§ 117.145

Moorhead Economic Development Authority v. Anda · 2010 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Woodhall v. State · 2007 36 citations

OPINION MEYER, Justice. Appellants Woodhall and Pieh (collectively appellants) appealed to the district court from separate condemnation awards. Respondent State of Minnesota filed motions to dismiss the appeals, and the district court granted both motions, holding that the court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the appeals because appellants failed to serve notice of appeal on all parties entitled to service under Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (2006). The appeals were consolidated, and the court of appeals affirmed dismissal of the appeals. We affirm. In October 2002, the state filed a petition in Kandiyohi County District Court to acquire certain parcels of property in Kandiyohi County under the power of eminent domain.[1] With respect to a parcel of land designated as Parcel 34, the petition listed appellants John A. Woodhall, Jr., Donna I. Woodhall, John A. Woodhall III, Diane M. Woodhall, Douglas Woodhall, and Carmen Woodhall as having an interest as either a fee holder or spouse of a fee holder. The petition also listed Kandiyohi County as having a tax interest in Parcel 34. All of these parties were served with notice of filing of the petition. In December 2002, the state filed a separate petition in Kandiyohi County District Court to acquire certain parcels of property in Kandiyohi County under the power of eminent domain. With respect to a parcel of land designated as Parcel 64, this petition stated that appellants Timothy R. Pieh and Mary B. Pieh had an interest as contract for deed vendees, Burton Van Ort had a fee interest, Ella Van Ort had an interest as spouse of the fee holder, Wells Fargo Bank had a mortgage interest, and Kandiyohi County had a tax interest. All of these parties were served with notice of filing of the petition. The district court granted both petitions and appointed commissioners to determine the amount of damages sustained by each condemnee pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 117.075, subd. 2 (2006). The commissioners in both proceedings then made an award, and in both the Woodhall and the Pieh cases the state mailed notices of the commissioners' award to the same individuals or entities that were served with notices of the petitions and then filed the appropriate affidavits. The Woodhalls, believing the commissioners' award to be inadequate, filed a notice of appeal with Kandiyohi County District Court and, at that time, served notice of appeal only on the Office of the Attorney General.[2] Similarly, the Piehs filed a notice of appeal with Kandiyohi County District Court and served notice only on the Office of the Attorney General. The state moved to dismiss both appeals on the grounds that appellants failed to serve timely notices of their appeals on all *360 parties entitled to such notice under Minn. Stat. § 117.145. In response, appellants each argued that, though some parties to the condemnation proceedings were not served with a notice of appeal, the unserved parties retained no ongoing interest in the pertinent land at the time of the appeal and therefore were not entitled to notice. Appellants claimed that their appeals were proper because they served notice on all parties with ongoing interests in the subject properties. The district court granted the state's motion to dismiss both appeals for the reason that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 required service on all the parties that received notice of the commissioners' awards.[3] In both cases, the district court dismissed the appeals concluding that appellants' failure to comply with section 117.145 deprived the court of jurisdiction.[4] Appellants appealed separately, and the appeals were consolidated. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissals for lack of jurisdiction. Woodhall v. State, Nos. A05-2424 & A05-2425, 2006 WL 2053415 (Minn.App. July 25, 2006). The court of appeals held that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 unambiguously requires service of notice of appeal on all "respondents named in the eminent domain proceeding." Id. at *2. On appeal to this court, appellants make three arguments. First, they argue that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 should be interpreted to require service only on those parties that retain an ongoing interest in the land that is the subject of the appeal. Second, appellants argue that the district court should not have dismissed the appeals because the court possessed subject matter jurisdiction even if appellants failed to give notice of their appeals to all parties entitled to such notice under Minn. Stat. § 117.145. Third, appellants argue that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 is unconstitutional if it requires service on parties that do not retain an ongoing interest in the land that is subject to the appeal.

