        Martin v. Morrison Trucking, Inc., 

(Minn. 2011); see also Minn. Stat. § 175A.01, subd. 5 (2024). And their jurisdiction “does

not extend to interpreting or applying legislation designed specially for the handling of

claims outside the workers’ compensation system.”           Sundby v. City of St. Peter,

 (Minn. 2005).

       Here, resolution of the issues presented in Conservator’s petition to set aside the

award requires only interpretation and application of the Workers’ Compensation Act. As

discussed above, an agreement to settle workers’ compensation claims is invalid “if a

guardian or conservator is required under section 176.092 and an employee or dependent

has no guardian or conservator.” 

, subd. 1(a). A guardian or

conservator is required when an employee is “an incapacitated person as that term is

defined in section 524.5-102, subdivision 6.” 

, subd. 1. Minnesota

Statutes section 176.092, subdivision 1, incorporates the definition from section 524.5-102,

subdivision 6, into the Act.

       Because the Act incorporates the definition of “incapacitated person,” whether

Lykins was an incapacitated person when he signed the Settlements presents an issue that




                                            24
arises under the Act. 10 For this reason, we conclude that the workers’ compensation courts

have the authority to decide the issue in these circumstances. 11

                                       *       *      *

       In summary, we hold that the WCCA correctly concluded that an evidentiary

hearing can and should be held to determine the fact issues presented. Minnesota Statutes

section 176.521, subdivision 3, authorizes the WCCA to set aside a workers’ compensation


10
       When an employee who is an incapacitated person does not have a conservator, it
makes sense for the compensation judge to make a referral to district court for appointment
of a conservator because the Act does not empower the workers’ compensation courts to
appoint a conservator. See 

, subd. 3. Rather, the district court has
exclusive jurisdiction in the appointment of a conservator. See 

(2024) (establishing the district court’s authority to appoint a conservator based on a
referral under Minnesota Statutes section 176.092, subdivision 3); see also 

 (2024) (establishing the district court’s authority to appoint a conservator
outside of workers’ compensation proceedings).
11
        Anderson also argues that the question of Lykins’s capacity when he signed the
Settlements is not justiciable because it presents a “purely hypothetical question.” In the
unique circumstances presented in this case, we agree that the question of Lykins’s capacity
is likely not a justiciable question before the district court because that question is relevant
only to the resolution of the petition to set aside the awards in Lykins’s workers’
compensation proceedings. Whether Lykins was an incapacitated person is not part of a
case in controversy before the district court—which already determined that Lykins needed
a conservator in 2022. See Winkowski v. Winkowski, 

, 308 n.7 (Minn.
2023) (stating that “Minnesota courts may only hear actual cases and controversies”). That
said, the workers’ compensation courts’ determination of incapacity is necessary to address
the claims raised in Lykins’s petition to set aside the awards. Those claims are based on
Lykins’s assertion of his statutory rights in the Act, and they are capable of specific
resolution by judgment. Onvoy, Inc. v. ALLETE, Inc., 

, 617–18 (Minn.
2007) (“A justiciable controversy exists if the claim (1) involves definite and concrete
assertions of right that emanate from a legal source, (2) involves a genuine conflict in
tangible interests between parties with adverse interests, and (3) is capable of specific
resolution by judgment rather than presenting hypothetical facts that would form an
advisory opinion.”). For these reasons, the question of Lykins’s capacity when he signed
the Settlements is justiciable before the workers’ compensation courts, even though it may
not be justiciable before the district court.

                                              25
award made upon a settlement if the WCCA determines that the settlement is not valid

under section 176.521, subdivision 1(a). Before making such a determination, the WCCA

is also statutorily authorized to refer questions of fact to a compensation judge. But the

WCCA erred when it required the compensation judge to refer the matter to district court

for an ultimate determination of incapacity. Instead, the WCCA should have referred the

matter to a compensation judge to determine whether Lykins was an incapacitated

person—as that term was defined in the 2016 statute—when he signed the Settlements.

See 

, subd. 6 (2016).

                                    CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and vacate in part the decision of the

WCCA. We vacate the WCCA’s instructions to the compensation judge insofar as they

may require referral of the issue of capacity to district court under Minnesota Statutes

section 176.092, subdivision 3. We otherwise affirm the WCCA’s decision.

      Affirmed in part; vacated in part.




                                           26