§ 14.69
Citing Cases (409)
Showing 100 most recent of 409 citing cases.
Minnesota Supreme Court
In the Matter of the SIRS Appeal by Best Care, LLC · 2025 1 citation
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In the Matter of the SIRS Appeal by Best Care, LLC · 2025 1 citation
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In the Matter of the Surveillance and Integrity Review (SIRS) Appeals by Trinity Home Health Care Services and Etyane ... · 2023 2 citations
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In re Restorff · 2019 1 citation
GILDEA, Chief Justice. *15In this case we are asked to decide whether appellant Amanda Restorff committed maltreatment by neglect under the Maltreatment of Minors Act ("the Act"). Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 2(g) (2018). The Commissioner of Human Services ("Commissioner") determined that Restorff committed maltreatment under the Act when a 3-year-old child wandered away from her daycare. On appeal, Restorff argues that the supervision she provided was appropriate and that the Commissioner misinterpreted the Act in finding her responsible for maltreatment. Because we conclude that the Commissioner misinterpreted the Act and failed to make necessary findings, we reverse and remand for additional fact finding and a revised agency decision consistent with this opinion. FACTS Amanda Restorff operates a daycare out of her home in Otsego. Before this appeal, Restorff had been licensed to run a daycare for 7 years; her license permitted her to care for up to 14 children at a time. On August 1, 2016, Restorff was caring for 12 children-4 of whom were under 5 years old. Restorff's license did not require that she have assistance in caring for this number of children, but on August 1 she did have help from her 13-year-old niece, Emma. Emma had taken online training before beginning work at the daycare and Restorff gave Emma instructions on supervising children.1 Three-year-old G.B. and his sister arrived at the daycare by 8:30 the morning of the incident. Restorff was preparing cereal, and the children were playing inside. Soon after G.B. and his sister arrived, Restorff helped the children put their shoes on in the garage and sent them to the backyard with Emma. The backyard is large-about an acre-and unfenced. But Restorff's license did not require that she have a fence or that she keep the children inside. Restorff testified that she would typically keep children younger than five on her deck, which has a gate, when they were outside. But, she explained, she did not do that on August 1 because she had help from Emma and because she was going to be in the house for such a brief period of time. Emma was pushing children on a swing set outside while Restorff finished getting breakfast ready back in the house. While Restorff was inside, the window by the kitchen sink and a nearby sliding-glass door were open. Both overlooked the backyard, and Restorff believed she could still see and hear all of the children while inside. Around 8:45 a.m., Restorff finished preparing cereal for the children and brought it out to the deck. At this point, the children had been in the backyard for some amount of time between 1 to 20 minutes.2 *16The cereal was distributed to the children, and Restorff realized that G.B. was missing when she discovered that there was an extra bowl. She began to search the yard, the garage, and the house, yelling out G.B.'s name. Around 8:47 a.m., the sheriff's office received a call that G.B. had been found near the side of a road approximately 2½ blocks from Restorff's house. A deputy arrived on the scene at 8:51 a.m. G.B. told the deputy his name and said that he was looking for his mother. The woman who found G.B. told the responding deputy that she lived near the corner of County Road 39 and Page Avenue Northeast in Otsego. She heard semi-trucks honking as they passed by her house that morning, and, when she looked outside, she found G.B. standing near an address sign across the street. The woman went outside, picked G.B. up, and called the sheriff's office. Back at Restorff's daycare, the search continued. Restorff called her father, who lived nearby, to search the neighborhood while she stayed at home and searched the house. Unable to find G.B., Restorff called 911 at 9:06 a.m. The 911 dispatcher told Restorff that someone had found G.B. and that he was with a deputy. The deputy brought G.B. back to Restorff's daycare a few minutes later. With G.B. returned, Restorff called G.B.'s parents to inform them about the incident. They told her-for the first time-that G.B. had wandered off before and that they did not fault her for the incident. G.B.'s mother said the same to the deputy sheriff. At approximately 9:45 a.m., Restorff reported the incident to her licensing worker. By the end of the day, the Minnesota Department of Human Services ("DHS") issued an order temporarily suspending Restorff's childcare license. Restorff initially appealed the temporary suspension but later withdrew that