OPINION MEYER, Justice. Appellants Woodhall and Pieh (collectively appellants) appealed to the district court from separate condemnation awards. Respondent State of Minnesota filed motions to dismiss the appeals, and the district court granted both motions, holding that the court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the appeals because appellants failed to serve notice of appeal on all parties entitled to service under Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (2006). The appeals were consolidated, and the court of appeals affirmed dismissal of the appeals. We affirm. In October 2002, the state filed a petition in Kandiyohi County District Court to acquire certain parcels of property in Kandiyohi County under the power of eminent domain.[1] With respect to a parcel of land designated as Parcel 34, the petition listed appellants John A. Woodhall, Jr., Donna I. Woodhall, John A. Woodhall III, Diane M. Woodhall, Douglas Woodhall, and Carmen Woodhall as having an interest as either a fee holder or spouse of a fee holder. The petition also listed Kandiyohi County as having a tax interest in Parcel 34. All of these parties were served with notice of filing of the petition. In December 2002, the state filed a separate petition in Kandiyohi County District Court to acquire certain parcels of property in Kandiyohi County under the power of eminent domain. With respect to a parcel of land designated as Parcel 64, this petition stated that appellants Timothy R. Pieh and Mary B. Pieh had an interest as contract for deed vendees, Burton Van Ort had a fee interest, Ella Van Ort had an interest as spouse of the fee holder, Wells Fargo Bank had a mortgage interest, and Kandiyohi County had a tax interest. All of these parties were served with notice of filing of the petition. The district court granted both petitions and appointed commissioners to determine the amount of damages sustained by each condemnee pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 117.075, subd. 2 (2006). The commissioners in both proceedings then made an award, and in both the Woodhall and the Pieh cases the state mailed notices of the commissioners' award to the same individuals or entities that were served with notices of the petitions and then filed the appropriate affidavits. The Woodhalls, believing the commissioners' award to be inadequate, filed a notice of appeal with Kandiyohi County District Court and, at that time, served notice of appeal only on the Office of the Attorney General.[2] Similarly, the Piehs filed a notice of appeal with Kandiyohi County District Court and served notice only on the Office of the Attorney General. The state moved to dismiss both appeals on the grounds that appellants failed to serve timely notices of their appeals on all *360 parties entitled to such notice under Minn. Stat. § 117.145. In response, appellants each argued that, though some parties to the condemnation proceedings were not served with a notice of appeal, the unserved parties retained no ongoing interest in the pertinent land at the time of the appeal and therefore were not entitled to notice. Appellants claimed that their appeals were proper because they served notice on all parties with ongoing interests in the subject properties. The district court granted the state's motion to dismiss both appeals for the reason that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 required service on all the parties that received notice of the commissioners' awards.[3] In both cases, the district court dismissed the appeals concluding that appellants' failure to comply with section 117.145 deprived the court of jurisdiction.[4] Appellants appealed separately, and the appeals were consolidated. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissals for lack of jurisdiction. Woodhall v. State, Nos. A05-2424 & A05-2425, 2006 WL 2053415 (Minn.App. July 25, 2006). The court of appeals held that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 unambiguously requires service of notice of appeal on all "respondents named in the eminent domain proceeding." Id. at *2. On appeal to this court, appellants make three arguments. First, they argue that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 should be interpreted to require service only on those parties that retain an ongoing interest in the land that is the subject of the appeal. Second, appellants argue that the district court should not have dismissed the appeals because the court possessed subject matter jurisdiction even if appellants failed to give notice of their appeals to all parties entitled to such notice under Minn. Stat. § 117.145. Third, appellants argue that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 is unconstitutional if it requires service on parties that do not retain an ongoing interest in the land that is subject to the appeal.

