STATE OF MINNESOTA

                                   IN SUPREME COURT

                                        A25-0225


Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals                                         Thissen, J.

Paula Kay Brunner,

                     Respondent,

vs.                                                                 Filed: August 6, 2025
                                                               Office of Appellate Courts
Post Consumer Brands and
Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc.

                     Relators.

                                 ________________________


David C. Wulff, Law Office of David C. Wulff, New Brighton, Minnesota, for respondent.

Christine L. Tuft, Erica A. Weber, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering, Smetak & Pikala, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, for relators.

Joshua W. Laabs, Schmidt & Salita Law Team, Minnetonka, Minnesota, for amicus curiae
Minnesota Association for Justice.

Timothy P. Jung, Lind Jensen Sullivan & Peterson, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Matthew L. Bonniwell, Erstad & Riemer, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae
Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association.

                                 ________________________

SYLLABUS

      1.     An employee may bring a direct claim under the Workers’ Compensation

Act, Minn. Stat. ch. 176 (2024), for medical expenses related to a compensable work injury


                                            1
that the employee’s health insurer covered before a determination was made that the injury

is compensable.

       2.     The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals erred by reversing the

compensation judge’s order under 

 (2024), extinguishing the health

insurer’s potential intervenor interest after it failed to timely intervene.

       Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

OPINION

THISSEN, Justice.

       We must decide whether an employee may raise a direct claim for medical expenses

related to a compensable injury under the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), Minn.

Stat. ch. 176 (2024), that the employee’s health insurer paid while her workers’

compensation claim was pending. This case presents an issue that is very similar to the

question we resolved in our recent decision in Johnson v. Concrete Treatments, Inc.,

7 N.W.3d 119 (Minn. 2024). Consistent with our holding in Johnson, 7 N.W.3d at 130,

we hold that an injured employee may bring a direct claim for medical expenses under the

Act related to a compensable work injury that their insurer paid before the injury was found

compensable. We must also determine whether the Workers’ Compensation Court of

Appeals (WCCA) erred by reversing a compensation judge’s order extinguishing a health

insurer’s intervenor interest in workers’ compensation proceedings. We hold that the




                                               2
WCCA erred in this respect because, in this case, the insurer did not timely intervene in

the proceedings as required by 

, subd. 2.

                                        FACTS

      Paula Brunner began working for relator Post Consumer Brands in April 2003.

During her employment, she worked as a packaging operator on the assembly line. In

January 2022, Brunner began complaining to the company nurse about pain in her left

shoulder and a limited range of motion. She requested that Post Consumer Brands cover

her medical expenses because the shoulder injury was work related.          Brunner saw

orthopedist Dr. Hans Bengtson for her shoulder condition and eventually had shoulder

surgery in February 2023. Following the surgery, Brunner was placed on leave and

received disability benefits until she returned to work in her pre-injury capacity in

November 2023.

      Post Consumer Brands and its workers’ compensation insurer, relator Gallagher

Bassett Services, 1 initially admitted that Brunner’s shoulder condition was work related.

Post Consumer Brands subsequently engaged Dr. Michael D’Amato to perform an

independent medical exam on Brunner’s left shoulder. Dr. D’Amato concluded that there

was no reasonable basis to support a claim of work-related injury as a contributing factor

to Brunner’s shoulder condition. After receiving Dr. D’Amato’s report, Post Consumer

Brands denied Brunner’s claim, asserting that her shoulder condition was not work related.

Following that determination, and in conformance with the directive in Minnesota Statutes


1
       We will refer to Post Consumer Brands and Gallagher Basset Services collectively
as Post Consumer Brands unless we are referring solely to Gallagher Bassett Services.

                                            3
section 176.191, subdivision 3, Brunner’s health insurer, Healthy Alliance Life Insurance

Company d/b/a Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield (Anthem), reimbursed Brunner’s medical

providers for treating and performing surgery on Brunner’s shoulder. See 

, subd. 3 (“If a dispute exists as to whether an employee’s injury is

compensable . . . and the employee is otherwise covered by an insurer or entity . . . that

insurer or entity shall pay any medical costs incurred by the employee for the injury up to

the limits of the applicable coverage . . . .”).

