STATE OF MINNESOTA

                                    IN SUPREME COURT

                                        A24-0182


Court of Appeals                                                                Gaïtas, J.

State of Minnesota,

                      Respondent,

vs.                                                                   Filed: July 9, 2025
                                                               Office of Appellate Courts
Clifford Robert Letourneau, III,

                      Appellant.

                              ________________________


Keith M. Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Kelsey A. Hopps, Assistant County
Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota, for respondent.

Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
appellant.

                              ________________________

SYLLABUS

      A person commits first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota Statutes

section 609.342, subdivision 1(d) (2024), if the person engages in nonconsensual sexual

penetration and “uses force”—i.e., inflicts bodily harm—before or during that act.

      Affirmed.


                                            1

OPINION

GAÏTAS, Justice.

       In this pretrial appeal we consider the meaning of the phrase “uses force” in the

first-degree criminal sexual conduct statute, Minnesota Statutes section 609.342,

subdivision 1(d) (2024). Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Clifford Robert

Letourneau, III, with first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of that provision,

which criminalizes nonconsensual sexual penetration when “the actor uses force as defined

in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (1).” The cross-referenced statute, in turn, defines

“force” as “the infliction by the actor of bodily harm.” 

, subd. 3(1)

(2024). The district court granted Letourneau’s motion to dismiss the charge for lack of

probable cause, concluding that the complaint failed to allege facts showing that

Letourneau used force to accomplish the act of sexual penetration. The court of appeals

reversed and remanded, interpreting the statute to require the use of force in conjunction

with sexual penetration, and not as a means to accomplish the act of penetration. We

granted Letourneau’s petition for review. Because we conclude that the plain language of

section 609.342, subdivision 1(d) criminalizes nonconsensual sexual penetration when the

actor uses force either before or during the act, we affirm.




                                              2
                                          FACTS

       The State charged Letourneau with first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation

of Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(d), 1 which criminalizes

nonconsensual penetration when “the actor uses force as defined in section 609.341,

subdivision 3, clause (1).” “Force,” under the cross-referenced statute, is defined as “the

infliction by the actor of bodily harm.” 

, subd. 3(1). The parties

stipulated to the record, 2 which established the following allegations in support of probable

cause: On the weekend of November 18, 2022, Letourneau arrived at K.L.’s home. Later

that evening, Letourneau approached K.L. and, without consent, inserted his penis into her

vagina. K.L. started to cry. K.L. later told an investigator that, after Letourneau started

sexually assaulting her, she started bleeding from her vagina. K.L. stated that this occurred

because Letourneau’s assault had ripped her vagina. Based on these allegations, the

complaint alleged that Letourneau “did unlawfully and wrongfully engage in sexual

penetration with K.L. and used force by the infliction of bodily harm.”

       Letourneau moved to dismiss the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge for

lack of probable cause, asserting that the allegations in the complaint “do not claim that

[Letourneau] inflicted bodily harm.” The State opposed the motion. It argued that K.L.’s


1
       The State also charged Letourneau with two other counts, involving a different
complainant, that are not at issue in this appeal: third-degree criminal sexual conduct in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.344, subdivision 1(b) (2024), and incest in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.365 (2024).
2
      The record includes a video recording and transcript of an investigator’s interview
with K.L., during which K.L. made statements that mirror K.L.’s statements alleged in the
complaint.

                                              3
report established the infliction of bodily harm on K.L. by Letourneau. After a hearing,

the district court asked for supplemental briefing on Letourneau’s motion. In its

memorandum accompanying the briefing order, the district court identified an issue of

statutory interpretation: whether section 609.342 subdivision 1(d) requires the actor to use

force to accomplish the act of nonconsensual sexual penetration. The district court noted

that other subdivisions of section 609.342 included the requirement that the actor use force

“to accomplish the act” or to “cause the complainant to submit.” See 

,

subd. 1(c)(i) (2024) (actor causes personal injury and uses coercion “to accomplish the

act”); 

, subd. 1(e)(i) (2024) (actor is aided and abetted by one or more

accomplices and actor or accomplice uses force or coercion “to cause the complainant to

submit”). And the district court stated that it was “leaning toward concluding that the

Legislature simply inadvertently failed to include a phrase like, ‘to accomplish the act’, in

connection with the term ‘force’ when it defined [section 609.342, subdivision 1(d)].”

