STATE OF MINNESOTA

                                    IN SUPREME COURT

                                        A23-1511


Court of Appeals                                                               Gaïtas, J.

Carlos Heard,

                      Appellant,

vs.                                                                Filed: June 18, 2025
                                                              Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

                      Respondent.


                              ________________________


Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant State
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth Scoggin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

                              ________________________

SYLLABUS

      1.     Our decisions in State v. Coleman, 

 (Minn. 2021), and State

v. Noor, 

 (Minn. 2021), announced new rules of substantive law

concerning the mental-state element of third-degree depraved-mind murder under




                                           1
Minnesota Statutes section 609.195(a) (2024), which apply retroactively to convictions

that were final when these rules were announced.

       2.     A postconviction petitioner is not required to independently satisfy the

requirements of State v. Knaffla, 

 (Minn. 1976), if the petitioner establishes

that a new interpretation of state law is retroactively applicable to the petitioner’s case in

the first postconviction petition filed after the new interpretation of state law is announced.

       Reversed and remanded.

OPINION

GAÏTAS, Justice.

       In this case, we are asked to decide whether two decisions of this court—State

v. Coleman, 

 (Minn. 2021), and State v. Noor, 

(Minn. 2021)—which address the mental state required for the offense of third-degree

depraved-mind murder, 

(a) (2024)—announced new rules of

substantive law that apply retroactively to convictions for that offense. Appellant Carlos

Heard was convicted of third-degree depraved-mind murder, and his conviction became

final eight years before we issued these decisions.          In 2023, Heard petitioned for

postconviction relief, arguing that Coleman and Noor announced new substantive rules that

retroactively applied to his conviction. Although the postconviction statute generally

prohibits petitions filed more than two years after the entry of a judgment of conviction,

Heard contended that his petition satisfied the statutory exception to the two-year time bar

for new interpretations of law. The district court denied Heard’s petition, and the court of

appeals affirmed. We conclude that our decisions in Coleman and Noor announced new


                                              2
rules of substantive law that apply retroactively to Heard’s conviction and that Heard’s

postconviction petition was timely filed under the new-interpretation-of-law exception to

the statutory time bar. Thus, we reverse the court of appeals’ decision and remand to the

district court with instruction to consider whether the rules announced in Coleman and

Noor affect the validity of Heard’s conviction.

                                          FACTS

       Following a 2011 jury trial, Heard was convicted of third-degree depraved-mind

murder, 

(a) (2004), for shooting and killing his brother during a

struggle over a gun, and second-degree intentional murder, 

, subd. 1(1)

(2004), for killing another person after gaining control of the gun. The district court

sentenced Heard to 313 months in prison for second-degree intentional murder and a

consecutive prison term of 180 months for third-degree depraved-mind murder.

Heard directly appealed to the court of appeals, challenging only the district court’s

decision to allow impeachment evidence at his trial. The court of appeals affirmed

Heard’s convictions, and this court denied review. See State v. Heard, No. A11-1628,

, at *6 (Minn. App. Aug. 13, 2012), rev. denied (Oct. 24, 2012).

Subsequently, Heard filed four postconviction petitions, which were all denied. 1

       Heard’s fifth postconviction petition is presently before us. His fifth postconviction

petition asserts that our decisions in State v. Coleman, 

 (Minn. 2021), and



1
      Heard unsuccessfully appealed the denial of two of those postconviction petitions.
See Heard v. State, No. A20-0672, 

, at *3 (Minn. App. Dec. 21, 2020);
Heard v. State, No. A14-1578, 

, at *4 (Minn. App. Apr. 20, 2015).

                                             3
State v. Noor, 

 (Minn. 2021), announced new rules of substantive law that

apply retroactively to invalidate his third-degree murder conviction. Coleman and Noor

both address different aspects of the mens rea—or the mental-state—element of

third-degree depraved-mind murder: “a depraved mind, without regard for human life.”

