STATE OF MINNESOTA

                                    IN SUPREME COURT

                                        A23-0560


Court of Appeals                                                               Gaïtas, J.

State of Minnesota,
                      Appellant,
vs.                                                                 Filed: July 23, 2025
                                                              Office of Appellate Courts
Nicholas Lee Hill,
                      Respondent.
                             ________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Adam E. Petras, Assistant
County Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant State
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

                              ________________________

SYLLABUS

      1.     The corpus delicti statute, 

 (2024), which bars a

conviction based solely on a confession, is satisfied for both completed offenses and

attempt offenses when there is independent evidence that reasonably tends to prove the

defendant committed the charged offense.

      2.     Respondent’s conviction for attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct

does not violate the corpus delicti statute, 

, because the State’s




                                           1
evidence independent of respondent’s confession reasonably tends to show that respondent

committed the offense.

       Reversed and remanded.

OPINION

GAÏTAS, Justice.

       In this attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct case, we consider the

operation of the corpus delicti statute, 

 (2024), which provides that a

defendant cannot be convicted of a crime based solely on the defendant’s confession to the

crime. After isolating and physically attacking a woman, respondent Nicholas Lee Hill

confessed that he had been planning to rape her during the encounter. Appellant State of

Minnesota charged Hill with attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and the

district court found Hill guilty and sentenced him to prison. The court of appeals reversed

Hill’s conviction, concluding that for attempt crimes, the corpus delicti statute requires

independent evidence of both a defendant’s intent and a substantial step toward

commission of the underlying offense, and that because Hill’s confession was the only

evidence that he intended to sexually penetrate the victim, Hill’s conviction violated the

corpus delicti statute. We granted the State’s petition for review. We confirm that the

standard we articulated in State v. Holl, 

, 814 (Minn. 2021)—which

requires independent evidence “that reasonably tends to prove” the defendant committed

the charged offense—applies to both completed crimes and attempt crimes. And because

we conclude that independent evidence reasonably tends to prove that Hill committed the

offense of attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct, thus satisfying the corpus delicti


                                             2
statute, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to that court to consider

the remaining arguments that Hill raised on appeal.

                                          FACTS

       The incident at issue here occurred at a subsidized senior living apartment building

in Minneapolis on May 11, 2020. Hill entered the lobby at around noon and asked a

building employee, M.K., for a rent application. M.K. recognized Hill, who had visited

the apartment building multiple times before and had requested a rent application each

time. Later, M.K. testified that during each of these previous encounters with Hill, she had

felt uneasy.

       C.L., who worked as a manager at the building, intervened and told M.K. that she

would handle Hill’s request. C.L. asked Hill to wait in the lobby while she retrieved an

application.   When she returned to the lobby moments later, she saw Hill walking

unaccompanied down a hallway. After C.L. instructed Hill to return to the lobby, he asked

to see a vacant apartment. C.L. took Hill to see an empty unit near the lobby.

       When they entered the apartment, Hill stood near the bathroom, and he asked C.L.

about the bathroom. C.L. later testified that she believed Hill wanted to get her into the

bathroom because he could have disabled her more easily there. Rather than entering the

bathroom, C.L. pointed out a closet to Hill. Suddenly, Hill pushed C.L. into the closet,

causing her to fall to the floor. Hill then leaned over C.L. and choked her with both of his

hands. C.L. screamed for help, pounded on the closet wall, and tried to scratch Hill’s face.




                                             3
       M.K. heard C.L. screaming, called 911, and began kicking the door to the apartment,

which was locked. C.L. later testified that she did not lock the door when she entered the

apartment with Hill.

       As Hill continued to choke C.L., she said, “You need to stop.” Hill’s face “went

blank,” and he stopped choking C.L. Both Hill and C.L. got up. Hill then pulled out a

knife, first pointing the blade toward C.L. but then turning it around as if to hand it to her.

C.L. took the knife. Hill then left the apartment, repeatedly saying, “I’m sorry.”

       M.K. and C.L. escorted Hill out of the apartment building. C.L. estimated that the

incident in the vacant apartment lasted “less than five minutes.” During that time, Hill did

not touch C.L.’s intimate parts, attempt to undress her or himself, or make any sexual

comments. C.L. later testified that Hill did not have an opportunity to touch her intimate

parts or to do anything sexual because she was fighting back. After the incident, C.L.’s

neck was red and bruised, and she experienced pain in her neck and body.