       In response to Post Consumer Brands’ decision to deny her claim as not work

related, Brunner filed a workers’ compensation claim petition seeking, among other things,

a determination that her shoulder injury was work related and compensable under the Act.

Brunner notified Anthem of its right to intervene in the workers’ compensation

proceedings. Despite receiving timely notice, Anthem did not file a timely motion to

intervene in the proceedings. Anthem did, however, respond to Brunner’s notice of its

right to intervention, stating that it would “expect reimbursement of [Anthem’s] interest in

the event of either a favorable decision at hearing or if settlement is reached through a

compromise agreement.”

       Brunner submitted a report prepared by Dr. Bengtson challenging Dr. D’Amato’s

report to the compensation judge. Dr. Bengston concluded that Brunner’s work activities

caused her shoulder condition. After a hearing, the compensation judge issued an order

finding that Dr. Bengtson’s opinions were more credible than Dr. D’Amato’s and that the

medical expenses Brunner incurred as a result of her shoulder injury were compensable

under the Act.


                                                   4
       Despite finding that Brunner’s injury resulted from work activities, the

compensation judge determined that Brunner could not bring a direct claim for medical

bills Anthem paid. The compensation judge reasoned that “[a]ll case authority for the

employee having a direct claim for medical expenses is derivative of Minn. Stat.

[§] 176.135 (2022) and refers to medical ‘providers.’ A health insurer is not a medical

provider.” 2 The compensation judge construed Brunner’s claim for medical bills as a claim

on behalf of Anthem seeking reimbursement for paying Brunner’s medical bills under the

health insurance policy between Brunner and Anthem. For this reason, the compensation

judge determined that, under Minnesota Statutes section 176.361—which provides for

extinguishment of the intervenor interests of a potential intervenor who fails to timely

intervene 3—Anthem’s failure to intervene in the workers’ compensation proceeding


2
        Section 176.135 requires an employer to “furnish any medical . . . treatment . . . as
may reasonably be required at the time of the [employee’s] injury and any time thereafter
to cure and relieve from the effects of the injury.” 

, subd. 1. This is
the substantive provision of the Act that allows employees to obtain medical benefits for
workplace injuries. See Leuthard v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 912, 

 (Minn. 2021)
(referring to section 176.135 as the “medical benefits statute”).
3
       Section 176.361, subdivision 2, provides in relevant part:

               Subd. 2. Written motion. A person desiring to intervene in a workers’
       compensation case as a party, including but not limited to a health care
       provider who has rendered services to an employee or an insurer who has
       paid benefits under section 176.191, shall submit a timely written motion to
       intervene to the commissioner, the office, or to the court of appeals,
       whichever is applicable.
               (a) . . . A motion to intervene must be served and filed within 60 days
       after a potential intervenor has been served with notice of a right to intervene
       or within 30 days of notice of an administrative conference or expedited
       hearing. . . . Where a motion to intervene is not timely filed under this


                                              5
extinguished Anthem’s claim for reimbursement and, by extension, Brunner’s claim on

Anthem’s behalf.

      The WCCA reversed the compensation judge’s finding that Brunner could not bring

a direct claim on Anthem’s behalf. Brunner v. Post Consumer Brands, No. WC24-6569,

, at *4 (Minn. WCCA Jan. 15, 2025). The WCCA relied on Minnesota

Statutes section 176.191, subdivision 3:

      If a dispute exists as to whether an employee’s injury is compensable under
      this chapter and the employee is otherwise covered by an insurer or entity
      pursuant to chapters 62A, 62C, 62D, 62E, 62R, and 62T, that insurer or entity
      shall pay any medical costs incurred by the employee for the injury up to the
      limits of the applicable coverage and shall make any disability payments
      otherwise payable by that insurer or entity in the absence of or in addition to
      workers’ compensation liability. If the injury is subsequently determined to
      be compensable pursuant to this chapter, the workers’ compensation insurer
      shall be ordered to reimburse the insurer or entity that made the payments
      for all payments made under this subdivision by the insurer or entity,
      including interest at a rate of 12 percent a year.