(a) (2024). 2 In Coleman, we stated that this element “requires a

showing that [an] eminently dangerous act was committed with a mental state of reckless

disregard of human life,” rather than “a mental-state element that requires a showing that

the act was committed in a reckless manner.” 957 N.W.2d at 80. Then, in Noor, we stated

that “the mental state required for depraved-mind murder cannot exist when the

defendant’s actions are directed with particularity at the person who is killed,” and we

overruled our decision in State v. Mytych, 

 (Minn. 1972), which affirmed

the defendant’s third-degree depraved-mind convictions even though she had directed her

actions with particularity at the victims. Noor, 964 N.W.2d at 433–36.

       Because Heard filed his present postconviction petition ten years after his conviction

became final, it implicated the two-year time bar in Minnesota’s postconviction statute.

, subd. 4(a) (2024) (providing that no petition for postconviction relief

may be filed more than two years after judgment is entered). But the petition asserts that

because Coleman and Noor announced new interpretations of state statutory law, Heard’s

request for relief can be considered under an exception to the two-year time bar for new

interpretations of law. 

, subd. 4(b)(3) (2024); see also Minn. Stat.


2
       Heard was convicted under the version of section 609.195(a) that was in effect when
his offense occurred in 2004. The Legislature has not amended the statute since that time.

                                             4
§ 590.01, subd. 4(c) (2024) (stating that “[a]ny petition invoking an exception provided in

paragraph (b) must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises”). 3

       The district court determined that Coleman and Noor do not provide new

interpretations of state law, but rather, affirm old rules. Based on this determination, the

district court concluded that Heard’s postconviction petition did not satisfy the exception

for new interpretations of law, and it denied postconviction relief without reaching the

merits of Heard’s argument that Coleman and Noor entitle him to a new trial. In a

unanimous and precedential decision, the court of appeals affirmed, holding that Coleman

“clarified” old law and that Noor “reaffirmed” existing law, and therefore, Heard’s

postconviction petition was untimely. Heard v. State, 8 N.W.3d 662, 669–72 (Minn. App.

2024). We granted Heard’s petition for further review.

                                         ANALYSIS

       Heard argues that our decisions in Coleman and Noor—separately and

together—announced new rules of law that are retroactively applicable to his conviction

for third-degree depraved-mind murder. He further argues that because these decisions

announced new rules of law that are retroactively applicable to his case, he timely filed his

postconviction petition under the postconviction statute.         The postconviction statute

provides an exception to the general two-year time bar when a petitioner asserts a new

interpretation of state statutory law and establishes that it is retroactively applicable to the



3
       Heard’s fifth postconviction petition was filed within two years of the Coleman and
Noor opinions. The petition was filed on March 27, 2023. Our opinion in Coleman was
filed on March 31, 2021, and our opinion in Noor was filed on September 15, 2021.

                                               5
petitioner’s case. Heard contends that because he timely filed his postconviction petition,

the district court abused its discretion in dismissing it as untimely.

       We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of

discretion. Pearson v. State, 

 (Minn. 2017). “A postconviction court

abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious

manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual

findings.” 

 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a rule of law

applies retroactively to convictions that were final when the rule was announced is a legal

question that we review de novo. See Johnson v. State, 

 (Minn. 2018).

       Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a), provides that no petition for

postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after judgment is entered in a

criminal case. However, the statute provides five exceptions to this time bar, including one

for new interpretations of law. That exception provides:

              (b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a court may hear a petition for
       postconviction relief if:
              ...
              (3) the petitioner asserts a new interpretation of federal or state
       constitutional or statutory law by either the United States Supreme Court or
       a Minnesota appellate court and the petitioner establishes that this
       interpretation is retroactively applicable to the petitioner’s case.

, subd. 4(b)(3). To satisfy the new-interpretation-of-law exception to

the two-year time bar, a petitioner must file a petition for postconviction relief within

two years of the exception arising.       

, subd. 4(c); Aili v. State,

, 446–47 (Minn. 2021). “A postconviction petitioner knows or should

know he has a claim on the date that a court decision announces an interpretation of law


                                              6
that provides the basis for a claim that the petitioner is entitled to relief because the

interpretation is a new rule of law that applies retroactively to the petitioner’s conviction.”

