§ 117.055

Minnesota Statutes

Source: 2025 Minnesota Statutes. For the official text, see revisor.mn.gov.

Citing Cases (12)

Minnesota Supreme Court

Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes · 2008 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Woodhall v. State · 2007 2 citations

III. Appellants argue that the right to just compensation for a government taking is a fundamental right, and they claim that "if Minn. Stat. § 117.145 were read to deny just compensation to a property owner for a reason as trivial as the failure to serve process on a [party] with no possible interest in the outcome of the litigation, [the statute's] constitutionality would be in considerable doubt." Appellants claim that "any attempt on the part of the legislative or executive branches to limit [this fundamental right] is subject to strict scrutiny." In addition, appellants claim that the service requirement of Minn. Stat. § 117.145 is arbitrary and is therefore a denial of procedural due process.[6] The constitutionality of a statute is a question this court reviews de novo. State v. Barnes, 713 N.W.2d 325, 330 (Minn.2006). Appellants will not be denied just compensation even if their appeals are dismissed because they will still receive just compensation as determined by neutral commissioners. Moreover, appellants cite no authority for the proposition that the right to just compensation is not sufficiently protected by the award determination of the commissioners alone; i.e., that any mechanism for appeal of the commissioners' award is required or is a fundamental right. Accordingly, appellants' first constitutional claim is without merit. A statute does not comport with due process when it is arbitrary or unreasonable. See Int'l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Goodrich, 350 U.S. 537, 547, 76 S.Ct. 621, 100 L.Ed. 681 (1956). Procedural due process does protect certain property interests, see Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), but appellants make no argument that the right to appeal a condemnation award is a property interest. Furthermore, the service requirements of Minn. Stat. § 117.145 are not overly burdensome, and they are reasonably calculated to ensure service on all parties with an interest in the appeal. Accordingly, any forfeiture of the opportunity to appeal is due to appellants' failure to comply with *364 statutory requirements for serving notice of the appeal, rather than a violation of due process. Affirmed. Dissenting, ANDERSON, PAUL H. and PAGE, JJ. ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. For the reasons set forth in my special concurrence in Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. ex rel. City of Richfield v. Adelmann, 590 N.W.2d 327 (Minn.1999) (Anderson, Paul H., J., concurring specially), I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the district court has lost subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. Therefore, I would reverse and let this case proceed. We need to be very cautious about how we treat the rights of persons when we apply the Takings Clauses which are more accurately described as the Eminent Domain Clauses[1] of both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution. In State v. Jude, we stated: The decisions in this state have never unduly restricted the owner's constitutional right to just compensation where there has been a taking of private property for public use under the powers of eminent domain. * * * Attempts on the part of a condemnor by technical means to defeat the landowner's right to his day in court have never been viewed with favor. 258 Minn. 43, 44, 102 N.W.2d 501, 503 (1960) (quoting State v. Rust, 256 Minn. 246, 253, 98 N.W.2d 271, 276 (1959)). In my view, the Takings Clauses do not expressly grant eminent domain powers to the government; eminent domain powers are rightly regarded as inherent powers of government. Rather, the Takings Clauses impose limitations on the exercise of this power, one limitation being the requirement that "just compensation be paid to the owner."[2] I regret that our jurisprudence has evolved to the point where we confuse the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction such that a failure to give notice to someone who does not have an interest in the condemned property can potentially thwart an owner's ability to receive "just compensation." PAGE, Justice (dissenting). I join in the dissent of Justice Paul H. Anderson. NOTES [1] Under Minn. Stat. § 117.055, subd. 1 (2006), such a petition must name "all persons appearing of record or known to the petitioner to be the owners" of the land to be condemned. "`Owner' includes all persons interested in such property as proprietors, tenants, life estate holders, encumbrancers, or otherwise." Minn. Stat. § 117.025, subd. 3 (2006). [2] Notice of the Woodhalls' appeal was subsequently mailed to the Kandiyohi County Treasurer/Auditor on May 23, 2005, after the 40-day appeal period had expired. [3] The district court did not specify whether service was required because those parties retained ongoing interests in the parcel subject to the appeal or because Minn. Stat. § 117.145 required service on those parties regardless of whether they retained such an interest. [4] In the Woodhall case, the district court held that Kandiyohi County was an interested party entitled to notice of the appeal under Minn. Stat. § 117.145. In the Pieh case, the district court held that Kandiyohi County, the Van Orts, and Wells Fargo were entitled to notice of the appeal under Minn. Stat. § 117.145. [5] Appellants contend it is undisputed that the unserved respondents had no interest in the property subject to condemnation. Respondents disagree and assert that these respondents, in fact, each had an ongoing interest in the property. Because our decision today does not depend on a resolution of this fact question, we choose not to address it here. [6] Neither the Woodhalls nor the Piehs raised this constitutional argument to the district court or the court of appeals. While an appellate court should generally not consider issues not raised to the courts below, it may decide an issue not determined by a lower court "where that question is decisive of the entire controversy and where there is no possible advantage or disadvantage to either party in not having a prior ruling on the question." Harms v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 300, LaCrescent, 450 N.W.2d 571, 577 (Minn. 1990); see also Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.04 (appellate court may "take any * * * action as the interest of justice may require"). Because a statute's constitutionality is a purely legal issue and because the state briefed the issue, we do not prejudice the state by considering the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 117.145. [1] William B. Stoebuck, Takings Clause, in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States 856 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992) [2] Stoebuck, supra note 1 at 856.

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County of Dakota v. Lyndale Terminal · 1995 1 citation

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Ario v. Metropolitan Airports Commission · 1985 1 citation

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State Ex Rel. Spannaus v. Hopf · 1982 1 citation

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Matter of City of Shakopee · 1980 1 citation

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