appeal. With the temporary suspension in place, Wright County's health and human services and child protection departments began a joint investigation. They interviewed Restorff, Emma, and G.B.'s father. After completing its investigation, Wright County determined that Restorff was responsible for maltreatment. In a letter to Restorff, Wright County explained that "a preponderance of the evidence ... shows that a child was found .3 miles from the daycare facility unattended." Restorff requested reconsideration, and Wright County affirmed its maltreatment determination. In addition to the maltreatment determination, Restorff's license remained suspended for several months as she worked with Wright County to install additional safeguards in her home. In November, Restorff prepared a "wandering prevention plan" in which she promised to voluntarily install a fence in her yard, amend her supervision policies, and enroll in a training course on supervision. By December 9, 2016, Restorff had put up a temporary fence around a portion of her yard, agreed to put a permanent fence in the yard once the ground thawed, completed a 2-hour course on supervision, and amended her supervision policies. Satisfied with these additional safeguards, DHS issued an order lifting the temporary suspension but placed conditions on Restorff's license for two years and imposed a $1,000 fine. Restorff appealed Wright County's maltreatment determination and DHS's order *17imposing conditions on her license and a fine. Under Minn. Stat. § 245A.08, subd. 2a(a) (2018) and Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 10i(f) (2018), an administrative law judge ("ALJ") held a contested-case hearing on March 15, 2017. At the hearing, Restorff testified that, before the incident in question, she had never received a license suspension or been found responsible for maltreatment. She also explained that she had never had a child wander away from her daycare before this incident. In addition to Restorff's testimony, 11 parents who planned to or had previously sent their children to Restorff's daycare-including G.B.'s mother-testified or wrote letters endorsing the quality of Restorff's daycare. Two people who had known Restorff for an extended period of time also submitted letters in the administrative proceeding endorsing Restorff's honesty and integrity. The ALJ issued a recommendation to the Commissioner of Human Services that the sanctions be affirmed. Specifically, the ALJ recommended that Restorff's maltreatment determination be affirmed because she failed to "provide for necessary supervision or child care arrangements appropriate for a child" as required by Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 2(g)(3). To reach this conclusion, the ALJ imported the definition of "supervision" from the daycare licensing rules. Those rules define "supervision" as "being within sight or hearing" of a child G.B.'s age "at all times so that the caregiver is capable of intervening to protect the health and safety of the child." Minn. R. 9502.0315, subp. 29a (2017). The ALJ concluded that Restorff was not within sight or hearing of G.B. "from the time he left [Restorff's] yard until the time he was returned to her care by a deputy sheriff," and, therefore, Restorff "failed to supervise" G.B as required by the Act. The Commissioner issued a final agency decision adopting the ALJ's recommendation but using a different analysis. The Commissioner characterized the maltreatment issue as "whether the supervision level was appropriate" for G.B. under the factors listed in Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 2(g)(3). She determined that Restorff's supervision level was inappropriate for G.B. "because G.B. was able to wander away without [her] knowledge." In addition, the Commissioner adopted the definition of "supervision" from the licensing rules and concluded that because G.B. was able to leave the daycare, he "was either not within [Restorff's] sight or hearing, or [Restorff] was not capable of intervening while G.B.'s elopement from [Restorff's] yard was in progress." Thus, while both the ALJ and the Commissioner used a strict-liability analysis, the ALJ determined that Restorff failed to supervise G.B. because she could not see or hear him after he left the backyard, and the Commissioner determined that Restorff must have failed to supervise G.B. because he was able to leave the backyard. Restorff petitioned the court of appeals for review by a writ of certiorari. The court of appeals affirmed. In re Maltreatment Determination of Restorff , No. A17-1433, 2018 WL 1997186 (Minn. App. Apr. 30, 2018). In doing so, the court of appeals, like the ALJ and the Commissioner, used the definition of "supervision" from Rule 9502.0315. The court of appeals adopted the ALJ's reasoning and concluded that, under the definition in the rule, Restorff needed to be within sight or hearing of G.B. "at all times," and that "G.B. was likely outside of Restorff's sight or hearing for at least 25 minutes" from the