       Police arrested Hill two days later. Following a Miranda warning, two police

investigators asked Hill what happened on the day of the assault. Hill responded, “[F]or

some reason my dick got really hard.” He admitted to assaulting C.L. in the closet of the

vacant unit and told the investigators that he “thought about raping her” but “didn’t follow

through.” Hill stated, “I stopped. I thought I was supposed to do it, but the way she was

acting didn’t seem correct, so I stopped and walked out.” The investigators asked Hill

about his purpose for going to the apartment building—whether he was “looking at the

apartment or . . . planning to rape” C.L.         Hill replied, “Um I was like thinking




                                              4
about . . . [r]aping her.” An investigator asked why Hill “[did] all that.” Hill replied,

“ ’Cause I was thinking about sex.”

        The State charged Hill with one count of attempted first-degree criminal sexual

conduct while armed with a dangerous weapon. 

, subd. 1 (2018);

, subd. 1(d) (2018). 1 Later, the State amended the complaint, adding

a second count: attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct causing personal injury

using force or coercion to accomplish the act. 

, subd. 1; 

, subd. 1(e)(i) (Supp. 2019).

        Hill moved to suppress his confession, arguing that the police violated his

constitutional rights by questioning him. The district court denied the motion, concluding

that Hill had waived his Miranda rights and that the confession would be admissible at

Hill’s trial.

        Hill then waived his right to counsel and chose to represent himself. Following the

discharge of his counsel, Hill asked the district court to reconsider its order denying the

motion to suppress Hill’s confession. The district court permitted Hill to present evidence

concerning the voluntariness of the confession. After an evidentiary hearing, the district

court denied Hill’s motion for reconsideration. The district court determined that Hill




1
        We cite here to the versions of the criminal statutes that were in effect at the time
the act occurred. The corpus delicti statute has remained unaltered.

                                             5
“knew and understood his Miranda rights,” and that Hill “was neither confused nor

delusional about where he was” and why the police were questioning him.2

       Hill waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to have a court trial. Because Hill

asserted a mental illness defense, the district court bifurcated the trial into two phases, a

guilt phase and a mental illness phase. 3

       During the State’s case-in-chief, M.K., C.L., and two police officers testified, and

the prosecutor introduced 11 exhibits, including Hill’s confession. 4 Hill presented no

evidence.

       The district court found Hill guilty of attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct

causing personal injury using force or coercion. It relied in part on Hill’s confession as

evidence of Hill’s intent to engage in sexual penetration with C.L. and Hill’s substantial




2
      Hill does not challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress his
statement before this court.
3
        Under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.02, subdivision 7, when a
defendant relies on both a not guilty defense and a mental illness defense, the district court
“must separate the two defenses,” considering the not guilty defense first and the mental
illness defense second.
4
        The State also moved to introduce evidence of Hill’s prior conviction for
first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b) as evidence
of Hill’s intent. See also State v. Spreigl, 

, 169–173 (Minn. 1965)
(allowing evidence of other criminal acts for specific purposes). The district court denied
the State’s motion, determining that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighed the probative value of the evidence.

                                              6
steps toward commission of the offense. 5 The district court found Hill not guilty of

attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct while armed with a dangerous weapon.

       As to Hill’s mental illness defense, the district court concluded that, although Hill

had a history of mental illness, he did not meet the requirements of the mental illness

defense because he understood the wrongful nature of his actions. 6 See 

 (2024) (“No person having a mental illness or cognitive impairment so as to be

incapable of understanding the proceedings or making a defense shall be tried, sentenced,

or punished for any crime; but the person shall not be excused from criminal liability except

upon proof that at the time of committing the alleged criminal act the person was laboring

under such a defect of reason, from one of these causes, as not to know the nature of the

act, or that it was wrong.”). The district court found that Hill recounted the sexual assault

to police, stated that he planned to rape C.L., and acknowledged that rape is wrong.

       At sentencing, the district court sentenced Hill to 180 months in prison.