OPINION MEYER, Justice. Appellants Woodhall and Pieh (collectively appellants) appealed to the district court from separate condemnation awards. Respondent State of Minnesota filed motions to dismiss the appeals, and the district court granted both motions, holding that the court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the appeals because appellants failed to serve notice of appeal on all parties entitled to service under Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (2006). The appeals were consolidated, and the court of appeals affirmed dismissal of the appeals. We affirm. In October 2002, the state filed a petition in Kandiyohi County District Court to acquire certain parcels of property in Kandiyohi County under the power of eminent domain.[1] With respect to a parcel of land designated as Parcel 34, the petition listed appellants John A. Woodhall, Jr., Donna I. Woodhall, John A. Woodhall III, Diane M. Woodhall, Douglas Woodhall, and Carmen Woodhall as having an interest as either a fee holder or spouse of a fee holder. The petition also listed Kandiyohi County as having a tax interest in Parcel 34. All of these parties were served with notice of filing of the petition. In December 2002, the state filed a separate petition in Kandiyohi County District Court to acquire certain parcels of property in Kandiyohi County under the power of eminent domain. With respect to a parcel of land designated as Parcel 64, this petition stated that appellants Timothy R. Pieh and Mary B. Pieh had an interest as contract for deed vendees, Burton Van Ort had a fee interest, Ella Van Ort had an interest as spouse of the fee holder, Wells Fargo Bank had a mortgage interest, and Kandiyohi County had a tax interest. All of these parties were served with notice of filing of the petition. The district court granted both petitions and appointed commissioners to determine the amount of damages sustained by each condemnee pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 117.075, subd. 2 (2006). The commissioners in both proceedings then made an award, and in both the Woodhall and the Pieh cases the state mailed notices of the commissioners' award to the same individuals or entities that were served with notices of the petitions and then filed the appropriate affidavits. The Woodhalls, believing the commissioners' award to be inadequate, filed a notice of appeal with Kandiyohi County District Court and, at that time, served notice of appeal only on the Office of the Attorney General.[2] Similarly, the Piehs filed a notice of appeal with Kandiyohi County District Court and served notice only on the Office of the Attorney General. The state moved to dismiss both appeals on the grounds that appellants failed to serve timely notices of their appeals on all *360 parties entitled to such notice under Minn. Stat. § 117.145. In response, appellants each argued that, though some parties to the condemnation proceedings were not served with a notice of appeal, the unserved parties retained no ongoing interest in the pertinent land at the time of the appeal and therefore were not entitled to notice. Appellants claimed that their appeals were proper because they served notice on all parties with ongoing interests in the subject properties. The district court granted the state's motion to dismiss both appeals for the reason that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 required service on all the parties that received notice of the commissioners' awards.[3] In both cases, the district court dismissed the appeals concluding that appellants' failure to comply with section 117.145 deprived the court of jurisdiction.[4] Appellants appealed separately, and the appeals were consolidated. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissals for lack of jurisdiction. Woodhall v. State, Nos. A05-2424 & A05-2425, 2006 WL 2053415 (Minn.App. July 25, 2006). The court of appeals held that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 unambiguously requires service of notice of appeal on all "respondents named in the eminent domain proceeding." Id. at *2. On appeal to this court, appellants make three arguments. First, they argue that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 should be interpreted to require service only on those parties that retain an ongoing interest in the land that is the subject of the appeal. Second, appellants argue that the district court should not have dismissed the appeals because the court possessed subject matter jurisdiction even if appellants failed to give notice of their appeals to all parties entitled to such notice under Minn. Stat. § 117.145. Third, appellants argue that Minn. Stat. § 117.145 is unconstitutional if it requires service on parties that do not retain an ongoing interest in the land that is subject to the appeal.

+ 33 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Condemnation by the City of Minneapolis of Certain Lands · 2001 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

HOUSING AND REDEVEL. AUTH. v. Adelmann · 1999 11 citations

+ 11 more citations in this opinion.

Housing & Redevelopment Authority ex rel. City of Richfield v. Adelmann · 1999 11 citations

+ 11 more citations in this opinion.

County of Dakota v. Lyndale Terminal · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Fine v. City of Minneapolis · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Alexandria Lake Area Service Region v. Johnson · 1980 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Robert W. Weckman v. County of Scott · 2014 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Cooperative Power Ass'n · 2012 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