Aili, 963 N.W.2d at 449.

       Here, there is no dispute that Heard petitioned for postconviction relief within two

years of our decisions in Coleman and Noor. But for Heard’s petition to satisfy the

new-interpretation-of-law exception to the postconviction time bar, Coleman and Noor

must have announced a new interpretation of state constitutional or statutory law that is

retroactively applicable to Heard’s case. Our focus here is whether either—or both—of

these two decisions announced new rules of law that retroactively apply to Heard’s

conviction.

                                              I.

                                              A.

       We first identify the law that we must apply to decide whether a prior decision of

this court announced a new rule of state constitutional or statutory law that is retroactive.

To decide whether a rule of federal constitutional criminal law is a new rule that applies

retroactively, we apply the standard established by the United States Supreme Court in

Teague v. Lane, 

 (1989). Aili, 963 N.W.2d at 447. Whether the Teague

standard also applies to the circumstances presented here—where a postconviction

petition alleges that a new interpretation of state statutory law satisfies the

new-interpretation-of-law exception to the postconviction statute’s two-year time bar—is

an open question. It is also a question that is not before us in this case. Both parties relied

on the Teague standard in the lower courts. The lower courts assumed that the Teague


                                              7
standard applies under the circumstances here. And both parties continue to rely on the

Teague standard before this court. We therefore assume, without deciding, that the Teague

standard applies in this case. See State v. Meger, 

, 422 n.4 (Minn. 2017)

(similarly concluding that “[b]ecause the parties agree that Teague applies in this case, we

assume, without deciding, that Teague provides the applicable framework here”).

       In Teague, the Supreme Court observed that old rules, which are an extension of

existing precedent, apply on collateral review—such as when a petitioner brings a

postconviction challenge to a conviction. See Teague, 

. But new rules

generally are not retroactive. 

 Although new rules typically apply to cases that are

pending before an appellate court when announced, they cannot be used to challenge a

conviction that is already final. 

 Teague identified two exceptions to the general

principle that a new rule is not retroactively applicable. 

. A new rule may be

applied retroactively if it “(1) is substantive, as compared to procedural, or (2) is a new

‘watershed’ rule of criminal procedure.” Johnson, 

. Subsequently, in

Edwards v. Vannoy, the Supreme Court eliminated the watershed exception for federal

cases. 

, 272 (2021). We have not addressed the continued vitality of the

watershed exception under Minnesota law in light of Edwards, nor do we have a need to

do so here. See Aili, 963 N.W.2d at 447–48 n.4.

       To apply the Teague standard, a court must first ask “whether the rule . . . is new,

or whether it is merely a predictable extension of a pre-existing doctrine.” Meger,

 (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted). A rule is new if

it “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal


                                             8
Government.” Teague, 

. “To put it differently, a case announces a new

rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s

conviction became final.” 

 We have stated that “it is not enough that a holding is

logically an extension of some precedent, as that is true of virtually all recently announced

rules.” Meger, 

 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Rather, the test is whether reasonable jurists hearing [the] petitioner’s claim at the time

his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to rule in his

favor.” 

 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In other words,

a decision announces a new rule if the outcome was susceptible to debate among reasonable

minds.” 

 (cleaned up).

       If a decision announced a new rule of law, we next ask whether the law is

substantive or procedural. Aili, 963 N.W.2d at 447. A new rule that is substantive may be

applied retroactively. Johnson, 

. Substantive rules “alter[] the range of

conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.” 

 at 681–82 (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “In other words, a decision that narrows the scope of

a criminal statute, as well as a constitutional determination that places particular conduct

or persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s power to punish is substantive for

purposes of the retroactivity analysis.” 

 (cleaned up). By contrast, procedural

rules regulate “only the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.” Schriro v.

Summerlin, 

 (2004). A new rule of procedural law does not result in a

group of persons who may no longer be guilty of a particular offense, but rather, it creates

a “ ‘possibility that someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have


                                             9
been acquitted otherwise.’ ” Johnson, 

 (quoting Schriro, 

).

