OPINION GILBERT, Justice. This case raises the issue of whether appellant Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency (SMMPA), a municipal power agency incorporated pursuant to Minn. Stat. *363§§ 453.51-62 (1996), is subject to the Minnesota Open Meeting Law, Minn. Stat. § 471.705 (1996), and the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01-99 (1996). SMMPA contends it is not subject to either the Open Meeting Law or the Data Practices Act because the legislature granted it the authority to conduct its affairs as a private corporation, which includes the authority to hold closed meetings and keep records private. We agree and reverse the court of appeals decision. I. SMMPA is a municipal power agency that was formed in 1977 by the joint action of 18 cities in southern Minnesota pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 453.51-.62 (1996) (“enabling legislation”). The enabling legislation permits cities to create municipal electric power agencies to ensure adequate, economical, and reliable sources of electric energy for the benefit of their citizens. Minn. Stat. § 453.51. Municipal power agencies are established “by the execution of an agency agreement authorized by a resolution of the governing body of each city.” Minn. Stat. § 453.53, subd. 1. If the agency agreement conforms to the requirements of the enabling legislation and is filed with the secretary of state, the secretary of state then issues a certificate of incorporation for the municipal power agency. Minn. Stat. § 453.53, subd. 2. SMMPA generates and transmits electricity and supplies it at wholesale to its 18 member cities. Those member cities then distribute the electricity to their respective retail customers. Although SMMPA, by statute, is a municipal corporation and a political subdivision of the state which is deemed to be performing an essential governmental function, it also operates a business. See Minn. Stat. § 453.53, subd. 1(1); Minn. Stat. § 453.54, subd. 1. It presumably generates revenues, incurs expenses, establishes rates, and it has statutory authority to finance, acquire, and dispose of property. Minn. Stat. § 453.54, subds. 7, 8, 9. SMMPA, and not its member cities, is liable on any bonds or notes issued to raise working capital. Minn. Stat. § 453.55, subd. 11. Furthermore, the enabling legislation requires SMMPA to maintain a registered office and be run by a board of directors and its officers. Minn. Stat. § 453.54, subd. 1; Minn. Stat. § 453.53, subds. 6, 7. Boards of municipal power agencies consist of at least five persons who are representatives of the respective member cities and who are selected by agreement or by a majority of the vote of such representatives. Id. at subds. 1(6), 5. Faced with an increasingly competitive electric utility industry, SMMPA asserts that it is necessary for it from time to time (like its privately-run competitors) to conduct closed board meetings to discuss strategy and other sensitive business information. Accordingly, it amended its bylaws to provide for closed board meetings and privacy for its records. SMMPA then brought a declaratory judgment action in district court to declare that the meetings of its board of directors are not subject to the Open Meeting Law. Respondents, various newspaper publishers and journalists, counterclaimed, asserting that SMMPA’s board must comply with the Open Meeting Law and that SMMPA’s records have to be made public under the Data Practices Act.1 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted relief to SMMPA, finding that the Open Meeting Law and the Data Practices Act do not apply to SMMPA. The court of appeals reversed on both issues, and SMMPA now appeals to this court. II. SMMPA contends that the court of appeals erred in reversing the district court’s order of summary judgment in favor of SMMPA When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the court below erred in applying the law. Art Goebel, Inc. v. North Suburban Agencies, Inc., 567 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn.1997). Neither party disputes any facts of this case. Rather, the parties *364disagree as to whether the Open Meeting Law and Data Practices Act apply to SMMPA. This court uses a de novo standard of review in determining whether the court below erred in its application of the law or the construction of a statute. Id.; Doe v. Minnesota State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 435 N.W.2d 45, 48 (Minn.1989). We begin our review by examining the requirements of the Open Meeting Law and the Data Practices Act. The Open Meeting Law provides in relevant part: Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all meetings, including éxecutive sessions, of any state agency, board, commission or department when required or permitted by law to transact public business in a meeting, and the governing body of any school district however organized, unorganized territory, county, city, town, or other public body, and of any committee, subcommittee, board, department or commission thereof, shall be open to the public, except meetings of the commissioner of corrections. Minn. Stat. § 471.705, subd. I.2 The Data Practices Act requires that “[a]ll government data collected, created, received, maintained or disseminated by a state agency, political subdivision, or statewide system shall be public unless classified by statute * * * as nonpublic or protected nonpublic.” Minn. Stat. § 13.03, subd. 1. “Government data” includes “all data collected, created, received, maintained or disseminated by any state agency, political subdivision, or statewide system.” Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 7. A willful violation of the Data Practices Act carries a criminal penalty;3 criminal statutes are generally strictly construed. State v. Zacher, 504 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn.1993). The next point of our analysis in this case is the enabling legislation under which SMMPA was formed. Critically, the enabling legislation grants SMMPA, as a duly-formed municipal power agency, the power to run its business like a private corporation. Minnesota Statutes § 453.54, subd. 21, provides that municipal power agencies may: [E]xercise all * ⅜ ⅜ powers not inconsistent with the Constitution of the state of Minnesota or the United States Constitution, which powers may be reasonably necessary or appropriate for or incidental to the effectuation of its authorized purposes or to the exercise of any of the powers enumerated in [section 453.54], and generally may exercise in connection with its property and affairs, * * ⅜ any and all powers which might be exercised by a natural person or a private corporation in connection with similar property and affairs. (Emphasis added). The legislature has defined a private corporation as a “company, association or body endowed by law with a corporate power or function. The term does not include a public corporation.” Minn. Stat. § 300.02, subd. 3 (1996). A public corporation is a “corporation formed solely for public and governmental purposes.” Id. at subd. 7. Although SMMPA possesses some attributes of a public corporation and is governed by its 18 member cities, SMMPA’s private corporate powers distinguish it from public corporations formed solely