§ 116.07

In the Matter of REICHMANN LAND AND CATTLE, LLP · 2015 14 citations

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Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency · 2002 2 citations

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State Ex Rel. Minnesota Public Lobby Ex Rel. South Metro Airport Action Council v. Metropolitan Airports Commission · 1994 3 citations

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White Bear Rod and Gun Club v. City of Hugo · 1986 2 citations

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Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst · 1977 1 citation

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Graco, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis · 2019 1 citation

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Jeffrey A. August, Relator v. Chisago County Board of Commissioners · 2015 1 citation

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United States Steel Corporation, Relator v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency · 2015 1 citation

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In re Reichmann Land & Cattle, LLP · 2014 3 citations

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Berne Area Alliance for Quality Living v. Dodge County Board of Commissioners · 2005 6 citations

II. In its motion for summary judgment, BAA asserted that the PCA, rather than the county, should have addressed whether an EIS was required. The district court ruled that the county was the RGU for addressing that question. In its request for reconsideration, BAA challenged this determination, and the district court declined to address it because motions for reconsideration are disfavored and because BAA's argument on the point was unfocused. On appeal, BAA again argues that the PCA, rather than the county, was the RGU and should have determined whether an EIS was required. It is undisputed that Finstuen's proposed project requires a permit from an RGU. "Any Minnesota county board may, by resolution, with approval of the [PCA], assume responsibility for processing applications for permits required by the [PCA] under this section for livestock feedlots [.]" Minn. Stat. § 116.07, subd. 7 (2004); accord Minn. R. 7020.1500 (2003). Regarding the jurisdiction of administrative agencies generally, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated:

II. In its motion for summary judgment, BAA asserted that the PCA, rather than the county, should have addressed whether an EIS was required. The district court ruled that the county was the RGU for addressing that question. In its request for reconsideration, BAA challenged this determination, and the district court declined to address it because motions for reconsideration are disfavored and because BAA's argument on the point was unfocused. On appeal, BAA again argues that the PCA, rather than the county, was the RGU and should have determined whether an EIS was required. It is undisputed that Finstuen's proposed project requires a permit from an RGU. "Any Minnesota county board may, by resolution, with approval of the [PCA], assume responsibility for processing applications for permits required by the [PCA] under this section for livestock feedlots [.]" Minn. Stat. § 116.07, subd. 7 (2004); accord Minn. R. 7020.1500 (2003). Regarding the jurisdiction of administrative agencies generally, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated:

II. In its motion for summary judgment, BAA asserted that the PCA, rather than the county, should have addressed whether an EIS was required. The district court ruled that the county was the RGU for addressing that question. In its request for reconsideration, BAA challenged this determination, and the district court declined to address it because motions for reconsideration are disfavored and because BAA's argument on the point was unfocused. On appeal, BAA again argues that the PCA, rather than the county, was the RGU and should have determined whether an EIS was required. It is undisputed that Finstuen's proposed project requires a permit from an RGU. "Any Minnesota county board may, by resolution, with approval of the [PCA], assume responsibility for processing applications for permits required by the [PCA] under this section for livestock feedlots [.]" Minn. Stat. § 116.07, subd. 7 (2004); accord Minn. R. 7020.1500 (2003). Regarding the jurisdiction of administrative agencies generally, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated:

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In Re Combined Air & Solid Waste Permit No. 2211-91-OT-1 · 1992 1 citation

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Northern States Power Co. v. City of Granite Falls · 1990 13 citations

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Alevizos v. METROPOLITAN AIRPORTS COM'N · 1990 1 citation

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Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Commission of Minneapolis & Saint Paul · 1990 1 citation

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In Re the Greater Morrison Sanitary Landfill · 1989 2 citations

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State v. Apple Valley Redi-Mix, Inc. · 1985 1 citation

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Wagner v. Scheirer · 2024 6 citations