        Against this legal backdrop, we next consider whether our decisions in Coleman

and Noor announced new rules.

                                              B.

                                              1.

        We initially consider Coleman. In Coleman, we addressed the mental state required

to commit the offense of third-degree depraved-mind murder. 957 N.W.2d at 77–81.

        Coleman, whose alcohol concentration was twice the legal limit, drove a

snowmobile at nearly 60 miles per hour across a busy frozen lake. Id. at 75. The

snowmobile struck and killed a child standing next to an icehouse. Id. at 74. A jury found

Coleman guilty of third-degree depraved-mind murder, and the district court sentenced him

to prison. Id. at 75.

        Coleman appealed his conviction to the court of appeals, arguing that the pattern

jury instruction that his jury received for third-degree depraved-mind murder failed to

adequately convey the mental-state element of the offense. State v. Coleman, 

, 477 (Minn. App. 2020), aff’d, 

 (Minn. 2021). As to the mental-state

element, the district court instructed Coleman’s jury that it had to find that:

              [The defendant’s] intentional act which caused the death of [the child]
        was eminently dangerous to human beings and was performed without regard
        for human life.

               Such an act may not be specifically intended to cause death and may
        not be specifically directed at [the child], but it was committed in a reckless



                                              10
       or wanton manner with the knowledge that someone may be killed and with
       a heedless disregard of that happening.

Id. at 477 (second and third alteration by the court of appeals). Coleman argued to the

court of appeals that this instruction materially misstated the law. Id. The court of appeals

agreed that the instruction was incorrect. Id. at 479–80. It determined that the instruction

should have informed the jury that “an actor evinces a depraved mind when the actor

engages in conduct that the actor is aware creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk to

human life and consciously disregards that risk.” Id. at 474. But because Coleman failed

to object to the instruction at trial, the court of appeals applied plain-error review. Id. at

476. Upon plain-error review, the court of appeals determined that the error was not plain

because the instruction did not directly contravene any decision of the court of appeals or

this court. Id. at 480.

       We granted review. Before turning to the jury instruction given at Coleman’s trial,

we noted that it was necessary to “first determine the proper mental state for third-degree

depraved mind murder.” Coleman, 957 N.W.2d at 77. We then traced the development of

our case law in this area. Id. at 77–80. Our decision observed that, in several cases, we

suggested that the mental-state element for third-degree depraved-mind murder was

general recklessness. Id. at 79. We concluded that those statements were dicta and that

they were ill-advised because they led to “ongoing confusion regarding the mental state

required for third-degree depraved mind murder.” Id. Specifically, some of our case law

led “some to believe that the statute requires a reckless act, as opposed to a mental state of

reckless disregard of life,” and unfortunately, this confusion persisted. Id. at 79–80.



                                             11
       Based on our review of our case law in Coleman, we determined that “our

precedents show that we have established no clear directive as to the mental state required

for third-degree depraved mind murder.” Id. at 80. We then “clarif[ied]” that our earlier

cases “did not create a mental-state element that requires a showing that the act was

committed in a reckless manner.” See id. Citing to a concurrence in our decision in

Netland, we held that the mental-state element of third-degree depraved-mind murder

instead “requires a showing that the eminently dangerous act was committed with a mental

state of reckless disregard of human life.” Id. (citing State v. Netland, 

 (Minn. 1995) (Tomljanovich, J., concurring)). We further stated:

              Accordingly, we hold that a person commits an eminently dangerous
       act (one that is highly likely to cause death) without regard to human life,
       when based on the surrounding circumstances one can infer that the
       defendant was indifferent to the loss of life that the defendant’s eminently
       dangerous act could cause.

Id. at 80.

       After defining the mental state required for third-degree depraved-mind murder, we

considered the pattern jury instruction that Coleman’s jury had received. Id. at 81. We

determined that the pattern instruction materially misstated the law because it did not

accurately reflect the mental-state element of the offense. Id. However, we did not go on

to consider whether the error was plain because, “even applying our clarified mental-state

element . . . , Coleman . . . failed to establish that the error affected his substantial rights.”