       Letourneau submitted a supplemental filing stating that he “agree[d] with the logic

as outlined in [the district court’s] order.” The State responded that section 609.342,

subdivision 1(d), unlike section 609.342, subdivision 1(c), does not require an actor to use

force to accomplish the act of penetration. According to the State, the allegations of

physical injury to K.L. were sufficient to satisfy the element of bodily harm. The State

also noted that the Legislature amended section 609.342 in 2021, removing the “to

accomplish the act” language from the “force” provision of the statute. See Act of June 30,

2021, ch. 11, art. 4, § 16, 2021 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1947, 2038–39 (codified at




                                             4


, subd. 1(d) (2024)). Given that change, the State argued, it was not

required to prove that Letourneau used force to accomplish the act of sexual penetration.

       Following supplemental briefing, the district court granted Letourneau’s motion to

dismiss the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge in the complaint. It concluded that,

to convict under section 609.342, subdivision 1(d), the State must prove that a defendant

used force to accomplish nonconsensual sexual penetration. The district court’s analysis

relied on the pattern jury instruction for the offense, which requires proof that “ ‘the

Defendant used “force” to accomplish the act [of penetration].’ ” See 10 Minn. Dist.

Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice—Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 12.05

(7th ed. 2023–2024).

       In a pretrial appeal to the court of appeals, the State challenged the dismissal of

the charge, arguing that the district court erred by determining that section 609.342,

subdivision 1(d), requires the State to prove that a defendant used force to accomplish an

alleged act of nonconsensual sexual penetration. State v. Letourneau, No. A24-0182,

, at *3 (Minn. App. Aug. 19, 2024). The State contended that the plain

language of the statute did not support the district court’s interpretation of the statute.

Letourneau argued to the court of appeals that the statute plainly requires the State to prove

that a defendant “uses the infliction of bodily harm” before “doing the act that the infliction

of bodily harm is used for.”

       The court of appeals determined that the word “uses” in section 609.342,

subdivision 1(d), is ambiguous. Letourneau, 

, at *4. Then, applying the

canon of “contemporaneous legislative history” and relying on the Legislature’s 2021


                                              5
amendments to section 609.342, the court of appeals observed that the Legislature’s intent

was clear: the State does not have to prove that “the actor used force to accomplish the act

of penetration” and need only prove that the actor used force. 

 at *5–6. The court of

appeals concluded that the State’s complaint alleged sufficient facts to show that

Letourneau used force during the sexual penetration. 

. It therefore reversed the

district court’s dismissal of the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge against

Letourneau. 

       We granted Letourneau’s petition for review.

                                         ANALYSIS

       This pretrial appeal 3 requires us to interpret the meaning of the phrase “uses force”

in Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(d), which criminalizes nonconsensual



3
        Neither party disputes this court’s jurisdiction over this appeal, and we agree that
we have jurisdiction. Kingbird v. State, 

, 637 (Minn. 2022) (noting that
subject-matter jurisdiction is “a threshold issue that we [may] raise sua sponte”). Although
the State’s ability to appeal a district court’s pretrial dismissal of a charge or complaint for
lack of probable cause is limited, it “may appeal as of right . . . from any pretrial order,
including probable cause dismissal orders based on questions of law.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
28.04, subd. 1(1). However, in such appeals, the State must also show that the alleged
error will “have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04,
subd. 2(2)(b). We view “critical impact” as a “threshold issue” and will not review a
pretrial order without such a showing. State v. Underdahl, 

(Minn. 2009); State v. Zais, 

 (Minn. 2011) (noting that the State has the
burden of showing critical impact). Here, the district court’s dismissal of the first-degree
criminal sexual conduct charge is based solely on a question of law—the interpretation of
“uses force” in subdivision 1(d). And because the district court dismissed the charge, the
State has satisfied its burden to establish critical impact. Underdahl, 

(stating that dismissal of a charge has a critical impact on the prosecution’s case even if
other charges remain). We accordingly conclude that this pretrial appeal is properly before
us.


                                               6
sexual penetration when “the actor uses force as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3,

clause (1).” 4 It is undisputed that the word “force,” as it applies here, is defined in section

609.341, subdivision 3(1) as “the infliction by the actor of bodily harm.” The issue before

us is what the phrase “uses force” means: Specifically, what must the purpose of the force

be, and when must the force be used? Letourneau contends that the phrase “uses force”

means that a defendant must use force prior to and in order to accomplish the act of sexual

penetration. 5 On the other hand, the State argues that the phrase is broad enough to include

situations where a defendant uses force during the act of sexual penetration.