Minn. R. 7020.0300, subp. 18. Thus, for example, one difference between a “feedlot” and a “pasture” appears to be whether the concentration of animals prevents maintenance of a vegetative cover (in the case of an “animal feedlot”) or allows it (in the case of a “pasture”). Defendants are MPCA employees who regulate feedlots. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–12. The MPCA possesses authority generally to promote waste disposal and improve air quality. Minn. Stat. §§ 116.02, 116.07. Under this general authority, the MPCA is “authorized to ‘adopt rules governing the issuance and denial of permits for livestock feedlots, poultry lots or other animal lots.’” Am. Compl. ¶ 22 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 116.07, subdiv. 7(h)). The MPCA also has enforcement power, and may pursue remedies such as civil penalties, injunctions, and criminal prosecutions. Minn. Stat. § 115.071. Defendant Randall Hukriede worked as program manager of the MPCA’s feedlot program and supervised Defendant Lisa Scheirer. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Ms. Scheirer, in turn, was supervisor of the

Minn. R. 7020.0300, subp. 18. Thus, for example, one difference between a “feedlot” and a “pasture” appears to be whether the concentration of animals prevents maintenance of a vegetative cover (in the case of an “animal feedlot”) or allows it (in the case of a “pasture”). Defendants are MPCA employees who regulate feedlots. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–12. The MPCA possesses authority generally to promote waste disposal and improve air quality. Minn. Stat. §§ 116.02, 116.07. Under this general authority, the MPCA is “authorized to ‘adopt rules governing the issuance and denial of permits for livestock feedlots, poultry lots or other animal lots.’” Am. Compl. ¶ 22 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 116.07, subdiv. 7(h)). The MPCA also has enforcement power, and may pursue remedies such as civil penalties, injunctions, and criminal prosecutions. Minn. Stat. § 115.071. Defendant Randall Hukriede worked as program manager of the MPCA’s feedlot program and supervised Defendant Lisa Scheirer. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Ms. Scheirer, in turn, was supervisor of the

Minn. R. 7020.0300, subp. 18. Thus, for example, one difference between a “feedlot” and a “pasture” appears to be whether the concentration of animals prevents maintenance of a vegetative cover (in the case of an “animal feedlot”) or allows it (in the case of a “pasture”). Defendants are MPCA employees who regulate feedlots. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–12. The MPCA possesses authority generally to promote waste disposal and improve air quality. Minn. Stat. §§ 116.02, 116.07. Under this general authority, the MPCA is “authorized to ‘adopt rules governing the issuance and denial of permits for livestock feedlots, poultry lots or other animal lots.’” Am. Compl. ¶ 22 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 116.07, subdiv. 7(h)). The MPCA also has enforcement power, and may pursue remedies such as civil penalties, injunctions, and criminal prosecutions. Minn. Stat. § 115.071. Defendant Randall Hukriede worked as program manager of the MPCA’s feedlot program and supervised Defendant Lisa Scheirer. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Ms. Scheirer, in turn, was supervisor of the

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Clean Fuels Development Coalition v. Kessler · 2023 2 citations

standards promulgated by states because they relate to fuel economy standards. [Pls.’ Opp’n 7–8, Dkt. No. 44.] But under the current administration, the agency has disavowed that view. B. Factual Background Minnesota law broadly requires the MPCA to protect public health and the environment from air pollution. Minn. Stat. § 116.07, subd. 2. The agency began the rulemaking process in 2019 and published proposed rules in December 2020. These rules

standards promulgated by states because they relate to fuel economy standards. [Pls.’ Opp’n 7–8, Dkt. No. 44.] But under the current administration, the agency has disavowed that view. B. Factual Background Minnesota law broadly requires the MPCA to protect public health and the environment from air pollution. Minn. Stat. § 116.07, subd. 2. The agency began the rulemaking process in 2019 and published proposed rules in December 2020. These rules

Gopher Oil Co., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California · 1991 2 citations

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Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Adams · 1979 2 citations

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