§ 168.72

Kedzior v. NORWEST BANK MINN., NAT. ASS'N · 1995 2 citations

ANALYSIS Appellants contend the district court erred in concluding the term "collect" in Minn. Stat. § 168.74 (1990) requires actual receipt of the excessive deferral fee for a violation under the statute. We disagree. In reviewing cases dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the only question before the reviewing court is whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Elzie v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 298 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Minn.1980) (quoting Royal Realty Co. v. Levin, 244 Minn. 288, 290, 69 N.W.2d 667, 670 (1955)). The construction of a statute is clearly a question of law and is subject to de novo review on appeal. Kronebusch v. MVBA Harvestore Sys., 488 N.W.2d 490, 494, pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992). Absent ambiguity in the words of a law, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1992). Minn. Stat. § 168.74 governs the extension of schedules and payments on contracts and states: The holder of a precomputed retail installment contract may, upon written agreement with the retail buyer, extend the scheduled due date, or defer the scheduled payment of all or part of any installment payment or payments, or renew the balance of such contract. In any such case the holder may restate the amount of the installments and the time schedule therefor, and collect as a refinance charge for such extension, deferment or renewal, a flat service fee not to exceed $5 and a total additional charge not exceeding the simple interest annual percentage rate under the original retail installment contract calculated on the respective descending balances computed from the date of such extension, deferment or renewal. (Emphasis added.) The plain language of Minn. Stat. § 168.74 sets the limit that respondent can "collect" as a deferral fee. Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (1992) mandates that words and phrases be construed "according to their common and approved usage." Black's Law Dictionary defines the word "collect" as: To gather together; to bring scattered things (assets, accounts, articles of property) into one mass or fund; to assemble. To receive payment. To collect a debt or claim is to obtain payment or liquidation of it, either by personal solicitation or legal proceedings. Black's Law Dictionary 238 (5th ed. 1979). Appellants argue for a more expansive definition of the word "collect" that would include "contracting for" or "reserving" payment. We note, however, that the legislature used broader language in describing prohibited conduct in another section of MVRISA. See Minn. Stat. § 168.72, subd. 1(c) (1990) ("no fee, commission, expense * * * may be taken, received, reserved or contracted for"). Because the legislature used this more expansive language in Minn. Stat. § 168.72, but used only the term "collect" in Minn. Stat. § 168.74, we will not infer a broader definition of "collect." See State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 21 N.W.2d 480, 486-87 (1946) ("the distinctions made in different statutes as manifested by the difference of terminology used should be observed"). In its order dismissing appellants' claim, the district court stated: [I]t is agreed that Norwest extended the payment schedule and attempted to charge, but did not collect from Kedzior, a fee in excess of that permitted by Minn. Stat. § 168.74. The district court then found Kedzior failed to state a claim where "usury is not present, and * * * Plaintiff was merely charged, but did not pay the excessive extension fee." Based on our reading of the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 168.74, we affirm the district court's interpretation of the statute. *122 Finally, because we affirm the district court's conclusion that under these facts respondent did not violate Minn. Stat. § 168.74, we do not address respondent's additional argument that the remedy provisions in Minn. Stat. § 168.75 that appellants are attempting to invoke, are, by their plain language, inapplicable to a violation of Minn. Stat. § 168.74.

ANALYSIS Appellants contend the district court erred in concluding the term "collect" in Minn. Stat. § 168.74 (1990) requires actual receipt of the excessive deferral fee for a violation under the statute. We disagree. In reviewing cases dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the only question before the reviewing court is whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Elzie v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 298 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Minn.1980) (quoting Royal Realty Co. v. Levin, 244 Minn. 288, 290, 69 N.W.2d 667, 670 (1955)). The construction of a statute is clearly a question of law and is subject to de novo review on appeal. Kronebusch v. MVBA Harvestore Sys., 488 N.W.2d 490, 494, pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992). Absent ambiguity in the words of a law, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1992). Minn. Stat. § 168.74 governs the extension of schedules and payments on contracts and states: The holder of a precomputed retail installment contract may, upon written agreement with the retail buyer, extend the scheduled due date, or defer the scheduled payment of all or part of any installment payment or payments, or renew the balance of such contract. In any such case the holder may restate the amount of the installments and the time schedule therefor, and collect as a refinance charge for such extension, deferment or renewal, a flat service fee not to exceed $5 and a total additional charge not exceeding the simple interest annual percentage rate under the original retail installment contract calculated on the respective descending balances computed from the date of such extension, deferment or renewal. (Emphasis added.) The plain language of Minn. Stat. § 168.74 sets the limit that respondent can "collect" as a deferral fee. Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (1992) mandates that words and phrases be construed "according to their common and approved usage." Black's Law Dictionary defines the word "collect" as: To gather together; to bring scattered things (assets, accounts, articles of property) into one mass or fund; to assemble. To receive payment. To collect a debt or claim is to obtain payment or liquidation of it, either by personal solicitation or legal proceedings. Black's Law Dictionary 238 (5th ed. 1979). Appellants argue for a more expansive definition of the word "collect" that would include "contracting for" or "reserving" payment. We note, however, that the legislature used broader language in describing prohibited conduct in another section of MVRISA. See Minn. Stat. § 168.72, subd. 1(c) (1990) ("no fee, commission, expense * * * may be taken, received, reserved or contracted for"). Because the legislature used this more expansive language in Minn. Stat. § 168.72, but used only the term "collect" in Minn. Stat. § 168.74, we will not infer a broader definition of "collect." See State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 21 N.W.2d 480, 486-87 (1946) ("the distinctions made in different statutes as manifested by the difference of terminology used should be observed"). In its order dismissing appellants' claim, the district court stated: [I]t is agreed that Norwest extended the payment schedule and attempted to charge, but did not collect from Kedzior, a fee in excess of that permitted by Minn. Stat. § 168.74. The district court then found Kedzior failed to state a claim where "usury is not present, and * * * Plaintiff was merely charged, but did not pay the excessive extension fee." Based on our reading of the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 168.74, we affirm the district court's interpretation of the statute. *122 Finally, because we affirm the district court's conclusion that under these facts respondent did not violate Minn. Stat. § 168.74, we do not address respondent's additional argument that the remedy provisions in Minn. Stat. § 168.75 that appellants are attempting to invoke, are, by their plain language, inapplicable to a violation of Minn. Stat. § 168.74.

Kedzior v. Norwest Bank Minnesota, National Ass'n · 1995 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Kadlec Motors, Inc. v. Knudson · 1986 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Kinzel v. Southview Chevrolet Co. · 1995 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.