       To decide this issue, we first identify the rules of statutory interpretation and the

language of section 609.342, subdivision 1(d). Because “force” is already defined by the


4
       Section 609.342, subdivision 1(d) states:

               Subdivision 1. Adult victim; crime defined. A person who engages
       in sexual penetration with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct
       in the first degree if any of the following circumstances exists:
       ...
               (d) the actor uses force as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3,
       clause (1).

       Section 609.341, subdivision 3(1) states: “ ‘Force’ means . . . : (1) the infliction by
the actor of bodily harm[.]” The requirement that the act be nonconsensual is contained
within the statutory definition of “sexual penetration.” 

, subd. 12
(2024) (“ ‘Sexual penetration’ means any of the following acts committed without the
complainant’s consent . . . .”).
5
        Initially, Letourneau’s argument appeared to be that the Legislature’s use of the
transitive verb “uses” requires an existing object—the infliction of bodily harm—to take
place before that infliction of bodily harm can be “used.” In other words, Letourneau
contended that the use of force must necessarily occur before the sexual penetration and
cannot occur during, or because of, the sexual penetration. At oral argument, however,
Letourneau’s position appeared to shift. As explained below, however, neither of these
arguments is reasonable in light of the plain language of the statute.

                                               7
statute, we next consider the meaning of the term “uses,” before then considering whether

the combination of the words “uses” and “force” creates a requirement that any force

precede the act of sexual penetration. Lastly, we apply the meaning of the phrase to the

allegations in this case.

                                            A.

       “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and

effectuate the intention of the legislature.” 

 (2024); see also State v.

Robinson, 

 (Minn. 2019). Statutory interpretation presents a question

of law, which we review de novo—without deference to the lower courts. Roberts v. State,

, 853 (Minn. 2020).

       The first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language of the

statute is ambiguous. State v. Degroot, 

, 360 (Minn. 2020). “Statutory

language is ambiguous only if, as applied to the facts of the particular case, it is

susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Dupey v. State, 

 (Minn. 2015). If a statute is unambiguous, we enforce the plain meaning of its language.

       Here, the parties dispute the plain meaning of the phrase “uses force” in section

609.342, subdivision 1(d). When interpreting a statute, we “give words and phrases their

plain and ordinary meaning.” State v. Hayes, 

 (Minn. 2013). To

determine the plain meaning, we look to the text and textual context of the statute. See

State v. Pakhnyuk, 

 (Minn. 2019). We read “the statute as a whole

and favor an interpretation that gives each word or phrase in a statute a distinct, not an


                                             8
identical, meaning.” State v. Friese, 

, 210 (Minn. 2021) (citations omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Among the textual clues we consider in determining

the meaning of the words of a statute are dictionary definitions. See State v. Beganovic,

, 643 (Minn. 2023) (stating that this court “may consult dictionary

definitions as part of th[e] inquiry” into a statute’s plain meaning); see also Hagen v. Steven

Scott Mgmt., Inc., 

, 170 (Minn. 2021) (“The canons of interpretation

include the ordinary-meaning canon, the whole-statute canon, and the canon against

surplusage.” (citations omitted)). Guided by these principles, we turn to the language of

the statute.

       Section 609.342, subdivision 1, concerns criminal acts of sexual penetration

committed against adult victims. It first states that “[a] person who engages in sexual

penetration 6 with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if

any of the following circumstances exists.” 

, subd. 1 (2024). Then,

subdivision 1 lists various “circumstances,” including the circumstance alleged here: that

“the actor uses force as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (1).” 

, subd. 1(d).

       Force, as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (1), is “the infliction by

the actor of bodily harm.” “Bodily harm,” in turn, is defined by criminal statutes as



6
       “Sexual penetration” is defined to encompass several acts, including “sexual
intercourse” or “any intrusion however slight into the genital or anal openings,” which are
“committed without the complainant’s consent, except in those cases where consent is not
a defense, whether or not emission of semen occurs[.]” 

, subd. 12
(2024).

                                              9
“physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” 

, subd. 7 (2024); see also Wayzata Nissan, LLC v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.,

 (Minn. 2016) (“When a word is defined in a statute, we are guided

by the definition provided by the Legislature.”). Accordingly, the statute criminalizes

nonconsensual sexual penetration when the actor inflicts physical pain or injury, illness, or

any impairment of physical condition.