for public and governmental purposes. The dissent seems to suggest that SMMPA is not distinguishable from a public corporation because it does not sell stock to raise capital. The legislature disagrees. The legislature endowed SMMPA with the powers of a private corporation in connection with similar property or affairs. The words “private corporation” in the enabling legislation are free from all ambiguity. “When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all *365ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1996). SMMPA has been granted management powers over its property and affairs similar to a private corporation. These powers are carried out by SMMPA with the authority of its 18 municipal member representatives and its board of directors as provided in its bylaws. In managing its affairs, a private corporation may adopt bylaws establishing the manner of calling and holding all meetings. Minn. Stat. § 300.52, subd. 1 (1996). This is precisely what SMMPA has done in this ease. It appears from the record that SMMPA’s bylaws, as they existed at the time of this litigation, were created and amended pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 453.53, subd. 4, which requires that the bylaws of municipal power agencies “shall be proposed by the board of directors and shall be adopted by a majority vote of the representatives of the member cities.” SMMPA’s bylaws establish the manner and time of conducting meetings and address the regulation of SMMPA’s property and affairs. The bylaws provide that all 18 municipal member representatives and the 18 alternate member representatives may attend meetings and have access to SMMPA’s records as though SMMPA was subject to the Open Meeting Law and the Data Practices Act. The bylaws do not allow for general public access. However, at oral argument, SMMPA’s counsel noted that SMMPA prepares detailed quarterly and annual financial statements which it distributes to its 18 member cities. Once in the control of the respective cities, who are subject to the Data Practices Act, these statements, are available for inspection by the general public. See Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 7; § 13.03, subd. 1. In addition, each agency agreement between SMMPA and each of the 18 cities are public and on file with the secretary of state. See Minn. Stat. § 453.53, subd. 2. Through the enabling legislation, the legislature plainly granted SMMPA the authority to run its affairs like a private corporation. We have long held that the plain language of the statute shall not be disregarded if the meaning is clear. Kirkwold Constr. Co. v. Capital M.G.A. Constr., Inc., 513 N.W.2d241 (Minn.1994); Lahr v. City of St. Cloud, 246 Minn. 489, 494 n. 10, 76 N.W.2d 119, 122 n. 9 (1956). This authority includes the power to hold meetings in accordance with its established bylaws. SMMPA’s bylaws provide for some privacy of its board meetings and for its documents. As such, SMMPA’s bylaws are somewhat similar to those of a private corporation preserving some privacy in dealing with its affairs and its properties. The dissent appears to entirely dismiss the proprietary nature of SMMPA and the private corporate attributes bestowed upon SMMPA by the legislature. The dissent further states that, absent the application of the Open Meeting Law to SMMPA, there is no corresponding assurance of proper conduct or internal cheeks among board members of municipal power agencies. However, the newspapers are not asserting any wrongdoing, they merely are demanding the right to be at all of SMMPA’s board meetings and to have access to all of its documents. Furthermore, the enabling legislation mandates that SMMPA’s directors “discharge their duties in good faith, and with that diligence and care which an ordinary prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 453.53, subd. 6. As the legislature envisioned, SMMPA needed some discretion to conduct its business. As such, the board deemed that it would be impractical for SMMPA to have to open to the public and its competitors all of its strategy meetings and documentation on management issues such as marketing, acquisitions, budgets, and personnel matters. Nonetheless, respondents contend that compliance with the Open Meeting Law and Data Practices Act is necessary for adequate regulation of municipal power agencies. Despite respondent’s claim, however, the language contained in the enabling legislation granting municipal power agencies the authority to act as private corporations regarding their affairs is clear, and it is not our role to read beyond those words. See Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 558 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Minn. 1997) (stating that our role is not to challenge the wisdom of the legislature, but “to *366give effect to its will as expressed in the unambiguous language of the statute”). Moreover, the legislature has instructed that the enabling legislation: shall be construed liberally to effectuate its legislative intent and purpose, as complete and independent authority for the performance of each and every act and thing authorized by [the enabling legislation] and all authority granted shall be broadly interpreted to effectuate this intent and purpose and not as a limitation of powers. Minn. Stat. § 453.62, subd. 1. This mandate reemphasizes SMMPA’s private corporation attributes and its right to be governed pursuant to its duly-adopted bylaws. SMMPA has permissibly elected, for reasonable proprietary and business concerns, to close some of its board meetings to the public because it is not subject to the Open Meeting Law or the Data Practices Act. The complete and independent authority granted to municipal power agencies to conduct their business as would a private corporation potentially creates a conflict with the public access nature of the Open Meeting Law and Data Practices Act. Indeed, the parties disagree over the effect and applicability of these statutory provisions relating to SMMPA. We conclude, however, that the legislature has provided that municipal power agencies, in managing their property and affairs, may act as private corporations and, as such, neither the Open Meeting Law nor the Data Practices Act apply to SMMPA. Moreover, when there is a “conflict or inconsistency between [the enabling legislation] and any other law or charter provision, [the enabling legislation] shall prevail.” MinmStat. 453.62, subd. 2 (emphasis added). The legislature also mandated that this prevailing provision, like all provisions in the enabling legislation, shall be liberally construed. Minn. Stat. § 453.62, subd. 1. Accordingly, to the extent there is a conflict between the enabling legislation and the Data Privacy Act or Open Meeting Law, the private corporation powers granted to SMMPA by the enabling legislation prevail. Because we conclude that the enabling legislation allows municipal power agencies to manage their property and affairs in the same manner as a private corporation pursuant to their bylaws, we hold that SMMPA’s election through its duly-adopted bylaws to restrict access to its meetings and records is within the statutory discretion granted to SMMPA. Reversed. TOMLJANOVICH, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