CONDEMNATION BY HOUS. & REDEV. v. Suh · 1996 8 citations

I The notice requirements for an appeal from a Commissioners' award are jurisdictional in nature. State by Mattson v. Goins, 286 Minn. 54, 57, 174 N.W.2d 231, 233 (1970). Noncompliance with the statutory prerequisites for an appeal deprives the district court of jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. A proper appeal from a Commissioners' award requires: (1) filing with the court administrator a notice of such appeal, and (2) serving by mail a copy of such notice on all respondents and all other parties to the proceedings having an interest in any parcel described in the appeal who are shown in the petitioner's affidavit of mailing, required by section 117.115, subdivision 2, as having been mailed a notice of the report of the commissioners. Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (Supp.1995). Under section 117.115, subdivision 2, the condemning authority must first send notice of the filing of the Commissioners' report to "(1) each respondent listed in the petition as having an interest in any parcel described in the report; (2) each other party to the proceeding whose appearance has been noted by the court in its order approving the petition under section 117.075; and (3) each respondent's attorney." Minn. Stat. § 117.115, subd. 2 (Supp.1995). An earlier version of the notice of appeal provision required that notice be given "to all parties of record having an interest in lands described in the appeal." Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (1994). The supreme court construed this provision as requiring an appealing party to serve a notice of appeal on "those individuals or entities that are named in the condemnation petition and have been served with process." County of Dakota v. Lyndale Terminal, 529 N.W.2d 672, 674-75 (Minn.1995). The supreme court decided Lyndale Terminal in April 1995, while legislation to amend Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (1994) was pending in the legislature. This court subsequently suggested that the amending legislation supported the interpretation given in Lyndale Terminal. Minneapolis Community Dev. Agency v. Golden Spike, Inc., 536 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Minn.App.1995) (applying Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (1994)), review denied (Minn. Oct. 18, 1995). In Golden Spike we also held that, under Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (1994), no jurisdictional defect resulted from a failure to serve a notice of appeal on parties who had settled their claims to the condemnation proceeds. Id. at 32. Applying the reasoning of Lyndale Terminal and the plain language of the 1995 amendment, we conclude that the notice of appeal provision, 1995 Minn.Laws ch. 106, § 3 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (Supp. 1995)), continues to require service of notice on individuals and entities who were named in the condemnation petition, who have not been dismissed as parties, and who have not settled their claims to the condemnation proceeds. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1994) (absent ambiguity courts must follow plain language of statute). The HRA argues that we should further extend the Golden Spike rationale and allow a party to appeal a Commissioners' award even though that party has not served a notice of appeal on respondents who were named in the condemnation petition and who have not settled their claims. Specifically, the HRA maintains that the provisions of Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (Supp.1995) should not mandate service of a notice of appeal on tenants who have entered into leases under terms that provide that the leases will terminate in the event of a public taking. Generally, a tenant may receive no compensation for the loss of his interest in a lease if the lease provides that it will automatically terminate upon the condemnation of the leased property. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 503, 162 N.W.2d 206, 214 (1968). In view of this general rule, the HRA contends that a tenant who enters into such a lease has no interest in the condemnation proceeds and should not be entitled to *118 receive a notice of appeal. We do not address the merits of this argument because the record contains only one tenant's lease and does not establish that the other nonsettling tenants had leases that automatically terminated their interests in the event of a public taking. It is undisputed that the HRA failed to serve a notice of appeal on any of the tenants who were named as respondents in the condemnation petition, including several tenants who did not settle their claims with Shin Jae Suh or the HRA. The HRA also failed to serve notice of the filing of the Commissioners' report on any of the named respondents, including Shin Jae Suh. The notice requirements of Minn. Stat. §§ 117.145, 117.115, subd. 2 (Supp.1995) were not met, and the district court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the HRA's appeal from the Commissioners' award.