       The term “uses” is not defined in the criminal sexual conduct statutes or in the

general criminal statutes. We next consider the meaning of “uses” in the context of section

609.342, subdivision 1(d).

                                             B.

       Both Letourneau and the State ask us to utilize a dictionary definition of the word

“uses.” Letourneau argues that the relevant dictionary definition of “uses” is “to put into

service or employ for a purpose” or “to put into action or service.” 7 The State contends

that we should define “uses” to mean “to put into service,” “to avail oneself of,” or

“employ.” 8

       We observe that both parties agree that the word means “to put into service” or “to

employ.”      However, Letourneau advances an interpretation that includes additional



7
      Letourneau relies on two online dictionaries, The American Heritage Dictionary of
the English Language, https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=use (last visited
Apr. 17, 2025), and Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/use.
8
       The State cites The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1907
(5th ed. 2011), and Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2523 (2002).

                                             10
language: “for a purpose.” In this context, Letourneau argues that “uses” means “to put

into service” or “to employ” for the purpose of engaging in sexual penetration. 9

       The State points out that Letourneau’s inclusion of the additional language “for the

purpose of” would call into question the Legislature’s use of other language in

subdivision 1. It points to subdivision 1(b), which prohibits sexual penetration where “the

actor is armed with a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to

lead the complainant to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon and uses or

threatens to use the weapon or article to cause the complainant to submit.” 

, subd. 1(b) (emphasis added). Similarly, when an actor is aided and abetted by

one or more accomplices, sexual penetration is unlawful under subdivision 1(e)(i) and (ii)


9
        We have consistently held that our criminal sexual conduct statutes do not require
the State to prove that a defendant used extrinsic force—that is, force beyond the force
inherent in a nonconsensual sexual act. See, e.g., State v. Mattson, 

(Minn. 1985) (concluding that evidence that the defendant grabbed the victim’s breast and
caused pain and bruising was sufficient to support his conviction under Minnesota Statutes
section 609.343(e)(i) (1984), prohibiting sexual contact where the defendant used force or
coercion and caused personal injury to the victim); In re Welfare of D.L.K., 

, 437–38 (Minn. 1986) (rejecting an interpretation of “ ‘uses force . . . to accomplish
the sexual contact’ ” under Minnesota Statutes section 609.345(c) (1984) that required a
precedent act of force and stating that “the requirement of force in section 609.345(c) [is]
satisfied when the actor inflicts bodily harm or pain or the threat thereof on another while
accomplishing sexual contact”); State v. Middleton, 

 (Minn. 1986)
(concluding that the coercion required by the phrase “uses force or coercion to accomplish
the sexual contact” under Minnesota Statutes section 609.345(c) (1984) “need not precede
or be separate from the sexual contact. It is enough that the coercive words or conduct,
and the fear they produce in the victim, are an aspect of, that is, they happen concurrently
with, the sexual contact”); cf. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 17.3(a)
(3d ed. 2018) (noting that an “extrinsic force” standard requires the use of force beyond
the force inherent in the nonconsensual sexual act). Given our precedent on this point, to
the extent that Letourneau’s argument can be construed as a claim that the use of force
intrinsic in sexual penetration cannot also establish force under section 609.342,
subdivision 1(d), we reject it.

                                            11
when the actor or an accomplice “uses force or coercion to cause the complainant to

submit” or uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon or similar article “to cause the

complainant to submit.” 

, subd. 1(e)(i), (ii) (emphasis added). And

the State observes that subdivision 1(c)(i) prohibits sexual penetration when the “actor uses

coercion to accomplish the act.” 

, subd. 1(c)(i) (emphasis added).

According to the State, if the Legislature had intended to prohibit the use of force “for the

purpose of engaging in sexual penetration” in section 609.342, subdivision 1(d), it would

have mirrored the language used in subdivision 1(b)—“to cause the complainant to

submit.” Thus, the State argues, “uses” must mean something else.

       We are persuaded by this argument. In interpreting statutes, we do not “examine

different provisions in isolation.” State v. Gaiovnik, 

 (Minn. 2011).

Rather, we read “[w]ords and sentences . . . in the light of their context.” Id.; see also State

v. 

 N.W.3d 150, 153–54 (Minn. 2025). We “interpret statutes to give effect to all

parts and no word, phrase, or sentence will be held superfluous, void, or insignificant.”

