STATE OF MINNESOTA

                                   IN SUPREME COURT

                                       A24-0507

Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals                                        Hudson, C.J.

James Jurgensen,

                    Relator,

vs.                                                                 Filed: June 25, 2025
                                                               Office of Appellate Courts
Dave Perkins Contracting, Inc.,
and TBG Claims Services,

                    Respondents.

                               ________________________

Joshua E. Borken, Law Office of Joshua Borken, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for relator.

Robin D. Simpson, Aafedt, Forde, Gray, Monson & Hager, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota,
for respondents.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter J. Farrell, Deputy Solicitor General, Madeleine
DeMeules, Jennifer A. Kitchak, Assistant Attorneys General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for
intervenor the Office of the Minnesota Attorney General.

                               ________________________

SYLLABUS

      1.     The 2024 amendment to 

, which increases the cap on

attorney fees in workers’ compensation cases, does not apply retroactively.

      2.     The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) did not err by

declining to automatically approve the requested excess fee.




                                            1
       3.       Minnesota Statutes § 176.081, subd. 1(a) (2022), which provides a

presumptive cap on attorney fees, does not violate the Contracts Clause of the Minnesota

Constitution.

       4.       The WCCA did not err by affirming the compensation judge’s denial of

excess attorney fees under Irwin v. Surdyk’s Liquor, 

 (Minn. 1999).

       Affirmed.

OPINION

HUDSON, Chief Justice.

       This case concerns whether attorney Joshua E. Borken, who represented relator

James Jurgensen in his workers’ compensation matter, is entitled to $4,000 in excess

attorney fees. Minnesota Statutes § 176.081, subd. 1(a) (2022), presumptively caps

attorney fees in workers’ compensation cases at $26,000. However, we have held that the

judiciary retains the authority to evaluate whether excess fees are appropriate by weighing

seven factors we set out in Irwin v. Surdyk’s Liquor, 

 (Minn. 1999).

       Here, the parties entered into a stipulation for settlement under which Borken would

receive 20 percent of a $150,000 settlement (i.e., $30,000). After weighing the Irwin

factors, the workers’ compensation judge denied Borken’s request for $4,000 in excess fees

above the statutorily capped amount of $26,000. On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation

Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed. Borken then appealed to this court raising, among

other issues, a challenge to the statute under the Contracts Clause of the Minnesota

Constitution. Specifically, Borken argued that 

, subd. 1(a) (2022),

impairs the parties’ right to contract as to attorney fees. The employer-respondents, Dave


                                            2
Perkins Contracting, Inc. and TBG Claims Services, filed a brief taking no position in

opposition.   The Minnesota Attorney General then intervened solely to defend the

constitutionality of the statutory cap on attorney fees. While briefing was underway on

appeal to this court, the Minnesota Legislature amended section 176.081, increasing the

presumptive cap from $26,000 to $55,000, effective for dates of injury on or after

October 1, 2024.

       The issues before the court are (1) whether the 2024 amendment to 

, subd. 1(a), applies retroactively in this case, (2) whether the WCCA erred by

not automatically approving the unobjected-to excess fee, (3) whether section 176.081,

subd. 1(a) (2022), violates the Contracts Clause of the Minnesota Constitution, and

(4) whether the WCCA erred by affirming the compensation judge’s denial of excess fees

under the Irwin factors. We conclude that (1) the 2024 amendment does not apply

retroactively, (2) the WCCA did not err when it did not automatically approve the excess

fee, (3) section 176.081, subd. 1(a) (2022), does not violate the Contracts Clause of the

Minnesota Constitution, and (4) the WCCA did not err when it affirmed the compensation

judge’s denial of excess fees under Irwin. We therefore affirm the decision of the WCCA.

                                         FACTS

       James Jurgensen sustained an admitted work injury on July 29, 2021, while working

for Dave Perkins Contracting, Inc. He retained attorney Joshua E. Borken to represent him

with respect to this injury. Jurgensen’s contingent fee agreement with Borken stated that

Borken would be entitled to 20 percent of the first $130,000 of compensation (i.e., $26,000)

and 20 percent of any excess amount, pending the approval of a compensation judge.


                                             3
       Minnesota Statutes § 176.081, subd. 1(a) (2022), presumptively caps attorney fees

in workers’ compensation cases at 20 percent of the first $130,000 (i.e., $26,000).

According to the language of the statute, this is the “maximum permissible fee,” and any

fee up to this amount does not require approval by the compensation judge or any other

party. 

, subd. 1(a) (2022).