I The notice requirements for an appeal from a Commissioners' award are jurisdictional in nature. State by Mattson v. Goins, 286 Minn. 54, 57, 174 N.W.2d 231, 233 (1970). Noncompliance with the statutory prerequisites for an appeal deprives the district court of jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. A proper appeal from a Commissioners' award requires: (1) filing with the court administrator a notice of such appeal, and (2) serving by mail a copy of such notice on all respondents and all other parties to the proceedings having an interest in any parcel described in the appeal who are shown in the petitioner's affidavit of mailing, required by section 117.115, subdivision 2, as having been mailed a notice of the report of the commissioners. Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (Supp.1995). Under section 117.115, subdivision 2, the condemning authority must first send notice of the filing of the Commissioners' report to "(1) each respondent listed in the petition as having an interest in any parcel described in the report; (2) each other party to the proceeding whose appearance has been noted by the court in its order approving the petition under section 117.075; and (3) each respondent's attorney." Minn. Stat. § 117.115, subd. 2 (Supp.1995). An earlier version of the notice of appeal provision required that notice be given "to all parties of record having an interest in lands described in the appeal." Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (1994). The supreme court construed this provision as requiring an appealing party to serve a notice of appeal on "those individuals or entities that are named in the condemnation petition and have been served with process." County of Dakota v. Lyndale Terminal, 529 N.W.2d 672, 674-75 (Minn.1995). The supreme court decided Lyndale Terminal in April 1995, while legislation to amend Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (1994) was pending in the legislature. This court subsequently suggested that the amending legislation supported the interpretation given in Lyndale Terminal. Minneapolis Community Dev. Agency v. Golden Spike, Inc., 536 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Minn.App.1995) (applying Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (1994)), review denied (Minn. Oct. 18, 1995). In Golden Spike we also held that, under Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (1994), no jurisdictional defect resulted from a failure to serve a notice of appeal on parties who had settled their claims to the condemnation proceeds. Id. at 32. Applying the reasoning of Lyndale Terminal and the plain language of the 1995 amendment, we conclude that the notice of appeal provision, 1995 Minn.Laws ch. 106, § 3 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (Supp. 1995)), continues to require service of notice on individuals and entities who were named in the condemnation petition, who have not been dismissed as parties, and who have not settled their claims to the condemnation proceeds. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1994) (absent ambiguity courts must follow plain language of statute). The HRA argues that we should further extend the Golden Spike rationale and allow a party to appeal a Commissioners' award even though that party has not served a notice of appeal on respondents who were named in the condemnation petition and who have not settled their claims. Specifically, the HRA maintains that the provisions of Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (Supp.1995) should not mandate service of a notice of appeal on tenants who have entered into leases under terms that provide that the leases will terminate in the event of a public taking. Generally, a tenant may receive no compensation for the loss of his interest in a lease if the lease provides that it will automatically terminate upon the condemnation of the leased property. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 503, 162 N.W.2d 206, 214 (1968). In view of this general rule, the HRA contends that a tenant who enters into such a lease has no interest in the condemnation proceeds and should not be entitled to *118 receive a notice of appeal. We do not address the merits of this argument because the record contains only one tenant's lease and does not establish that the other nonsettling tenants had leases that automatically terminated their interests in the event of a public taking. It is undisputed that the HRA failed to serve a notice of appeal on any of the tenants who were named as respondents in the condemnation petition, including several tenants who did not settle their claims with Shin Jae Suh or the HRA. The HRA also failed to serve notice of the filing of the Commissioners' report on any of the named respondents, including Shin Jae Suh. The notice requirements of Minn. Stat. §§ 117.145, 117.115, subd. 2 (Supp.1995) were not met, and the district court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the HRA's appeal from the Commissioners' award.