Roberts v. State, 

, 853 (Minn. 2020) (citation omitted) (internal quotation

marks omitted). When a word has two definitions, but one would create redundancy in the

statute, we have rejected that definition of the word. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn. v.

Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 

 (Minn. 1994).                    Section 609.342,

subdivision 1, clearly prohibits some acts—using a weapon, using coercion, and using

force when aided and abetted by an accomplice—that cause a complainant to submit to

sexual penetration. But adopting Letourneau’s proposed interpretation of “uses” for

subdivision 1(d), which does not include the phrase “to cause the complainant to submit,”


                                              12
would render the language in subdivision 1(b), (c)(i), (e)(i), and (e)(ii), superfluous.

Roberts, 945 N.W.2d at 853; see also State v. Thompson, 

, 69 (Minn. 2020)

(stating that the canon against surplusage instructs us to “avoid interpretations that would

render a word or phrase superfluous, void, or insignificant, thereby ensuring each word in

a statute is given effect”).

       Additionally, we note that in the context of the first-degree criminal sexual conduct

statute, the phrases “to cause the complainant to submit” and “to accomplish the act” are

phrases of limitation. 

, subd. 1(b),(c)(i), (e)(i), and (e)(ii). But there

is no such limiting phrase in subdivision 1(d). This is significant because, “[w]hen the

Legislature uses limiting or modifying language in one part of a statute, but omits it in

another, we regard that omission as intentional and will not add those same words of

limitation or modification to parts of the statute where they were not used.” State v.

Schwartz, 

, 419 (Minn. 2021).

       Because Letourneau’s proposed definition of the word “uses”—to put into service

or to employ for the purpose of accomplishing sexual penetration—is clearly inconsistent

with other provisions of the first-degree criminal sexual conduct statute, we reject it as

unreasonable. The only reasonable interpretation of “uses” in the context of section

609.342, subdivision 1(d), is the State’s proposed interpretation—“to put into service” or

“to employ.”

       We next consider the meaning of the words “uses” and “force” together.

Specifically, we address whether the combination of these words creates a requirement that

any force must precede the act of sexual penetration.


                                              13
                                            C.

       Letourneau argues that placing the words “uses” and “force” (which is statutorily

defined as “the infliction of bodily harm”) in their proper grammatical context shows that

section 609.342, subdivision 1(d), requires proof that an actor inflicted bodily harm before

committing the act that the infliction of bodily harm was used for. Stated otherwise,

Letourneau’s argument is that the logical result of the combination of these two words is

that bodily harm is inflicted and is then “used” to commit the act of sexual penetration.

       We disagree. The meaning of the phrase “uses force” in subdivision 1(d) must

be considered in the context of what “uses force” is establishing: a “circumstance.”

, subd. 1 (“A person who engages in sexual penetration with another

person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if any of the following

circumstances exists: . . . .”); Gaiovnik, 

 (stating that we read words of

a statute “in the light of their context”). A “circumstance” is defined as “a specific part,

phase, or attribute of the surrounding or background of an event, fact, or thing or of the

prevailing conditions in which it exists or takes place: a condition, fact, or event

accompanying, conditioning, or determining another: an adjunct or concomitant that is

present or logically likely to be present.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

410 (2002) (emphasis added). If the actor’s use of force in section 609.342, subdivision

1(d), is an “event accompanying, conditioning or determining” the sexual penetration, the

plain language of the statute penalizes the use of force both before (“conditioning or

determining”) and during (“accompanying”) the sexual penetration.




                                            14
       Letourneau argues that interpreting “uses force” in section 609.342, subdivision

1(d) to include the infliction of bodily harm both before and during the act of sexual

penetration would render section 609.342, subdivision 1(c), superfluous. Subdivision 1(c)

criminalizes sexual penetration accompanied by acts causing “personal injury.” 10 We are

unconvinced by that argument because it fails to recognize two important distinctions

between subdivision 1(c) and subdivision 1(d).

       First, subdivision 1(c) does not involve the same kind of “force” as subdivision 1(d).

As previously explained, section 609.342, subdivision 1(d), requires that “[t]he actor uses

force as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (1).” And clause 1 defines force

as “the infliction by the actor of bodily harm.” 

, subd. 3(1). On the

other hand, section 609.342, subdivision 1(c), requires both that the actor “cause[] personal

injury” and the existence of one of the attendant circumstances specified in section

609.342, subdivision 1(c)(i)–(iii). 