Id. We concluded that, given the overwhelming evidence of Coleman’s indifference to the

loss of human life that his eminently dangerous conduct could cause, he was not prejudiced

by the incorrect jury instruction. Id. at 82–83.


                                               12
       Heard argues that Coleman announced a new rule of law. He points out that the

decision acknowledged that this court had not previously established a “clear directive” as

to the mental state required for third-degree depraved-mind murder. Id. Moreover, he

notes that the decision invalidated the pattern jury instruction that had long been used in

such cases. 4

       The State responds that Coleman makes clear that the pattern jury instruction—and

not this court’s decisions—sowed confusion about the mental-state element because the

instruction misstated this court’s case law. And the State contends that pattern jury

instructions, unlike decisions of this court, are not binding authority. The State also argues

that the Coleman decision explicitly states that it clarifies existing precedent. According

to the State, a clarification is not an announcement of a new rule of law.

       In Coleman, we stated that our previous case law had not established a “clear

directive” as to the mental-state element for third-degree depraved-mind murder. Id. at 80.

We recognized that our earlier decisions resulted in “ongoing confusion regarding the

mental state required for third-degree depraved mind murder.” Id. at 79. And for the first

time in Coleman, we directly articulated the required mental state for third-degree

depraved-mind murder. Id. at 80. Additionally, we held in Coleman that the pattern jury



4
       The pattern jury instruction was later amended based, in part, on the Coleman
decision. See 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice—Jury Instructions Guides,
Criminal, CRIMJIG 7.15 n.3 (7th ed. 2024). That instruction now defines the offense of
“Murder in the Third Degree—Eminently Dangerous Act” under Minnesota Statutes
section 609.195(a) as the following: “Under Minnesota law, whoever causes the death of
another person by perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to others, without regard for
human life, but without intent to cause the death of any person, is guilty of a crime.”

                                             13
instruction, which cited to our case law as authority, materially misstated the mental-state

element for the offense. Id. at 78 n.3 (observing that the erroneous language in the pattern

jury instruction purportedly was taken from this court’s decision in State v. Lowe, 

 (Minn. 1896) (citing 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice—Jury

Instructions Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 11.38 n.2 (6th ed. 2015))).

       Although the State correctly observes that we used the term “clarify” in describing

our decision, our analysis in Coleman demonstrates that we announced a new rule of law.

We effectively acknowledged that the mental-state element for third-degree

depraved-mind murder was “susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.” See Meger,

 (cleaned up). To address the “ongoing confusion,” we then identified

the required mental state for the offense. Coleman, 957 N.W.2d at 79–80. Given our

analysis, the decision in Coleman was not merely a predictable extension of a preexisting

doctrine. Rather, under the Teague standard, Coleman announced a new rule of law. We

conclude that the court of appeals erred in holding otherwise.

                                             2.

       Next, we consider whether our decision in Noor also announced a new rule of law.

In Noor, we addressed whether a defendant can be convicted of third-degree

depraved-mind murder if the defendant’s act was directed at a particular person.

964 N.W.2d at 427.

       Noor was a police officer who shot and killed a person while responding to that

person’s call for assistance. Id. The caller had contacted 911 to report a possible crime in

the alley behind her home. Id. As Noor and his partner were in the alley investigating, the


                                            14
caller approached their police vehicle, startling Noor. Id. Noor fired his gun out of his

partner’s window and directly at the caller, striking and killing her. Id. A jury found Noor

guilty of third-degree depraved-mind murder for this incident. Id. at 429.

       Noor appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to

support his conviction for third-degree depraved-mind murder because his act of shooting

had been directed at a particular person—the caller. State v. Noor, 

, 652

(Minn. App. 2021), rev’d, 

 (Minn. 2021). He contended that an act

directed at a particular person cannot constitute third-degree depraved-mind murder

because the statute defining the offense criminalizes a generalized indifference to human

life. 