       Although section 176.081 sets out the “maximum permissible fee,” we held in Irwin

that section 176.081 is unconstitutional “to the extent it impinges on our inherent power to

oversee attorneys and attorney fees and deprives us of a final, independent review of

attorney fees.” 

. Therefore, the judiciary retains the authority to “review

the compensation judges’ determination of reasonable attorney fees.” 

 We outlined

seven factors for compensation judges to review when determining the reasonableness of

attorney fees: “[1] the amount involved, [2] the time and expense necessary to prepare for

trial, [3] the responsibility assumed by counsel, [4] the experience of counsel, [5] the

difficulties of the issues, [6] the nature of the proof involved, and [7] the results obtained.”

       Here, the parties ultimately settled for $150,000 and filed an executed Stipulation

for Settlement with the Office of Administrative Hearings. Borken sought $30,000 (i.e.,

20 percent of the $150,000 settlement), $26,000 of which would be presumptively

reasonable under section 176.081, and $4,000 of which would be an excess fee requiring

the compensation judge’s approval. The employee understood the terms of the agreement

and agreed that Borken was entitled to the $4,000 in excess fees. The respondents agreed

that the total fees sought were reasonable, and they did not object to the release of excess


                                               4
fees to Borken. In the compensation judge’s Partial Award on Stipulation, the judge

approved $26,000 in attorney fees but ordered the insurer to hold the remaining $4,000 in

escrow pending a hearing to determine whether the excess fees were due and owing.

       After this hearing, the compensation judge denied Borken’s request for excess fees.

Applying the Irwin factors, the compensation judge determined that the statutory maximum

of $26,000 adequately compensated Borken for the time he spent on the case and the risk

he incurred by representing the employee on a contingent basis. The compensation judge

did not address Borken’s Contracts Clause challenge due to a lack of jurisdiction. 1

       Borken appealed, and the WCCA affirmed. The WCCA determined that there was

no abuse of discretion when the compensation judge denied Borken’s claim for excess fees.

The WCCA also concluded that automatic approval of an excess fee—even an

unobjected-to excess fee—is inconsistent with section 176.081, which provides the

$26,000 presumptive cap. To support this conclusion, the WCCA cited Mack v. City of

Minneapolis, 

 (Minn. 1983), where we stated that “[t]o hold that

section 176.081 does not apply where the parties stipulate a settlement would greatly

reduce the effect of the section.” Ultimately, the WCCA concluded that “a subsequent

separate review of the claim for excess fees in this case was required, and that the

compensation judge properly denied the portion of the stipulation that provided for excess



1
       It was proper for the compensation judge not to address this constitutional issue for
want of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of compensation judges and the WCCA is limited to
questions of law and fact arising under the workers’ compensation laws of Minnesota.
Hale v. Viking Trucking Co., 

 (Minn. 2002); Minn. Stat. § 175A.01,
subd. 5 (2024).

                                             5
fees.” Like the compensation judge, the WCCA did not address the constitutional issue

due to a lack of jurisdiction. 2

       Borken petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari. The Minnesota Attorney

General moved to intervene solely to defend the constitutionality of section 176.081, and

we granted the motion to intervene.

                                       ANALYSIS

       There are four issues before us. Three of these issues were raised by Borken in his

opening brief to this court: (1) whether the WCCA erred when it did not automatically

approve an unobjected-to attorney fee under 

.3200, subp. 8 (2023);

(2) whether section 176.081’s presumptive cap on attorney fees violates the Contracts

Clause of the Minnesota Constitution; and (3) whether the WCCA erred when it concluded

that the Irwin factors did not support an award of excess fees in this case. But before

addressing these issues, we first discuss whether the 2024 amendment to

section 176.081—which was passed while briefing was underway before this

court—applies retroactively.

                                            I.

       We first consider whether the 2024 amendment to section 176.081’s presumptive

cap applies retroactively. We turn to 

, subd. 1 (2024), and 

 (2024), to guide our retroactivity analysis. Minnesota Statutes § 645.31, subd. 1,



2
        “The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals shall have no jurisdiction in any
case that does not arise under the workers’ compensation laws of the state . . . .” Minn.
Stat. § 175A.01, subd. 5.

                                            6
provides that “new provisions [to an amended law] shall be construed as effective only

from the date when the amendment became effective.” Furthermore, 

provides a presumption against retroactive effect: “No law shall be construed to be

retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature.” We apply these

principles when we address retroactivity, including in the workers’ compensation context.