GARDEBRING, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion today because neither the statutory grant of authority to the Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency nor the provisions of the state’s Open Meeting Law and Data Practices Act provide for such a result. At the heart of the majority’s analysis is a mistaken view of the essential nature of a municipal power authority. The majority argument begins with the statutory language granting SMMPA and other municipal power authorities “any and all powers which might be exercised by a natural person or a private corporation in connection with similar property and affairs.” Minn. Stat. § 453.54, subd. 21 (1996).4 From this, the majority concludes that, because private corporations may have closed meetings and keep internal information secret, SMMPA may proceed in the same way. However, SMMPA clearly does not have all of the powers of a business corporation formed under the laws of Minnesota, nor does it conduct its business as a private corporation does. First, a municipal power *367authority authorized under chapter 453 is not created by private individuals for private ends. See Minn. Stat. § 302A.101 (1996). Rather, it can be formed only by the acts of other units of government — cities—which are authorized to join together to secure “an adequate, economical, and reliable, supply of energy.” Minn. Stat. § 453.51 (1996). No private business objectives are served by a municipal power agency, as is the requirement for a business corporation. See Minn. Stat. § 302A.011, subd. 8 (1996). Further, no one, including the majority, would argue that SMMPA can acquire capital for its busi-, ness purposes through the issuance of stock, as can a business corporation. See Minn. Stat. § 302A.401 (1996). While a business corporation is owned only by those who choose to invest equity, a municipal power authority is owned by all the citizens of the communities which join together to create it. These differences illustrate a simple point — while SMMPA is like a private corporation in some respects, in other respects it is quite different. And it is those latter characteristics that make it subject to the provisions of both the Open Meeting Law and the Data Practices Act. A municipal power agency can be formed only by the actions of “two or more cities” and “is created and incorporated * * * as a municipal corporation and a political subdivision of the state, to exercise thereunder a part of the sovereign powers of the state." Minn. Stat. § 453.53, subd. 1 (1996) (emphasis added). Further, a municipal power agency is “deemed to be performing an essential government function.” Minn. Stat. § 453.54, subd. 1 (1996) (emphasis added). The majority chooses to overlook these critical characteristics of SMMPA — that it is a political subdivision of the state, exercising the sovereign powers of the state, performing an essential government function — things that surely cannot be said of a private corporation. Furthermore, these statutorily-defined characteristics of SMMPA bring it squarely within the reach of both the Open Meeting Law and the Data Practices Act. The Open Meeting Law provides that: Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all meetings, including executive sessions, of * * * the governing body of any school district however organized, unorganized territory, county, city, town or other public body,'* * * shall be open to the public. Minn. Stat. § 471.705, subd. 1 (1996) (emphasis added). The Open Meeting Law does not define “other public body,” but surely a “political subdivision” created to exercise the “sovereign powers of the state” must be within the scope of that generic language. Thus, under the plain language of the Open Meeting Law, SMMPA is governed by its requirements and its meetings are required to be open to the press and to members of the public. This result is .consistent with our understanding of the legislative purpose of the Open Meeting Law. We said in St. Cloud Newspapers, Inc. v. District 742 Community Schs., 332 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.1983), that the statute has three objectives: (1) “to prohibit actions being taken at a secret meeting where.it is impossible for the interested public to become fully informed concerning board decisions or to detect improper influences,” Lindahl v. Independent School District No. 306, 270 Minn. 164, 167, 133 N.W.2d 23, 26 (1965); (2) “to assure the public’s right to be informed,” Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School District No. 709, 298 Minn. 306, 313, 215 N.W.2d 814, 821 (1974); and (3) “to afford the public an opportunity to present its views to the board,” Sullivan v. Credit River Township, 299 Minn. 170, 175, 217 N.W.2d 502, 506 (1974). These objectives are surely as applicable to the efficient delivery of electrical power by a public entity as they are to the provision of education to Minnesota’s children. Indeed, this court has stated unequivocally that the Open Meeting Law must be construed broadly in favor of the public. Merz v. Leitch, 342 N.W.2d 141,145 (Minn.1984). Moreover, public access to records and meetings of municipal power agencies such as SMMPA is critical because, unlike private business corporations organized under Minn. Stat. ch. 302A, the enabling legislation does not provide for any internal cheeks on agency authority. Chapter 302A requires that the *368directors of private business corporations act in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation. Minn. Stat. § 302A.251, subd. 1 (1996). Directors of private corporations are also personally liable for a breach of loyalty, acts or omissions made in bad faith or that involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the law, or for any transaction from which the director derived an improper benefit. Id. at subd. 4 (1996). Absent application of the Open Meeting Law, there is no corresponding assurance of proper conduct among board members of municipal power agencies. The analysis under the Data Practices Act is similar, though perhaps even stronger. The Data Practices Act, adopted by the legislature initially in 1974 to provide the public with information about governmental activities, regulates access to records maintained by governmental agencies. See Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01-.99 (1996). It provides that all “state agencies, political subdivisions and statewide systems shall be governed by” the Data Practices Act. Minn. Stat. § 13.01, subd. 1 (emphasis added). It further defines “political subdivision” to mean “any county, statutory or home rule charter city, school district, special district and any board, commission, district or authority created pursuant to law, local ordinance, or charter provision.” Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 11 (emphasis added). Thus, SMMPA, which is by definition a “political subdivision” and a governmental “authority created pursuant to law,” is, by operation of its enabling legislation and the Data Practices Act, governed by that act. To argue otherwise is to ignore the plain meaning of both statutes, which this court should be loathe to do. It is also significant to note that the legislature has specifically provided for exceptions to the application of these two important statutes, including entities that share the same kinds of competitive pressures identified by SMMPA as a reason for its exclusion from the statutes at issue here. For example, Minn. Stat. § 144.581, subd. 5 (1996), provides that meetings of the board of directors of a government-owned or operated hospital may close meetings to discuss specific marketing activity where disclosure of information would cause harm to the hospital’s competitive position. Significantly, the Open Meeting Law itself requires that it applies to all public bodies unless “otherwise expressly provided by statute.” Minn. Stat. § 471.705 (1996). The absence of such an explicit exclusion for SMMPA and similar organizations suggests that the legislature intended for the Data Practices Act and the Open Meeting Law to apply to them. Finally, the majority notes that SMMPA has elected “for reasonable proprietary and business concerns” to close some of its board meetings to the public and prohibit public access to its records. This concern for SMMPA’s role in the electric utility market and its competitive position vis a vis other utilities, some of them private, is perhaps commendable, but ought not to influence the decision of this court. There are good and appropriate reasons for statutes such as the Open Meeting Law and the Data Practices Act, including to shed a little sunshine on the inner workings of government. Cities are not required to join together to form publicly-owned electrical utilities, but if they do, those publicly-owned entities should not automatically be entitled to a level of secrecy in doing business that other government entities are not accorded. If SMMPA is indeed conducting an essential government function, that is all the more reason to allow the public access to its operations. I conclude that SMMPA is subject to both the Open Meeting Law and the Data Practices Act, and would therefore, affirm the court of appeals.

