§ 117.195

Minnesota Statutes

Source: 2025 Minnesota Statutes. For the official text, see revisor.mn.gov.

Citing Cases (21)

Minnesota Supreme Court

State of Minnesota, by its Commissioner of Transportation v. David J. Schaffer, Below, ... · 2024 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Faricy Law Firm, P.A. v. API, Inc. Asbestos Settlement Trust · 2018 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

DeCook v. Rochester International Airport Joint Zoning Board · 2012 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Condemnation by the City of Minneapolis of Certain Lands · 2001 25 citations

+ 25 more citations in this opinion.

State Ex Rel. Humphrey v. Jim Lupient Oldsmobile Co. · 1993 10 citations

509 N.W.2d 361 (1993) STATE of Minnesota, by Hubert H. HUMPHREY, III, its Attorney General, Petitioner, Appellant, v. JIM LUPIENT OLDSMOBILE COMPANY, formerly Lupient Oldsmobile Company, et al., Respondents. STATE of Minnesota, by Hubert H. HUMPHREY, III, its Attorney General, Lower Court Petitioner, v. Douglas J. KRUEGER, et al., Lower Court Respondents. No. C4-92-1190. Supreme Court of Minnesota. December 17, 1993. *362 Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Louis K. Robards, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for appellant. David D. Meyer, William S. Rosen, St. Paul, for respondents. Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc. KEITH, Chief Justice. In this case, we are asked to clarify the standards to be used by a trial court in determining what interest rate provides just compensation to landowners in condemnation proceedings. We reverse and remand. The state commenced this action to acquire by eminent domain certain property owned by Respondent James W. Lupient as part of a project to upgrade Highway 12 in Golden Valley, Minnesota. On October 17, 1988, the state acquired title and right of possession to this property and deposited its appraised amount of damages in the sum of $73,960 with the Hennepin County District Court Administrator. On February 6, 1992, three court-appointed commissioners, after hearings in August of 1991, awarded damages of $172,384 for this taking. Neither party appealed the commissioners' award. Both parties anticipated that the state would owe yearly interest as part of just compensation on the difference between the amount paid by the state since the taking and the commissioners' award. On April 6, 1992, the state deposited its final payment with the trial court which amount included simple interest computed at the rate set by Minn. Stat. § 117.195 and § 549.09 (1992). The interest rates paid by the state averaged seven percent per year.[1] Lupient then filed a motion requesting that the district court order the state to pay interest at the rate of 13.2 percent per year. This rate was based on the amount earned during this period by a pension and profit sharing trust for employees of various Lupient companies known as the Harold Chevrolet Pension Trust. This trust was managed by Investment Advisors, Inc. of Minneapolis and earned an average yearly return of 13.2.[2] Lupient also argued that the prime interest rates during this period were ten percent and he was required to pay one percent over prime to obtain operating revenues for his businesses and, this too, indicated that a higher interest rate than seven percent was required. The state opposed Lupient's motion, asserting that the yearly rates based on the secondary market yield of one-year Treasury Bills provided by Minn. Stat. §§ 117.195 and 549.09 afforded just compensation and reflected a reasonable return on prudent investments with a guaranteed protection of principal. The state further argued that Lupient had not met his burden of proving that 13.2 percent per year interest represented a no-risk rate of return consistent with reasonable and prudent investments. On May 1, 1992, after submission of affidavit and depositions, the trial court held a hearing in chambers on this issue and on May 13, 1992, *363 filed an order directing the state to pay interest at the rate of 13.2 percent per year. The trial court did not issue findings of fact, conclusions or a memorandum of law. