§ 116.06

Waste Recovery Cooperative v. County of Hennepin · 1994 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst · 1977 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Max Schwartzman & Sons v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency · 2003 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Jindra v. City of St. Anthony · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

McGuire v. County of Scott · 1994 1 citation

' The PCA’s response to Scott County’s environmental assessment worksheet (EAW) for the highway project and alleged decision not to require an indirect source permit do not support the conclusion that the agency chose to waive its noise regulations. The county submitted the EAW not as a written application for a variance but, as admitted in its brief, to conform to other state highway construction requirements. Furthermore an interest source permit provides little defense to an action based on noise pollution, because it applies to air emissions rather than noise. See Minn. R. 7023.9005, subp. 5 (1993); Minn. Stat. § 116.06, subds. 2, 9, 15 & 16 (1992). The agency’s apparent inaction on the reported noise rule violation underscores rather than bars the applicability of MERA, for it was intended to provide adequate civil remedies for private protection of environmental resources in conjunction or in lieu of government enforcement.

Matter of Dougherty · 1992 1 citation

1. Personal Liability of Relator Dougherty A corporate officer may be held liable for hazardous waste violations if the officer personally participates in the wrongful, injury producing act. United States v. Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326, 1341 (E.D.Pa.1983). However, the evidence must show that the individual either directs or participates in the violations. Id. at 1342; Morgan v. Eaton's Dude Ranch, 307 Minn. 280, 283, 239 N.W.2d 761, 762-63 (1976). Dougherty correctly asserts there is insufficient evidence that he directly participated in the alleged violations. While there is ample evidence to establish that Dougherty personally participated in corporate affairs, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to conclude that Dougherty directed other employees to sweep hazardous materials outside the building or ignore environmental regulations. There is no evidence Dougherty personally placed hazardous materials into the environment. The Commissioner's finding that Dougherty personally participated in the violations was erroneous. However, Dougherty's personal liability is not premised solely on his personal participation in the violations. The Commissioner contends that even if Dougherty did not participate directly in the violations, he is liable under the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine. This doctrine imposes liability on parties due to their responsible relationship to a violation. United *489 States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73, 95 S.Ct. 1903, 1911-12, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284-85, 64 S.Ct. 134, 138, 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943). The Park Court described the emerging liability of responsible corporate agents: The liability of managerial officers did not depend on their knowledge of, or personal participation in, the act made criminal by the statute. Rather, where the statute under which they were prosecuted dispensed with "consciousness of wrongdoing," an omission or failure to act was deemed a sufficient basis for a responsible corporate agent's liability. It was enough in such cases that, by virtue of the relationship he bore to the corporation, the agent had the power to prevent the act complained of. Park, 421 U.S. at 670-71, 95 S.Ct. at 1911. The Court concluded that because the jury found the corporate officer had a responsible relationship to the violations and because he had the power and the responsibility to address the violations, he could be held criminally liable for violations which he did not actually commit. Id. 421 U.S. at 673-74, 95 S.Ct. at 1912. We determine in the instant case: (1) the responsible corporate officer doctrine applies to the statutes and regulations at issue, and (2) relator Dougherty can be held liable under an application of the doctrine. The responsible corporate officer doctrine applies to public welfare offenses which impose strict liability by plain language and intent. Id. 421 U.S. at 672, 95 S.Ct. at 1911; Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284-85, 64 S.Ct. at 138. A public welfare offense occurs where a statute is intended to improve the common good and the legislature eliminates the normal requirement for culpable intent, resulting in strict liability for all those who have a responsible share in the offense. Park, 421 U.S. at 672-73, 95 S.Ct. at 1911-12; Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 259-60, 72 S.Ct. 240, 248, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284-85, 64 S.Ct. at 138; United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254, 42 S.Ct. 301, 303, 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922). We conclude the responsible corporate officer doctrine applies to the laws at issue in this case. Minnesota's hazardous waste laws constitute a public welfare statute because they pervasively affect activities which threaten human health and safety as well as the environment. See United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir.1986) (characterizing federal hazardous waste law, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), as public welfare statute); United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 666 (3d Cir. 1984) (characterizing RCRA as public welfare statute), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208, 105 S.Ct. 1171, 84 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985). In addition, the violations alleged are strict liability offenses. See Minn. Stat. § 116.072, subd. 1 (1990) (no requirement of "knowledge" or "willfulness"); see also United States v. Liviola, 605 F.Supp. 96, 100 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (similar provisions in RCRA are "strict liability offenses not requiring proof of willful intent"). The responsible corporate doctrine is appropriate in the context of environmental laws: Imposing liability upon only the corporation, but not those corporate officers and employees who actually make corporate decisions, would be inconsistent with [the legislature's] intent to impose liability upon the persons who are involved in the handling and disposal of hazardous substances. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 745 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S.Ct. 146, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987); cf. Park, 421 U.S. at 672, 95 S.Ct. at 1911 (requirements placed on corporate officers may be demanding or even onerous, yet are "no more stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business"). In addition, imposing liability on corporate officers is especially appropriate in the civil context. See United States v. Hodges X-Ray, Inc., 759 F.2d 557, 561 (6th Cir.1985) (rationale for holding corporate officers responsible *490 for acts of the corporation is "even more persuasive where only civil liability is involved"). Three essential elements must be satisfied before liability will be imposed upon a corporate officer under the responsible corporate officer doctrine: (1) the individual must be in a position of responsibility which allows the person to influence corporate policies or activities; (2) there must be a nexus between the individual's position and the violation in question such that the individual could have influenced the corporate actions which constituted the violations; and (3) the individual's actions or inactions facilitated the violations. Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74, 95 S.Ct. at 1912; see Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284, 64 S.Ct. at 138 (offense is committed by all who "have such a responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws"). This case presents facts strikingly similar to Park. In Park the president of a large national food store chain was convicted of causing adulterated food to be transported and sold in interstate commerce in violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Park, 421 U.S. at 660-61, 95 S.Ct. at 1906. In addition to being the corporation's president, Park was responsible for the entire operation of the company and had received notice of unsanitary conditions at one of the company's warehouses. Id. 421 U.S. at 662-63, 95 S.Ct. at 1906-07. At trial, Park acknowledged that the system for keeping food sanitary was not working "properly", but also stated that he was doing everything he could to remedy the violation. Id. 421 U.S. at 663, 95 S.Ct. at 1907. The Court upheld Park's conviction even though he did not personally participate in the contamination of the food because Park had a responsible relationship to the violations and because Park had not prevented or corrected the violations. Id. 421 U.S. at 673-74, 95 S.Ct. at 1912. Relator Dougherty must be similarly accountable. First, he was in a position of responsibility as president and primary emergency coordinator. Second, the violations at issue were clearly within his sphere of influence and involvement. Dougherty was the primary contact with all regulatory bodies concerning hazardous waste and the person ultimately in charge of operations at the facility. Finally, Dougherty failed to prevent the violations and take proper corrective action once the violations occurred. The evidence is undisputed that Dougherty was aware of the acid pooling on the floor and that the acidity of the substance made it hazardous. Dougherty was aware that employees and equipment tracked the material out of the facility. Dougherty's only response to these violations was his statement that the problem was caused by a building contractor's error and that MCM expected to correct the problem in the future. This claim of attempted compliance is unavailing. See Liviola, 605 F.Supp. at 100 (defendant's professed lack of intent to violate the law is irrelevant in strict liability context). Dougherty was also aware of the unlabelled waste paint container and the unamended contingency plan, yet he did nothing to remedy these violations. Dougherty argues that an imposition of personal liability through use of the responsible corporate officer doctrine is tantamount to vicarious liability. However, as the Park Court noted, a corporate officer will not be held liable solely because of the individual's position within the corporation. Park, 421 U.S. at 674, 95 S.Ct. at 1912. As outlined above, Dougherty is personally liable because he satisfied all three elements of the doctrine, not merely because he is president of MCM. Dougherty next contends that he should not be held liable because the Commissioner has not presented sufficient evidence to "pierce the corporate veil." See Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn.1979) (necessary elements for piercing corporate veil). This argument is also unfounded because the record demonstrates that the Commissioner never sought to penalize Dougherty solely because of his status as a stockholder or officer of the corporation. See United States v. Mottolo, 605 F.Supp. *491 898, 913 n. 17 (D.N.H.1985) (defendant's attempt to argue defective pleading on issue of piercing corporate veil without merit where prosecutor did not claim misuse of corporate form or rely on piercing of the corporate veil). The Commissioner was not required to "pierce the corporate veil" before holding Dougherty personally liable. See Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 744 (personal liability is distinct from derivative liability that results from piercing corporate veil); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir.1985) (corporate officer may be held personally responsible without piercing corporate veil). Finally, Dougherty attempts to eliminate personal liability by claiming that because neither "corporate officer" nor "shareholder" is specifically mentioned in the definition of "person," he cannot be subject to the administrative penalty order. This argument is also unconvincing. Minn. Stat. § 116.06, subd. 8 (1990) provides the relevant definition of person: Any human being, any municipality or other governmental or political subdivision or other public agency, any public or private corporation, any partnership, firm, association, or other organization, any receiver, trustee, assignee, agent, or other legal representative of any of the foregoing, or any other legal entity, but does not include the pollution control agency. This is a singularly encompassing definition. See United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1418 (10th Cir.1991) (similar definition of "person" in Clean Water Act clearly includes individuals); Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 665 (RCRA definition of "person" is expansive). Dougherty is a "person" within the context of this enforcement action.

In re the Amended Administrative Penalty Order Issued to Dougherty · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Waste Recovery Cooperative of Minnesota v. County of Hennepin · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Normandale Properties, Inc. · 1988 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Gerring · 1988 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.