GARDEBRING, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion today because neither the statutory grant of authority to the Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency nor the provisions of the state’s Open Meeting Law and Data Practices Act provide for such a result. At the heart of the majority’s analysis is a mistaken view of the essential nature of a municipal power authority. The majority argument begins with the statutory language granting SMMPA and other municipal power authorities “any and all powers which might be exercised by a natural person or a private corporation in connection with similar property and affairs.” Minn. Stat. § 453.54, subd. 21 (1996).4 From this, the majority concludes that, because private corporations may have closed meetings and keep internal information secret, SMMPA may proceed in the same way. However, SMMPA clearly does not have all of the powers of a business corporation formed under the laws of Minnesota, nor does it conduct its business as a private corporation does. First, a municipal power *367authority authorized under chapter 453 is not created by private individuals for private ends. See Minn. Stat. § 302A.101 (1996). Rather, it can be formed only by the acts of other units of government — cities—which are authorized to join together to secure “an adequate, economical, and reliable, supply of energy.” Minn. Stat. § 453.51 (1996). No private business objectives are served by a municipal power agency, as is the requirement for a business corporation. See Minn. Stat. § 302A.011, subd. 8 (1996). Further, no one, including the majority, would argue that SMMPA can acquire capital for its busi-, ness purposes through the issuance of stock, as can a business corporation. See Minn. Stat. § 302A.401 (1996). While a business corporation is owned only by those who choose to invest equity, a municipal power authority is owned by all the citizens of the communities which join together to create it. These differences illustrate a simple point — while SMMPA is like a private corporation in some respects, in other respects it is quite different. And it is those latter characteristics that make it subject to the provisions of both the Open Meeting Law and the Data Practices Act. A municipal power agency can be formed only by the actions of “two or more cities” and “is created and incorporated * * * as a municipal corporation and a political subdivision of the state, to exercise thereunder a part of the sovereign powers of the state." Minn. Stat. § 453.53, subd. 1 (1996) (emphasis added). Further, a municipal power agency is “deemed to be performing an essential government function.” Minn. Stat. § 453.54, subd. 1 (1996) (emphasis added). The majority chooses to overlook these critical characteristics of SMMPA — that it is a political subdivision of the state, exercising the sovereign powers of the state, performing an essential government function — things that surely cannot be said of a private corporation. Furthermore, these statutorily-defined characteristics of SMMPA bring it squarely within the reach of both the Open Meeting Law and the Data Practices Act. The Open Meeting Law provides that: Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all meetings, including executive sessions, of * * * the governing body of any school district however organized, unorganized territory, county, city, town or other public body,'* * * shall be open to the public. Minn. Stat. § 471.705, subd. 1 (1996) (emphasis added). The Open Meeting Law does not define “other public body,” but surely a “political subdivision” created to exercise the “sovereign powers of the state” must be within the scope of that generic language. Thus, under the plain language of the Open Meeting Law, SMMPA is governed by its requirements and its meetings are required to be open to the press and to members of the public. This result is .consistent with our understanding of the legislative purpose of the Open Meeting Law. We said in St. Cloud Newspapers, Inc. v. District 742 Community Schs., 332 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.1983), that the statute has three objectives: (1) “to prohibit actions being taken at a secret meeting where.it is impossible for the interested public to become fully informed concerning board decisions or to detect improper influences,” Lindahl v. Independent School District No. 306, 270 Minn. 164, 167, 133 N.W.2d 23, 26 (1965); (2) “to assure the public’s right to be informed,” Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School District No. 709, 298 Minn. 306, 313, 215 N.W.2d 814, 821 (1974); and (3) “to afford the public an opportunity to present its views to the board,” Sullivan v. Credit River Township, 299 Minn. 170, 175, 217 N.W.2d 502, 506 (1974). These objectives are surely as applicable to the efficient delivery of electrical power by a public entity as they are to the provision of education to Minnesota’s children. Indeed, this court has stated unequivocally that the Open Meeting Law must be construed broadly in favor of the public. Merz v. Leitch, 342 N.W.2d 141,145 (Minn.1984). Moreover, public access to records and meetings of municipal power agencies such as SMMPA is critical because, unlike private business corporations organized under Minn. Stat. ch. 302A, the enabling legislation does not provide for any internal cheeks on agency authority. Chapter 302A requires that the *368directors of private business corporations act in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation. Minn. Stat. § 302A.251, subd. 1 (1996). Directors of private corporations are also personally liable for a breach of loyalty, acts or omissions made in bad faith or that involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the law, or for any transaction from which the director derived an improper benefit. Id. at subd. 4 (1996). Absent application of the Open Meeting Law, there is no corresponding assurance of proper conduct among board members of municipal power agencies. The analysis under the Data Practices Act is similar, though perhaps even stronger. The Data Practices Act, adopted by the legislature initially in 1974 to provide the public with information about governmental activities, regulates access to records maintained by governmental agencies. See Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01-.99 (1996). It provides that all “state agencies, political subdivisions and statewide systems shall be governed by” the Data Practices Act. Minn. Stat. § 13.01, subd. 1 (emphasis added). It further defines “political subdivision” to mean “any county, statutory or home rule charter city, school district, special district and any board, commission, district or authority created pursuant to law, local ordinance, or charter provision.” Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 11 (emphasis added). Thus, SMMPA, which is by definition a “political subdivision” and a governmental “authority created pursuant to law,” is, by operation of its enabling legislation and the Data Practices Act, governed by that act. To argue otherwise is to ignore the plain meaning of both statutes, which this court should be loathe to do. It is also significant to note that the legislature has specifically provided for exceptions to the application of these two important statutes, including entities that share the same kinds of competitive pressures identified by SMMPA as a reason for its exclusion from the statutes at issue here. For example, Minn. Stat. § 144.581, subd. 5 (1996), provides that meetings of the board of directors of a government-owned or operated hospital may close meetings to discuss specific marketing activity where disclosure of information would cause harm to the hospital’s competitive position. Significantly, the Open Meeting Law itself requires that it applies to all public bodies unless “otherwise expressly provided by statute.” Minn. Stat. § 471.705 (1996). The absence of such an explicit exclusion for SMMPA and similar organizations suggests that the legislature intended for the Data Practices Act and the Open Meeting Law to apply to them. Finally, the majority notes that SMMPA has elected “for reasonable proprietary and business concerns” to close some of its board meetings to the public and prohibit public access to its records. This concern for SMMPA’s role in the electric utility market and its competitive position vis a vis other utilities, some of them private, is perhaps commendable, but ought not to influence the decision of this court. There are good and appropriate reasons for statutes such as the Open Meeting Law and the Data Practices Act, including to shed a little sunshine on the inner workings of government. Cities are not required to join together to form publicly-owned electrical utilities, but if they do, those publicly-owned entities should not automatically be entitled to a level of secrecy in doing business that other government entities are not accorded. If SMMPA is indeed conducting an essential government function, that is all the more reason to allow the public access to its operations. I conclude that SMMPA is subject to both the Open Meeting Law and the Data Practices Act, and would therefore, affirm the court of appeals.