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's award of 13.2 percent per year interest noting: The proper inquiry is: what return would have been available to the landowner had he been paid in money the value of the property at the time of the taking and had made reasonable and prudent investments? Had Lupient been paid at the time the State took possession, he could have put his money at reasonable and prudent risk. There is no reason to limit him to a "risk-free" return because the operational assumption is that he has received his principal and could have put it to work. State by Humphrey v. Jim Lupient Oldsmobile Co., 1993 WL 44202 at *5 (Minn.App. 1993) (citations omitted). We granted review to clarify the standard by which a trial court should determine the interest rate in condemnation cases. This court first dealt with this issue in 1981, in the case of State by Spannaus v. Carney, 309 N.W.2d 775 (Minn.1981). In that appeal, the appellants contended that the statutory interest rate of six percent provided by Minn. Stat. § 334.01, subd. 1 (1980) did not satisfy the requirements of just compensation guaranteed by Minn. Const. art. 1, § 13. Id. at 776. The court found that the determination of the rate of interest on condemnation awards is a judicial decision. Id. The court remanded the case to the trial court to resolve the issue of whether interest of six percent satisfied the requirements of just compensation. Id. The court stated that the trial court must determine the rate of interest required to give the landowner "the market value of the property at the time of taking contemporaneously paid in money." Id. The court went on to hold that the landowner is entitled to that return which would have been available if the landowner had been timely paid and had made reasonable and prudent investments. Id. The rate of return which satisfies the requirement of just compensation, the court held, may be more, less, or equal to the return allowed by statute. Id. Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly held that they are not bound by a statute setting an interest rate in condemnation cases and have remanded for a determination of whether the statutory rate provides just compensation. See United States v. 50.50 Acres of Land, 931 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir.1991) (holding trial court erred in failing to find a flexible statutory rate based on rates of one-year Treasury Bill was "unreasonable" before entering judgment for interest at a rate other than that set by statute). In 1984, the Minnesota legislature set forth the present procedure used to determine interest rates in condemnation actions. These statutes set a flexible interest rate based on the secondary market yield of one-year United States Treasury Bills. Minn. Stat. §§ 117.195 and 549.09 (1992). The question then becomes, what weight, if any, should the trial court give to the statutory rate. We have occasionally permitted a statute to stand as a matter of comity, even where the legislature has encroached somewhat upon a judicial function, so long as the statute does not conflict with this court's inherent authority to make the final decision. See Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 424-25, 210 N.W.2d 275, 278-80 (1973) (noting that the court has "acquiesced in legislative acts prescribing administrative procedures for admission and discipline of attorneys as long as such acts do not usurp the right of the Court to make the final decision.") See also Maynard E. Pirsig and Randall M. Tietjen, Court Procedure and the Separation of Powers in Minnesota, 15 WM. MITCHELL L.REV. 141, 182 (1989). In this case, because we have not set out guidelines by which trial courts may determine interest rates in condemnation actions, we believe that, as a matter of comity, the statutory interest rate should be weighed by the trial court as evidence of an appropriate rate. We believe that a reasonable rate is what a reasonable and prudent investor would earn while investing so as to maximize the rate of return over the relevant period of time, yet guarantee safety of principal. This definition is consistent with definitions articulated *364 in other jurisdictions. See United States v. 50.50 Acres of Land, 931 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. 429.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459, 465 (9th Cir. 1980); Redevelopment Agency v. Gilmore, 38 Cal.3d 790, 214 Cal.Rptr. 904, 912-913, 700 P.2d 794, 804 (1985). The requirement that a reasonable rate on investments be one which guarantees safety of principal means that the types of investment to which a trial court should look as evidence of a reasonable rate must be those which have a very low risk.[3] In this case, the evidence before the trial court failed to show that the 13.2 percent rate was based on investments which guarantee safety of principal. Lupient stated in his deposition that he believed that Investment Advisors, Inc. had invested the pension plan in stocks which do not guarantee a return of principal. Lupient did not release information to show the percentage of the pension plan that was invested in stocks but the state's expert's affidavit showed that the state had a similar rate of return on a plan in which 60 percent of the funds were invested in stocks. Further, Lupient's evidence showed that the rate of return on the pension plan had varied widely from year-to-year, from 23.4 percent in 1989, to 0.6 percent in 1990, and then back up to 23 percent in 1991. These fluctuations do not appear to be consistent with a