time he left the backyard until he was returned to the daycare. Id. at *3. *18We granted Restorff's petition for review of the maltreatment determination.3 On appeal, Restorff argues that the Commissioner misinterpreted and misapplied the Maltreatment of Minors Act in finding her responsible for maltreatment. Specifically, she argues that the language "to provide for necessary supervision" under Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 2(g)(3), requires caregivers to make and execute a plan for a child's supervision, not guarantee "a fail-safe supervisory system." Otherwise, according to Restorff, "every parent in this state, as well as every licensed daycare provider, who has ever had a child stray out of sight or hearing while under their supervision [will be liable] for maltreatment by neglect." The Commissioner contends that she properly interpreted and applied the Act, and she urges us to affirm the determination of maltreatment. ANALYSIS This case involves the safety of a young child who wandered away from his caregivers. Although the child was not injured, that fortuity does not change the seriousness of the situation. This case also comes to us against the backdrop of a marked increase in the number of reports of child maltreatment and increased scrutiny of the work caregivers and government officials alike perform.4 While these developments should provide incentives to caregivers and government officials to ensure all reasonable steps are taken to protect children, they do not alter the controlling legal standards or the responsibility of Minnesota's courts to ensure that those standards are met. To that end, the Administrative Procedure Act controls our review in this case. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, we may reverse or modify an agency decision if it is, among other things, affected by an error of law or unsupported by substantial evidence. Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (2018). In addition, we may remand the case for additional fact finding if the agency's findings are insufficient. In re A.D. , 883 N.W.2d 251, 258 (Minn. 2016). Agency decisions enjoy a presumption of correctness that warrants deference by courts. In re Appeal by Kind Heart Daycare, Inc. v. Comm'r of Human Servs. , 905 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2017). But when confronted with questions of law, our review is de novo. Id. Whether an agency decision is supported by substantial evidence is a question of law, Webster v. Hennepin County , 910 N.W.2d 420, 428 (Minn. 2018), as are questions of statutory interpretation, In re A.D. , 883 N.W.2d at 256. I. Restorff argues that the Commissioner misinterpreted the Maltreatment of Minors Act in finding her responsible for maltreatment. The Act requires, among other things, that local welfare agencies investigate reports of maltreatment in child care programs and make determinations as to whether maltreatment occurred. Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subds. 3c(a), 10e(c) (2018). Maltreatment includes physical abuse, sexual abuse, mental injury and neglect. Id. , subd. 10e(f). The Act specifically *19defines each of these terms, but only "neglect" is at issue here. The definition of "neglect" includes nine clauses that set out qualifying acts and omissions. See id. , subd. 2(g)(1)-(9). Restorff was found to have violated clause 3. Id. , subd. 2(g)(3) ("Clause 3"). Clause 3 defines "neglect" as the failure by a person responsible for a child's care: to provide for necessary supervision or child care arrangements appropriate for a child after considering factors as the child's age, mental ability, physical condition, length of absence, or environment, when the child is unable to care for the child's own basic needs or safety, or the basic needs or safety of another child in their care. To determine whether the Commissioner's maltreatment determination was proper under Clause 3, we must interpret three distinct elements: (1) the effect of "provide for;" (2) what "necessary supervision" entails; and (3) what it means for supervision to be "appropriate for a child" under the listed factors. Our statutory interpretation starts with the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the terms. Emerson v. Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. 199 , 809 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2012).5 In the absence of statutory definitions, we often look to dictionary definitions to determine the plain meaning of a statute's terms. In re A.D. , 883 N.W.2d at 256. In addition, we consider a statute "as a whole so as to harmonize and give effect to all its parts." Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc. , 254 Minn. 62, 93 N.W.2d 690, 698 (1958). A. We begin with an interpretation of "provide for." The parties agree that to "provide for" supervision means to create and execute a plan for a child's supervision. According to Restorff, to provide for something "reflects an element of advance preparation." She argues that the presence of "child care arrangements" in Clause 3 further supports this interpretation because an "arrangement" is also a plan or agreement to do something in the future. The Commissioner agrees with Restorff's interpretation and concedes that Restorff implemented a plan for G.B.'s supervision on August 1. But the Commissioner argues that "the supervision plan upon which [Restorff] relied was insufficient given the circumstances at her family child care program at the time of the incident." (Emphasis added). We agree with the parties that to "provide for" supervision means to make and execute a plan for supervision. The dictionary definition of "provide" is "[t]o make available," "[t]o supply something needed or desired," or "[t]o take[ ] measures in preparation." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1418 (5th ed. 2011). As an example of "provide" being used to signify taking measures in preparation, the dictionary gives the phrase "provide[ ] for the common defense." Id. Accordingly, under the plain and ordinary meaning of "provide for," Clause 3 requires a caregiver to create and execute a plan for a child's supervision. Such a definition contemplates that a parent or childcare provider might directly supervise a child or delegate that task to another individual. In either situation, the caregiver is providing for supervision. B. We next consider the term "necessary supervision." Clause 3 states that supervision *20is necessary "when the child is unable to care for the child's own basic needs or safety, or the basic needs or safety of another child in their care." Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 2(g)(3). But the Act does not contain a specific definition of "supervision." The ALJ, the Commissioner, and the court of appeals all imported the definition of "supervision" from the daycare licensing rules to determine what the term means under the Act. DHS promulgated the daycare licensing rules, and they define supervision as "a caregiver being within sight or hearing of an infant, toddler, or preschooler at all times so that the caregiver is capable of intervening to protect the health and safety of the child." Minn. R. 9502.0315, subp. 29a. Based on that definition, all three decision-makers below determined that Restorff failed to provide for necessary supervision of G.B. The ALJ and the court of appeals reached this conclusion by reasoning that G.B. was out of sight of both Restorff and Emma and could not be heard from the time he left the backyard until he was returned to the daycare. The Commissioner's final agency decision, on the other hand, found that Restorff failed to provide for supervision by applying a presumption: because G.B. wandered away without Restorff's knowledge, he "was either not within [Restorff's] sight or hearing, or [Restorff] was not capable of intervening while G.B.'s elopement from [Restorff's] yard was in progress." Using the daycare licensing rules to define supervision under the Act was improper. Under our principles of statutory interpretation, we look to an outside statute or rule like Rule 9502.0315 only when a statute is ambiguous, see State v. Thonesavanh , 904 N.W.2d 432, 437-38 (Minn. 2017) (explaining the in pari materia canon of construction), or when a word is a technical term with a special meaning, see Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2018). Neither condition exists here. In addition, we look to the statutory or regulatory definition of a word only when that definition is applicable. See Wayzata Nissan, LLC v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. , 875 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Minn. 2016) ("When there is no applicable statutory definition, we often consult dictionary definitions to discern a word's plain meaning." (emphasis added)); see also Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC , 884 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Minn. 2016) ("When a statute or a rule does not contain a definition of a word or phrase, we look to [dictionary definitions] ...." (emphasis added)). The daycare licensing rules are not in chapter 626 or incorporated by Clause 3. And, more importantly, the daycare licensing rule at issue explicitly states that it applies only to other daycare licensing rules. Minn. R. 9502.0315, subp. 1 (2017) ("As used in parts 9502.0315 to 9502.0445, the following terms have the meanings given them.").6 Thus, the Commissioner erred in importing the daycare licensing rules to ascertain the plain meaning of "supervision" in Clause 3.7 *21Because there is no applicable statutory definition of "supervision," we look to dictionary definitions. Wayzata Nissan, LLC , 875 N.W.2d at 286. "Supervision" is defined as "[t]he act, process, or function of supervising." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1750 (5th ed. 2011). "Supervise," in turn, means "[t]o manage and direct; be in charge of." Id. A close synonym of supervision is "care," id. , which means, in relevant part, "watchful oversight," id. at 281. Using these definitions, "supervision" under Clause 3 requires that caregivers provide for watchful oversight of children in their care. C. The final issue of statutory interpretation is what it means for supervision to be "appropriate." Clause 3 requires that caregivers provide for supervision that is "appropriate for a child after considering factors [such] as the child's age, mental ability, physical condition, length of absence, or environment." This language requires the Commissioner to conduct a fact-specific examination of all of the circumstances present to determine whether the supervision plan was appropriate in the abstract and whether the plan was executed appropriately in the specific context at issue. In sum, Clause 3 requires that a caregiver create and execute a plan for a child's supervision. That supervision must include the provision of all watchful care that is necessary and appropriate under the circumstances, including consideration of the specific factors listed in Clause 3. The Act does not impose a mechanical definition of what this supervision must look like but instead requires that the plan be appropriate under the listed factors. With this interpretation in mind, we must decide whether substantial evidence in the record supports the Commissioner's determination that Restorff committed maltreatment by neglect under Clause 3. II. The substantial evidence standard requires "more than a scintilla of evidence, more than 'some' evidence, and more than 'any' evidence." Webster v. Hennepin County , 910 N.W.2d 420, 428 (Minn. 2018). It is such evidence "that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." In re A.D. , 883 N.W.2d 251, 259 (Minn. 2016). Here, the record shows that Restorff created and executed a plan for supervision on the morning of August 1. Under this plan, Emma, Restorff's helper, supervised 12 children in an unfenced backyard while Restorff was within earshot inside the house. Restorff and Emma followed this plan for some time between 1 and 20 minutes before Restorff joined Emma and the children outside. In creating and executing the plan, Restorff did not know that G.B. had a propensity to wander and had never had a child wander away from her large backyard before. The decision-makers below did not conduct a fact-specific examination of these circumstances to determine whether Restorff's supervision plan was appropriate. *22Instead, they each adopted the definition of supervision from the daycare licensing rules and applied that rule to conclude that Restorff failed to provide supervision. But Clause 3 requires an assessment of whether the supervision was appropriate given the circumstances. The Commissioner's final decision came closest to an appropriateness analysis when she said, "[t]he issue is whether the supervision level was appropriate given G.B.'s age, his mental ability, and his being permitted in the unfenced back yard when [Restorff] was not present outdoors." But the Commissioner followed that issue statement with the conclusory determination that Restorff's "supervision of G.B. was not adequate because G.B. was able to wander away without [Restorff]'s knowledge and [Restorff] was incapable of intervening." Instead of analyzing the relevant factors listed in Clause 3, the Commissioner found that Restorff's supervision plan was automatically inappropriate because G.B. was able to wander. This strict-liability analysis is erroneous because it is not what the Act requires. As Restorff argues, such an interpretation would make every caregiver who has a child wander liable for maltreatment regardless of the particulars of their supervision plan or the incident.8 Although the Commissioner erred when she misinterpreted the statute, we may not reverse the final agency decision if substantial evidence in the record supports her ultimate determination. See Webster , 910 N.W.2d at 430 (noting that the Administrative Procedure Act instructs reviewing courts to consider "all evidence in the record, not just the evidence formally relied on by the [agency]"). With the benefit of hindsight, one can see how Restorff's supervision plan may have been inadequate. Watching 12 children is difficult, especially in a space without physical boundaries and when there is only one person fully committed to watching those children. *23But if Restorff was inside only for a brief period, her supervision plan could be appropriate under the factors. After all, Restorff's helper was with the children outside. Restorff was not aware of G.B.'s propensity to wander and had never had a child wander away from her backyard before.9 Moreover, a window and door were open so that Restorff could hear if something happened or if Emma called. In our view, the most important factor to the appropriateness analysis in this case is the amount of time Restorff was inside while the children were outside with Emma. This specific fact, however, is missing from the final agency decision. Neither the ALJ nor the Commissioner made a factual finding as to