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In re Access to Law Enforcement Records Relating to the Arrest of Quinn · 1994 1 citation

OPINION COYNE, Justice. Reversing the decision of the court of appeals in In re Quinn, 503 N.W.2d 480 (Minn.App.1993), we hold that the district court erred in ordering the expungement and sealing of law enforcement records relating to an investigation into a complaint made early on the morning of November 10, 1992, by a 19-year-old woman that she had just been raped by a professional hockey player in a Bloom-ington hotel room. Peter Daniel Quinn was a hockey player for the Minnesota North Stars. Early in his career, he had played with the Pittsburgh Penguins. On the evening in question, Quinn and three of his former Pittsburgh teammates — Mario Lemieux, Rick Toeehet, and Bob Errey — who were in town to play the North Stars, went to Hooter’s, a bar at the Mall of America in Bloomington. There they met the complainant, “Jane Doe,” and two of her friends, one of whom was working as a waitress at the bar. When the bar'-closed, the three women accompanied the men to the nearby Marriott Hotel, where the Pittsburgh players were staying. It is undisputed that Lemieux had consensual intercourse with one of the women in room number 1001 and that Quinn contempo*897raneously had intercourse with the complainant, Doe, in the same room. What is disputed is whether Quinn’s penetration of Doe was with her consent or was forced. Doe and her friends told police that Quinn made sexual advances toward her and that, even though she told Quinn she did not want to have intercourse with him, he continued his advances and forcibly penetrated her. Lem-ieux then allegedly called Quinn away from Doe momentarily, and Doe and the other woman who was still in the room tried to leave. However, according to the women, Quinn returned and, this time wearing a condom, again penetrated Doe. Doe then crawled out of the room into the hallway, where she eventually vomited. Her friend had to knock on the door in order to retrieve some of Doe’s clothes. The friend stated that Lemieux answered the door and gave her the clothes, but that in the meantime the players had soaked the clothes in beer. Lemieux and Quinn also allegedly called the women “fucking bitches” and, concerned that the women might cause “a scene” in the hallway, threatened to call security if the women did not leave. After going to the home of one of her friends, Doe went to a local hospital for a sexual assault examination and called police. The officer who questioned her noted a bruise or scratch on her left shoulder and another mark on her upper back. Bloomington police commenced an investigation that included arresting Quinn, executing a search warrant at the hotel, and taking statements from the witnesses, including the three Pittsburgh Penguin players. The Bloomington Police Chief believed that a rape had occurred and urged prosecution. The Hennepin County Attorney, however, decided not to prosecute Quinn. The decision not to prosecute was announced two weeks after the incident. The North Stars fired Quinn for violating the team’s curfew on the night in question. Quinn and the other three hockey players, Lemieux, Tocchet and Errey, quickly obtained a temporary restraining order barring the City of Bloomington from releasing any of the information in the police files to the public. The district court gave Quinn five days to move for expungement. The three others asked that the records be sealed.1 A number of parties moved to intervene: the Minneapolis Star-Tribune and the St. Paul Pioneer Press, who want to see the files; the female witnesses, who want their names stricken from any papers in the file; and Jane Doe, who wants to see the file because she is considering filing a civil suit for damages. After a hearing, the district court ordered, inter alia, that Quinn’s arrest record be expunged and the investigative file sealed. The court denied Doe’s request and the newspapers’ requests to see the file. Both the trial court and the court of appeals relied heavily on this court’s decision in State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353 (Minn.1981), in concluding that the trial court had “inherent authority” to protect Quinn and the other men from harm that might be caused by the release of the information. See Quinn, 503 N.W.2d at 483-84. It is true that State v. C.A. contains expansive language concerning the scope of the judiciary’s inherent authority to order ex-pungement of investigative and arrest records even where no claim is made that the maintenance or dissemination of the records would violate the constitutional rights of the subject of the investigation and even where the records are not court records. However, this court also said in C.A. that exercise of inherent authority extends only to “unique judicial functions,” that courts “must proceed cautiously” in relying on the doctrine of inherent authority and must respect the *898“equally unique authority of the executive and legislative branches.” 