low-risk investment. On remand, and in future condemnation actions, the trial court should presume that the statutory rate is reasonable and, therefore, meets the requirements of just compensation and should order judgment at that rate unless the condemnee rebuts this presumption and affirmatively shows that another rate is reasonable and affords just compensation. In determining a reasonable rate, the trial court should look to rates on investments which guarantee safety of principal. The state also urges that the trial court should have held a full trial-type evidentiary hearing to determine the appropriate interest rate. The statutory scheme does not require a full evidentiary hearing to determine just compensation in each condemnation action. See Minn. Stat. § 117.085 (1992). This scheme requires only notice and an opportunity to be heard. A full adjudicative hearing on this issue is not necessary. We believe that the standards set out in this opinion will more narrowly focus the trial court's inquiry and the trial court may set the interest rate based on affidavits and depositions. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. SIMONETT, Justice (concurring specially). I join in the court's opinion but wish to comment on what is a "judicial question." It is said that determining the measure of compensation in condemnation proceedings is a "judicial and not a legislative question" because the government may not constitute itself the judge in its own case. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327, 13 S.Ct. 622, 626, 37 L.Ed. 463 (1892). Thus the government as a taker should not be setting the rate of interest for what it is taking; or at least the legislative branch, which pays the award, should not be setting the interest. This determination, so the reasoning goes, is better made by the judicial branch which is structured to be a neutral arbiter. Nevertheless, the question of interest relates not to the amount of the award itself but to preserving the value of the award. While an award reflects the many unique characteristics of the particular parcel taken, an interest rate is less unique or particularized, more easily identified, and allows for some relaxation of the "judicial question" test. Thus courts have allowed a *365 statutory interest rate to be "evidence" of what is just compensation. In Monongahela, Congress authorized the condemnation of the property owner's lock and dam but added a proviso that in determining the amount of the award, the property owner's franchise to collect tolls was not to be considered. It was in the context of rejecting this proviso that the Court said the right to compensation was a judicial, not a legislative, question. In Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306, 43 S.Ct. 354, 356, 67 L.Ed. 664 (1923), the United States Supreme Court held that a property owner was entitled to interest on its condemnation award as part of "just compensation"; but there Congress had made no provision for any interest, so the Court approved use of South Carolina's legal rate. The majority opinion in this case is consistent with State by Spannaus v. Carney, 309 N.W.2d 775, 776 (Minn.1981). Here the interest rate, although prescribed by statute, is tied to a rate outside the control of the state legislature, is updated every year, and is the rate paid on other money judgments. In enacting this statutory rate it is presumed the legislature did not intend to violate the constitutional requirements for just compensation. Hence, Minn. Stat. §§ 117.195 and 549.09 are construed in tandem to set a rate that is presumptively just compensation. This presumption is rebuttable, thus affording the property owner its judicial forum. The proper interest rate in a particular case is a mixed question of law and fact with significant constitutional implications, and the question, therefore, is for the court to decide. NOTES [1] The yearly interest rates set by Minn. Stat. §§ 117.195 and 549.09 are based on the secondary market yield of one-year United States Treasury Bills. The rates for the time period relevant to this case were eight percent for 1988 and 1989, seven percent for 1990 and 1991 and five percent for 1992. [2] The Harold Chevrolet Pension Trust earned rates of 10.4 percent in 1987 and 1988, 23.4 percent in 1989, 0.6 percent in 1990, and 23.0 percent in 1991. [3] For example, the following would qualify as very low risk investments to which a trial court might look for evidence of a reasonable rate: certificates of deposit from federally insured banks, United States Treasury Bills with maturities within the relevant time period, other government bonds, and long term corporate bonds from AAA rated companies with maturities within the relevant time period. This list is not intended to be exclusive and trial courts may look to other investments so long as they are very low risk.