       The court of appeals affirmed Noor’s conviction, relying in part on our decision in

State v. Mytych, 

 (Minn. 1972). Noor, 955 N.W.2d at 652–56. In that

case, we affirmed Mytych’s conviction for third-degree depraved-mind murder for killing

the wife of her romantic interest. Mytych, 

. The evidence established

that Mytych had purchased a revolver, flown from Chicago to Saint Paul under an assumed

name, traveled to her romantic interest’s apartment, shot and injured her romantic interest,

and shot and killed his wife. 

. On appeal to this court, Mytych argued that she

could not be guilty of third-degree depraved-mind murder for killing the wife because “the

facts show that the fatal shots were directed with particularity and may have well been the

result of culpable negligence which would constitute second-degree manslaughter.” 

. We did not specifically address this argument in the Mytych decision. See 

 at 281–

83. But we stated that “[t]he trial court was justified in finding that defendant was guilty


                                            15
of something more serious than culpable negligence, and that her acts evinced a depraved

mind in the sense in which that term is used in the statute defining murder in the

third-degree.” 

.

       In affirming Noor’s conviction, the court of appeals observed that Mytych remained

good law. See Noor, 955 N.W.2d at 652. And it observed that Mytych stood for the

proposition that a person can commit the offense of third-degree depraved-mind murder

even when the act that results in death is directed at a particular person. Id. at 653. The

court of appeals stated:

              Because [the third-degree depraved-mind statute] does not require
       that more than one person be put in jeopardy and the supreme court in Mytych
       upheld a conviction of third-degree murder even though the victims were
       known to and targeted by the defendant, we cannot say that Noor’s
       third-degree murder conviction is invalid simply because his dangerous act
       was directed at the single person outside of his partner’s window.

Id. at 655.

       We granted review in Noor. Before this court, the State relied on Mytych to argue

that Noor’s conviction for third-degree depraved-mind murder should be upheld even

though the evidence established that Noor directed his act of shooting at the caller.

Noor, 964 N.W.2d at 433. The State argued that Mytych established that a third-degree

depraved-mind murder conviction could be based on conduct directed at a particular

person. Id.

       However, noting that we are “ ‘extremely reluctant to overrule’ ” our decisions, our

decision in Noor overruled Mytych. Id. at 435 (quoting Daniel v. City of Minneapolis,

 (Minn. 2019)).        We concluded that Mytych was “clearly and



                                            16
manifestly wrong when it was decided, and it remains clearly wrong today.” 

 We

observed that the decision was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with our other case law.

Id. at 436. And we went on to hold in Noor that the mental state required for third-degree

depraved-mind murder is “a generalized indifference to human life,” which “cannot exist

when the defendant’s conduct is directed with particularity at the person who is killed.” Id.

at 438.

          Heard argues that our decision in Noor announced a new rule of law. He first

contends that, under the Teague standard, a court always announces a new rule of law when

it overrules binding precedent, even when the overruled decision was an outlier, such as

Mytych. To support this argument, Heard relies on the United States Supreme Court’s

decision in Edwards v. Vannoy, 

, 272 (2021), where the Court—in holding

that its prior decision overruling an outlier case in its jurisprudence announced a new rule

of law—observed that overruling a binding precedent is “[t]he starkest example of a

decision announcing a new rule.” 5 Id. at 265.

          But we need not, and do not, decide whether a decision of this court that

overrules binding precedent always announces a new rule of law. We decide instead, as

Heard alternatively argues, that the Mytych decision—even though it was wrongly



5
       The Supreme Court concluded in Edwards that its earlier decision Ramos v.
Louisiana, 

 (2020)—which overruled Apodaca v. Oregon, 

 (1972),
to the extent that it was inconsistent with the holding that the constitutional requirement
for jury unanimity in criminal cases applies to the states—announced a new rule of law.
Edwards, 593 U.S. at 276. But the Court did not conclude that this resulted in the new rule
applying retroactively. Id. This was because, as the Court explained, “new procedural
rules do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.” Id. (emphasis added).

                                             17
decided—created sufficient uncertainty in the law such that the question of whether a

third-degree depraved-mind murder could include an act directed at a particular person

“was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.”           Meger, 

.