       Hill appealed his conviction, 7 arguing, among other things, that his conviction

violated the corpus delicti statute because, beyond his confession, the State failed to present

evidence that reasonably tends to prove that he committed attempted first-degree criminal

sexual conduct. State v. Hill, 10 N.W.3d 317, 320 (Minn. App. 2024). The court of appeals


5
        Under Minnesota Statutes section 609.17, subdivision 1, “[w]hoever, with intent to
commit a crime, does an act which is a substantial step toward, and more than preparation
for, the commission of the crime is guilty of an attempt to commit that crime.”
6
       The district court’s rejection of Hill’s mental illness defense is not before us in this
appeal.
7
       Hill has been represented by counsel throughout his appeal.

                                              7
agreed and reversed Hill’s conviction. 

 at 327–28. One judge dissented, determining

that the State’s evidence satisfied the corpus delicti statute. 

 at 330–31 (Reyes, J.,

dissenting).

       We granted the State’s petition for review.

                                       ANALYSIS

       In this case, we are asked to address what Minnesota’s corpus delicti statute requires

when a defendant, following a confession, is charged with an attempted criminal sexual

conduct offense. The court of appeals held that in all cases involving an attempt crime to

which the defendant confessed, the corpus delicti statute requires the State to present

evidence independent of the confession that reasonably tends to prove the defendant’s

intent to commit the underlying crime and the defendant’s substantial step toward the

commission of that crime. Hill, 10 N.W.3d at 324–25.

       According to the State, the court of appeals’ rule is too demanding. The State points

out that we have previously held the corpus delicti statute requires independent evidence

“that reasonably tends to prove that the specific crime charged in the complaint actually

occurred,” State v. Holl, 

, 814 (Minn. 2021), and it contends that standard

should apply to both completed crimes and attempt crimes. The State further argues that

the independent evidence here satisfies this standard. Hill disagrees. He supports the court

of appeals’ approach, and he argues that the State presented no independent evidence to

establish that he intended to sexually assault C.L. or took a substantial step toward

committing that act.




                                             8
       To answer the questions presented here, we must first interpret the corpus delicti

statute as it pertains to attempt crimes, including attempted first-degree criminal sexual

conduct, and then apply our interpretation to the evidence in this case. We review both

issues de novo. See Holl, 966 N.W.2d at 814.

                                              I.

                                             A.

       We begin our analysis by considering the corpus delicti rule and our state statute

codifying the rule. The corpus delicti rule “seeks to ensure the State has established the

occurrence of a crime before introducing the statements or confessions of the accused to

demonstrate that the accused committed the crime.” Holl, 966 N.W.2d at 809 (citation

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). It also “discourages coercively acquired

confessions and requires that admissions and confessions from defendants are reliable.”

Id. at 808 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Corpus delicti” is Latin

for the “body of the crime.” Holl, 966 N.W.2d at 809 (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting State v. Dern, 

 (Kan. 2015) (explaining the origins of the corpus

delicti doctrine)). The corpus delicti doctrine originated in English common law. See 

(summarizing Perry’s Case, a 1661 English case in which John Perry was convicted for

the murder of his master and executed based solely on a false confession, after which the

alleged victim reappeared and explained that he had instead been kidnapped and sold into

slavery); see also Dern, 

; David A. Moran, In Defense of the Corpus Delicti

Rule, 

, 826–27 (2003). It was first codified in Minnesota as a territorial

statute in 1851. State v. McCoy, 

, 484 (Minn. 2021) (citing Minn. Rev.


                                              9
Stat. (Terr.) ch. 132, § 240 (1851) (prohibiting a conviction “without proof that the offence

charged has been committed”)).

       The current version of Minnesota’s corpus delicti statute states, in relevant part, “A

confession of the defendant shall not be sufficient to warrant conviction without evidence

that the offense charged has been committed . . . .” 

. In State v. Holl,

we interpreted the statute as “requir[ing] the State to present evidence independent of a

confession that reasonably tends to prove that the specific crime charged in the complaint

actually occurred.” 966 N.W.2d at 814. We noted that the statute “does not require that

each element of the offense charged be individually corroborated.” Id. (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted).      Additionally, we observed that “circumstantial

evidence can still be construed as sufficient independent evidence for corroboration.” Id.

                                             B.

       To address the question presented here—what evidence is required to establish the

corpus delicti for attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct—we consider that specific

offense.

