§ 117.075

Minnesota Statutes

Source: 2025 Minnesota Statutes. For the official text, see revisor.mn.gov.

Citing Cases (25)

Minnesota Supreme Court

Moorhead Economic Development Authority v. Anda · 2010 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Woodhall v. State · 2007 2 citations

OPINION MEYER, Justice. Appellants Woodhall and Pieh (collectively appellants) appealed to the district court from separate condemnation awards. Respondent State of Minnesota filed motions to dismiss the appeals, and the district court granted both motions, holding that the court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the appeals because appellants failed to serve notice of appeal on all parties entitled to service under Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (2006). The appeals were consolidated, and the court of appeals affirmed dismissal of the appeals. We affirm. In October 2002, the state filed a petition in Kandiyohi County District Court to acquire certain parcels of property in Kandiyohi County under the power of eminent domain.[1] With respect to a parcel of land designated as Parcel 34, the petition listed appellants John A. Woodhall, Jr., Donna I. Woodhall, John A. Woodhall III, Diane M. Woodhall, Douglas Woodhall, and Carmen Woodhall as having an interest as either a fee holder or spouse of a fee holder. The petition also listed Kandiyohi County as having a tax interest in Parcel 34. All of these parties were served with notice of filing of the petition. In December 2002, the state filed a separate petition in Kandiyohi County District Court to acquire certain parcels of property in Kandiyohi County under the power of eminent domain. With respect to a parcel of land designated as Parcel 64, this petition stated that appellants Timothy R. Pieh and Mary B. Pieh had an interest as contract for deed vendees, Burton Van Ort had a fee interest, Ella Van Ort had an interest as spouse of the fee holder, Wells Fargo Bank had a mortgage interest, and Kandiyohi County had a tax interest. All of these parties were served with notice of filing of the petition. The district court granted both petitions and appointed commissioners to determine the amount of damages sustained by each condemnee pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 117.075, subd. 2 (2006). The commissioners in both proceedings then made an award, and in both the Woodhall and the Pieh cases the state mailed notices of the commissioners' award to the same individuals or entities that were served with notices of the petitions and then filed the appropriate affidavits. The Woodhalls, believing the commissioners' award to be inadequate, filed a notice of appeal with Kandiyohi County District Court and, at that time, served notice of appeal only on the Office of the Attorney General.[2] Similarly, the Piehs filed a notice of appeal with Kandiyohi County District Court and served notice only on the Office of the Attorney General. The state moved to dismiss both appeals on the grounds that appellants failed to serve timely notices of their appeals on all *360 parties entitled to such notice under Minn. Stat. § 117.145. In response, appellants each argued that, though some parties to the condemnation proceedings were not served with a notice of appeal, the unserved parties retained no ongoing interest in the pertinent land at the time of the appeal and therefore were not entitled to notice. Appellants claimed that their appeals were proper because they served notice on all parties with ongoing interests in the subject properties. The district court granted the state's motion to dismiss both appeals for the reason that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 required service on all the parties that received notice of the commissioners' awards.[3] In both cases, the district court dismissed the appeals concluding that appellants' failure to comply with section 117.145 deprived the court of jurisdiction.[4] Appellants appealed separately, and the appeals were consolidated. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissals for lack of jurisdiction. Woodhall v. State, Nos. A05-2424 & A05-2425, 2006 WL 2053415 (Minn.App. July 25, 2006). The court of appeals held that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 unambiguously requires service of notice of appeal on all "respondents named in the eminent domain proceeding." Id. at *2. On appeal to this court, appellants make three arguments. First, they argue that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 should be interpreted to require service only on those parties that retain an ongoing interest in the land that is the subject of the appeal. Second, appellants argue that the district court should not have dismissed the appeals because the court possessed subject matter jurisdiction even if appellants failed to give notice of their appeals to all parties entitled to such notice under Minn. Stat. § 117.145. Third, appellants argue that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 is unconstitutional if it requires service on parties that do not retain an ongoing interest in the land that is subject to the appeal.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Lundell v. COOPERATIVE POWER ASS'N · 2006 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Condemnation by the City of Minneapolis of Certain Lands · 2001 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

County of Anoka v. Blaine Building Corp. · 1997 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Condemnation by the Minneapolis Community Development Agency · 1989 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

City of Mankato v. Hilgers · 1981 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

City of Shakopee v. Minnesota Valley Electric Cooperative · 1981 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re Wilmarth Line of the C U Project · 1980 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

City of Minnetonka v. Carlson · 1980 2 citations

298 N.W.2d 763 (1980) CITY OF MINNETONKA, petitioner, Appellant, v. Clarence Dwight CARLSON, et al., Respondents. No. 50556. Supreme Court of Minnesota. October 31, 1980. *764 Deborah Hedlund, Minnetonka, for petitioner, appellant. Olson, Gunn & Seran, Minneapolis, for respondents. Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument. SCOTT, Justice. The petitioner, City of Minnetonka, appeals from the order of a three-judge panel of the Hennepin County District Court filed on August 3, 1979, granting attorneys fees in the amount of $30,000 in favor of the respondents. We affirm. The facts underlying this controversy were fully described in an opinion issued in this case on a prior occasion, entitled City of Minnetonka v. Carlson, 265 N.W.2d 205 (Minn.1978) [Carlson I]. The eight respondents owned three parcels of land which the City of Minnetonka wished to obtain for park and recreational purposes. The city obtained two separate appraisals of the three parcels. One appraisal valued them at $264,000, the other appraisal at $240,000. On the basis of these appraisals, the city commenced condemnation proceedings in district court. The respondents retained attorney John D. Flanery to represent them under a contingent fee agreement providing that the attorney would receive one-third of the amount by which the condemnation awards exceeded $150,000. The city's petition to condemn was granted and three commissioners were appointed pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 117.075 (1976) to determine an award. Because the commissioners returned awards totaling $404,475 greater than the highest of the two private appraisals, the city decided to abandon the condemnation. At this point, Attorney Flanery associated with a law firm to assist him in contesting the legality of the city's abandonment. The Hennepin County District Court subsequently held that the city could properly abandon the condemnation, and no appeal was taken from that determination. Thereafter, the respondents moved the district court for an order directing the city *765 to pay their reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney fees, relying upon Minn. Stat. § 117.195 (1976).[1] The district court ordered the city to pay the respondents $1,500 for appraisal expenses, but denied any recovery of attorneys fees. An appeal was then taken to this court. In Carlson I, the court concluded that the respondents were entitled to attorneys fees for services prior to the time of abandonment. In authorizing the award of attorneys fees, the Carlson I court stated: [W]hat constitutes the reasonable value of the legal services is a question of fact to be determined by the evidence submitted, the facts disclosed by the record of the proceedings, and the court's own knowledge of the case. * * * Absent any statutory limitations, allowances should be made with due regard for all relevant circumstances, including the time and labor required; the nature and difficulty of the responsibility assumed; the amount involved and the results obtained; the fees customarily charged for similar legal services; the experience, reputation and ability of counsel; and the fee arrangement existing between counsel and the client.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Alexandria Lake Area Service Region v. Johnson · 1980 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Cooperative Power Ass'n v. Eaton · 1979 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.