§ 145.365

Anker v. Little · 1995 1 citation

Anker argues the section’s location among traffic statutes creates an ambiguity regarding the legislature’s intent to destroy the ability to maintain crashworthiness suits that rely on seat belt evidence. See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 133-34 (Tex.1994) (finding a similar statute’s context created an ambiguity because it was unlikely the legislature intended a traffic statute to abolish a class of crashworthiness actions). However, Anker suggests no other logical placement for this law. Tort doctrines are products of common law evolution and the legislature has not elected to codify all statutes bearing on tort liability in a single chapter of the Minnesota Statutes. Instead, the legislature aggregates statutes by the activity to be regulated, which in no way detracts from their effect on common law tort liability. See Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 16 n. 1 (Simonett, J., concurring specially (joined by two other members of the majority) and declaring that Minn. Stat. § 169.865, located amongst traffic statutes, bars civil suits requiring proof of the failure to use a child restraint system); see also Minn. Stat. § 169.96 (1994) (treating infractions of traffic regulations as prima facie evidence of negligence); cf. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 12-15 (upholding the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 145.424 (1984), a statute prohibiting wrongful life and birth actions, and located amidst public health provisions (such as Minn. Stat. §§ 145.365 (1984) (trafficking in skunks), 145.425 (1984) (pay toilets in public places))). The gag rule’s codification as a traffic statute creates no ambiguity and, thus, affords us no opportunity to look beyond its plain meaning.