509 N.W.2d 361 (1993) STATE of Minnesota, by Hubert H. HUMPHREY, III, its Attorney General, Petitioner, Appellant, v. JIM LUPIENT OLDSMOBILE COMPANY, formerly Lupient Oldsmobile Company, et al., Respondents. STATE of Minnesota, by Hubert H. HUMPHREY, III, its Attorney General, Lower Court Petitioner, v. Douglas J. KRUEGER, et al., Lower Court Respondents. No. C4-92-1190. Supreme Court of Minnesota. December 17, 1993. *362 Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Louis K. Robards, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for appellant. David D. Meyer, William S. Rosen, St. Paul, for respondents. Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc. KEITH, Chief Justice. In this case, we are asked to clarify the standards to be used by a trial court in determining what interest rate provides just compensation to landowners in condemnation proceedings. We reverse and remand. The state commenced this action to acquire by eminent domain certain property owned by Respondent James W. Lupient as part of a project to upgrade Highway 12 in Golden Valley, Minnesota. On October 17, 1988, the state acquired title and right of possession to this property and deposited its appraised amount of damages in the sum of $73,960 with the Hennepin County District Court Administrator. On February 6, 1992, three court-appointed commissioners, after hearings in August of 1991, awarded damages of $172,384 for this taking. Neither party appealed the commissioners' award. Both parties anticipated that the state would owe yearly interest as part of just compensation on the difference between the amount paid by the state since the taking and the commissioners' award. On April 6, 1992, the state deposited its final payment with the trial court which amount included simple interest computed at the rate set by Minn. Stat. § 117.195 and § 549.09 (1992). The interest rates paid by the state averaged seven percent per year.[1] Lupient then filed a motion requesting that the district court order the state to pay interest at the rate of 13.2 percent per year. This rate was based on the amount earned during this period by a pension and profit sharing trust for employees of various Lupient companies known as the Harold Chevrolet Pension Trust. This trust was managed by Investment Advisors, Inc. of Minneapolis and earned an average yearly return of 13.2.[2] Lupient also argued that the prime interest rates during this period were ten percent and he was required to pay one percent over prime to obtain operating revenues for his businesses and, this too, indicated that a higher interest rate than seven percent was required. The state opposed Lupient's motion, asserting that the yearly rates based on the secondary market yield of one-year Treasury Bills provided by Minn. Stat. §§ 117.195 and 549.09 afforded just compensation and reflected a reasonable return on prudent investments with a guaranteed protection of principal. The state further argued that Lupient had not met his burden of proving that 13.2 percent per year interest represented a no-risk rate of return consistent with reasonable and prudent investments. On May 1, 1992, after submission of affidavit and depositions, the trial court held a hearing in chambers on this issue and on May 13, 1992, *363 filed an order directing the state to pay interest at the rate of 13.2 percent per year. The trial court did not issue findings of fact, conclusions or a memorandum of law. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's award of 13.2 percent per year interest noting: The proper inquiry is: what return would have been available to the landowner had he been paid in money the value of the property at the time of the taking and had made reasonable and prudent investments? Had Lupient been paid at the time the State took possession, he could have put his money at reasonable and prudent risk. There is no reason to limit him to a "risk-free" return because the operational assumption is that he has received his principal and could have put it to work. State by Humphrey v. Jim Lupient Oldsmobile Co., 1993 WL 44202 at *5 (Minn.App. 1993) (citations omitted). We granted review to clarify the standard by which a trial court should determine the interest rate in condemnation cases. This court first dealt with this issue in 1981, in the case of State by Spannaus v. Carney, 309 N.W.2d 775 (Minn.1981). In that appeal, the appellants contended that the statutory interest rate of six percent provided by Minn. Stat. § 334.01, subd. 1 (1980) did not satisfy the requirements of just compensation guaranteed by Minn. Const. art. 1, § 13. Id. at 776. The court found that the determination of the rate of interest on condemnation awards is a judicial decision. Id. The court remanded the case to the trial court to resolve the issue of whether interest of six percent satisfied the requirements of just compensation. Id. The court stated that the trial court must determine the rate of interest required to give the landowner "the market value of the property at the time of taking contemporaneously paid in money." Id. The court went on to hold that the landowner is entitled to that return which would have been available if the landowner had been timely paid and had made reasonable and prudent investments. Id. The rate of return which satisfies the requirement of just compensation, the court held, may be more, less, or equal to the return allowed by statute. Id. Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly held that they are not bound by a statute setting an interest rate in condemnation cases and have remanded for a determination of whether the statutory rate provides just compensation. See United States v. 50.50 Acres of Land, 931 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir.1991) (holding trial court erred in failing to find a flexible statutory rate based on rates of one-year Treasury Bill was "unreasonable" before entering judgment for interest at a rate other than that set by statute). In 1984, the Minnesota legislature set forth the present procedure used to determine interest rates in condemnation actions. These statutes set a flexible interest rate based on the secondary market yield of one-year United States Treasury Bills. Minn. Stat. §§ 117.195 and 549.09 (1992). The question then becomes, what weight, if any, should the trial court give to the statutory rate. We have occasionally permitted a statute to stand as a matter of comity, even where the legislature has encroached somewhat upon a judicial function, so long as the statute does not conflict with this court's inherent authority to make the final decision. See Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 424-25, 210 N.W.2d 275, 278-80 (1973) (noting that the court has "acquiesced in legislative acts prescribing administrative procedures for admission and discipline of attorneys as long as such acts do not usurp the right of the Court to make the final decision.") See also Maynard E. Pirsig and Randall M. Tietjen, Court Procedure and the Separation of Powers in Minnesota, 15 WM. MITCHELL L.REV. 141, 182 (1989). In this case, because we have not set out guidelines by which trial courts may determine interest rates in condemnation actions, we believe that, as a matter of comity, the statutory interest rate should be weighed by the trial court as evidence of an appropriate rate. We believe that a reasonable rate is what a reasonable and prudent investor would earn while investing so as to maximize the rate of return over the relevant period of time, yet guarantee safety of principal. This definition is consistent with definitions articulated *364 in other jurisdictions. See United States v. 50.50 Acres of Land, 931 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. 