       Hill was convicted of attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct causing

personal injury using force or coercion.      

, subd. 1; 

, subd. 1(e)(i). To prove the completed offense of first-degree criminal sexual

conduct under that provision, the State must establish that the defendant (1) sexually

penetrated the complainant, (2) without the complainant’s consent, (3) caused personal

injury to the complainant, and (4) used force or coercion.          

,

subd. 1(e)(i); see also 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice—Jury Instruction


                                             10
Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 12.03 (7th ed. 2024). An attempt offense has different

elements than a completed offense. “[A]ttempt is an inchoate crime that must be connected

to an uncompleted substantive crime that was attempted.” State v. Noggle, 

 (Minn. 2016). To convict a person of an attempt, the State must prove that the

person, “with intent to commit a crime, does an act which is a substantial step toward, and

more than preparation for, the commission of the crime.” 

, subd. 1.

Thus, to establish guilt of attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct under section

609.342, subdivision 1(e)(i), the State must prove that a defendant intended to sexually

penetrate a nonconsenting complainant causing personal injury using force or coercion,

and the defendant took a substantial step toward committing that crime.

                                              C.

       Having identified the elements of attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct

under section 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i), we now address the court of appeals’ approach to

determining whether there was sufficient independent evidence of this offense to satisfy

section 634.03, the corpus delicti statute.

       The court of appeals considered the implications of the corpus delicti statute and

our prior case law, including Holl, for inchoate crimes such as attempt. Hill, 10 N.W.3d

at 321. Ultimately, the court of appeals held that “if the specific crime charged in the

complaint is an attempt crime, the state must present evidence independent of the

confession that reasonably tends to prove . . . an intent to commit [the] underlying crime

and . . . a substantial step toward the commission of the underlying crime.” 

 at 324–25.




                                              11
       The court of appeals reached this conclusion by first identifying the essential

elements of attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct: (1) intent to commit

first-degree criminal sexual conduct causing personal injury using force or coercion and

(2) a substantial step toward the commission of that crime. 

 at 321–22. It then

acknowledged the rule that we announced in Holl that the corpus delicti statute “does not

require that each element of the offense charged be individually corroborated.” 

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis removed). But the court

of appeals noted that the Holl decision does not provide further guidance about which

elements must be corroborated. 

 Citing “[p]rior supreme court opinions” generally, the

court of appeals stated that “the state must corroborate the elements of a crime that

constitute the corpus delicti of the crime.” 

 at 322–23.

       The court of appeals cited McCormick on Evidence—a treatise that we have

previously relied on—for the proposition that the corpus delicti of an offense generally

consists of (1) “a particular injury or harm” and (2) “the criminal nature of the cause of the

injury or harm.” Hill, 10 N.W.3d at 323; see 1 Charles T. McCormick, McCormick on

Evidence § 146 (Robert P. Mosteller ed., 8th ed. 2022). It observed that this proposition is

consistent with some of our decisions addressing the corpus delicti for completed crimes.

Hill, 10 N.W.3d at 323 (citing State v. Laliyer, 

 (1860) (stating that the

corpus delicti for murder is that “the particular murder . . . has been committed by some

one” and that the “death was caused by the criminal agency of another”); State v. Grear,

, 140–41 (Minn. 1882) (observing that the corpus delicti for assault was

established where a woman was shot, there was no evidence that she shot herself or that


                                             12
there was an accident, and there was independent evidence showing that the defendant shot

the woman); State v. Plagman, 

 (Minn. 1963) (stating that the corpus

delicti for arson was established by independent evidence that the fire “was of incendiary

origin” and the defendant’s subsequent confession during a court proceeding)). Relying

on McCormick on Evidence and these decisions, the court of appeals interpreted Holl to

require the State to “present evidence independent of the defendant’s confession that

reasonably tends to prove those elements of the specific crime charged . . . that constitute

the corpus delicti of the crime.” Hill, 10 N.W.3d at 323.