304 N.W.2d at 358-59. Moreover, there are present in this case factors not present in C.A.: (a) an aggrieved person who wants to see the file because she is contemplating filing a civil suit and (b) aggrieved newspapers who claim a protectable interest in the information.2 With this in mind, we proceed to an examination of the relevant provisions of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act: 13.01 GOVERNMENT DATA. * * * * * * Subd. 3. Scope. This chapter regulates * * * access to government data in * » * p0iitieai subdivisions. It establishes a presumption that government data are public and are accessible by the public for both inspection and copying unless there is federal law, a state statute, or a temporary classification of data .that provides that certain data are not public. ****** 13.03 ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT DATA. Subdivision 1. Public data. All government data collected ***bya*** political subdivision * * * shall be public unless classified by statute, or temporary classification * * *, or federal law, as nonpublic or protected nonpublie, or with respect to data on individuals, as private or confidential. * * * * * * Subd. 3. Request for access to data. Upon request to a responsible authority or designee, a person shall be permitted to inspect and copy public government data at reasonable times and places * * *. * * * * * * 13.82 COMPREHENSIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT DATA. Subdivision 1. Application. This section shall apply to * * * municipal police departments * * *. Subd. 2. Arrest data. The following data created or collected by law enforcement agencies which documents any actions taken by them to * * * arrest * * ⅜ an adult individual ⅜ * * shall be public at all times in the originating agency: (a) Time, date and place of the action; ****** (e) The charge, arrest or search warrants, or other legal basis for the action; ****** (j) The name, age, sex and last known address of an adult person * * * arrested * * *; ****** (l) The manner in which the agencies received the information that led to the arrest and the names of individuals who supplied the information unless the identities of those individuals qualify for protection under subdivision 10; * * * * * Subd. 5. Data collection. Except for the data defined in subdivisions 2, 3 and 4, investigative data collected or created by a law enforcement agency in order to prepare a case againsta a person ⅞ ⅜ * for the commission of a crime or civil wrong is confidential or protected nonpublie while the investigation is active. Inactive investigative data is public unless the release of the data would jeopardize another ongoing investigation or would reveal the identity of individuals protected under subdivision 10. * * * An investigation becomes inactive upon the occurrence of any of the following events: (a) a decision by the * ⅜ * appropriate prosecutorial authority not to pursue the case; ****** Subd. 6. Access to data for crime victims. The prosecuting authority shall release investigative data collected by a law *899enforcement agency to the victim of a criminal act or the victim’s legal representative upon written request unless the prosecuting authority reasonably believes: (a) That the release of that data will interfere with the investigation; or (b) That the request is prompted by a desire on the part of the requester to engage in unlawful activities. ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ‡ ⅜ Subd. 10. Protection of identities. A law enforcement agency * * * may withhold public access to data on individuals to protect the identity of individuals in the following circumstances: [[Image here]] (b) when access to the data would reveal the identity of a victim of criminal sexual conduct * * *; [[Image here]] (d) when access to the data would reveal the identity of a victim of or witness to a crime if the victim or witness specifically requests not to be identified publicly, and the agency reasonably determines that revealing the identity of the victim or witness would threaten the personal safety or property of the individual; * * * * * * Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01, 13.03, 13.82 (1992). We address first the issue of pub-lie/press access under the Act. In our opinion, the terms of the Act require release of the file upon a request made to the Bloom-ington Police Department. The investigation is no longer active, since the Hennepin County Attorney has rejected the recommendation of the Bloomington Police Chief and has chosen not to prosecute. Inactive investigative data, in the words of section 13.82, subdivision 5, “is public unless the release of the data would jeopardize another ongoing investigation or would reveal the identity of individuals protected under subdivision 10.” The release of the data clearly would not jeopardize another ongoing investigation, because there is no evidence that there is another ongoing investigation. Moreover, the release of the data would not reveal the identity of individuals protected under subdivision 10. Quinn and his friends who are witnesses have not clearly articulated why subdivision 10 applies, but it appears that they are arguing that their reputations as hockey stars constitute “property” within the meaning of the subdivision and, presumably because the release of the file would reveal unflattering facts, their property interest in their reputations would be harmed by release of the file. We concluded, however, in Demers v. City of Minneapolis, 