429.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459, 465 (9th Cir. 1980); Redevelopment Agency v. Gilmore, 38 Cal.3d 790, 214 Cal.Rptr. 904, 912-913, 700 P.2d 794, 804 (1985). The requirement that a reasonable rate on investments be one which guarantees safety of principal means that the types of investment to which a trial court should look as evidence of a reasonable rate must be those which have a very low risk.[3] In this case, the evidence before the trial court failed to show that the 13.2 percent rate was based on investments which guarantee safety of principal. Lupient stated in his deposition that he believed that Investment Advisors, Inc. had invested the pension plan in stocks which do not guarantee a return of principal. Lupient did not release information to show the percentage of the pension plan that was invested in stocks but the state's expert's affidavit showed that the state had a similar rate of return on a plan in which 60 percent of the funds were invested in stocks. Further, Lupient's evidence showed that the rate of return on the pension plan had varied widely from year-to-year, from 23.4 percent in 1989, to 0.6 percent in 1990, and then back up to 23 percent in 1991. These fluctuations do not appear to be consistent with a low-risk investment. On remand, and in future condemnation actions, the trial court should presume that the statutory rate is reasonable and, therefore, meets the requirements of just compensation and should order judgment at that rate unless the condemnee rebuts this presumption and affirmatively shows that another rate is reasonable and affords just compensation. In determining a reasonable rate, the trial court should look to rates on investments which guarantee safety of principal. The state also urges that the trial court should have held a full trial-type evidentiary hearing to determine the appropriate interest rate. The statutory scheme does not require a full evidentiary hearing to determine just compensation in each condemnation action. See Minn. Stat. § 117.085 (1992). This scheme requires only notice and an opportunity to be heard. A full adjudicative hearing on this issue is not necessary. We believe that the standards set out in this opinion will more narrowly focus the trial court's inquiry and the trial court may set the interest rate based on affidavits and depositions. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. SIMONETT, Justice (concurring specially). I join in the court's opinion but wish to comment on what is a "judicial question." It is said that determining the measure of compensation in condemnation proceedings is a "judicial and not a legislative question" because the government may not constitute itself the judge in its own case. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327, 13 S.Ct. 622, 626, 37 L.Ed. 463 (1892). Thus the government as a taker should not be setting the rate of interest for what it is taking; or at least the legislative branch, which pays the award, should not be setting the interest. This determination, so the reasoning goes, is better made by the judicial branch which is structured to be a neutral arbiter. Nevertheless, the question of interest relates not to the amount of the award itself but to preserving the value of the award. While an award reflects the many unique characteristics of the particular parcel taken, an interest rate is less unique or particularized, more easily identified, and allows for some relaxation of the "judicial question" test. Thus courts have allowed a *365 statutory interest rate to be "evidence" of what is just compensation. In Monongahela, Congress authorized the condemnation of the property owner's lock and dam but added a proviso that in determining the amount of the award, the property owner's franchise to collect tolls was not to be considered. It was in the context of rejecting this proviso that the Court said the right to compensation was a judicial, not a legislative, question. In Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306, 43 S.Ct. 354, 356, 67 L.Ed. 664 (1923), the United States Supreme Court held that a property owner was entitled to interest on its condemnation award as part of "just compensation"; but there Congress had made no provision for any interest, so the Court approved use of South Carolina's legal rate. The majority opinion in this case is consistent with State by Spannaus v. Carney, 309 N.W.2d 775, 776 (Minn.1981). Here the interest rate, although prescribed by statute, is tied to a rate outside the control of the state legislature, is updated every year, and is the rate paid on other money judgments. In enacting this statutory rate it is presumed the legislature did not intend to violate the constitutional requirements for just compensation. Hence, Minn. Stat. §§ 117.195 and 549.09 are construed in tandem to set a rate that is presumptively just compensation. This presumption is rebuttable, thus affording the property owner its judicial forum. The proper interest rate in a particular case is a mixed question of law and fact with significant constitutional implications, and the question, therefore, is for the court to decide. NOTES [1] The yearly interest rates set by Minn. Stat. §§ 117.195 and 549.09 are based on the secondary market yield of one-year United States Treasury Bills. The rates for the time period relevant to this case were eight percent for 1988 and 1989, seven percent for 1990 and 1991 and five percent for 1992. [2] The Harold Chevrolet Pension Trust earned rates of 10.4 percent in 1987 and 1988, 23.4 percent in 1989, 0.6 percent in 1990, and 23.0 percent in 1991. [3] For example, the following would qualify as very low risk investments to which a trial court might look for evidence of a reasonable rate: certificates of deposit from federally insured banks, United States Treasury Bills with maturities within the relevant time period, other government bonds, and long term corporate bonds from AAA rated companies with maturities within the relevant time period. This list is not intended to be exclusive and trial courts may look to other investments so long as they are very low risk.