       Next, the court of appeals considered how to discern the corpus delicti of attempted

first-degree criminal sexual conduct. It noted that, unlike a completed crime, “an attempt

[crime] typically does not result in a tangible injury or harm.” Id. at 324. Again citing

McCormick on Evidence, the court of appeals adopted the “gravamen” approach, which

provides that the corpus delicti of an inchoate crime requires independent evidence

establishing the “ ‘gravamen of the offense.’ ” Id. (quoting McCormick on Evidence

§ 146). The court of appeals defined the gravamen of an offense as “the material part of a

criminal charge.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). And observing

that the elements of a defendant’s intent and an act constituting a substantial step toward

the completed crime “are material and essential to the existence of an attempt crime,” the

court of appeals concluded that “[t]he corpus delicti of an attempt crime must encompass

both elements.” Id. (“There can be no attempt crime if there is only an intent to commit a

crime but no act in furtherance of that intent. . . . And there can be no attempt crime if

there is only an act, without any intent to commit a crime.”). To establish the corpus delicti


                                             13
for attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct, the court of appeals held that the State

must present evidence, independent of a defendant’s confession, that reasonably tends to

prove (1) the defendant’s intent to commit first-degree criminal sexual conduct and (2) the

defendant’s act that was a substantial step toward committing the completed offense. Id.

at 325.

          Finally, applying this rule to the circumstances in Hill’s case, the court of appeals

concluded that the State had failed to establish the corpus delicti for attempted first-degree

criminal sexual conduct. Id. at 327–28. The court of appeals determined that the State’s

independent evidence did not establish Hill’s intent to engage in nonconsensual sexual

conduct. Id. And because it determined that the State did not present independent evidence

of Hill’s intent, it concluded that reversal of Hill’s conviction was required. Id. at 328.

          One court of appeals judge dissented, determining that there was sufficient

independent evidence to establish the corpus delicti of attempted first-degree criminal

sexual conduct. Id. at 330 (Reyes, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the State need

not corroborate every element of the charged crime, and the State “undisputed[ly]”

established “three of the four elements” of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Id. Thus,

according to the dissent, the State satisfied its burden under the corpus delicti statute to

produce evidence that “ ‘reasonably tends to prove’ ” that Hill attempted to engage in

forcible sexual penetration. Id. (quoting Holl, 966 N.W.2d at 814).

          Alternatively, the dissent concluded, even if the corpus delicti statute requires

independent evidence of intent, the State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence

showing Hill’s intent to engage in forcible sexual penetration of C.L. Id. at 331–32. The


                                               14
dissent pointed to M.K. and C.L.’s testimony as well as the reasonable inferences that can

be drawn from them:

       [Hill] did not have to overtly express his intentions during the assault because
       his conduct demonstrated that he was executing his plan to sexually assault
       C.L. He cased C.L.’s workplace by visiting it several times before the
       incident occurred. He asked C.L. to show him an apartment under false
       pretenses. Then, when he had her alone in the apartment, he forced her into
       a closet, locked the door behind him, pushed her flat on the ground, and
       began choking her. . . . Not only do these circumstances “reasonably tend[]
       to prove” [Hill’s] guilt, but they point unerringly to the only conclusion that
       a woman in C.L.’s situation would reach: that [Hill] intended on engaging
       in criminal sexual conduct . . . .

Id. at 333.

                                             D.

       We now consider whether the court of appeals’ rule—that for an attempt crime, the

corpus delicti statute requires independent evidence of both a defendant’s intent and a

substantial step toward commission of the underlying offense—accurately reflects

Minnesota law.

       The State argues that the court of appeals’ approach is inconsistent with the corpus

delicti statute and our case law. It contends that the court of appeals drew an unnecessary

distinction between attempt crimes and completed crimes. According to the State, the

standard we articulated in Holl—which requires independent evidence “that reasonably

tends to prove” the defendant committed the charged offense—should apply to both

completed crimes and attempt crimes. Holl, 966 N.W.2d at 814.

       Hill, on the other hand, observes that completed crimes and attempt crimes are

qualitatively different. Thus, he argues, the corpus delicti for these types of crimes must



                                             15
also be different. Hill advocates for the “gravamen” approach adopted by the court of

appeals. According to Hill, this approach comports with how we have described what the

corpus delicti is: the “ ‘substance or foundation’ ” of the crime. See McCoy, 963 N.W.2d

at 477 n.1 (quoting Corpus Delicti, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)). Hill also

supports the court of appeals’ bright-line rule requiring independent evidence of a

defendant’s intent to commit an underlying crime to establish the corpus delicti for attempt

crimes. He points out that an attempt offense generally does not result in the infliction of

any harm. And he argues that without independent evidence of a defendant’s intent to

commit the offense, the corpus delicti statute becomes meaningless for attempt offenses.