Although we may not have relied on Mytych to address the specific issue raised in Noor

before our Noor decision, we cited Mytych as recently as 2019 when addressing the

mental-state element of third-degree depraved-mind murder.             See State v. Hall,

 (Minn. 2019) (citing Mytych for the proposition that the State is not

required to prove a defendant’s lack of an intent to effect death to establish the commission

of third-degree depraved-mind murder). Moreover, the two judges in the court of appeals’

majority in Noor were convinced that Mytych was good law. And the State continued to

rely on Mytych when it appeared before this court in Noor’s case. Because reasonable

jurists believed before our decision in Noor that a person could commit the offense of

third-degree depraved-mind murder by directing an act toward a particular person, Noor

announced a new rule when it stated that the required mental state for this offense “cannot

exist when the defendant’s conduct is directed with particularity at the person who is

killed.” Noor, 964 N.W.2d at 438. We therefore conclude that Noor announced a new rule

of law for the purpose of the Teague standard. The court of appeals erred in holding

otherwise.

       The next part of the Teague retroactivity analysis requires us to decide whether the

new rules announced in Coleman and Noor are substantive or procedural. 6


6
       The courts below did not address this issue because they determined that the
decisions concerned old rules.

                                             18
                                             C.

       As noted, under the Teague standard, new rules that are substantive apply

retroactively to final convictions. Johnson, 

. On the other hand, new

rules that are procedural generally do not apply retroactively. 

 A rule is substantive if

it “alters the range of conduct . . . that the law punishes.” 

 at 681–82 (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Procedural rules regulate only the procedures for

determining a defendant’s culpability. 

.

       We agree with Heard that the new rules we announced in Coleman and Noor are

substantive. 7   In both cases, we defined the mental-state element of the offense of

third-degree depraved-mind murder. We stated in Coleman that to prove the mental-state

element of the offense, the State must establish that the defendant was indifferent to the

loss of life that the defendant’s eminently dangerous act could cause. 957 N.W.2d at 73.

And we stated in Noor that the mental-state element of third-degree depraved-mind murder

cannot exist when a defendant’s conduct is directed with particularity at the person who is



7
        The State asks us not to address the question of whether Coleman and Noor
announced new substantive or procedural rules. It argues that we should remand to allow
the district court to consider this question in the first instance. Although the State’s brief
acknowledges that it did not argue during the proceedings before the district court that
Coleman and Noor announced procedural rules, the State suggests that it was not required
to do so because the sole question presented to the district court was whether Heard was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
        However, Heard did not request an evidentiary hearing. And the record confirms
that the State did not argue in its filings to the district court or the court of appeals that
Coleman and Noor announced procedural rules. Thus, the State has forfeited any argument
that the rules announced in these cases are procedural. See State v. Torgerson, 

, 168 n.3 (Minn. 2023) (declining to address an issue based on the forfeiture doctrine
because the State had not raised it to the district court or the court of appeals).

                                             19
killed. 964 N.W.2d at 426. By defining the mental-state element of the offense, our new

rules altered the range of conduct that the law punishes. Accordingly, our decisions in

Coleman and Noor announced substantive rules. Under the Teague standard, because

Coleman and Noor announced new rules of substantive law, our decisions in those cases

apply retroactively.

                                             II.

       The final question we must address is whether the district court can consider the

merits of Heard’s postconviction petition notwithstanding the two-year statutory time bar

under our state postconviction statute, section 590.01. Although Heard acknowledges that

he brought his petition for postconviction relief more than two years after his conviction

for third-degree depraved-mind murder became final, he contends that his petition is timely

under the exception to the two-year statutory time bar for new interpretations of law. See

, subd. 4(b)(3). That exception allows a district court to hear a petition

for postconviction relief if a petitioner asserts a new interpretation of state statutory law

within two years of a court decision announcing a new rule of law that retroactively applies

to the petitioner’s case. 

, subd. 4(b)(3); 

 subd. 4(c); see also Aili,

963 N.W.2d at 449.

       The State does not dispute that Heard filed his petition for postconviction relief

within two years of our decisions in Coleman and Noor. See 

,

subd. 4(c) (“Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (b) must be filed

within two years of the date the claim arises.”). But the State argues that Heard must

overcome an additional hurdle for the district court to consider the merits of his case.