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Fine v. City of Minneapolis · 1986 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

City of Minnetonka v. Carlson · 1980 2 citations

298 N.W.2d 763 (1980) CITY OF MINNETONKA, petitioner, Appellant, v. Clarence Dwight CARLSON, et al., Respondents. No. 50556. Supreme Court of Minnesota. October 31, 1980. *764 Deborah Hedlund, Minnetonka, for petitioner, appellant. Olson, Gunn & Seran, Minneapolis, for respondents. Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument. SCOTT, Justice. The petitioner, City of Minnetonka, appeals from the order of a three-judge panel of the Hennepin County District Court filed on August 3, 1979, granting attorneys fees in the amount of $30,000 in favor of the respondents. We affirm. The facts underlying this controversy were fully described in an opinion issued in this case on a prior occasion, entitled City of Minnetonka v. Carlson, 265 N.W.2d 205 (Minn.1978) [Carlson I]. The eight respondents owned three parcels of land which the City of Minnetonka wished to obtain for park and recreational purposes. The city obtained two separate appraisals of the three parcels. One appraisal valued them at $264,000, the other appraisal at $240,000. On the basis of these appraisals, the city commenced condemnation proceedings in district court. The respondents retained attorney John D. Flanery to represent them under a contingent fee agreement providing that the attorney would receive one-third of the amount by which the condemnation awards exceeded $150,000. The city's petition to condemn was granted and three commissioners were appointed pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 117.075 (1976) to determine an award. Because the commissioners returned awards totaling $404,475 greater than the highest of the two private appraisals, the city decided to abandon the condemnation. At this point, Attorney Flanery associated with a law firm to assist him in contesting the legality of the city's abandonment. The Hennepin County District Court subsequently held that the city could properly abandon the condemnation, and no appeal was taken from that determination. Thereafter, the respondents moved the district court for an order directing the city *765 to pay their reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney fees, relying upon Minn. Stat. § 117.195 (1976).[1] The district court ordered the city to pay the respondents $1,500 for appraisal expenses, but denied any recovery of attorneys fees. An appeal was then taken to this court. In Carlson I, the court concluded that the respondents were entitled to attorneys fees for services prior to the time of abandonment. In authorizing the award of attorneys fees, the Carlson I court stated: [W]hat constitutes the reasonable value of the legal services is a question of fact to be determined by the evidence submitted, the facts disclosed by the record of the proceedings, and the court's own knowledge of the case. * * * Absent any statutory limitations, allowances should be made with due regard for all relevant circumstances, including the time and labor required; the nature and difficulty of the responsibility assumed; the amount involved and the results obtained; the fees customarily charged for similar legal services; the experience, reputation and ability of counsel; and the fee arrangement existing between counsel and the client.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