       In our view, the better rule—and the rule most consistent with the corpus delicti

statute itself and our case law—is the rule that we recently articulated in Holl. There, we

stated that the plain language of the corpus delicti statute is satisfied when there is

independent evidence “that reasonably tends to prove” the defendant committed the

charged offense. Holl, 966 N.W.2d at 814. We now hold that this rule applies to both

completed offenses and attempt offenses. Accordingly, we reject the court of appeals’

holding that, to establish the corpus delicti for attempt crimes, the State must present

independent evidence of both a defendant’s intent to commit the underlying crime and a

substantial step toward the commission of the underlying crime. Instead, the corpus delicti

statute, section 634.03, is satisfied when the State presents independent evidence that

reasonably tends to prove the defendant committed the charged attempt offense.

       We are persuaded that this rule should apply to both completed offenses and attempt

offenses for two reasons. First, it best reflects the limited purpose of the corpus delicti


                                            16
statute: to avoid prosecutions for nonexistent crimes when the only evidence of the crime

is a defendant’s confession. See Holl, 966 N.W.2d at 809 (stating that the corpus delicti

statute “seeks to ensure the State ‘has established the occurrence of a crime before

introducing the statements or confessions of the accused’ ” (quoting Taylor, 831 A.2d

at 590)). Our cases show that the quantum of evidence necessary to achieve this limited

purpose is not high. See, e.g., State v. McLarne, 

 (Minn. 1915)

(requiring, for arson, corroboration that a building burned and that “the origin of the

fire . . . was the criminal act of defendant, or any one else”); State v. Wylie, 

, 708–09 (Minn. 1922) (focusing on whether the crime of larceny occurred at all and,

if so, whether there was evidence corroborating the identity of the individual who

committed larceny); State v. Voges, 

 (Minn. 1936) (defining the corpus

delicti of homicide as “the death of a human being and that a criminal agency produced it”

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also McCormick on Evidence

§ 146 (“Only ‘slight’ corroborating evidence [of the corpus delicti] is often required . . . .”

(citations omitted)). Imposing a heightened standard for independent evidence in attempt

cases therefore would be incongruous with the limited purpose of the corpus delicti statute.

       Second, we have held that the plain language of the corpus delicti statute “does not

require that each element of the offense charged be individually corroborated.” Holl,

966 N.W.2d at 814 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court of

appeals’ decision—requiring independent evidence in every attempt case of both a

defendant’s intent to commit a completed crime and a substantial step toward commission

of that crime—effectively necessitates corroboration of each element of a charged offense,


                                              17
contrary to the plain meaning of the corpus delicti statute. Because the statute itself does

not prescribe any quantum of proof or formula for assessing independent evidence,

adopting an element-specific requirement for a particular category of cases would require

us to read additional language into the statute. We decline to do so. See Noggle,

 (stating that we do not read additional language into a statute).

       Hill argues that some of our case law has, at times, required independent

corroboration of a defendant’s intent to establish the corpus delicti. He contends that the

court of appeals’ approach—requiring independent proof of a defendant’s intent for

attempt offenses—is consistent with our earlier decisions. For example, Hill notes, we

stated in State v. McLarne that “to prove the corpus delicti in arson, it is necessary to show,

not only that the building burned, but that the fire was designedly set by some one.”

. In State v. McTague, we reiterated that the corpus delicti rule requires

corroboration of both a fire and the criminal nature of the fire in arson cases, stating that

“proof of the corpus delicti requires proof of the burning of the building and proof that the

fire was criminally set.” 

 (1934). And in State v. Plagman, we noted

that the corpus delicti of arson is “[t]hat there was a fire willfully set by someone,” and we

upheld the defendant’s arson conviction. 

. Hill argues that these are

examples of this court holding that intent “is a required part of the corpus delicti” for certain

crimes.