See, e.g., Leahy v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 

 (Minn. 1983) (“Our case law

holds . . . that the workers’ compensation law in effect on the date of injury governs, absent

a clear manifestation of a contrary legislative intent.”); Kahn v. State, Univ. of Minn.,

 (Minn. 1982) (“Minn. Stat. § 645.31 (1980) provides that new

provisions in a statute shall be construed as effective only from the date when the

amendment became effective.”).

       Here, the 2024 amendment to section 176.081, which increases the presumptive cap

on attorney fees to 20 percent of the first $275,000 (i.e., $55,000), is “effective for dates of

injury on or after October 1, 2024.” Act of May 8, 2024, ch. 97, § 4, 2024 Minn. Law 818,

819–21 (codified at 

, subd. 1 (2024)) [hereinafter Act of May 8,

2024]. In other words, the Act of May 8, 2024, specifically directs, in plain language, that

the new presumptive cap is effective only for injuries on or after a specific date: October 1,

2024. The injury at issue in this case occurred on July 29, 2021. Because the injury

predated the 2024 amendment, the higher presumptive cap of the 2024 amendment does

not apply.

       Additionally, no evidence clearly indicates that the Legislature intended for the

2024 amendment to apply retroactively.             “In the absence of a clear legislative


                                               7
mandate . . . the law applicable is that which was in effect on the date of injury.” Kahn,

. Section 645.21 requires clear evidence of retroactive intent in the

statute’s language—such as use of the term “retroactive”—before we determine that the

Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. In re Individual 35W Bridge

Litig., 

 (Minn. 2011). There is no such evidence here; the text of the

statute includes absolutely no language expressing the Legislature’s intent that the

amendment should apply retroactively. But cf. Marose v. Maislin Transp., 

, 511–12 (Minn. 1987) (concluding that the statutory amendment at issue “clearly

manifested a legislative intent that it should have retrospective application” when the

statute contained the following language: “[These changes] are effective for all cases

pending on July 1, 1983, regardless of the date of injury, date of hearing, or date of appeal

and all decisions of workers’ compensation judges and the workers’ compensation court of

appeals issued on or after July 1, 1983, shall apply [them].” (citation omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

       The argument against retroactive effect is even stronger in this case because the

statutory language is expressly prospective—it applies to injures occurring “on or after

October 1, 2024,” nearly five months after the Governor signed the bill into law in May

2024. See Act of May 8, 2024 at 819–21, 844. If the Legislature had wanted the statute to

be retroactive, it would not have picked a date in the future. The statutory language

here—“[t]his section is effective for dates of injury on or after October 1, 2024”—is unlike

the language in Marose, which referred to “all cases pending on July 1, 1983, regardless

of the date of injury.” 413 N.W.2d at 511–12. There is no language in the amendment to


                                             8
§ 176.081, subd. 1, to suggest that it applies to “all cases pending . . . regardless of the date

of injury.” Because the 2024 amendment lacks any clear expression of legislative intent to

the contrary—and instead provides an expressly prospective date—the 2024 amendment

to section 176.081 does not apply retroactively.

                                               II.

       Next, we consider whether the WCCA erred when it did not automatically approve

an unobjected-to attorney fee under 

.3200, subp. 8.               Minnesota Rule

1415.3200, subp. 8, provides:

       The office shall assign an attorney fee statement to a judge when action by a
       judge is needed. . . . Where no objection to the requested fee has been filed,
       the judge or court before whom the matter is pending shall issue a summary
       decision under Minnesota Statutes, section 176.305,[3] regarding the amount
       of attorney fees owing under this part and Minnesota Statutes,
       section 176.081 or 176.191.

       Borken argues that 

.3200 reserves the judicial power to regulate the

amount of attorney fees only when a dispute arises. Borken emphasizes that no party

involved in this case has objected to the excess attorney fee. The compensation judge

similarly found that neither the employee nor the employer nor the insurer objected to the

release of excess fees to Borken. Because there is no fee dispute between the parties,

Borken contends that 

.3200 establishes a summary proceeding that precludes

separate review of a claim for excess fees. He claims that section 176.081 and Irwin


3
       Minnesota Statutes § 176.305, subd. 1a (2024), provides in part: “If appropriate, a
written summary decision shall be issued within ten days after the [settlement] conference
stating the issues and a determination of each issue. . . . The summary decision is final
unless a written request for a formal hearing is served on all parties and filed with the
commissioner within 30 days after the date of service and filing of the summary decision.”

                                               9
address disputed claims for attorney fees while 

.3200 addresses undisputed

claims. He further argues that when no party objects to the claimed attorney fees, the

compensation judge is mandated to issue a final summary decision without a hearing, and

that the compensation judge may not modify the award of attorney fees in a stipulation for

settlement. The respondent did not challenge Borken’s argument regarding 

.3200, subp. 8.