County of Freeborn v. Bryson · 1980 2 citations

294 N.W.2d 851 (1980) COUNTY OF FREEBORN, by Its County Attorney, Respondent, v. William H. BRYSON, et al., Appellants, and State of Minnesota, by William H. Bryson, et al., Appellants. STATE of Minnesota, by Warren Spannaus, Its Attorney General, Intervenor, v. COUNTY OF FREEBORN, et al., Respondents. No. 50214. Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 3, 1980. Christian, Slen, Savelkoul, Johnson, Broberg & Kohl and Rolf O. Slen, Albert Lea, for appellants. *852 Paul G. Morreim, County Atty., Albert Lea, for respondent. Heard before KELLY, YETKA, and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. PETERSON, Justice. Appellants William H. and Arlene Bryson, landowners in this eminent domain proceeding, appeal from an order of the district court denying their motion for an award of costs and attorneys fees against respondent, County of Freeborn. This matter has been before us on two prior occasions. Respondent originally brought an action to condemn land for a roadway through a marsh owned by appellants. However, in County of Freeborn v. Bryson (Bryson I), 297 Minn. 218, 210 N.W.2d 290 (1973), and County of Freeborn v. Bryson (Bryson II), 309 Minn. 178, 243 N.W.2d 316 (1976), appellants raised a successful defense of their action based on the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, Minn. Stat. ch. 116B (1978). In Bryson II, we remanded the matter with instructions that judgment be entered in favor of appellants. Upon entry of judgment in their favor, appellants brought the present motion for an award of costs and attorneys fees under Minn. Stat. § 117.195 (1978), seeking costs of $508.64 and attorneys fees of $17,500, in accordance with an affidavit submitted by Attorney Rolf O. Slen. The district court denied the motion, without taking evidence, upon the ground that such an award is not authorized by the statute. Appellants appeal from the order denying their motion. The sole issue on appeal is whether in an eminent domain proceeding a landowner, who obtains a judgment preventing the taking of the land in question by invoking ch. 116B, is entitled to an award of costs and attorneys fees under § 117.195. Attorneys fees are allowed in eminent domain proceedings only where authorized by statute. City of Minnetonka v. Carlson, 265 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Minn. 1978). State, by Spannaus v. Carter, 300 Minn. 495, 497, 221 N.W.2d 106, 107 (1974). Section 117.195 of the statute provides: All damages allowed under this chapter, whether by the commissioners or upon appeal, shall bear interest from the time of the filing of the commissioner's report or from the date of the petitioner's possession whichever occurs first. If the award is not paid within 70 days after such filing, or, in case of an appeal within 45 days after final judgment, or within 45 days after a stipulation of settlement, the court, on motion of the owner of the land, shall vacate the award and dismiss the proceedings as against such land. When the proceeding is so dismissed or the same is discontinued by the petitioner, the owner may recover from the petitioner reasonable costs and expenses including attorneys' fees. The language of § 117.195 states that attorneys fees will be allowed in eminent domain cases (1) where the trial court dismisses the proceeding due to the failure of the condemnor to pay the award within the required time and (2) where the proceeding is "discontinued by the petitioner." The question before the court, therefore, is whether the clause "discontinued by the petitioner" is intended to allow attorneys fees only where there is a voluntary discontinuance or whether it also applies where the discontinuance is a result of a court determination that condemnation shall not lie under the Environmental Rights Act. Section 117.195 has been in force in substantially the same form since 1905. Until recently, the power of eminent domain and the manner of its exercise lay almost entirely within the discretion of the condemnor. Since the property owner could not object to the location of a particular improvement, virtually the only objection that could be raised was that no valid public purpose was being served. As we held in Bryson I and Bryson II, however, this situation was changed by passage *853 of the Environmental Rights Act in the early 1970's. Appellants argue, therefore, that it is inconceivable that the legislature could have intended to allow attorneys fees where the condemnor itself determined it made a mistake and dismissed the condemnation proceeding but not to allow them where the court dismissed the condemnation on the basis of the legislature's direction to protect the state's natural resources. Although we are sympathetic to appellants' position, we are bound by the statutory language. Nothing in § 117.195 allows for attorneys fees where the proceeding is discontinued by the court rather than the petitioner, for a reason other than delay in payment of the award. The fact that the provision specifically includes dismissal by the court for delay in payment is a clear indication that the legislature did not intend to include dismissal by the court on other grounds. Furthermore, if any such dismissal can be considered a "discontinuance" within the terms of the provision, the words "by the petitioner" become superfluous. The purpose of § 117.195 also supports this conclusion. We noted in State, by Mondale v. Nelson, 267 Minn. 70, 73, 125 N.W.2d 166, 168 (1963), that the purpose of the statute was to "prevent condemning authorities from bringing successive proceedings with a view to discontinuing and relitigating those in which the awards appeared excessive." In the case at bar, there is no danger of relitigation because the county had been enjoined