                                             20
According to the State, Heard must also show that his petition is not procedurally barred

under our decision in State v. Knaffla, 

 (Minn. 1976). In Knaffla, we held

that “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims

known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction

relief.” 8 

. When a petitioner did not previously raise a claim, there are two

exceptions to the Knaffla procedural bar: (1) if the petition presents a novel legal issue

or (2) if the interests of justice require review. Gilbert v. State, 2 N.W.3d 483, 487

(Minn. 2024). The State contends that because Heard did not raise his claims regarding

the mental state required for third-degree depraved-mind murder in his direct appeal or the

four postconviction petitions he filed before we announced our decisions in Coleman and

Noor, his claims are barred by the rule announced in Knaffla. We disagree.

       The State cites no authority for the proposition that postconviction petitioners are

required to independently satisfy the requirements of Knaffla when they establish that a

new interpretation of state law is retroactively applicable to them in the first postconviction

petition they file after the new interpretation of state law is announced. Nor does the State




8
       Knaffla was decided before the Legislature amended subdivision 1 of Minnesota
Statutes § 590.01 to include the sentence, “A petition for postconviction relief after a direct
appeal has been completed may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on
direct appeal of the conviction or sentence.” Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 14, § 12,

, 1097 (emphasis added). We have not yet decided the impact of
those amendments on Knaffla and its exceptions. See Onyelobi v. State, 

,
279 n.3 (Minn. 2019); Fox v. State, 

, 433 n.2 (Minn. 2018); Hooper v.
State, 

, 788 n.2 (Minn. 2013). Neither party has asked us to reach this
issue here, and we assume without deciding that Knaffla remains good law.

                                              21
make a convincing argument that the requirements of Knaffla must be independently

satisfied in this context.

       Neither the postconviction statute nor our case law support the State’s contention

that a petitioner who satisfies the new-interpretation-of-law exception to the statutory time

bar in the first postconviction petition they file after the new interpretation of state law is

announced must independently show that the claim is not Knaffla barred. Moreover,

holding that Heard’s claims regarding the mental state required for third-degree

depraved-mind murder are procedurally barred by Knaffla because he did not raise the

claims in the direct appeal and four postconviction petitions he filed before we announced

our decisions in Coleman and Noor would render the new-interpretation-of-law exception

to section 590.01 meaningless. Requiring petitioners to anticipate and raise a new rule of

law before the new rule is announced is inconsistent with the plain language and clear

purpose of the new-interpretation-of-law exception to the statute. Furthermore, doing so

would be incompatible with our precedent. We have stated that “[w]e cannot expect a

defendant to foresee a new rule of law.” State v. Osborne, 

 (Minn.

2006). And we have held that a “new rule of law, announced after a direct appeal has been

completed, may present a claim that was unknown on direct appeal, and thus is not barred

by Knaffla.” Stiles v. State, 

 (Minn. 2006).

       Accordingly, we hold that a postconviction petitioner is not required to

independently satisfy the requirements of Knaffla if the petitioner establishes that a new

interpretation of state law is retroactively applicable to the petitioner’s case in the first

postconviction petition filed after the new interpretation of state law is announced.


                                              22
                                           * * *

       Heard established that Coleman and Noor announced new interpretations of state

law that are retroactively applicable to him in the first postconviction petition that he filed

after the new interpretations of state law were announced. Moreover, Heard filed his

postconviction petition within two years of our decisions in Coleman and Noor. Thus,

Heard’s postconviction petition was timely filed under the new-interpretation-of-law

exception to the statutory time bar, and the court of appeals erred when it determined that

the petition was untimely and affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition. Because

the district court did not consider the merits of Heard’s postconviction claims, a remand to

the district court is necessary.

                                      CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and

remand to the district court to consider the effect of our decisions in Coleman and Noor on

Heard’s third-degree depraved-mind murder conviction.

       Reversed and remanded.




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