       We do not read these cases to establish a rule requiring independent corroborating

evidence of a defendant’s intent. None of the arson cases cited by Hill require the State

to corroborate the defendant’s mental state.         Rather, they merely require evidence


                                               18
independent of the defendant’s confession that the fire resulted from a criminal act, instead

of an accident or natural cause. See McLarne, 

 (requiring only that the

State corroborate that “the fire was designedly set by some one” as opposed to an accidental

or naturally occurring cause (emphasis added)); McTague, 

 (requiring only

that the State corroborate that “the fire was criminally set” as opposed to an accidental or

naturally occurring cause (emphasis added)); Plagman, 

 (requiring only

that the State corroborate that the fire was “willfully set by someone” as opposed to an

accidental or naturally occurring cause (emphasis added)).

       Hill points to our decision in State v. Koskela as an additional indication that we

have required corroboration of a defendant’s intent to establish the corpus delicti for certain

offenses. 

 (Minn. 1995). The victim in that case was stabbed to death in

the bedroom of her apartment. 

 at 626–27. Initially, the case went unsolved. See 

. But almost three years after the murder, the police learned that Koskela had

confessed to three witnesses that he had entered the victim’s apartment through a balcony

and murdered her. 

 at 627–28. He told two of these witnesses that he had planned to

rob the victim. 

. Following his arrest, Koskela confessed to the police. 

at 627–28. During that confession, he told the police that he did not enter the apartment to

burglarize or rob the victim. 

.

       Based on his confessions and other evidence, Koskela was charged with first-degree

felony murder and first-degree burglary. See 

. A jury found him guilty of both

offenses. 

. On appeal to this court, Koskela argued that the evidence was

insufficient to establish that he committed a first-degree burglary because there was no


                                              19
evidence of his specific intent to burglarize the victim other than his confessions to the

two witnesses.    

.     We cited the corpus delicti statute, observing that a

defendant’s confession “is not sufficient to sustain a conviction without evidence that the

offense charged has been committed.” 

 (citing 

). And citing a

sufficiency-of-the-evidence case, we stated, “In a burglary case, this court has held that it

is not necessary for the state to prove that anything actually was taken from the premises

in order to meet its burden of proof—the critical point is the defendant’s intentions.” 

(citing State v. Hall, 

 (Minn. 1970)). We then concluded that there

was sufficient “corroborative evidence” for the jury “to determine that [Koskela] had the

intent to commit burglary when he entered the victim’s apartment.” 

 The court noted

that Koskela had confessed his intent to rob the victim to two witnesses and that the

circumstances of the offense “could lead a jury to reasonably conclude that [Koskela]

entered the dwelling with the intent to commit burglary.” 

       We disagree with Hill that our decision in Koskela announced a requirement for

independent evidence of a confessing defendant’s intent to commit a charged offense. The

decision does not explicitly adopt this requirement. And we are unable to glean any such

requirement from our analysis in Koskela. Although we referenced the corpus delicti

statute, the issue before the court was Koskela’s claim “that the state failed to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt the elements of burglary in the first degree.” 

 Moreover, in

determining that there was sufficient “corroborative evidence” of Koskela’s intent, we

relied, in part, on his confessions that he intended to burglarize the victim. 

 We went

on to determine that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable


                                             20
doubt that Koskela committed a first-degree burglary. 

 Given our analysis in Koskela,

we cannot conclude that the decision requires independent evidence of intent to establish

the corpus delicti for an offense.

       Although the corpus delicti statute does not require independent evidence of every

element of an offense, we emphasize that confessing defendants are entitled to the

additional protection of due process under the federal and state constitutions. “Due process

requires that the State bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element

of a charged offense in a criminal trial.” State v. Pakhnyuk, 

(Minn. 2019). This constitutional requirement ensures that convictions are based on

sufficient evidence of each element of a crime.

       As to the evidence required to satisfy our corpus delicti statute, however, we instruct

courts to apply the standard we established in Holl: the independent evidence must

“reasonably tend[] to prove that the specific crime charged in the complaint actually

occurred.” Holl, 966 N.W.2d at 814. The State need not corroborate each individual

element of the underlying offense, and circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to

corroborate a defendant’s confession. Id.

                                             II.

                                             A.

       With this rule in mind, we now consider whether the evidence independent of Hill’s

confession was sufficient to satisfy the corpus delicti statute for attempted first-degree

criminal sexual conduct.