468 N.W.2d 71, 74 (Minn.1991), that subdivision 10⅛ “threat” exception applies “only in cases where the person might suffer serious harm or retaliation.” The Bloomington Police Department has determined that no such threat exists here. Moreover, as the Star-Tribune argues in its brief on appeal, if “emotional distress constitutes a ‘threat to personal safety’ * * * under the statute, then the exception * * * would swallow the rule” because one is necessarily distressed by one’s association with conduct of the sort here alleged. Similarly, if possible harm to one’s reputation constitutes a threat to one’s property under the statute, the exception would again swallow much of the rule because possible harm to reputation often accompanies release of information of the sort involved in this case. The men also assert that releasing the files will discourage witnesses from cooperating with the police in future cases. Although we do not believe that this is true, this is a policy argument that is better addressed to the legislature. Jane Doe’s right of access is even greater than that of the public/press. She is a member of the public and has the same right as any other member of the public to scrutinize inactive police files". But, under section 13.82, subdivision 6, as the victim of a crime, she has a greater right of access than the public/press. The question of victim aCr cess to investigative data was addressed as follows in Donald A. Gemberling & Gary A. Weissman, Data Privacy: Everything You Wanted to Know About the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act — From “A” to “Z”, 8 Wm.Mitch.L.Rev. 573, 646 (1982): The problem of victim access to active investigative data is particularly acute *900when the victim, or his or her attorney or other representative, may want and even need access to the investigative data to begin assessing or preparing a civil case against the alleged perpetrator. While there may be insufficient investigative data to criminally charge and convict the alleged perpetrator, the difference in the degree of proof in a civil case may make the investigative data or evidence developed from it legally sufficient, or at least very helpful, in preparing the civil case. To deal with victim access to investigative data, the legislature, in 1979, amended [the Data Practices Act] to provide that upon written request to the appropriate prosecutorial authority in the jurisdiction which is maintaining the active investigative data, the prosecuting authority “shall release investigative data collected by a law enforcement agency to the victim of a criminal act or his legal representative.” The prosecuting authority is not required to provide victims or their legal representatives access to active investigative data if “the prosecuting authority reasonably believes: (a) That the release of that data will interfere with the investigation; or (b) That the request is prompted by a desire on the part of the requester to engage in unlawful activities.” Under the statute, the victim has access to active investigative data still in the hands of the prosecutor’s office unless release of the data to the victim will hinder the investigation or further an intent to use it for unlawful purposes.3 In summary, Doe’s right of access under section 13.82, subdivision 6, commenced immediately, continued throughout the period that the investigation was active, and continued after the investigation became inactive; moreover, as a member of the public, she also had the same right of access as the public/press under section 13.82, subdivision 5, once the investigation became inactive. Finally, we reject the contention that expungement and sealing was justified in this case to protect a “unique judicial function” and that therefore expungement and sealing was justified notwithstanding the applicability of the statute. As this court said in State v. Carriere, 290 N.W.2d 618, 620 n. 3 (Minn. 1980), the prosecutor is an executive officer or official. The same is true of police officers. The court, of course, has some control over prosecutors and police officers stemming from the fact that crimes can only be prosecuted in courts and the fact that prosecutors are officers of the court. But courts, for example, generally cannot tell a prosecutor whether or not to charge an individual with a crime and cannot tell a prosecutor to accept an offer by a defendant to plead guilty to a lesser offense than charged if the prosecutor can show that the state can withstand a motion to dismiss the charge. Id. Similarly, while the court can indirectly control a prosecutor’s out-of-court conduct through the disciplinary rules and through the exclusionary sanction, the court generally cannot directly control how prosecutors run their offices or how police departments investigate crimes. If the records involved were judicial records and if the judiciary had some legitimate interest in expunging or sealing of the records, then the doctrine of inherent judicial authority might require us to resolve a conflict. As we see it, however, there is no judicial interest in the expunging or sealing of the records in question and there is no conflict. The decision of the district court, affirmed by the court of appeals, is therefore reversed in its entirety. Reversed.