       We disagree with Borken’s claim that undisputed fees are entitled to automatic

approval under 

.3200, subp. 8. “Like statutes, administrative regulations are

governed by general rules of construction.” In re Reissuance of an NPDES/SDS Permit to

U.S. Steel Corp., 

, 576 (Minn. 2021) (citation omitted) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “When determining the meaning of administrative rules, we interpret

words and sentences in the light of their context and construe rules as a whole.” 

 (citation

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plain reading of the text of 

.3200, subp. 8, does not support Borken’s assertions. Even when there is no objection

to the requested fee, the Rule states that the compensation judge “shall issue a summary

decision under Minnesota Statutes, section 176.305, regarding the amount of attorney fees

owing under this part and Minnesota Statutes, section 176.081 or 176.191.” The text of

the Rule thus provides that section 176.081, which includes the presumptive cap, governs

the compensation judge’s summary decision.           Furthermore, we have held that “the

[workers’ compensation] court of appeals has discretion in determining the reasonableness

of attorney fees notwithstanding a stipulation for settlement which undertakes to fix

attorney fees.” Mack, 

. In sum, neither the text of 

.3200,


                                              10
subp. 8, nor the case law supports Borken’s argument that his undisputed excess fee request

is entitled to automatic approval.

                                              III.

         We now consider whether section 176.081’s presumptive cap on attorney fees

violates the Contracts Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. Neither the compensation

judge nor the WCCA reached this constitutional issue due to a lack of jurisdiction. 4 “The

constitutional interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, which we review de

novo.” David v. Bartel Enters. (Nitro Green), 

 (Minn. 2014). “We

presume statutes to be constitutional and exercise our power to declare a statute

unconstitutional with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary.” Gluba ex rel.

Gluba v. Bitzan & Ohren Masonry, 

 (Minn. 2007). “The party that

asserts a constitutional challenge to the exercise of legislative authority bears a heavy

burden to prevail on that claim.” Clark v. City of Saint Paul, 

, 345 (Minn.

2019).

         The Contracts Clause of the Minnesota Constitution provides that “[n]o . . . law

impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.” Minn. Const. art. I, § 11. We use a

three-part test to analyze a contract-impairment claim:

         First, we consider whether the challenged legislation operates as a substantial
         impairment of a contractual obligation. Second, if a substantial impairment
         is found, we consider whether there is a significant and legitimate public
         purpose behind the legislation. Finally, we review the legislation in light of
         the identified public purpose to see whether the adjustment of the rights and

4
       Again, the jurisdiction of compensation judges and the WCCA is limited to
questions of law and fact arising under the workers’ compensation laws of Minnesota.
Hale, 

; Minn. Stat. § 175A.01, subd. 5.

                                               11
       responsibilities of the contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions
       and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the
       legislation’s adoption.

Jennissen v. City of Bloomington, 

, 816 (Minn. 2020) (citations omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted).       Critically, “[t]he contracts clause[] prevent[s]

retroactive impairment of contracts. When the statute was in force and effect at the time

the contract was made, there is no impairment, because existing statutes are read into future

contracts and enter into the contract terms by implication.” Gretsch v. Vantium Cap., Inc.,

 (Minn. 2014). In other words, “contracts are made in submission to

existing legislation.” W. States Utils. Co. v. City of Waseca, 

 (Minn.

1954) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

       Here, the relevant provisions of 

 have been in effect since

2013. The statute was already in effect when Borken and Jurgensen entered into the

retainer agreement on September 20, 2021; Borken even included the text of the 2014

statute in his retainer agreement with Jurgensen. The statute’s presumptive cap therefore

“enter[ed] into the contract terms by implication.” Gretsch, 

. Because

section 176.081 predated Borken’s retainer agreement with Jurgensen, there is no

retroactive contractual impairment and therefore no Contracts Clause violation.

                                            IV.

       Finally, we review whether the WCCA erred when it concluded that the Irwin

factors did not support an award of excess fees in this case. “Whether the compensation

judge applied the appropriate legal analysis is an issue of law that we review de novo.”

Braatz v. Parsons Elec. Co., 

 (Minn. 2014). “If the compensation


                                             12
judge performed the correct legal analysis, however, we review the attorney fee award for

an abuse of discretion.” 

 Furthermore, when, as here, the WCCA affirms the findings

of the compensation judge, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the affirmed

findings of the WCCA. Lagasse v. Horton, 

, 202 (Minn. 2022). “[W]e

cannot disturb those findings unless they are manifestly contrary to the evidence, or the

evidence clearly requires reasonable minds to adopt a contrary conclusion.” 