(Emphasis added). The WCCA determined that a conflict exists between sections 176.191,

subdivision 3, and 176.361, subdivision 2. Brunner, 

, at *3–4. In

resolving the conflict, the WCCA concluded that section 176.191, subdivision 3, controls,

and thus the compensation judge erred by extinguishing Anthem’s intervenor interest in

the proceeding. Brunner, 

, at *3–4. The WCCA ordered Post Consumer

Brands to “reimburse Anthem for all payments made to cure and relieve the employee’s




      section, the potential intervenor may not collect, or attempt to collect, the
      extinguished interest from the employee, employer, insurer, or any
      government program.

                                            6
left shoulder condition arising out of the work injury culminating on January 11, 2022,

including payment of interest at a rate of 12 percent a year.” 

.

       Post Consumer Brands petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari, asking us to

reverse the WCCA’s determinations that (1) Brunner may raise a direct claim for

reimbursement for expenses paid for by Anthem, and (2) the compensation judge erred by

extinguishing Anthem’s intervenor interest in the proceedings under section 176.361. 4

                                        ANALYSIS

       In this opinion, we answer two questions. First, we consider whether an employee

may bring a direct claim for medical expenses related to a compensable work injury already

paid by the employee’s health insurer during the pendency of the compensation

proceedings, notwithstanding the health insurer’s failure to intervene in the workers’

compensation proceedings. Second, we address whether the WCCA erred by reversing the

compensation judge’s order extinguishing Anthem’s intervenor interest in the



4
       At the hearing before the compensation judge, Brunner’s counsel alleged that the
Anthem insurance plan is a plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), a federal law governing health insurance plans in private industry.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461. ERISA permits an insurer to bring a federal claim against a plan
beneficiary if the insurer has paid expenses for an injury for which the beneficiary later
receives workers’ compensation benefits. See 

(a)(3). Post Consumer
Brands’ attorney correctly stated that “there is nothing in the record that says [the Anthem
insurance plan is] an ERISA plan.” After we issued the writ of certiorari, Brunner moved
to supplement the record. Brunner seeks to add into the record Post Consumer Brands’
response to a demand for discovery—dated after the hearing before the compensation judge
and the compensation judge’s order—confirming that the Anthem insurance plan is an
ERISA plan. Post Consumer Brands opposes the motion as improperly filed with this court
and not compliant with Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.05. Because determining whether the
plan is governed by ERISA is unnecessary to our decision, we deny the motion to
supplement the record.

                                              7
compensation proceedings under Minnesota Statutes section 176.361. These are both

questions of law that require us to interpret the Act, and thus we review each question de

novo. Johnson, 7 N.W.3d at 126.

                                              I.

       Our decision in Johnson resolves the first question. In that case, Johnson suffered

a work-related injury and sought treatment.         

 at 122–23.     He filed a workers’

compensation claim petition asserting that his employer was responsible for the cost of

medical treatment. 

. At the time, bills from two of Johnson’s medical providers

remained unpaid. 

. Johnson notified the providers of the claim petition and their

right to intervene in the proceeding under section 176.361, but the providers did not

intervene. Johnson, 7 N.W.3d at 123. Johnson asserted a direct claim for payment of his

medical expenses under the Act. 

. Johnson’s employer asserted that Johnson

could not bring a direct claim for the medical expenses because the medical providers who

provided the services could have intervened under section 176.361 but did not. Johnson,

7 N.W.3d at 124–25.

       We rejected the employer’s argument. 

. We recognized that “[t]he

Workers’ Compensation Act . . . gives an injured employee the right to seek payment from

the employer for the costs of medical treatment that is reasonably required to cure or relieve

the effects of an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.” 