In Re Quinn · 1994 1 citation

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Demers v. City of Minneapolis · 1991 1 citation

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Doe v. Minnesota State Board of Medical Examiners · 1989 2 citations

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Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments · 1983 2 citations

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Minnesota Court of Appeals

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Minn. Stat. § 13.01, subd. 3 (2014); see also Minn. Stat. § 13.03, subd. 1 (2014) (stating

Robert Burks v. The Metropolitan Council · 2015 1 citation

government entities.” Minn. Stat. § 13.01, subd. 3 (2014). The MGDPA also

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Helmberger v. Johnson Controls, Inc. · 2012 1 citation

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KSTP-TV v. Ramsey County · 2010 2 citations

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International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 292 v. City of St. Cloud · 2008 1 citation

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State v. T.M.B. · 1999 1 citation

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Deli v. University of Minnesota · 1998 1 citation

On April 12, 1993, the University discharged Deli for reasons unrelated to the Florida videotape. Deli v. University of Minn., 511 N.W.2d 46, 53-54 (Minn.App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Mar. 23, 1994). Following an unsuccessful challenge to her termination, Deli filed this action against the University alleging violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01-99 (1996) (Data Practices Act), breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. The trial court granted summary judgment in the University’s favor. We affirmed that judgment in part, but reversed and remanded on the data practices and promissory estoppel claims. Deli v. Hasselmo, 542 N.W.2d 649, 658 (Minn.App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 1996). Before trial, the court again granted summary judgment on the data practices claim. The jury returned a special verdict in favor of Deli on her promissory estoppel claim. Concluding that injustice could only be avoided through enforcement of the director’s promise, the trial court awarded Deli $675,-000 in damages for emotional distress suffered to the time of trial.

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