, subd. 1(c)(i)–(iii). But none of

those attendant circumstances involves force as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3,

clause (1). Rather, section 609.342, subdivision 1(c)(ii), requires both that the actor causes

“personal injury” and that “the actor uses force, as defined in section 609.341,


10
       Section 609.342, subdivision 1(c) states that “[a] person who engages in sexual
penetration with another person” commits first-degree criminal sexual conduct if:

              (c) the actor causes personal injury to the complainant, and any of the
       following circumstances exist:
              (i) the actor uses coercion to accomplish the act;
              (ii) the actor uses force, as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3,
       clause (2); or
              (iii) the actor knows or has reason to know that the complainant is
       mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless[.]

                                             15
subdivision 3, clause (2).”     

, subd. 1(c)(ii) (emphasis added).

Clause 2 defines force as “the attempted infliction, or threatened infliction by the actor of

bodily harm or commission or threat of any other crime by the actor against the

complainant or another, which causes the complainant to reasonably believe that the actor

has the present ability to execute the threat.” 

, subd. 3(2) (2024). In

other words, “force,” when required under subdivision 1(c)¸ is of a different character than

the “force” required by subdivision 1(d).

       Second, the definition of “personal injury” referenced in section 609.342,

subdivision 1(c), is more expansive than the definition of “bodily harm” as referenced in

section 609.342, subdivision 1(d). “Personal injury” for the purpose of section 609.342,

subdivision 1(c), “means bodily harm as defined in section 609.02, subdivision 7, or severe

mental anguish or pregnancy.” 

, subd. 8 (2024). Although the

definition of “force” in section 609.342, subdivision 1(d), also references “bodily harm,”

it does not include “severe mental anguish or pregnancy.”

       Taken together, section 609.342, subdivision 1(c)(ii), contemplates duress-type

force—the attempt to inflict bodily harm or threats of bodily harm or another crime—and

a broad array of resulting harm, including bodily harm, severe mental anguish, or

pregnancy. See 

, subd. 8 (defining “[p]ersonal injury”). But section

609.342, subdivision 1(d), only contemplates assaultive physical force—“the infliction by

the actor of bodily harm” and the resulting “physical pain or injury, illness, or any

impairment of physical condition.” See 

, subd. 7 (defining “[b]odily

harm” as “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition”).


                                             16
Because section 609.342, subdivision 1(c) criminalizes a different type of “force” and a

broader array of resulting harm than subdivision 1(d), our interpretation of “uses force” in

section 609.342, subdivision 1(d) does not render section 609.342, subdivision 1(c),

superfluous.

       For these reasons, we conclude that section 609.342, subdivision 1(d)

unambiguously criminalizes the use of force either before or during nonconsensual sexual

penetration.   Because “the Legislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain and

unambiguous language,” we “interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without

resorting to the canons of statutory construction.” State v. Struzyk, 

,

284–85 (Minn. 2015). 11

                                             D.

       Having resolved the issue of statutory interpretation, we must determine whether

the State offered sufficient evidence to show probable cause that Letourneau used force

either before or during nonconsensual sexual penetration. Probable cause for a charge

exists where facts submitted to the district court show a reasonable probability that the

person committed the crime. State v. Lopez, 

 (Minn. 2010). When a

district court dismisses a charge for lack of probable cause based on a legal determination,




11
        Because the meaning of the statute can be determined from the canons of
interpretation, we do not reach Letourneau’s argument that the rule of lenity favors his
interpretation. See State v. Thonesavanh, 

 (Minn. 2017) (“[T]he rule
of lenity is a canon of last resort, applicable only when, after consulting traditional canons
of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute.” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

                                             17
we review the district court’s decision de novo. State v. Dixon, 

, 392

(Minn. 2022).

       Here, the facts alleged in the complaint include K.L.’s allegations that, after

Letourneau sexually penetrated her, she started bleeding from her vagina; that this occurred

because Letourneau’s assault had ripped her vagina; and that K.L. did not consent to sexual

activity with Letourneau. In addition to the facts alleged in the complaint, the State

submitted a video recording and transcript of an investigator’s interview with K.L., during

which K.L. made the same statements included in the complaint.

       The facts alleged in the complaint and the State’s supplemental evidence establish

probable cause that Letourneau used force before or during his act of sexually penetrating

K.L. without her consent. We therefore agree with the court of appeals that the district

court erred in dismissing the charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under section

609.342, subdivision 1(d), for lack of probable cause.

                                     CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

       Affirmed.




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