. We

then turned to the plain language of section 176.361, governing intervention, and

concluded that “[n]othing in the language of section 176.361 impairs the right of the

employee to seek direct payment of medical expenses.” Johnson, 7 N.W.3d at 127. We


                                              8
reasoned that the right at issue under section 176.361 is the “procedural right to intervene

in the workers’ compensation matter” and not “the employee’s freestanding substantive

right to have their qualifying medical expenses paid by their employer.”           Johnson,

7 N.W.3d at 128. In other words, the extinguishment language in section 176.361 is

narrowly focused on preventing a party who has a claim under the Act 5 from making that

claim in the workers’ compensation proceeding unless the party intervenes in a timely

manner. Johnson, 7 N.W.3d at 127 & n.5. Accordingly, we held that “the plain language

of section 176.361 does not limit an employee’s right to seek direct payment of medical

expenses, even when a medical provider has failed to intervene to assert a claim in

accordance with the statute.” Johnson, 7 N.W.3d at 127. Rather, “even if a medical

provider itself is barred from bringing a claim for medical expenses because it sought to

intervene after the statutory deadline [or did not intervene at all], the employee’s right to

assert a direct claim for those medical expenses endures.” 

.

       As in Johnson, Brunner seeks payment from her employer and its workers’

compensation insurer for the costs of medical treatment that was reasonably required to

cure or relieve the effects of her shoulder injury. On appeal, the employer and workers’

compensation insurer do not contest that the shoulder injury arose out of and in the course

of Brunner’s employment. But, like the employer in Johnson, they argue that a third-

party’s failure to intervene in the workers’ compensation proceeding extinguishes



5
       In Johnson, we recognized that the Act “also gives medical providers who treat
injured employees for work-related injuries the right to assert their own claim[s] for
reimbursement directly from the employer.” 7 N.W.3d at 126.

                                             9
Brunner’s right to make a direct claim seeking payment for the costs of medical treatment

from them. We hold, in accordance with Johnson, that Brunner is entitled to seek and

recover direct payment for those medical expenses from her employer and its workers’

compensation insurer. Anthem’s failure to intervene in Brunner’s workers’ compensation

proceeding to assert an independent claim related to Brunner’s medical expenses does not

extinguish Brunner’s “freestanding substantive right” to have her employer and its

workers’ compensation insurer pay those medical expenses. 

 (emphasis omitted).

       Post Consumer Brands attempts to distinguish Johnson and urges us to reach a

different result in this case. It observes that Johnson concerned the failure of a medical

provider (as opposed to a health insurer) to intervene and notes that, unlike Johnson,

Anthem had already paid the medical providers in this case and Brunner herself owes her

providers no money. Because of those factual differences, Post Consumer Brands argues

that the rule we announced in Johnson does not apply. We do not find this argument

persuasive.

       First, the language of section 176.361 does not support Post Consumer Brands’

argument that Anthem’s status as a health insurer matters to the outcome of this case. See

In re Est. of Ecklund, 20 N.W.3d 351, 355 (Minn. 2025) (stating that when interpreting a

statute, “[w]e begin with the plain language, and, if there is only one reasonable

interpretation of that language, we adopt that meaning”). Section 176.361, subdivision 1,

grants the right to intervene to “[a] person” who has an interest in a workers’ compensation

proceeding “such that the person may either gain or lose by an order or decision.”

Section 176.361, subdivision 2, sets procedural time limits by which a person must submit


                                            10
a motion to intervene and provides that the “potential intervenor interest” is extinguished

if the time limitations are not met.       Notably, in section 176.361, subdivision 2, the

Legislature provided two non-exclusive examples of persons who may intervene: a health

care provider who has rendered services to the employee (Johnson) and an insurer who

has paid for those medical services pending resolution of the workers’ compensation claim

(this case). Nowhere in the statute did the Legislature differentiate between medical

providers and health insurers in the way Post Consumer Brands suggests.