altogether from pursuing the condemnation. Courts in other states with similar statutes all have interpreted the authorization of attorneys fees to be limited to cases where the condemnor had voluntarily abandoned the proceeding. See e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Abbott, 217 Cal. 184, 17 P.2d 993 (1932) (cited in our opinion in Nelson); Martineau v. State Conservation Commission, 54 Wis.2d 76, 194 N.W.2d 664 (1972); Shuey v. Preston, 172 Ohio St. 413, 177 N.E.2d 789 (1961). In Nelson, we held that § 117.195 did not authorize an award of attorneys fees where the condemnation proceeding was dismissed by the court because of the petitioner's delay in pursuing the case. Although it could be said that the proceeding was not really "discontinued" because the state intended to renew and go forward with the petition, we specifically considered and rejected appellant's argument that the statute should not be literally construed to limit attorneys fees to cases where the state itself dismissed the proceeding. Appellants express a legitimate concern over perceived unfairness in allowing attorneys fees where a condemnor itself chooses to abandon the proceeding but not where the court is the one that stops the condemnation. Such a policy does seem to place a burden on the landowner who successfully challenges a condemnation petition on the basis of the state's interest in the conservation of its natural resources.[1] But, we cannot go beyond the clear limitations of § 117.195 or ignore our caveat in Carter, where we noted that even though reform in this area is "long overdue," arguments for change must be directed to the legislature, not to the courts. The trial court's denial of attorneys fees to appellants is accordingly affirmed. Affirmed. YETKA, Justice (dissenting). The statute authorizes an award of costs and attorneys' fees where the trial court dismisses the proceeding due to the failure of the condemnor to pay the award within the required time or where the proceeding is "discontinued by the petitioner." The question before the court, therefore, involves *854 interpretation of the clause "discontinued by the petitioners." Does the statute intend to allow attorneys' fees only where there is a voluntary discontinuance or does it also apply where the discontinuance is a result of a court determination that condemnation shall not lie under the Environmental Rights Act? The statute in question has been in force in substantially the same form since 1905. Until very recent times, the power of eminent domain and the manner of its exercise lay almost entirely with the discretion of the condemnor. Since the property owner could not object to the location of a particular improvement, virtually the only objection which could be raised was that no valid public purpose was being served. As we held in both Bryson I and Bryson II, however, the rules have been greatly changed by the passage of the Environmental Rights Act in the early 1970's. We cannot conceive of the legislature intending to allow attorney's fees in a situation where the condemnor itself determined it made a mistake and dismissed the condemnation proceedings and yet not to allow attorneys' fees in a proceeding where the court holds that the governmental body cannot condemn the land because of the legislature's direction to protect the state's natural resources. Respondents cite our case of State v. Nelson, 267 Minn. 70, 125 N.W.2d 166 (1963) for the proposition that the statute does not contemplate attorneys' fees for a court-ordered dismissal. Nelson is distinguishable on two grounds. First, the court in that case found that the condemnation action would not in fact be abandoned but would very likely be recommenced. We said: Appellant here argues that the statute should not be literally construed to limit attorneys' fees to those cases where the state has itself dismissed the proceedings. It is appellant's contention that the purpose of the statute is frustrated where the state fails to pursue a condemnation but refuses to dismiss because of its potential liability for attorneys' fees. While there would be force in this argument if the record compelled a finding that these proceedings had actually been abandoned, the evidence is all to the contrary. Although it is clear there have been delays, it is equally obvious that the state intends to go forward as expeditiously as possible. 267 Minn. at 73-74, 125 N.W.2d at 168. In this case, there is no way that the County of Freeborn can continue or recommence the condemnation proceedings against the appellant's land. Secondly, the Nelson case was decided a decade before the Environmental Rights Act was even passed. I therefore accept the interpretation of the statute which makes common sense and hold that attorneys' fees and costs are collectible both in the situation of a voluntary dismissal of a condemnation proceedings by the condemnor and in the case where a court has held that condemnation will not lie. I also have in mind our recent case ordering the state to provide counsel for the indigent in paternity cases where the county attorney brings the proceedings on behalf of the state. In that case, we relied upon our supervisory power to insure the fair administration of justice. Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn. 1979). KELLY, Justice (dissenting). I join the dissent of Justice Yetka. WAHL, Justice (dissenting). I join the dissent of Justice Yetka. SCOTT, Justice (dissenting). I join the dissent of Justice Yetka. NOTES [1] The burden, of course, is no greater than that on any person who with the help of legal counsel successfully defends against a lawsuit. Except where specifically authorized by statute, no successful defendant is entitled to attorneys fees.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.