I The notice requirements for an appeal from a Commissioners' award are jurisdictional in nature. State by Mattson v. Goins, 286 Minn. 54, 57, 174 N.W.2d 231, 233 (1970). Noncompliance with the statutory prerequisites for an appeal deprives the district court of jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. A proper appeal from a Commissioners' award requires: (1) filing with the court administrator a notice of such appeal, and (2) serving by mail a copy of such notice on all respondents and all other parties to the proceedings having an interest in any parcel described in the appeal who are shown in the petitioner's affidavit of mailing, required by section 117.115, subdivision 2, as having been mailed a notice of the report of the commissioners. Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (Supp.1995). Under section 117.115, subdivision 2, the condemning authority must first send notice of the filing of the Commissioners' report to "(1) each respondent listed in the petition as having an interest in any parcel described in the report; (2) each other party to the proceeding whose appearance has been noted by the court in its order approving the petition under section 117.075; and (3) each respondent's attorney." Minn. Stat. § 117.115, subd. 2 (Supp.1995). An earlier version of the notice of appeal provision required that notice be given "to all parties of record having an interest in lands described in the appeal." Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (1994). The supreme court construed this provision as requiring an appealing party to serve a notice of appeal on "those individuals or entities that are named in the condemnation petition and have been served with process." County of Dakota v. Lyndale Terminal, 529 N.W.2d 672, 674-75 (Minn.1995). The supreme court decided Lyndale Terminal in April 1995, while legislation to amend Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (1994) was pending in the legislature. This court subsequently suggested that the amending legislation supported the interpretation given in Lyndale Terminal. Minneapolis Community Dev. Agency v. Golden Spike, Inc., 536 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Minn.App.1995) (applying Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (1994)), review denied (Minn. Oct. 18, 1995). In Golden Spike we also held that, under Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (1994), no jurisdictional defect resulted from a failure to serve a notice of appeal on parties who had settled their claims to the condemnation proceeds. Id. at 32. Applying the reasoning of Lyndale Terminal and the plain language of the 1995 amendment, we conclude that the notice of appeal provision, 1995 Minn.Laws ch. 106, § 3 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (Supp. 1995)), continues to require service of notice on individuals and entities who were named in the condemnation petition, who have not been dismissed as parties, and who have not settled their claims to the condemnation proceeds. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1994) (absent ambiguity courts must follow plain language of statute). The HRA argues that we should further extend the Golden Spike rationale and allow a party to appeal a Commissioners' award even though that party has not served a notice of appeal on respondents who were named in the condemnation petition and who have not settled their claims. Specifically, the HRA maintains that the provisions of Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (Supp.1995) should not mandate service of a notice of appeal on tenants who have entered into leases under terms that provide that the leases will terminate in the event of a public taking. Generally, a tenant may receive no compensation for the loss of his interest in a lease if the lease provides that it will automatically terminate upon the condemnation of the leased property. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 503, 162 N.W.2d 206, 214 (1968). In view of this general rule, the HRA contends that a tenant who enters into such a lease has no interest in the condemnation proceeds and should not be entitled to *118 receive a notice of appeal. We do not address the merits of this argument because the record contains only one tenant's lease and does not establish that the other nonsettling tenants had leases that automatically terminated their interests in the event of a public taking. It is undisputed that the HRA failed to serve a notice of appeal on any of the tenants who were named as respondents in the condemnation petition, including several tenants who did not settle their claims with Shin Jae Suh or the HRA. The HRA also failed to serve notice of the filing of the Commissioners' report on any of the named respondents, including Shin Jae Suh. The notice requirements of Minn. Stat. §§ 117.145, 117.115, subd. 2 (Supp.1995) were not met, and the district court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the HRA's appeal from the Commissioners' award.

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Condemnation by the Housing & Redevelopment Authority in & for the Fridley v. Shin Jae Suh · 1996 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Minneapolis Community Development Agency v. Golden Spike, Inc. · 1995 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Independent School District No. 194 Lakeville v. Tollefson Development, Inc. · 1993 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Judd v. State Ex Rel. Humprey · 1992 5 citations

On December 9, 1991, the state mailed a notice of award letter to respondent and informed him the period for appealing the award would expire on January 11, 1992, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (1990). On January 10, 1992, respondent filed a notice of appeal with the district court administrator and attached an affidavit to show an earlier mailing of a copy of the notice to all parties of record with an interest in the land but omitting the state as a notified party.

On December 9, 1991, the state mailed a notice of award letter to respondent and informed him the period for appealing the award would expire on January 11, 1992, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (1990). On January 10, 1992, respondent filed a notice of appeal with the district court administrator and attached an affidavit to show an earlier mailing of a copy of the notice to all parties of record with an interest in the land but omitting the state as a notified party.

On December 9, 1991, the state mailed a notice of award letter to respondent and informed him the period for appealing the award would expire on January 11, 1992, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (1990). On January 10, 1992, respondent filed a notice of appeal with the district court administrator and attached an affidavit to show an earlier mailing of a copy of the notice to all parties of record with an interest in the land but omitting the state as a notified party.

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Judd v. State ex rel. Humphrey · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

County of Benton ex rel. Board of Commissioners v. Gruszka · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Helgeson v. Gisselbeck · 1985 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Fine v. City of Minneapolis · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State ex rel. Spannaus v. King Properties, Inc. · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.