          Second, the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to differentiate between

medical providers and health insurers as Post Consumer Brands urges is consistent with

our reasoning in Johnson. The fundamental premise of that decision is that an employee’s

“freestanding substantive right to have their qualifying medical expenses paid by their

employer” is distinct from, and undiminished by, others’ failure to intervene in a timely

fashion to assert independent claims against the employer. Johnson, 7 N.W.3d at 128

(original emphasis omitted; new emphasis added). This is consistent with the Act’s aim of

employers paying employee medical expenses that result from injuries arising out of and

in the course of employment. See 

 (“It is the intent of the legislature

that chapter 176 be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity

and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost . . . .”). Post Consumer Brands

makes no claim that, had Anthem timely intervened, Post Consumer Brands would not

have an obligation to cover Brunner’s medical expenses for her work-related shoulder

injury.




                                              11
       Third, we conclude that it makes no difference in our analysis that in Johnson the

medical providers had not yet been paid when the employee asserted his direct claim, while

Brunner’s medical providers have been paid. See Johnson, 7 N.W.3d at 124. As an initial

matter, nothing in the language of section 176.135 or 176.361 distinguishes between paid

and unpaid expenses. More importantly, an employee’s direct claim for medical expenses

is founded on the principle that, when an employee is injured at work, the employer is

responsible for medical treatment related to that injury. 

, subd. 1

(requiring employers to “furnish any medical, psychological, chiropractic, podiatric,

surgical and hospital treatment . . . as may reasonably be required at the time of the injury

and any time thereafter to cure and relieve from the effects of the injury”). The employer’s

obligation under the Act does not disappear because some other party—a health insurer or

the employee—has paid the medical providers pending resolution of the workers’

compensation proceeding. Again, the employee’s freestanding direct right to recover the

costs of medical treatment from the employer is independent of other claims. 6

       Post Consumer Brands also suggests that section 176.191, subdivision 3, which

involves insurer payment, eliminates an employer’s general obligation to pay for the


6
       The compensation judge determined that Brunner could not make a direct claim for
the medical expenses Anthem covered. He reasoned that although some existing case law
recognizes an employee’s ability to raise a direct claim for medical expenses under
section 176.135, those cases refer only to “providers” and never mention health insurers.
Accordingly, the compensation judge determined that, once a health insurer has paid an
employee’s medical expenses incurred as a result of a work injury, the employer’s
obligation under the Act to cover the cost of the medical treatment disappears and the
employee may make no direct claim for those medical expenses. We disagree with that
reading of the statute and the case law interpreting it. Section 176.135 imposes an


                                             12
medical expenses an employee incurs because of a work injury. That argument misreads

the statute.

       As noted above, section 176.191, subdivision 3, provides:

       If a dispute exists as to whether an employee’s injury is compensable under
       this chapter and the employee is otherwise covered by an insurer or entity
       pursuant to chapters 62A, 62C, 62D, 62E, 62R, and 62T, that insurer or entity
       shall pay any medical costs incurred by the employee for the injury up to the
       limits of the applicable coverage and shall make any disability payments
       otherwise payable by that insurer or entity in the absence of or in addition to
       workers’ compensation liability. If the injury is subsequently determined to
       be compensable pursuant to this chapter, the workers’ compensation insurer
       shall be ordered to reimburse the insurer or entity that made the payments for
       all payments made under this subdivision by the insurer or entity, including
       interest at a rate of 12 percent a year.

Nothing in this language supports Post Consumer Brands’ position that the provision

relieves an employer of its obligation to compensate an employee when the employee has

a health insurance policy. Rather, section 176.191, subdivision 3, functions to protect

employees and treating medical providers when an employer contests whether a claim is

compensable. It does so by requiring that an employee’s health insurer pay for medical

treatment notwithstanding any provision in a health insurance policy exempting from

coverage any treatment for work-related injuries covered by workers’ compensation. But

the statutory language expressly contemplates that the employer and its workers’

compensation insurer (and not the health insurer) have an obligation to pay for those




obligation on employers to “furnish any medical, psychological, chiropractic, podiatric,
surgical and hospital treatment . . . as may reasonably be required at the time of the injury
and any time thereafter to cure and relieve from the effects of the injury.” 