                                             21
       We initially address the court of appeals’ concern that the State’s evidence did not

satisfy the corpus delicti for attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct because there

was no independent evidence of Hill’s intent to sexually penetrate C.L. during the

encounter. Citing some of our sufficiency-of-the-evidence cases, the court of appeals

focused on the lack of independent evidence of a sexual nature. Hill, 10 N.W.3d at 327.

For example, the court of appeals observed that in State v. Wallace, 

(Minn. 1997), we affirmed the defendant’s conviction for attempted second-degree

criminal sexual conduct where the defendant “unbuckled and began to remove the belt on

his pants,” in addition to other evidence. Hill, 10 N.W.3d at 327. And in State v. Welch,

, 617–20 (Minn. 2004), we affirmed the defendant’s attempted criminal

sexual conduct conviction based on evidence that the defendant made statements to the

victim with a “discernable sexual overtone” and other-acts evidence showing that the

defendant had engaged in similar sexual assaults in the past. Hill, 10 N.W.3d at 327.

(internal quotation marks omitted). The court of appeals recognized that these cases, which

evaluated the sufficiency of the evidence, required the State’s evidence to meet the higher

burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Hill, 10 N.W.3d at 327. But the court of

appeals used these decisions to highlight the lack of similar evidence in Hill’s case. 

       We disagree that such evidence is necessarily required to establish the corpus delicti

for an attempted criminal sexual conduct offense. In considering the sufficiency of the

evidence underlying an attempted criminal sexual conduct conviction, we have observed

that “[w]hat is sufficient in one case might not be sufficient in another.” State v. Degroot,

, 363 (Minn. 2020). For this reason, we have determined that “no definite


                                             22
rule, applicable to all cases, can be laid down as to what constitutes an [attempt] within the

meaning of our statute.” 

 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Instead, “[e]ach case must depend largely upon its particular facts and the

inferences which the jury may reasonably draw therefrom.” 

 (citation omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In the context of the corpus delicti statute, which imposes a

lesser burden than the due process requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, we

similarly reject any formulaic approach to deciding whether the independent evidence

reasonably tends to prove the commission of the specific crime charged.

        We now apply our Holl rule to the State’s evidence in this case. The State’s

evidence was as follows: Before the date of the offense, Hill made multiple visits to the

apartment building where C.L. was employed. On the day of the attack, Hill went to the

apartment building with a knife. Hill asked C.L. to show him a vacant apartment. Once

they entered a vacant apartment, Hill inquired about the bathroom, which C.L. construed

as an attempt to get her into the confined space of that room. When C.L. did not enter the

bathroom, Hill shoved her into a closet. He leaned over C.L. and choked her as C.L.

attempted to fight back. M.K. tried to enter the apartment in response to C.L.’s screams,

but she was unable to open the door. C.L. knew that she had not locked the door behind

her. After the incident, C.L.’s neck was red and bruised, and she felt pain in her neck and

body.

        The State’s evidence reasonably tends to prove that Hill committed the offense of

attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct causing personal injury using force or

coercion. It is reasonable to infer from the evidence—which shows that Hill went to the


                                             23
apartment building armed with a knife, persuaded C.L. to take him to a vacant apartment,

locked the door, knocked C.L. to the ground, loomed over C.L. while she was on her back,

and choked C.L.—that Hill intended to sexually penetrate C.L. without consent and took a

substantial step toward committing that offense. 

, subd. 1; 

, subd. 1(e)(i). Thus, the State satisfied its burden of establishing the corpus

delicti for attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct, as required by section 634.03,

and the court of appeals erred in concluding otherwise. We accordingly reverse the

decision of the court of appeals.

                                             B.

       Because the court of appeals reversed Hill’s conviction pursuant to section 634.04,

it did not address the additional issues that Hill raised on appeal. Hill’s counsel raised two

additional issues before the court of appeals, and Hill raised several arguments in a pro se

supplemental brief. Hill, 10 N.W.3d at 320–21. When we reverse a court of appeals

decision and are confronted with questions the court of appeals did not reach, a remand

may be appropriate. See Dupey v. State, 

 (Minn. 2015); State v. Ross,

, 276 n.3 (Minn. 2007). We determine that a remand to the court of appeals

to address the additional issues raised by Hill is appropriate. Therefore, we remand to the

court of appeals to consider those remaining issues.

                                      CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and

remand to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

       Reversed and remanded.


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