how long the children were outside without Restorff. In addition, the record offers a variety of possibilities as to how long the children were outside. These timelines range from 1 to 20 minutes, and it is unclear which of these is correct. Even the Commissioner is inconsistent in her brief to our court on the issue. In some places, the Commissioner says that the children went outside at "approximately 8:40 a.m.," which would mean that, based on the final agency decision, the children were outside for 5 minutes without Restorff. At other places in her brief, however, the Commissioner claims that Emma "was outside alone with the children for 10-15 minutes while [Restorff] prepared breakfast." In her final agency decision, the Commissioner says that it does not matter whether "the time frame that [Restorff] was actually indoors was closer to 10 minutes, 5 minutes, or 3 minutes." According to the Commissioner, under any of these time frames, "it was reasonably foreseeable that this child care arrangement was insufficient to provide the supervision necessary for a preschool-age child, such as G.B." We disagree. Clause 3 specifically directs us to consider the "length of absence" in determining whether supervision was appropriate. Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 2(g)(3). It is one thing for a caregiver to step away from her wards for a brief period of time to complete other necessary tasks. It is another thing entirely to leave children alone for long periods of time with a single young supervisor. In other words, the length of the absence matters.10 But we are missing a factual determination on the length of Restorff's absence-a fact that is both material in this case and *24explicitly called for by the Act. And we cannot make a factual finding on this issue ourselves. See, e.g. , Gibson v. Civil Serv. Bd. , 285 Minn. 123, 171 N.W.2d 712, 715 (1969) ("The functions of fact-finding, resolving conflicts in the testimony, and determining the weight to be given to it and the inferences to be drawn therefrom rest with the administrative board."); Mitchell Transp., Inc. v. R.R. & Warehouse Comm'n , 272 Minn. 121, 137 N.W.2d 561, 567 (1965) ("[Q]uestions of fact and of policy are for administrative and not judicial determination."); Morey v. Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 492, Austin Pub. Schs. , 271 Minn. 445, 136 N.W.2d 105, 108 (1965) ("[M]aking findings of fact is the obligation of the administrative body and is not a function to be performed by the court in the first instance.").11 Under our jurisprudence, when an "agency's findings are insufficient, 'the case can be either remanded for additional findings or reversed for lacking substantial evidence supporting the decision.' " In re A.D. , 883 N.W.2d at 258 (quoting Dokmo v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, Anoka-Hennepin , 459 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Minn. 1990) ). Remand "is appropriate 'to permit further evidence to be taken or additional findings to be made in accordance with the applicable law.' " Id. (quoting Dokmo , 459 N.W.2d at 675 ). Here, the length of time the children were outside without Restorff is an important fact that we cannot determine on our own. In addition, the Commissioner was without the benefit of the interpretation we announce today in making her final agency decision. Accordingly, we remand12 to the Commissioner *25for additional fact finding and a revised agency decision.13 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the Commissioner for additional fact finding and a revised agency decision. Reversed and remanded Dissenting, Hudson, J. DISSENT
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. Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (1982) provides:
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In the Matter of the Appeal by Serenity Adult Day Center of the Order of License Revocation License No. 1094723 (Rule ... · 2024 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In the Matter of the Appeal by Pond Early Childhood Family Development Center of the Order to Pay a Fine for Background ... · 2024 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In re: The Matter of T. M. and the Commissioner Jodi Harpstead · 2024 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In the Matter of the Wetland Conservation Act appeal filed by David Stock of a Restoration Order located in part of ... · 2024 2 citations
+ 2 more citations in this opinion.
In the Matter of the Correction Orders Issued to the Wealshire of Bloomington · 2024 2 citations
+ 2 more citations in this opinion.
In the Matter of the Appeal by Crawford House, LLC, of the Order Of License Revocation License Nos. 1073328 (HCBS) ... · 2024 1 citation
Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (2022). A relator has the burden of proof when challenging an agency
Republican Party of Minnesota v. Nathan Miller, Relators, Attorney General Keith Ellison, ... · 2024 6 citations
+ 6 more citations in this opinion.