, subd. 1. That obligation does not turn on whether the employee still owes
money to the medical providers who provided treatment.

                                             13
medical expenses if the injury is found to be a compensable work injury. In other words,

the workers’ compensation insurer’s obligation to reimburse a health care insurer flows

from the employer’s (and its workers’ compensation insurer’s) more general obligation to

the employee to cover medical expenses incurred from a work injury. Post Consumer

Brands’ argument flips that relationship on its head.

       Post Consumer Brands also asserts that Anthem’s failure to intervene bars Brunner

from making a direct claim for the medical expenses she incurred because section 176.361,

subdivision 2, regarding intervention, specifically identifies a health insurer “who has paid

benefits under section 176.191” as a potential intervenor. Post Consumer Brands argues

that this language indicates that the Legislature understood section 176.191,

subdivision 3—which includes the obligation that if an injury is deemed compensable, the

workers’ compensation insurer must be ordered to reimburse the health insurer—to create

an interest giving rise to a right to intervene. It follows, according to Post Consumer

Brands, that a health insurer’s failure to intervene in a timely manner means that the health

insurer may not demand reimbursement for amounts it paid to the employee’s medical

providers. Consequently, according to Post Consumer Brands, because Brunner’s health

insurer has no right to reimbursement for amounts paid under the legal obligations created

in section 176.191, subdivision 3, Brunner should also be precluded from recovering those

amounts.

       Again, we disagree. The final link in this chain of reasoning runs afoul of our

conclusion in Johnson that an employee has a right to bring a direct claim to recover

medical expenses incurred as a result of a work injury notwithstanding another party’s


                                             14
failure to timely intervene.          Johnson, 7 N.W.3d at 128.        Indeed, section 176.361,

subdivision 2—the basis for Post Consumer Brands’ argument—specifically refers to both

a health insurer (as is the case here) and “a health care provider who has rendered services

to an employee” (as was the case in Johnson) as potential intervenors. If the reference to

a health insurer compels the result that Post Consumer Brands claims—that a health

insurer’s failure to intervene means that an employee cannot directly recover—then the

reference to a provider should compel the same result when a provider fails to intervene.

This conclusion is wholly inconsistent with our holding in Johnson. In short, Post

Consumer Brands’ reliance on the reference to a health care insurer in section 176.361,

subdivision 2, does not distinguish this case from Johnson.

       In summary, we hold that the rule we announced in Johnson, 7 N.W.3d at 130—that

an employee may bring a direct claim against their employer for medical expenses incurred

as a result of a compensable work injury notwithstanding that a person with a potential

intervenor     interest   did   not    timely   intervene   in   the   workers’   compensation

proceeding—applies when the potential intervenor is a health insurer who paid medical

expenses on behalf of the employee pending resolution of the workers’ compensation

proceedings.

                                                II.

       We now turn to the question of whether the WCCA erred in determining that

Anthem’s “potential intervenor interest” in the compensation proceedings was not

extinguished even though Anthem did not intervene in the proceeding as required under

section 176.361, subdivision 2. We conclude the WCCA erred. As we discussed in


                                                15
Johnson, a “potential intervenor interest” is the “procedural right to intervene in the

workers’ compensation matter.”        7 N.W.3d at 128.       Anthem’s failure to intervene

extinguished its right to pursue in the workers’ compensation proceeding an independent

claim to recover the amounts it paid for Brunner’s medical injuries related to her shoulder

injury.

          That conclusion does not mean, however, that Post Consumer Brands may avoid its

obligation to pay for the medical expenses Brunner incurred to treat her shoulder injury.

As discussed in Part I, Brunner may bring a direct claim against Post Consumer Brands for

medical expenses.       Further, the statute mandates that, once an injury is deemed

compensable under the Act, “the workers’ compensation insurer shall be ordered to

reimburse the insurer or entity that made the payments for all payments made under this

subdivision by the insurer or entity, including interest at a rate of 12 percent a year.” 