       Although section 176.081 sets out the “maximum permissible fee,” we held in Irwin

that section 176.081 is unconstitutional “to the extent it impinges on our inherent power to

oversee attorneys and attorney fees and deprives us of a final, independent review of

attorney fees.” 

. Therefore, the judiciary retains the authority to “review

the compensation judges’ determination of reasonable attorney fees.” 

 “In its review,

the WCCA should not only consider the statutory guidelines, but also [1] the amount

involved, [2] the time and expense necessary to prepare for trial, [3] the responsibility

assumed by counsel, [4] the experience of counsel, [5] the difficulties of the issues, [6] the

nature of the proof involved, and [7] the results obtained.” 

       Borken argues that section 176.081 provides that a 20 percent contingency fee is

presumptively reasonable and that “there is no reason to conduct a judicial review when

the fee award is calculated consistently with the statutory formula and does not exceed the

statutory limit.” However, Borken reads the statutory text selectively. To be clear: it is

only 20 percent of the first $130,000 that is presumptively reasonable. Although the fee

award that Borken sought here was 20 percent of the overall settlement amount of




                                             13
$150,000, it was still more than 20 percent of the first $130,000 under the version of

section 176.081 in effect at that time.

       In the alternative, Borken argues that if the Irwin factors apply in this case, the

compensation judge erred in finding that these factors did not support release of the $4,000

in excess fees. The compensation judge considered the seven Irwin factors, ultimately

determining that fees in excess of the statutory maximum were not appropriate. The

WCCA affirmed the compensation judge’s findings and determined that there was no abuse

of discretion in concluding that the maximum statutory fee of $26,000 provided adequate

compensation and in denying the $4,000 excess fee claim.

       Borken argues that the compensation judge did not “place correct emphasis on the

factors that matter the most when a matter is undisputed.” First, Borken claims that the

compensation judge erred in declining to consider the specific amount of the settlement

(i.e., $150,000) and future medical disputes in the judge’s analysis of the amount involved.

In analyzing the amount involved, the compensation judge noted that the issues involved

entitlement to wage loss benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, and rehabilitation

services, though the compensation judge did not state the specific dollar amount involved.

Second, Borken also claims that it was inappropriate for the compensation judge to

combine two of the factors—the difficulties of the issues and the nature of the proof—into

a single inquiry. Specifically, the compensation judge found that the “[t]he issues involved

average complexity and limited proof as Attorney Borken did not have to review much

documentary evidence, file any pleadings, participate in any depositions, or retain any

experts. The case settled before the filing of a pleading and prior to any evidentiary


                                            14
hearing.” Third, Borken contends that the compensation judge placed either too much or

too little weight on most of the other Irwin factors, including the time and expense

necessary to prepare for trial, expertise of counsel, and nature of the proof involved.

Neither the respondents nor the Attorney General addressed the compensation judge’s

application of the Irwin factors.

          We said in Braatz that “all relevant circumstances should be considered when

awarding attorney fees” and that the compensation judge in that case “properly considered

all seven Irwin factors . . . ensur[ing] that the attorney did not recover an unreasonable

amount of fees for his representation.” 850 N.W.2d at 711–12. We have never held that

each of the seven Irwin factors must be separately considered. Still, in Braatz we cited our

decision in Green v. BMW of North America, LLC, 

 (Minn. 2013), in which

we “concluded that it was an abuse of discretion when the district court failed to consider

the amount at issue in the litigation and awarded $221,499 in attorney fees for a $25,157

damage award under Minnesota’s lemon law.” Braatz, 

. In Green, the

district court “concluded that it was improper to consider the amount at issue in the

litigation” and “declined to consider the amount involved in the litigation.” 

.

          Here, the compensation judge considered all seven Irwin factors, though the judge

combined two of the factors into one.        And unlike the district court in Green, the

compensation judge noted and considered the categories of benefits and services involved,

although the judge did not identify the specific dollar amounts. Our precedents do not

directly address whether it is an abuse of discretion to combine two of the Irwin factors


                                             15
into one inquiry or to fail to specify the dollar amount involved. However, because the

compensation judge nonetheless considered all seven factors (despite merging two of them

into one inquiry) and did in fact address the “amount involved” factor (even if the

compensation judge did not articulate the specific dollar amount), we conclude that there

was no abuse of discretion.      Moving forward, however, the better practice is for

compensation judges to specify the dollar amount at issue and to consider each of the seven

factors individually.

                                    CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Workers’ Compensation

Court of Appeals.

       Affirmed.




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