In the Matter of Issuance of Air Emissions Permit No. 13700345-101 for PolyMet Mining, Inc., City of Hoyt Lakes, St. ... · 2023 2 citations
+ 2 more citations in this opinion.
In the Matter of the Determination of the Need for an Environmental Impact Statement for the Mankato Motorsports Park. ... · 2023 2 citations
forth in Minn. Stat. § 14.69 in its review of a negative EIS declaration). We may reverse
forth in Minn. Stat. § 14.69 in its review of a negative EIS declaration). We may reverse
Lewison v. Hutchinson · 2019 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In re Minn. Power for Auth. to Increase Rates for Elec. Serv. in State · 2019 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In re Decision to Deny the Petitions for a Contested Case Hearing · 2019 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In re Qwest Corp. · 2018 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In re Minn. Living Assistance, Inc. · 2018 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
Verhein v. Piper · 2018 2 citations
+ 2 more citations in this opinion.
Partners in Nutrition's Appeal of Disapproval of Site Expansion in the CACFP Program · 2017 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
West McDonald Lake Ass'n v. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources · 2017 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
Partners in Nutrition's Appeal of Disapproval of Site Expansion in the CACFP Program · 2017 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In the Matter of Unity Health Care, Class F Home License No. 352187 and Unity Home Care, Inc., Class A Professional Home Care License No. 353694. · 2017 1 citation
or (f) was arbitrary or capricious. Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (2014).
In re the Matter of: Verdell Fredrick Borth v. Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Human Services, Carver County · 2017 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In the Matter of the Athlete Agent Application of Donald Walthal.l · 2017 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
+ 2 more citations in this opinion.
Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy, Relator v. City of Winsted, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency · 2017 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In the Matter of the License of Jeffrey L. Olson, Psy.D., L.P., License No. LP4532. · 2016 1 citation
Care License of Burke, 666 N.W.2d 724, 726 (Minn. App. 2003); Minn. Stat. § 14.69
In the Matter of HIBBING TACONITE MINE AND STOCKPILE PROGRESSION and Williams Creek Project Specific Wetland Mitigation · 2016 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
+ 2 more citations in this opinion.
In the Matter of Temphy Thompson�s Verified Application for Compensation from the Contractor Recovery Fund. · 2016 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In the Matter of the SIRS Appeal of Gary L. Johnson and In the Matter of the SIRS Appeal of Joshawa J. Johnson. · 2016 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In the Matter of 2015 Class C License Application of Dr. Mohamed El Deeb. · 2016 1 citation
Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (2014). We presume the correctness of an agency’s decision and
In the Matter of the Administrative Order with Penalty Issued to Architektur, Inc., Philip Carlson and Virginia Carlson, a/k/a Gina Carlson. · 2016 2 citations
+ 2 more citations in this opinion.
Appeal of John Krenik to a Vehicle-abatement order at 1270 Cleveland Avenue. · 2016 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
Appeal of Krenik · 2016 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In the Matter of the Revocation of the Family Child Care License of Jennifer Ball. · 2016 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In the Matter of the Petition of Northern States Power Company, d/b/a Xcel Energy, for Approval of Its Proposed Community Solar Garden Program. · 2016 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
Lucas Sanchez v. St. Louis County Public Health and Human Services Department, Minnesota Department of Human Services · 2016 2 citations
+ 2 more citations in this opinion.
In the Matter of the Temporary Immediate Suspension of the Family Child Care License of Angie Mattison. · 2016 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
Steven Abrahamson, Relators v. The St. Louis County School District, Independent School District No. 2142, Office of Administrative Hearings · 2016 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In the Matter of Kayvon Behnam, D. C., License No. 3644. · 2016 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
In the Matter of the Appeal by Tami L. Kreuzer of the Maltreatment Determination and Order to Forfeit a Fine. · 2015 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
Ken Peterson, Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry v. United Parcel Service, Inc., Relator. · 2015 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.