, subd. 3. Thus here, because Brunner prevailed in establishing that her

injury is compensable under the Act and submitted evidence of the amounts Anthem paid

her medical providers, Gallagher Bassett Services must reimburse Anthem for all payments

that it, as the health insurer, made under this subdivision, including interest at a rate of 12

percent a year in accordance with section 176.191, subdivision 3. 7

          We disagree with Post Consumer Brands’ contention that our decision in this case

renders the intervention requirements in section 176.361 “essentially meaningless.” As we


7
       The WCCA determined that Anthem’s failure to intervene did not extinguish
Anthem’s potential intervenor interest.     It reasoned that the directive in
section 176.191—that the compensation judge shall order Post Consumer Brands to


                                              16
stated in Johnson, the purpose of the extinguishment language in section 176.361,

subdivision 2(a), was “to avoid tardy intervention—a purpose that is achieved by

preventing potential intervenors from joining the proceeding after the statutory deadline.”

7 N.W.3d at 127 n.5. Section 176.361 continues to serve that important purpose. A

potential intervenor who fails to meet the deadline may not, for example, present evidence

in support of a claim at or before the compensation hearing or participate in the

compensation proceedings through an attorney. 

, subds. 1, 6.

       It is true that a health insurer that fails to intervene runs the risk, for example, that

an employee will not present evidence of how much the health insurer has paid medical

providers, making it difficult to determine the amount the workers’ compensation insurer

owes to reimburse the health insurer. 8 In this case, however, because that information was


reimburse Anthem for all medical bills it paid on Brunner’s behalf pending resolution of
Post Consumer Brands’ obligation to cover the medical costs of treating Brunner’s
injury—irreconcilably conflicted with the extinguishment provision in section 176.361,
subdivision 2(a). Applying the statutory order of operations rules for resolving an
irreconcilable conflict between two statutes, 

 (2024), the WCCA
concluded that the extinguishment provision in section 176.361, subdivision 2(a), was
inoperative under the circumstances of this case. We do not need to reach the questions of
whether an irreconcilable conflict exists or how to resolve the conflict because the answer
to that question does not affect our resolution of the case. As we discussed in Part I, the
fact that Anthem’s right to intervene and directly assert its claim to recover the amounts it
paid to Brunner’s medical providers from Post Consumer Brands is extinguished does not
eliminate Brunner’s right to bring a direct claim for those same medical expenses. And
here—where Brunner prevailed on the issue of her injury being compensable under the Act
and also submitted evidence as to the amounts Anthem paid her medical providers—Post
Consumer Brands must reimburse Anthem for all payments it made under section 176.191,
subdivision 3, including interest at a rate of 12 percent a year.
8
        An insurer may be willing to run that risk. Brunner points out that, under the terms
of her policy with Anthem and federal law, 

(a)(3), Anthem may bring a
subrogation claim against Brunner for any amounts (up to the amount Anthem paid to


                                              17
available to the compensation judge, we conclude that the compensation judge must follow

the mandate set forth in section 176.191, subdivision 3, and order Gallagher Bassett

Services to reimburse Anthem for all payments the insurer or entity made under this

subdivision, including interest at a rate of 12 percent a year.

                                       CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the

WCCA. We affirm the WCCA to the extent that it held that Brunner may raise a direct

claim for medical expenses Anthem paid before the compensation judge determined her

injury was compensable. We reverse the WCCA to the extent that it held that the

compensation judge erred by extinguishing Anthem’s intervenor interest in the

compensation proceedings and thus reinstate Order 4 of the compensation judge’s Findings

and Order. We further order that in accordance with these holdings, Gallagher Bassett

Services must reimburse Anthem for the amount it paid Brunner’s providers in accordance

with section 176.191, subdivision 3.

       Affirmed in part; reversed in part.




Brunner’s health care providers) that Brunner recovered for those medical expenses in the
workers’ compensation proceeding. We have never held that a health insurer’s subrogation
claim against its insured brought under state law (independent of the Act) is extinguished
under section 176.361, subdivision 2(a). We need not decide that issue today.

                                              18